Natesan, J.- This appeal is against the Judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Ootacamund, dismissing the plaintiff’s suit, wherein was claimed inter alia relief of declaration of plaintiff’s title to the suit properties, and possession and mesne profits. The appeal raises the interesting question as to when an attachment of immovable property could be said to have been made to make void a private alienation of the property under section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code, and whether all the requirements of Order 21, rule 54 of the Civil Procedure Code, as amended in this State have to be complied with for the attachment to have the effect of invalidating private sales. The question does not present much difficulty, and, as we see it, is covered by a catena of decisions of this Court and other Courts all requiring punctilious adherence to the requirements of Order 21, rule 54 of the Civil Procedure Code. As learned Counsel appearing for the contesting respondent sought to distinguish particularly the decisions of this Court and draw a line of distinction as to mandatory and directory provisions in procedure, we shall examine the question a little more in extenso than will be strictly necessary. We shall first discuss the material facts and findings on which there is contest and which now survive for consideration. The suit property is a bungalow known as “Landsdowne,” bearing door No. 284 with outhouses bearing door No. 285 with subdivisions therein, in Ward No. 12 within the Municipal limits of Ootacamund, situated in R.S. No. 3688, of an extent of 4 acres and 15 cents. The second defendant in the suit, out of which this appeal arises, was the admitted owner of the property, and the plaintiff, the appellant herein, claims the property under a conveyance in her favour dated 19th October, 1956, evidenced by the registered sale deed, Exhibit A-10 for a consideration of Rs. 15,000. The first defendant in the suit, who is the contesting and first respondent in this appeal hereinafter referred as respondent, is a money decree-holder, who obtained a decree against the second defendant on 11th April, 1956 for a sum of Rs. 3,046, in O.S. No. 10 of 1956 on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Ootacamund, the second defendant herein being the fourth defendant in that suit. 3,046, in O.S. No. 10 of 1956 on the file of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Ootacamund, the second defendant herein being the fourth defendant in that suit. Pursuant to the decree, the first defendant claims to have attached the property in E.P. R. No. 329 of 1956. the attachment being effected on 4th August, 1956, and purchased the property in Court auction on the said attachment on 3rd February, 1958 for Rs. 12,005. The sale was confirmed in the usual course on 7th March, 1958, Exhibit B-6, dated 7th March, 1958 being the sale certificate’. As the property was in the possession of tenants, who in fact had attorned to the plaintiff and were paying rents to her, the first defendant secured symbolic delivery of the property. There was obstruction against delivery, when the plaintiff came to know of the delivery proceedings, and the plaintiff came forward with this suit after the petition filed by her to accept her obstruction, E.A. No. 231 of 1958, was dismissed. While in the pleading the plaintiff had attacked the decree which the first defendant had obtained against the second defendant as fraudulent and collusive, and the first defendant attacked the sale in favour of the plaintiff as not genuine or supported by consideration, now before us no serious argument was attempted by either party on these aspects. The trial Court has found that consideration passed for the sale in favour of the plaintiff and, in fact, has given a decree against the second defendant for a sum of Rs. 16,250, while dismissing the suit against the first defendant. There is evidence to show that the plaintiff’s father, who has given evidence as P.W.6, was in charge of the negotiations for the purchase of the property in favour of the plaintiff, that Messrs. Mathew and Mathew, Advocates, Ootacamund, adviced them with reference to the purchase and that on the purchase the plaintiff entered into possession, the tenants on the property attorning to the plaintiff. R.F. Stoney, a retired Chief Engineer, who has been a tenant of the property for over twenty four years, had given evidence as P.W.l. He had been paying rents direct to the plaintiff by cheque and for a period through Messrs. King and Partidge, a firm of solicitors at Ootacamund. R.F. Stoney, a retired Chief Engineer, who has been a tenant of the property for over twenty four years, had given evidence as P.W.l. He had been paying rents direct to the plaintiff by cheque and for a period through Messrs. King and Partidge, a firm of solicitors at Ootacamund. It has not been made out that the property had been sold at any under-value to excite the suspicion of the Court. In fact, at the Court auction the first defendant had purchased it for Rs. 12,005, and the suggestion that was made to P.W.6, the plaintiff’s father, in cross-examination was that the sale was with an agreement for a reconveyance. This, of course, has been denied. It may also be noted that in these proceedings the sale has not been attacked as one in fraud of creditors coming under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. The contest between the parties, and the only question for consideration is whether the conveyance in favour of the plaintiff is void under section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code. The learned Subordinate Judge has not made any distinction as to the proceedings relating to the attachment and the proceedings relating to the actual sale. The plaintiff in the plaint, had questioned the very factum of attachment,. It was pleaded that the properties were never, in fact, attached; no affixture was made, nor any beat of drum as required by law at or near the property. Her case is that notwithstanding the absence of a regular attachment, the records have been manipulated by fraud and collusion as if there was perfected attachment. As regards the sale also it was pleaded that there was no publication and proclamation of the execution sale in or about the property as required by law. The first defendant, in his written statement, countered by stating that the formalities for getting attachment had been observed by the amin. While in the plaint, mistakes in the amin’s report as to the property attached were pointed out and particularly that the property attached was stated to be in Ward No. 7, whereas the suit property was in Ward No. 12 in the written statement it was stated that it was false to state that the report mentioned that the property in Ward No. 7 had been attached. The first defendant, of course, affirmed the regularity of the proceedings relating to the court auction sale. Issues in respect of these contentions, viz., issues Nos. 2 and 3, run as follows:- 2. Are the decree, attachment and sale in O.S. No. 10 of 1956 not binding on the plaintiff? Are they vitiated by fraud, collusion and irregularity? 