B. J. DIVAN, A. R. BAKSHI, J. ( 1 ) HIS Lordship after narrating the facts further observed:-] Mr. Nanavati appearing on behalf of the petitioners has raised various contentions. Mr. Nanavati contended that the trial Court if considered as a Court of Small Causes had no jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction according to the Small Cause Court Act or Rules framed by the High Court and had no such power invested in it if considered as a special Tribunal dealing with cases that would fall within the purview of sec. 28 of the Rent Act. According to Mr. Nanavati the Court trying matters under the Rent Act was a special tribunal authorized to try special types of suits and one must look to the provisions of the Rent Act which created the special tribunal for the nature and extent of the powers vested in it. If the statute did not give a power to such a tribunal the tribunal would have no jurisdiction and authority to grant any relief relating to such powers with which it was not invested by the Act. Mr. Nanavati referred to sec. 28 of the Rent Control Act and contended that it only gave powers to the Rent Tribunal to try and deal with such matter as were mentioned in the section and that the matter of granting a temporary injunction could not be said to be a matter which fell within the purview of sec. 28 As a special Tribunal under the Rent Act contended Mr. Nanavati the Small Causes Court or the Civil Judges Court trying the rent matter could not have powers under the Civil Procedure Code to grant temporary injunction or even inherent powers under the Civil Procedure Code. According to Mr. Nanavati not only there were no inherent powers in the special Tribunal under the Civil Procedure Code but the special Tribunal had no such powers apart from the Code. The power to grant a temporary injunction according to Mr. Nanavati was a matter which did not relate to procedure but which affected substantive rights and therefore unless such a power was specifically conferred. the special Tribunal could not grant a temporary injunction. ( 2 ) MR. Nanavati in the course of his arguments made reference to sec. The power to grant a temporary injunction according to Mr. Nanavati was a matter which did not relate to procedure but which affected substantive rights and therefore unless such a power was specifically conferred. the special Tribunal could not grant a temporary injunction. ( 2 ) MR. Nanavati in the course of his arguments made reference to sec. 8 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides that except the provisions mentioned in the section the provisions in the body of the Code shall not apply to suits or proceedings in the Presidency Small Causes Court. Mr. Nanavati also referred to Order 51 of the Civil Procedure Code and to sec. 9 of the Presidency Small Causes Court Act. He also referred to the Small Causes Court Rules the combined effect of rule 1 (2) and the Schedule being that none of the sections from the Civil Procedure code from secs. 1 to 152 were made applicable to the Small Causes Court at Ahmedabad and the First Schedule applied with alterations whereby Order 39 Rules 1 to 5 and 9 were omitted. The argument of Mr. Nanavati was that a Small Cause Court as such had no jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction and that therefore one would have to turn to the provisions of the Rent Act for the purpose of finding out whether such jurisdiction was vested in the special Tribunal created by the Act. According to Mr. Nanavati the Courts trying rent suits under the Rent Act were special Tribunals and had no more powers than those which were conferred on them by the Act which created them. On this basis it was contended that the jurisdiction that could be exercised by such Tribunals would be according to law by which that Tribunal was constituted and that it was not permissible to call in aid any of the provisions of Civil Procedure Code or inherent powers of a Court to support an action which did not fall within the purview of the special Act or the rules made there under Mr. Nanavati further contended that neither the Rent Act nor the rules framed under the Act gave such powers to the Rent Court of granting a temporary injunction and therefore the order of the trial court was without jurisdiction and unauthorised. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate these contentions of Mr. Nanavati further contended that neither the Rent Act nor the rules framed under the Act gave such powers to the Rent Court of granting a temporary injunction and therefore the order of the trial court was without jurisdiction and unauthorised. ( 3 ) IN order to appreciate these contentions of Mr. Nanavati it would be necessary to refer to some of the provisions of the Bombay Rents Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act 1947 (hereinafter called the Act ). The relevant section in respect of the jurisdiction of Courts is sec. 28 which is as under:- (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law and notwithstanding that by reason of the amount of claim or for any other reason the suit or proceeding would not but for this provision be within its jurisdiction (a) in the City of Ahmedabad the Court of Small Causes of Ahmedabad. (AA) in any area for which a Court of Small Causes is established under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act 1887 (IX of 1887) such Court and (B) elsewhere the Court of the Civil Judge (Junior Division) having Jurisdiction in the area in which the premises are situate or if there is no such Civil Judge the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) having ordinary jurisdiction shall have jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which any of the provisions of this Part apply and to decide any application made under this Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of this Act or any of its provisions and subject to the provisions of sub-sec. (2) no other court shall have jurisdiction to entertain any such suit proceeding or application or to deal with such claim or question. 2 Notwithstanding anything contained in clause (aa) of sub-sec. (1) the District Court may at any stage withdraw any such suit proceeding or application pending in a Court of Small Causes established for any area under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act 1887 (IX of 1887) and transfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) having ordinary jurisdiction in such area. (1) the District Court may at any stage withdraw any such suit proceeding or application pending in a Court of Small Causes established for any area under the Provincial Small Cause Courts Act 1887 (IX of 1887) and transfer the same for trial or disposal to the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) having ordinary jurisdiction in such area. (B) Where any such proceeding or application has been withdrawn under clause (a) the Court of the Civil Judge (Senior Division) which thereafter tries such suit proceeding or application as the case may be may either re-try it or proceed from the stage at which it was withdrawn. (C) The Court of the Civil Judge trying any suit proceeding or application withdrawn under clause (a) from the Court of Small Causes shall for purposes of such suit proceeding or application as the case may be deemed to be the Court of Small Causes. EXPLANATION:--IN this section proceeding does not include an execution proceeding arising out of a decree passed before the coming into operation of this Act. Sec. 29 relates to appeals and sec. 29a provides that nothing contained in sec. 28 or 29 shall be deemed to bar a party to a suit proceeding or appeal mentioned therein in which a question of title to premises arises and is determined from suing in a competent Court to establish his title to such premises. Sec. 31 provides for procedure of Courts specified in secs. 28 and 29 and says that the Courts specified in secs. 28 and 29 shall follow the prescribed procedure in trying and hearing suits proceedings applications and appeals and in executing orders made by them. Sec. 49 of the Act makes provision for making rules for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of the Act and sub-sec. (2) (iii) of sec. 49 in particular states that the rules may provide for the procedure to be followed in trying or hearing suits proceedings applications appeals and execution of orders. In exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 49 of the Act rules have been framed by Government. (2) (iii) of sec. 49 in particular states that the rules may provide for the procedure to be followed in trying or hearing suits proceedings applications appeals and execution of orders. In exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 49 of the Act rules have been framed by Government. In rule 2 which is a definition clause (a) defines Code as meaning the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and rule 8 provides that in suits and proceedings other than those referred to in rules 5 and 7 the Court of Small Causes shall as far as may be and with the necessary modifications follow the procedure prescribed for a court of first instance by the Code. Rule 16 provides that in deciding any question relating to procedure not specifically provided for by these rules the court shall as far as possible be guided by the provisions contained in the Code. ( 4 ) SUB-SEC. (1) of sec. 28 of the Act confers jurisdiction on Courts specified therein to entertain and try suits or proceedings between a landlord and a tenant relating to matters enumerated therein. The matters in respect of which such jurisdiction is conferred are matters of a civil nature and ordinary Civil Court would also have jurisdiction to entertain and try a matter which arises between a landlord and a tenant. But what the section does is that it confers jurisdiction upon special Courts and it ousts the jurisdiction of other Courts in respect of the matters enumerated therein. The special Court specified in sec. 28 has jurisdiction to entertain and try any suit or proceeding between a landlord and a tenant relating to the recovery of rent or possession of any premises to which the provisions of the section apply and to decide any application made under the Act and to deal with any claim or question arising