3. Whether the properties had been attached in O.S. No. 10 of 1956 of the Subordinate Judge’s Court, Ootacamund ? On these issues, after upholding the validity of the decree which had been obtained against the second defendant, the learned Subordinate Judge held that he had no hesitation in finding “ that the attachment and sale proclamation and ergo the sale in pursuance of these are vitiated by irregularity.” The learned Subordinate Judge observed that the reference to Ward No. 7 in the amin’s report instead of Ward No. 12 may be condoned, as also the misdescription relating to the door numbers. The learned Subordinate Judge referred to the absence of affixture of the order of attachment in the Municipal Office as required under the Madras Amendment and observed that this lacuna could not be overcome and so gave his finding as to the irregularity of the attachment. It may here be pointed out that with reference to the case of the plaintiff that there was no torn torn or affixture on the property, apart from referring to the evidence of the parties, there is no specific analysis of the evidence and a clear finding, though it may be implied by the ultimate finding that the learned Subordinate Judge was inclined to hold that there was torn torn and affixture at the property. For effecting attachment of immovable property under Order 21, Rule 54 of the Civil Procedure Code, as amended in Madras under section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code, there has to be an order prohibiting the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the property in any way, and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge. This order has to be proclaimed as provided in sub-clause (2) of rule 54. This order has to be proclaimed as provided in sub-clause (2) of rule 54. It must be (a) proclaimed by beat of drum or other customary mode at some place on or adjacent to such property; (b) a copy of the order must be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property; and (c) a copy shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the Court-house; (d) if the property is land paying revenue to the Government, a copy of the order has to be affixed in the office of the Collector of the District where the land is situated, and (e) where the property is situated within the limits of a Municipality, a copy of the order should be affixed in the office of the Municipality also. Now, in this case, the plaintiff has denied the proclamation of the attachment order by beat of drum or other customary mode at or near the property. The plaintiff has denied also affixture on a conspicuous part of the property, and affixture in the office of the Municipality. So far as affixture in the office of the Municipality is concerned, it is not contended before us that there was such affixture. The amin’s return of attachment does not show it and the amin who carried out the attachment has admitted that he did not affix the order in the Municipal Office. About the absence of torn torn and affixture on the property we have, on the plaintiff’s side, the evidence in particular of P.Ws. 1 and 2 P.W.1 Mr. Stoney, is a retired Chief Engineer of the P.W.D., who has been on the property for over twenty-five years. At the time of giving evidence he was eighty-three years old. According to him, he did not see any amin coming to the property to attach it. He is positive in his recollection that he was in his bungalow in Ootacamund on 4th August, 1956, the date on which, according to the first defendant and the amin, torn torn was made and the order copy affixed on the property This witness admits that in 1958 a notice was found pasted in the front door of the bungalow. That, of course , relates to the proclamation of sale. That, of course , relates to the proclamation of sale. For his recollection as to the absence of affixture of attachment order and tom-tom he relies on a diary which he maintained where, according to him, he noted down anything particular. It shows that on 5th April, 1958 he had gone to the club; on his return he found the notice above referred to pasted on the front door. He had not seen any notice pasted on the door prior to that. He says that he was interested in the purchase of the property. According to him, if anybody had come he would have known, or his servants would have brought it to his notice. Whenever he went to the club he states he made a note of it in the diary. Even so, if he went to the golf club or for shooting he could make a note of it in the diary and there was no entry in his diary on 4th August, 1956. P.W. 2 is the driver of P W. 1 who had been with him for thirty-six years. He was residing in an outhouse of the bungalow and he was with his master in the bungalow always except when he went out for meals, being practically his Secretary. He deposes that if there was tom-tom he would have known it. He states that even if he was not at home, his wife or any member of his family would inform him. In his cross-examination P.W.2 was asked whether A.M. Yussuf, Rasheed and Nanjundiah did not reside at Finger Post, the locality where the suit property is situated. To a question in cross-examination with reference to these people, he has stated, “ if they have attested to any tom-tom made there, I cannot say why they have attested to such a report”. It has been elicited in his re-examination that these persons reside about a furlong from the bungalow. The importance of this piece of evidence lies in this, that in the amin’s report, Exhibit B-1, these persons figure as attestors, but not one of them has been examined. Absolutely, no explanation is given for their non-examination. The amin, who was entrusted with the warrant for effecting the attachment, has given evidence as D.W.1. He states that the attestors to his effecting the attachment are of the locality and all of them reside at Finger Post. Absolutely, no explanation is given for their non-examination. The amin, who was entrusted with the warrant for effecting the attachment, has given evidence as D.W.1. He states that the attestors to his effecting the attachment are of the locality and all of them reside at Finger Post. He says that one or two of them were residing in the property attached and were Muslims, but cannot point them out in Exhibit B-1, the return of the warrant. According to him, he effected the attachment in Ward No. 7. The present first defendant, the plaintiff in the suit in which execution was being levied, is stated to have accompanied him and identified the property. The first defendant’s name is also to be found as a signatory to the amin’s report Exhibit B-1, under the attestors. But the first defendant has not gone into the witness box. Only his son has given evidence as D.W.6. The amin does not speak about the presence of the son at the time of the attachment. In the return of the warrant of attachment, according to the amin, he went inside the gate to the main building and affixed a copy of the order of attachment to the outer door of the bungalow. He saw door No. 285 only which, of course, refers to the outhouses. He admits that he did not note the door number of the main building. The Commissioner appointed in this suit in his report has stated that the main building with the garage block adjoining it is door No. 284 in Ward No. 12 and that the door number is found painted in two places on the main building. While erroneous door numbers in the warrant of attachment or return may not be of material importance when there is no question about the identity of the property attached, the answers given by the witness (D.W.1) throws doubt about his having been on the property. He says that he did not see any servant of Mr. Stoney, the tenant of the bungalow. In the property there are two outhouses, garage, servants’ quarters, stable, godowns, etc. In the outhouses and stable several persons reside. D.W.1 would say that he did not remember whether there was any servant at the back of the house. D.W.2 is the person who is stated to have beat tom-tom. Stoney, the tenant of the bungalow. In the property there are two outhouses, garage, servants’ quarters, stable, godowns, etc. In the outhouses and stable several persons reside. D.W.1 would say that he did not remember whether there was any servant at the back of the house. D.W.2 is the person who is stated to have beat tom-tom. He also speaks to the signatures of attesting witnesses being taken at the time of the attachment, and affixture of the notice on the bungalow. This witness would state that besides the first defendant, his son also was there at the time of the attachment. According to