out of the Act or any of its provisions. This section enables the special Courts to deal with any claim or question which arises out of the Act and also applies where the relationship of landlord and tenant is disputed. Although there fore the matters referred to in sec. 28 are placed within the jurisdiction of the special Courts nevertheless those matters are essentially of a civil nature. This section enables the special Courts to deal with any claim or question which arises out of the Act and also applies where the relationship of landlord and tenant is disputed. Although there fore the matters referred to in sec. 28 are placed within the jurisdiction of the special Courts nevertheless those matters are essentially of a civil nature. The jurisdiction conferred by these sections on the special Court is not affected by any provision in any law requiring a suit to be filed in a particular Court or by the amount of the claim or for any other reason. While therefore trying the cause that has arisen in the suit triable by the special Court the cause as stated above being essentially of a civil nature the Court trying the suit is a Civil Court trying a matter of a civil nature and cannot be considered to be merely a special Tribunal. No doubt it is by virtue of sec. 28 a Court of special jurisdiction and even Court of exclusive jurisdiction but because of that reason it can not be said that it loses its qualities of a Civil Court. No doubt where the Act expressly takes away such powers or where the exercise of powers or the application of the Civil law of the land becomes inconsistent with the provisions of the Act the law or the procedure specifically set out in the Act must apply and not the civil law of the land. But where the Act is silent and there is nothing to restrict the application of the ordinary law of the land in the Act itself it cannot be said that the ordinary civil law of the land is wholly abrogated and what is contained within and found in the four corners of the Act alone and nothing else can be made applicable in a case which is tried by the Rent Court constituted under the Act. It is therefore not correct to say as was contended by Mr. Nanavati that the principles of law relating to injunction and particularly temporary injunction contained in the Specific Relief Act could never be made applicable to a case which is tried by a special Court constituted under the Act. It is therefore not correct to say as was contended by Mr. Nanavati that the principles of law relating to injunction and particularly temporary injunction contained in the Specific Relief Act could never be made applicable to a case which is tried by a special Court constituted under the Act. ( 5 ) MOREOVER the Code of Civil Procedure is essentially a Code relating to procedure and the very preamble of the Code says that it is a law relating to procedure in Civil Courts. It is true that the Code is not primarily intended to create new rights but procedure would mean some which is designated to facilitate justice and the manner in which the ends of justice are to be implemented. The manner of administering justice and the mode of conducting suits in a Court of law would no doubt require some rules to regulate the proceedings in the Court. But it would also involve some investiture of powers in the Court if the rules for facilitating and implementing the ends of justice were to be enforced. In a civil suit it does not always happen that what is the main cause of action is the only question that arises in the suit. There would be many ancillary and incidental points and other incidental questions which would arise in the trial of the suit and which would require to be dealt would for taking steps for the protection of the rights of the parties. No doubt such steps must be referable to the main cause and be consistent with and incidental to the substantive nature of the civil action. But from the inception of the suit till its end those questions which are relatable to the substantive cause which is the subject matter of the suit would require to be tried and dealt with. For the purpose of dealing with such matters as would arise in the course of a suit it would be necessary to regulate the manner in which such matters are to be disposed of and also to give the Court trying such matters the power to deal with them. For the purpose of dealing with such matters as would arise in the course of a suit it would be necessary to regulate the manner in which such matters are to be disposed of and also to give the Court trying such matters the power to deal with them. This being the position it would be difficult to distinguish between powers and procedure because the very regulation of procedure would mean that some action relating to the suit has to be taken and there must be the power to deal with the question in respect of which the action has to be taken. It would therefore not be correct to say that the provisions relating to grant of injunction in the Civil Procedure Code would not be applicable because the Act by virtue of sec. 31 of the Act and rules referred to earlier relates to and provides for the procedure in trying and hearing suits proceedings and other matters under the Act. In Sitaram Hirachand Birla v. Yograjsing Shankarsing Parihar 55 B. L. R. 334 it was observed that the whole of the Civil Procedure Code deals with procedure and in the course of procedure the Court always exercises powers and when the Court is exercising its powers it is exercising them in order to carry out the procedure laid down in the Code and therefore procedure and powers in this sense are really interchangeable terms and it is difficult to draw a line between procedure and power. The relevant observation in the case occur at page 337 and are as under:-THE further contention of Mr. Patwardhan is that whereas sec. 90 (2) deals with procedure sec. 92 deals with the powers of the Tribunal and Mr. Patwardhan further contends that sec. 90 (2) only comes into play after the hearing of the petition has actually commenced. Mr. Patwardhan says that under this sub-section the Tribunal has only those powers which the Court enjoys under the Code under O. XVIII of the Code and subsequent Orders which deal with the trial of suits. In our opinion the trial of suits does not mean the same thing as the hearing of a suit. Order XVIII in terms speaks of the hearing of a suit and not the trial of a suit A Court is concerned with the trial of a suit from the time when it is instituted. In our opinion the trial of suits does not mean the same thing as the hearing of a suit. Order XVIII in terms speaks of the hearing of a suit and not the trial of a suit A Court is concerned with the trial of a suit from the time when it is instituted. The hearing of the suit is only a part of the trial of the suit and the hearing is concerned with what happens in open Court when witnesses are examined and cross-examined addresses are delivered by counsel and judgment is delivered. But a great many things go on after a suit is instituted which are all concerned with the trial of it and there is no reason why sub-sec. (2) of sec. 90 should be limited and confined to procedure which applies only at the hearing of the suit and not outside that hearing. Therefore the power conferred upon the Tribunal to try a petition in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure is a power much wider than merely applying procedure which would be applicable to the hearing of a suit But even so Mr. Patwardhan wants to distinguish between procedure referred to in sub-sec. (2) of sec. 90 and the powers referred to in sec 92 Undoubtedly there is considerable force in Mr. Patwardhans contentions but on the other hand Mr. Kotwal has drawn our attention to the fact that whereas sub-sec. (2) of sec. 90 is mad subject to not only the provisions of the Act but of any rules made thereunder sec 92 is not made subject to any rules and Mr. Kotwal suggests that the scheme of the Act is that the powers conferred upon the Tribunal under sec. 92 are minimum powers which cannot be taken away by any rules framed under the Act whereas the general power of procedure given to the Tribunal under sec. 90 (2) is a power which is subject to the rules may modify limit or restrict the power that a Tribunal may exercise similar to the power exercised by a Court under the Civil Procedure Code. In our opinion Mr. Kotwal is right because on principle it is difficult to make a distinction between procedure and the powers of a Court as suggested by Mr. Patwardhan. In our opinion Mr. Kotwal is right because on principle it is difficult to make a distinction between procedure and the powers of a Court as suggested by Mr. Patwardhan. The whole of the Civil Procedure Code as its very name implies deals with procedure. In the course of procedure the Court always exercises powers and when the Court is exercising its powers it is exercising them in order to carry out the procedure laid down in the Code. Therefore procedure and powers in this sense are really interchangeable terms and it is difficult to draw a line between procedure and power. The case reported in 55 B. L. R. 334 referred to above was referred to in the case of Harish Chandra Bajpai and another v. Triloki Singh and another A. I. R. 1957 S C. 444 and it was observed in that case at page 454 that the second contention urged on behalf of the appellants is that if the provisions of the Civil Procedure; Code are held to be applicable in their entirety to the trial of election petitions then there was no need to provide under sec. 92 that the Tribunal was to have the powers of courts under the Code of Civil Procedure in respect of the matters mentioned therein as those powers would pass to it under sec. 90 (2) But this argument overlooks that the scope of sec 90 (2) is in a material particular different from that of sec 92. While under sec 90 (2) the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code are applicable only subject to the provision of the Act and the rules made thereunder there is no such limitations as regards the powers conferred by sec 92. It was obviously the intention of the Legislature to put the powers of the Tribunal in respect of the matters mentioned in sec 92 as distinguished from the other provisions of the Code on a higher