him, Mr. Stoney was not there and the house was closed. The attachment was at about 11 a.m. D.W.6 is the son of the first defendant, whose presence at the time of the attachment is not spoken to by the amin. According to D.W.6 there was nobody on the property at the time of the attachment. He speaks to tom-tom and affixture of notice and people being present at the time of the attachment. As adverted to earlier, there has been no critical analysis of the evidence relating to the tom-tom and affixture of notice by the learned Subordinate Judge and no proper appraisal of the evidence in the light of probabilities and the facts as emerge from the evidence of the witnesses. When the question is whether there has been tom-tom and affixture, and evidence has been adduced, there is no question of relying upon any presumption under section 114 of the Evidence Act. Presumption is only as to the regularity of an official act which is proved to have been performed. The presumption does not come in when there is no evidence that the act has been performed, or the evidence that is let in does not warrant an inference of performance. As observed in Murugappa Chettiar v. Thirumalai Nadar 1 by Rajamannar, J., as he then was: "No doubt, when the only evidence is that a particular judicial or official act has been performed, and there is no other evidence on record, it may be presumed that that particular judicial or official act was regularly performed. As observed in Murugappa Chettiar v. Thirumalai Nadar 1 by Rajamannar, J., as he then was: "No doubt, when the only evidence is that a particular judicial or official act has been performed, and there is no other evidence on record, it may be presumed that that particular judicial or official act was regularly performed. But when the dispute is whether a particular judicial or official act was performed or not, I think there is nothing in law which enables a Court to presume that that act was, as a matter of fact, performed. The question here is whether there was any affixture at all of the order of attachment on the property. If there was any reliable evidence as to that fact, I can agree that it may be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that the affixture was properly made. But I do not think that it is permissible to decide the question in dispute entirely on a presumption." As noticed in the same decision, it is not obligatory on the part of the Court to draw a presumption always. As Burn, J., noticed in Noor Ahamed Mohideen Pillai Tharahan v. Pechi Ammal1, the report of the Court amin that "I have attached " will not be sufficient to presume that everything needful to effect a valid attachment have been made. To the same effect is the decision in Hiralal v. Jagatipati Sahai2. In the face of the categorical denial of P.Ws.1 and 2, whose evidence we see no reason to reject, it is difficult to hold on the inconclusive testimony of D.Ws.1 and 2 that there has been tom-tom and affixture on the property. A reading of the evidence of the amin leads one to suspect whether at all he had been in the neighbourhood. If he had been on the property he must have seen the number of the bungalow shown in two places, according to the Commissioner. Again, the defendant, who has referred to attesting witnesses and questioned P.W.2 about the residence of these witnesses in the locality, have not chosen to examine them. The first defendant himself, whose signature is found on the amin’s return of attachment, does not go into the witness box, and only his son speaks about the attachment. Again, there is discrepancy as to the ward in which the attachment was effected. The first defendant himself, whose signature is found on the amin’s return of attachment, does not go into the witness box, and only his son speaks about the attachment. Again, there is discrepancy as to the ward in which the attachment was effected. The amin says that he effected the attachment in Ward No. 7. The property is admittedly in Ward No. 12, ‘and that is also the report of the Commissioner. In these circumstances, we are unable to hold that there has been proclamation of the order of attachment by beat of drum at some place on or adjacent to the property or affixture of the order on a conspicuous part of the property as required under Order 21, rule 54(2) of the Civil Procedure Code. We have, therefore, this, that of the requirements to perfect an attachment under Order 21, rule 54, three of them are wanting: (i) beat of drum at about the property; (ii) affixture of the order on a conspicuous part of the property; and (iii) affixture of the order in the office of the Municipality. Now, the question is whether these defects are fatal to the attachment as to rule out the applicability of section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code to the transfer in question. While proceedings in execution of a money decree are pending, no right to immovable property is directly or specifically in question. It is only when an attachment is effected, it operates as a valid prohibition against alienation of the attached property making void the alienation against claims enforceable under the attachment. Section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code runs thus: "Where an attachment has been made, any private transfer or delivery of the property attached or of any interest therein and any payment to the judgment-debtor of any debt, dividend or other monies contrary to such attachment, shall be void as against all claims enforceable under the attachment. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, claims enforceable under an attachment include claims for the rateable distribution of assets. " For the interdiction against alienation to have effect and invalidate private transfer of the property, the requirement is that the attachment must have been ‘made’ The question is when an attachment could be said to have been 'made'. Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, claims enforceable under an attachment include claims for the rateable distribution of assets. " For the interdiction against alienation to have effect and invalidate private transfer of the property, the requirement is that the attachment must have been ‘made’ The question is when an attachment could be said to have been 'made'. Order 21, rule 54 of the Civil Procedure Code, which has been already referred to, gives the procedure for attachment of immovable property. As amended in Madras, it runs thus: " Rule 54.-(1) Where the property is immovable, the attachment shall be made by an order prohibiting the judgment-debtor from transferring or charging the property in any way, and all persons from taking any benefit from such transfer or charge. (2) The order shall be proclaimed at some place on or adjacent to such property by beat of drum or other customary mode. A copy of the order shall be affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and on a conspicuous part of the Court-house. Where the property is land paying revenue to the Government, a copy of the order shall be similarly affixed in the office of the Collector of the district where the land is situated. Where the property is situated within the cantonment limits, the order shall be similarly affixed in the office of the local Cantonment Board and the military estates officers concerned, and where the property is situated within the limits of the Municipality, in the office of the Municipality within the limits of which the property is situated. (3) The order of attachment shall be deemed to have been made as against transferees without consideration from the judgment-debtor from the date of the order of attachment, and as against all other persons from the date on which they respectively had knowledge of the order of attachment, or the date on which the order was duly proclaimed under sub-rule (2) whichever is the earlier." Obviously, for