pedestal and as observed in Sitaram v. Yograjsing A I R. 1953 Bom 293 they are the irreducible minimum which the Tribunal is to possess it is then argued that sec. 92 confers powers on the Tribunal in respect of certain matters while sec 90 (2) applies the Civil Procedure Code in respect of matters relating to procedure that there is a distinction between power and procedure and that the granting of amendment being a power and not a matter of procedure it can be claimed only under sec. 92 and not under sec. 90 (2 ). We do not see any antithesis between procedure in sec. 90 (2) and powers under sec. 92 When the respondent applied to the Tribunal for amendment he took a procedural step and that he was clearly entitled to do under sec 90 (2 ). The question of power arises only with reference to the order to be passed on the petition by the Tribunal. Is it to be held that the presentation Or a petition is competent but the passing of any order thereon is not We are of opinion that there is no substance in this contention either in Inamati Mallappa Basappa v. Desai Basawaraj Ayyappa and others A. I. R. 1958 S. C. 698 the case was entirely different. In that case it was held the Representation of the People Act was a self-contained code governing the trial of election petitions and the provisions of O. 23 R. I would not apply to election petitions and it would not be open to a petitioner to withdraw or abandon a part of his claim once an election petition was presented to the Election Commission more so when such a withdrawal or abandonment of a part of the claim would have the effect of depriving the returned candidate or any other party to the petition of the right of recrimination which had accrued to him under sec. 97 of the Act. It has to be remembered that an election petition is not a suit but has a characteristic of its own and an election proceeding is a statutory proceeding and the withdrawal of petitions would affect public rights. 97 of the Act. It has to be remembered that an election petition is not a suit but has a characteristic of its own and an election proceeding is a statutory proceeding and the withdrawal of petitions would affect public rights. At page 701 it was pointed out that it was necessary at the outset to understand the nature and scope of an Election Petition and that as was observed by the Supreme Court in another case all election contest was not an action at law or a suit in equity but was a purely statutory proceeding unknown to the common law and that the court possessed no common law power. It was also pointed out in that case that an election petition was not a matter in which the only persons interested were candidates who strove against each other at the elections but that the public also were substantially interested in it and this was not merely in the sense that an election had news value but an election was an essential part of the democratic process. It was also pointed out in that case that an election petition was not a suit between two persons but was a proceeding in which the constituency itself was the principal party interested. Therefore on the principles laid down is 55 B. L. R. 334 which case was affirmed in A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 444 and on the principles discussed above it is permissible to say that powers which are necessary for the carrying out of procedure would be included in and would be interchangeable with the rules relating to procedure particularly where powers are necessary for carrying out the procedure employed by the Court while dealing with a civil action. It is needless to say that jurisdiction to entertain a suit in respect of the matters mentioned in sec. 28 of the Rent Control Act would also empower the Court to deal with incidental and ancillary questions relating to such matters. In the case of Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Phiroze Framroze Taraporwala 55 Bombay Law Reporter 271 a direction for payment of mesne profits was considered as an integral part of the decree for possession in a suit under the Rent Act. In the case of Importers and Manufacturers Ltd. v. Phiroze Framroze Taraporwala 55 Bombay Law Reporter 271 a direction for payment of mesne profits was considered as an integral part of the decree for possession in a suit under the Rent Act. As a matter of fact the power given to the Rent Court under the Act is to decide and deal with all questions between landlord and tenant relating to recovery of rent and possession or those arising under the Act. These powers would be exercisable from the institution of the suit till its termination and the Court would have the jurisdiction to pass orders in respect of these matters including incidental proceedings arising in the suit because the Court has the power to decide all matters which are incidental or ancillary to the determination of the question which it is entitled to decide under the Act. If it were not so the Rent Court which could pass a decree and give a particular direction would not be able to give an interim relief or interim direction for the protection of the rights of the parties although it could pass a