section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code having the effect, the mere fact that an order of attachment has been passed is not sufficient. The requirement of section 64 is that an attachment should have been 'made'. The leading case which, in our view, is decisive of the matter, is the decision of the Privy Council in Muthiah Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty1. The requirement of section 64 is that an attachment should have been 'made'. The leading case which, in our view, is decisive of the matter, is the decision of the Privy Council in Muthiah Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty1. That was, no doubt, a case arising under Article 11, Schedule I of the Limitation Act. But the principle applicable is the same, whether it be under Article 11 or for purposes of section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code. Article 11 prescribed a period of one year from the date of the order in a suit by a person against whom an order under the Civil Procedure Code has been made on a claim preferred to or an objection made to the attachment of property attached in execution. The question for consideration naturally was when was the property attached in execution. Lord Shaw, who delivered the judgment of the Board, after referring to the fasciculus of clauses beginning with rule 41 of Order 21 of the Civil Procedure Code, prescribing various modes of attachment according to the kind of the property to be attached, observed: "The instances go to show that under the Civil Procedure Code most anxious provisions are enacted in order to prevent the mere order of a Court from effecting attachment, and plainly indicating that the attachment itself is something separate from the mere order, and is something which has to be done and effected before the attachment can be declared to have been accomplished." That which has to be done for accomplishing attachment of immovable property is clearly prescribed under Order 21, rule 54, and Lord Shaw observes at page 356 of the report: "No property can be declared to be attached unless first the order for attachment has been issued, and secondly in execution of that order the other things prescribed by the rules in the Code have been done. " It is on the basis of this pronouncement of the Privy Council that case after case has required the punctilious observance of the requirements of the Code as to attachment for its having effect under section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code. The argument of learned Counsel for the respondents with referene to this decision of the Privy Council is that, in that particular case there was only an order for attachment and no further steps were taken. The argument of learned Counsel for the respondents with referene to this decision of the Privy Council is that, in that particular case there was only an order for attachment and no further steps were taken. Learned Counsel submits that if some steps in pursuance of the order of attachment had been taken, that would be sufficient, and it is not necessary that all the prescribed things must have been done. This overlooks that the decision of the Privy Council sets out a general principle applicable to all cases and points out that before a property can be held to have been attached, "the other things prescribed by the rules in the Code should have been done". (Italicized is ours for emphasis.) After setting out this principle, the Judicial Committee proceeds to consider whether the attachment "took place" in the case before them. In Sinnappan v. Arunachalam Pillai2, it was held that an attachment operated as a valid prohibition against alienation of attached property only from the date on which the necessary proclamation was made and the copy of the order affixed as contemplated under Order 21, rule 54 of the Civil Procedure Code. In that case the Court had ordered the attachment on 12th July, 1909; warrant of attachment was issued on the 16th of July, 1909, and the actual attachment by means of proclamation and affixture of notice of the attachment was made only on the 22nd of July, 1909. In the meantime, the judgment-debtor had sold the lands to the defendant by a sale deed executed on the 19th of July, 1909. Abdur Rahim, Officiating Chief Justice, while giving the opinion of the Court, observed: “The object of section 64’ is to prohibit alienation after attachment, and if the mere passing of an order in Court would have that effect, one can easily imagine that the judgment-debtor would be in a position to make alienations to innocent purchasers to their prejudice. The essence of an order of attachment is to prohibit the judgment-debtor from transferring the property and until such a prohibition is proclaimed and made known in the way provided by the rule, it cannot be said to have come into operation.” The object being to ward off innocent purchasers by adequate publication, the Code has provided for the dissemination of the purport of the order to the widest extent possible. It has to be proclaimed at or about the property by affixture and beat of drum. If the property is within the Municipal limits, affixture on the Municipal, notice board is evidently expected to bring the order of attachment to the notice of a number of persons. Councillors will be frequenting the place. Citizens or clerks or servants will be frequenting the Municipal office for purposes of payment of taxes, securing licences, approval of plans for building, etc. When Council meetings are held, the public also often gather there. In a village beat of drum ordinarily attracts considerable attention; but in a Municipal area it may pass unnoticed even in the neighbourhood. That may be one of the reasons why in the Madras Amendment, where the property is situated within the Municipal limits, affixture in the office of the Municipality is also insisted upon. The prohibitive order of attachment, it may be noticed, is directed not only against the judgment-debtor but enjoins all persons from accepting transfers from the judgment-debtor. It is a warning directed to the public. The material portion of Form No. 24, Appendix E, in respect of an attachment in execution runs thus: “........You are hereby prohibited and restrained, until the further order of this Court, from transferring or charging the property specified in the schedule hereunto annexed, by sale, gift or otherwise, and that all persons be, and that they are hereby, prohibited from receiving the same by purchase, gift or otherwise.” As the only mode of promulgation of the order for reaching the public is that provided in Order 21, rule 54, Civil Procedure Code, the notice to the public is really constructive. When third party purchasers could be affected and their transaction nullified on constructive notice of the order of attachment any one of the steps in the procedure prescribed for giving that constructive notice must, in our opinion be strictly adhered to and punctiliously followed. The view of the Full Bench in Sinnappan v. Arunachalam1if we may say so with respect, is clear and emphatic that until a prohibition against transfer is proclaimed and made known in the way provided by the rule, the attachment cannot be said to have come into operation. The view of the Full Bench in Sinnappan v. Arunachalam1if we may say so with respect, is clear and emphatic that until a prohibition against transfer is proclaimed and made known in the way provided by the rule, the attachment cannot be said to have come into operation. In Murugappa Chettiar v. Thirumalai Nadar2, the order of attachment was procured in respect of several properties, some of them suit properties, consisting of house and lands being in a zamin village. There was evidence of affixture only on the house; there was some evidence of affixture in the Mitta office; but there was no evidence to show that the copy of the order was affixed on the suit lands. After referring to the observations in Sinnappan v. Arunachalam Pillai1above referred to, Rajamannar, J., as he then was, observed: “It is so because section 61 of the Code of Civil Procedure affects adversely even the rights of transferees for consideration and it is necessary to protect the interests of such transferees that the fact of attachment should be made known by following the procedure laid down by the Code.” It was held in that case that by reason of the absence of affixture on the lands there was no valid attachment of the suit properties. A number of cases have been referred to by learned Counsel for the plaintiff, where for failure to affix in one or other manner as provided in the Code, attachments have been held to be invalid. As we have no doubt about the position, we shall refer to a few of them only. In Nawab Ahamed Yarkhan v. S.K. Bose3, a decision of a Division Bench of the Lahore High Court, the order was promulgated at the property and a copy of the order affixed in the Court-house, but there was no affixture in the office of the Collector of the district. This defect was held to vitiate the attachment and not attract the provisions of section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is observed that where the law laid down a definite procedure for the conduct of an act, which was purely ‘symbolical’, the procedure must be strictly followed and any omission therein must be recorded as material. This defect was held to vitiate the attachment and not attract the provisions of section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code. It is observed that where the law laid down a definite procedure for the conduct of an act, which was purely ‘symbolical’, the procedure must be strictly followed and any omission therein must be recorded as material. In Hiralal v. Jagatipati Sahai1, already referred to above, there was evidence that the order of attachment was proclaimed by beat of drum and that a copy of the order was affixed on a part of the property and also on a part of the Court house; but there was absolutely no evidence that it was affixed in the office of the Collector. Therefore, it was held that there was no valid attachment and that the defendant could rely upon his transaction dated 21st April, 1920, even though a prohibitory order had been passed on the 23rd of March, 1920 and other requirements of Order 21, rule 54 had been carried out. In Pokhapal Singh v. Kanhaiyalal2, the validity of an addition to Order 21, rule 54 made by the Allahabad High Court under section 122 of the Civil Procedure Code came up for consideration. The added rule provided that the attachment order “ shall take effect as against purchasers for value and in good faith from the date when a copy of the order is affixed on the porperty, and against all other transferees from the judgment-debtor from the date on which such order is made.” It will be seen that this amendment provides for the attachment taking effect in cases of transferees for value even if only a copy of the order has been affixed on the property, whereas clause (2) of Order 21, rule 54 requires, besides affixture, the beating of drum, affixture in the Court-house and affixture in the office of the Collector. Noticing that sub-rule (3) to rule 54 did not require the full steps set out under sub-rule (2) for accomplishing the attachment, the Court held that the rule was repugnant to section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code, which avoided a transfer only when the attachment had been ‘made’, that is to say, when all the steps required by the rules as to proclamation and otherwise have been complied with. In that case the purchaser had notice of the order of attachment. In that case the purchaser had notice of the order of attachment. It was held that even this did not affect the position. Braund, J., observed: “And finally the effect of this line of reasoning which starts with the fact that attachment has not been ‘made ‘, until it has been proclaimed, is that until that moment is arrived, there is no completed adverse title of which the purchaser can have notice. All that he can possibly have notice of up to that point is that steps are in progress from which ultimately completed attachment may emerge. In other words, the judgment-debtor (sic. decree-holder) has not yet grasped the property as against the purchaser who for value and in good faith buys before he completes his hold on it. This seems to me to be a perfectly logical result, since it would surely be inequitable that an honest purchaser should suffer from having notice of the possibility of that which has not yet, and may never actually, occur.” In Lakshmandas v. Roopchand3, it was found that the order had been proclaimed by beat of drum in the village and a copy of the order had been affixed in the village chavadi. There was no affixture of the copy on a conspicuous part of the property and it was held that the formalities prescribed by Order 21, rule 54 had not been fully complied with, and that, therefore, the aid of section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code could not be invoked. In Bank of Chettinad v. Matung Hla Sye4, in execution of a money decree, attachment of 400 baskets of paddy lying on the threshing floor was applied for and ordered. There were three heaps of paddy sheaves; the decree-holder attached one heap of paddy sheaves; he, however, failed to affix a copy of the warrant of attachment on the threshing floor. One Venkatachalam Chettiar, who had knowledge of the attachment proceedings, took all the paddy away as having been purchased by him prior to the attachment. The Court held that the attachment had not been effected in the manner laid down in Order 21, rule 44 of the Civil Procedure Code and that, therefore, section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply. The Court held that the attachment had not been effected in the manner laid down in Order 21, rule 44 of the Civil Procedure Code and that, therefore, section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code did not apply. It was contended there that even though the attachment had not been effected as provided under Order 21, rule 44 of the Civil Procedure Code, the claimant had notice of the attachment and that, therefore, he was estopped from pleading that the attachment was invalid. After quoting from the decision of the Privy Council in Muthiah Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty1, the Court proceeded thus: "What is clear in the present case is, as pointed out above, that a copy of the warrant of attachment was not affixed, as should have been, on the threshing floor of the respondents. Therefore, the attachment, according to the decision of the Privy Council cited above, must be declared to be invalid and that the transfer of the paddy in question was a valid transfer. " In our view, it is needless to further add to the citations. The weight of authority is all one way; the order of attachment is one thing, and it is the promulgation of it in the manner provided under Order 21, rule 54 of the Civil Procedure Code: that completes the attachment. The order is only the beginning and not the end of the attachment, and till there is proclamation of the order in the various ways as provided for, section 64 of the Civil Procedure Code can have no application. It is here that learned Counsel, Mr. Sundaram Iyer for the respondent, contends that the directions as to the mode of attachment under Order 21, rule 54 are directory and not mandatory, and that defects or failure to carry out one or the other of the steps will not vitiate the attachment, or render it incomplete. Learned Counsel submits that neither in Muthiah Chetty v. Palaniappa Chetty1, nor in Sinnappan v. Arunachalam Pillai2, the question arose for consideration as to the extent to which the provisions of Order 21, rule 54 must be complied