decree to protect such rights at the end of the trial. The case of Rameshwar Dayal v. Sub-Divisional Officer Ghatampur I. L. R. 2 Allahabad 298 strongly relied upon by Mr. Nanavati was a case under the U. P. Panchayat Raj Act 1947. Rule 25 of the Rules framed under the Act provided that an election petition was to be tried in accordance with the procedure applicable under the Code of Civil Procedure to the trial of suits. It was held in that case that the Code of Civil Procedure prescribed the procedure for the trial of suits and also conferred various incidental powers upon the courts trying the suits and Rule 25 of the U. P. Panchayat Raj Rules made only those provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure applicable to the hearing of elections which related to the trial of suits but it did not confer upon the Sub Divisional Officer all the powers that were conferred upon a court by the Code of Civil Procedure. It was held that the expression procedure applicable to the trial of suits in Rule 25 did not include a power to issue an injunction or grant a stay order. It was held that the expression procedure applicable to the trial of suits in Rule 25 did not include a power to issue an injunction or grant a stay order. It was also held that the inherent power of the court to do justice and to pass any orders which it considered necessary in the interest of justice irrespective of whether express provisions of the rules of procedure provided for it or not was also not available to an election tribunal in that it was not a court and possessed no common law powers. According to that decision an election tribunal could pass only such orders as the provisions of the Act under which it was created provided for. In the course of the judgment it was observed that an injunction was a matter of power and not of procedure because it did not at all affect the progress of the suit which could go on or remain stayed whether an injunction was granted or refused. Now it has to be remembered that this case related to a special tribunal which was created under a special Act. An election petition was purely a statutory proceeding which according to the judgment was unknown to common law and that was a case relating to an Act where powers and procedure were differently provided. The observations contained in the case reported in 55 Bombay Law Reporter referred to above make the position sufficiently clear that there would be cases in which powers and procedure were interchangeable terms and that would be so particularly in respect of cases triable under the Rent Act which gives jurisdiction to a Civil Court which has the power to deal with questions and substantive and ancillary matters arising out of the provisions of the Act in a Civil Suit. We are not impressed by the argument of Mr. Nanavati that the provisions relating to the grant of temporary injunction contained in sec. 94 of the Code of Civil Procedure are supplementary proceedings which do not make the decree futile or affect the decree if granted or refused and that therefore the powers to be exercised in relation to these supplementary proceedings cannot be related to and included in the procedure referred to in sec. 31 of the Act and the relevant rules made thereunder. 31 of the Act and the relevant rules made thereunder. ( 6 ) MOREOVER in the case of Manohar Lal Chopra v. Rai Bahadur Rao Raja Seth Hiralal A. I. R. 1962 S. C. 527 it was held that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code were not exhaustive and that if the provisions of sec. 94 were not there in the Code the Court could still issue temporary injunctions in the exercise of its inherent jurisdiction. It was observed that it was in the incidence of the exercise of the power of the Court to issue temporary injunction that the provisions of sec. 94 of the Code had their effect and not in taking away the right of the Court to exercise its inherent powers. Sec. 151 itself says that nothing in the Code shall be deemed to limit or otherwise affect the inherent power of the Court to make orders necessary for the ends of justice. It was observed that the inherent power has not been conferred upon the Court but it is a power inherent in the Court by virtue of its duty to do justice between the parties before it and when the Code itself recognizes the existence of the inherent power of the Court there is no question of implying any powers outside the limits of the Code. As there is nothing in the Act which is contrary to the exercise of such powers or which prohibits the exercise of such powers the Rent Court which is not a special tribunal but a Civil Court would have the power to deal with a civil matter and all matters incidental thereto unless the provisions in the Act indicated to the contrary. For all the reasons stated above we are of the view that the contention that the Court constituted under sec. 28 of the Act had no jurisdiction to grant a temporary injunction and that therefore the order passed by the Appellate Bench of the Court of Small Causes was invalid cannot be upheld. [ The rest of the judgment is not material for the reports] application dismissed. .