with to perfect the attachment. Learned Counsel points out that in neither of the cases was any further step taken apart from the issue of the prohibitory order and that therefore there was no scope for consideration of the present point raised by him. Learned Counsel points out that in neither of the cases was any further step taken apart from the issue of the prohibitory order and that therefore there was no scope for consideration of the present point raised by him. Learned Counsel would distinguish the decision in Murugappa Chettiar v. Thirumalai Nadar3, also as a case where, with reference to the particular properties in question, there was no attempt at carrying out the steps as provided for under Order 21, rule 54 (2). Reliance is placed by learned Counsel on Dhian Singh v. Secretary of State for India in Council4, and the decision of the Orissa High Court in Ratha Harijan v. Narasingha Rana5, In our view in Dhian Singh v. Secretary of State for India in Council4the question in this form with reference to Order 21, rule 54 did not arise for consideration. There is no reference even to Muthiah Chetty v, Palaniappa Chetty1, and Sinnappan v. Arunachalam Pillai2. In Dhian Singh v. Secretary of State for India in Council4, an attachment before judgment of a book debt was sought. The attachment itself appears to have been properly effected and no question was raised as to want of formalities in effecting the attachment. In fact, it was specifically. observed that the attachment of the debt was in terms of Order 21, rule 46(1) of the Civil Procedure Code and that the attachment treated as one in execution would be perfectly valid. The challenge to the attachment was on the ground that the requirements of Order 38 of the Civil Procedure Code as to attachment before judgment had been overlooked, no notice having been issued to the judgment-debtor in terms of rule 5 of Order 38. What had to be considered by their Lordships, and was considered, was whether the non-compliance of the directions in rules 5 and 6 of Order 38 of the Civil Procedure Code invalidated the attachment which had been effected or rendered it merely voidable at the instance of the owner of the property attached, that is, the judgment-debtor. There was evidence to show that the judgment-debtor had acquiesced in the attachment. There was evidence to show that the judgment-debtor had acquiesced in the attachment. It was pointed out therein that rule 5 of Order 38 of the Civil Procedure Code was intended for the protection of the person whose property is sought to be attached before judgment and that if he did not receive notice required by law and was consequently denied the privilege of staving off the attachment by the offer of security, he had remedy by way of appeal. Emphasis was laid on the fact that the person affected in that case did not care to take recourse to that remedy, and acquiesced in the order. This decision does not decide the question as to when an attachment gets perfected. As the Court had jurisdiction to order an attachment before judgment, it was held that the order of the Court would prima facie be regarded as valid and operative unless it was set aside in the manner provided by law by the party prejudicially affected by it. The subject of consideration in that case was not as to the mode in which attachment had to be effected. Reference was made to section 99 of the Civil Procedure Code which provides that no decree is to be reversed or substantially varied for any error, defect or irregularity in any proceedings in the suit, not affecting the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court, and read with section 141, the principle was held to apply to the order of attachment in question. No doubt, in Ratha Harijan v. Narasingha Rana1, with reference to the mode of attachment, it was observed that even if there were omissions in the matter of observing the formalities in making the attachment, the attachment was not invalid; and for this, reliance is placed on the decision in Dhian Singh v. Secretary of State for India in Council2. In this case, actually on the merits, there was a finding based on oral and documentary evidence that the attachment was made on the spot, that a copy of the writ of attachment was affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and that proclamation was made by beat of drums. In this case, actually on the merits, there was a finding based on oral and documentary evidence that the attachment was made on the spot, that a copy of the writ of attachment was affixed on a conspicuous part of the property and that proclamation was made by beat of drums. Regarding the other requirements under Order 21, rule 54 of the Civil Procedure Code, there was no positive evidence that they were not followed, and the Court held that the question of the attachment being invalid on account of the non-compliance with certain procedure laid down by Order 21, rule 54 of the Civil Procedure Code did not arise. In the circumstances, in our view, the observations in Ratha Harijan v. Narasingha Rana1, that even if there were omissions in the matter of observing the formalities in making the attachment, the attachment was not invalid, are obiter and not of assistance to the learned Counsel for the respondent. Mr. Sundaram Iyer, learned Counsel for the respondent, drew our attention to the following passage in Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition, page 369), which has been relied on in Dhian Singh v. Secretary of State for India in Council2: “On the other hand, where the prescriptions of a statute relate to the performance of public duty, and where the invalidation of acts done in neglect of them would work serious general inconvenience or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, yet not promote the essential aims of the Legislature, such prescriptions seem to be generally understood as mere instructions for the guidance and government of those on whom the duty is imposed, or, in other words, as directory only.” This principle may be relevant in the context of that case but in our view, this has no application when we are concerned with the observance of procedural formalities, where rights of persons, particularly third parties, would be affected. The following observations in Maxwell would, in our opinion, govern the position. The following observations in Maxwell would, in our opinion, govern the position. At page 368 the learned author observes: “The same imperative effect seems in general presumed to be intended even when the observance of the formalities is not a condition exacted from the party seeking the benefit given by the statute, but a duty imposed on a Court or public officer in the exercise of the power conferred on him, when no general inconvenience or injustice calls for a different construction.” The following passage in the same page in illustration of the above principle appears to us to be apposite to the question now in consideration: “An enactment which provided that every warrant issued by a Court should be under its seal was equally imperative, and not only was the commitment under an unsealed warrant invalid, but the person who had obtained it without taking care that the Court performed its duty of sealing it’was held liable in damages to the person arrested under it. This was hard on the former, but it was essentially for the latter that the order should be duly authenticated.” As to whether a provision in a statute is mandatory or merely directory, no universal rule can be laid down, and the Court will have to get at the real intention of the Legislature by carefully considering the whole scope of the provision, the object intended and its effect on the right of parties. In Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad1, Rajagopala Ayyangar, J., delivering the judgment of the Court, observes: “It is needless to add that the employment of the auxiliary verb ‘shall’ is inconclusive and similarly the mere absence of the imperative is not conclusive either. The question whether any requirement is mandatory or directory has to be decided not merely on the basis of any specific provision which, for instance, sets out the consequences of the omission to observe the requirement, but on the purpose for which the requirement has been enacted, particularly in the context of the other provisions of the Act and the general scheme thereof. It would, inter alia, depend on whether the requirement is insisted on as a protection for the safeguarding of the right of liberty of person or of property which the action might involve.” In State of Uttar Pradesh v. Baburam2, Subba Rao, J., sets out the principle thus: “When a statute uses the word ‘shall’ prima facie it is mandatory, but the Court may ascertain the real intention of the Legislature by carefully attending to the whole scope of the statute.” Now with reference to every one of the steps to be taken under Order 21, rule 54 (2) the language used is imperative. The Legislature has made no distinction between one step and another and all of them are aimed at the same purpose. The object of the provision as pointed out in more than one case-Vide the observations in Sinnappan v. Arunachalam Pillai3, and Murugappa Chettiar v. Thirumalai Nadar4, is to protect bona fide transferees from the penal provisions of section 64 of the Code of Civil Procedure. To adopt with respect the language of Rajagopala Iyengar, J., in Collector of Monghyr v. Keshav Prasad1, the requirements are insisted upon as protection for safeguarding of the right of property. As noticed already, an attachment not only prohibits the judgment-debtor from transferring his properties, but there is an interdiction against the public generally from taking benefit under any transfers from the judgment-debtor. Any purchaser for consideration, however, bona fide and even though he be totally unaware of the attachment, would, after attachment had been made of the property, take it subject only to the claims enforceable under the attachment. There is an embargo on the acquisition, and enjoyment of property after an attachment, even though there may be no actual notice of the attachment, notice being constructive only, to be inferred from the promulgation of the order of attachment as provided for under Order 21, rule 54(2). This is a restriction on the fundamental rights in property; it may be reasonable in the context; but as in all restrictions its application must be strictly within the letter of the law. This is a restriction on the fundamental rights in property; it may be reasonable in the context; but as in all restrictions its application must be strictly within the letter of the law. Referring to an analogous provision in the old Civil Procedure Code, section 276, Muhamood, J., in Ganga Din v. Khushali5, observed thus: “ Now it is clear to my mind that section 276 is a distinct interference with private rights of alienating property, and I believe it is a fundamental principle relating to the interpretation of statutes, that where the Legislature interferes in this manner, the provisions enabling it to do so must be not only carefully but strictly construed.” We have, therefore, no hesitation in concluding that the requirements of Order 21, rule 54(1) and (2) are mandatory and every one of the prescribed things must be done before an attachment could be said to have been made for section 64, Civil Procedure Code, to come into operation. We fail to see on what principle a distinction could be made between one requirement and another to hold that compliance with some only of the requirements of Order 21, rule 54(2) would be substantial compliance with the provisions of the rule and could be held to perfect the attachment. The Legislature has made no distinction between the several requirements and the language, as already noticed, with reference to every one of the requirements, is imperative. The argumentum ab inconvenient!, does not appeal to us. Procedural rules are enacted to be observed, and we fail to see why we should condone laches. If breaches are permitted and Courts have to go into the question as to what effect it had on the publication, actual or constructive, then room is given for difference of outlook and opinion and endless proceedings in execution which are already generally protected. We have to sound a note of caution that the view we take is not in conflict or in any way inconsistent with the case-law holding that breach of rules in execution relating to attachment and sale does not ipso facto invalidate or vitiate the sale. The statute itself has provided remedy for such breaches by an application for setting aside the sale under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, on proof of substantial injury. The statute itself has provided remedy for such breaches by an application for setting aside the sale under Order 21, rule 90, Civil Procedure Code, on proof of substantial injury. It has been held that attachment is only a necessary preliminary to a judicial sale, but that even a sale without attachment is not a nullity, the omission to attach being only a material irregularity rendering the sale to be set aside under Order 21, rule 90, if substantial injury is proved. These are matters arising between the decree-holder and auction-purchaser or judgment-debtor. But different equities and rules have to be applied when an alienee from the judgment-debtor prior to the perfected attachment comes on the scene. It is only a regularly perfected attachment that would attract the operation of section 64. Therefore the cases under Order 21, rule 90 where omission to affix the sale proclamation as provided for under Order 21, Rule 54 read with Order 21, rule 67 have been held to be only material irregularities have no relevance to the matter under consideration. We may also add that once it is established that the several steps required under Order 21, Rule 54(2) have been in fact taken, a presumption can be made as to the regularity of the steps proved to have been taken. In this case we have held that it has not been established that there was even affixture and beat of drum at or about the property in question. Admittedly, there has been no affixture in the Municipal Office. Assuming that on the evidence one can come to the conclusion that there has been beat of drum at or about the property and affixture of the order on the property, the absence of affixture in the Municipal Office, an equally imperative requirement, by itself would vitiate the attachment and render unavailable section 64, Civil Procedure Code. Once it is held that a legally perfected attachment is an essential requisite for the operation of section 64, the question whether the alienee had notice or not of the decree or of the execution proceedings would be of little consequence. A mere notice will not complete and legalise an imperfect attachment-vide Galab Bhai v. Kika Jivan1, Pokhapal Singh v. Kanhaiyalal2, and Bank of Chettinad v. Maung Hla Sye3, But knowledge of execution proceedings may affect the private purchaser under other principles of law. A mere notice will not complete and legalise an imperfect attachment-vide Galab Bhai v. Kika Jivan1, Pokhapal Singh v. Kanhaiyalal2, and Bank of Chettinad v. Maung Hla Sye3, But knowledge of execution proceedings may affect the private purchaser under other principles of law. The transaction may get suspect and liable to be impeached under section 53 of the Transfer of Property Act. But even if knowledge of the purchaser can have any relevancy, in this case there is no evidence to warrant an inference that the plaintiff had notice of all the proceedings for attachment of the property in question. No doubt the learned Subordinate Judge in one part of his judgment holds that the plaintiff must have been aware of the decree and execution proceedings. All the same at the end while granting a decree against the second defendant, the learned Subordinate Judge would observe that it was not possible to agree that the plaintiff had purchased the property in spite of the decree in O.S. No. 10 of 1956 and execution proceedings connected therewith against the suit property. The learned Subordinate Judge comments that the second defendant had not chosen to examine himself to maintain his version that the plaintiff purchased the property for a lesser sum knowing of the decree, attachment etc. In the earlier part of the judgment the learned Subordinate Judge has rejected the evidence of D.W. 6 who speaks to the knowledge of the plaintiff by deposing that the plaintiff’s father had approached the first defendant to settle the decree in O.S. No. 10 of 1956; but curiously from the averments in the plaint questioning the bona fides of the decree against the second defendant it is concluded that the plaintiff and her father must have been aware of the proceedings. The learned Subordinate Judge overlooks that the plaint allegations are based on knowledge subsequently acquired. According to the plaintiff, it was only when there was an attempt by the first defendant to take delivery of the property and secure attornment letters from the tenants the plaintiff came to know of the execution. Our attention has not been drawn to any tangible evidence on record from which an inference could be made that the plaintiff or her father was aware of the proceedings for the attachment of the property in question. The plaintiff had parted with the full consideration for the purchase. Our attention has not been drawn to any tangible evidence on record from which an inference could be made that the plaintiff or her father was aware of the proceedings for the attachment of the property in question. The plaintiff had parted with the full consideration for the purchase. It has not been shown to be a speculative purchase. She had the benefit of legal advice in the transaction and if in fact she or her father who was in charge of the transaction had knowledge of the decree, as deposed to by the plaintiff’s father, the purchase would not have been made. Learned Counsel for the respondent referred to the fact that there was prior attachment of this property by this very plaintiff in O.S. No. 55 of 1953 on the file of Sub-Court, Ootacamund, evidenced by Exhibit B-7. But admittedly the property was not sold under that attachment and the attachment was raised on 27th March, 1957. As observed in Nana Rao v. Arunachalam1, “an attachment effected after a private alienation is not assisted by attachment before the alienation.” As regards the applicability of section 47, Civil Procedure Code, once it is held that section 64 does not affect the plaintiff’s purchase, the title of the plaintiff is paramount and section 47, Civil Procedure Code, can have no application. The sale in favour of the plaintiff had been effected before a valid attachment and the plaintiff is not bound by the subsequent proceedings leading to the sale in favour of the decree-holder. An execution sale can pass only the right, title and interest of the judgment-debtor. The decision in Venkatachalapathi v. Venkatappayya2 relied upon by learned Counsel for the respondent can have no application in the instant case. In that case subsequent to an interim order of stay of execution granted in an appeal without notice to the decree-holder but before the communication to the Court of first instance, an order of attachment was made. Further proceedings by way of actual attachment took place and, as noticed in page 502 of the report, the proceedings by way of attachment of the properties in dispute took place in a Court of competent jurisdiction. The interim stay order was later vacated and pending proceedings by the judgment-debtor questioning the validity of the attachment, third parties purchased the properties from the judgment-debtor. The interim stay order was later vacated and pending proceedings by the judgment-debtor questioning the validity of the attachment, third parties purchased the properties from the judgment-debtor. While the District Munsif and the Subordinate Judge on appeal therefrom concurred in quashing the attachment proceedings, this Court in Venkatachalapathi Rao v. Kameswaramma3, upheld the validity of the attachment. In those circumstances it was held that prima facie the third parties must be taken to have purchased subject to the result of the execution proceedings and the principle of lis pendens would apply to such case. Proceedings, their Lordships observed: “If for any reason the proceedings that were had relating to the properties in question prior to the plaintiff’s purchase should prove abortive and infructuous, and the decree-holder had to take entirely fresh execution proceedings after the plaintiff’s purchase, then there would be force in the respondents’ contention that such fresh execution proceedings would not be binding on them unless they were made parties to the same. On the other hand, it is not open to a party to a proceeding to nullify the effect of proceedings already properly taken with reference to that property by transferring the same to strangers .” There was perfected attachment in that case and the question that arose for consideration was as to the validity of the proceedings in view of the interim order of stay. That case can have no application when here the Court finds as a fact that there was no perfected attachment. Of course, if we had found in this case that the attachment was in order, the plaintiff would be bound by the execution proceedings and section 47, Civil Procedure Code, could apply. In the result, the plaintiff has to succeed. Her title is declared and reliefs granted as prayed for. The property will be redelivered to her. The plaintiff has prayed for mesne profits from 5th April, 1958 till the date of the suit and pendente lite. The learned Subordinate Judge has discussed the quantum of profits under issue 9. It is not clear from the discussion whether in assessing the profits on the basis of rents, deduction was made in respect of taxes. There is no evidence as to who paid taxes. The learned Subordinate Judge has discussed the quantum of profits under issue 9. It is not clear from the discussion whether in assessing the profits on the basis of rents, deduction was made in respect of taxes. There is no evidence as to who paid taxes. The learned Subordinate Judge himself remarks that neither P.W.5 nor D.W.6 has adduced sufficient evidence to show that the income of the suit properties is as much as stated by them. In the circumstances we cannot accept the finding of the learned Subordinate Judge as to the quantum of profits. In the absence of acceptable evidence as to profits accrued from 5th April, 1958 till the date of the suit, we disallow the claim for past mesne profits. For mesne profits pendente lite from the date of the institution of the suit the plaintiff is relegated to proceedings under Order 20, rule 12, Civil Procedure Code. As the suit is being decreed against the first defendant, the decree claimed by the plaintiff in the alternative against the second defendant has to be and is hereby set aside. So far as the costs of the action are concerned, this is a fit and proper case where the second defendant should pay the costs of the plaintiff and first defendant both in the trial Court and in this Court. There will be a decree accordingly against the second defendant for the costs of the plaintiff and the first defendant in both the Courts. As defendants 3 to 6 disclaimed all interest in the suit, the dismissal of the suit as against them will stand. The appeal against them is therefore dismissed. But as no relief has been claimed against them there will be no order for costs in their favour. V.K. ----- Order accordingly.