JUDGMENT Gyanendra Kumar, J. - The applicant had been convicted under Section 155 of the U. P. Municipalities Act and was sentenced to pay a fine of Rs. 5,000/- and in default to undergo six months simple imprison merit. The applicant went up in appeal before the Sessions Judge, who upheld his conviction and sentence. 1 Hence this revision. 2. There is hardly any dispute about the facts of the case. On 19-4-1952 the accused-applicant, who is a resident of Kotma, district Sahdol (Madhya Pradesh) had brought 45 bags of catechu weighing 86 maunds 25 seers within the Municipality of Allahabad through Gau Ghat Octroi barrier, without paying octroi duty of Rs. 785.74 nP. said to be due thereon. 3. The accused pleaded not guilty but admitted having brought the aforesaid quantity of catechu into the :'Municipal limit of Allahabad on the alleged date. 14c also stated that he had been dealing with one Ram Ji Lal Arhatya (wholesale dealer) of Mirganj, Allahabad and that he also possessed invoice (bee issued by the wholesale dealer in which the account of expenses etc. relating to the transaction in question have been noted. 4. It is worthy of note that the accused-applicant was prosecuted on 30-3-1963 almost 11 years after the commission of the offence. The case of the applicant, however, was that he had brought the said quantity of catechu for sale and that he had actually sold the same to the aforesaid, Ram Ji Lal. P. W. 1 Zahurul Haq who was working as clerk at the Gan Ghat barrier on the relevant date also deposed that when the applicant had brought the above quantity of catechu on a motor truck to his Octroi barrier, he had told the witness that he was taking the catechu to the city for sale. The prosecution version thus supports the allegation of the applicant that the said catechu had been brought here for the purpose of sale. It would be instantly seen that the goods brought into the Municipal limits for the purpose of sale were not liable to taxation or octroi duty, at the time of the alleged offence. 5. The prosecution version thus supports the allegation of the applicant that the said catechu had been brought here for the purpose of sale. It would be instantly seen that the goods brought into the Municipal limits for the purpose of sale were not liable to taxation or octroi duty, at the time of the alleged offence. 5. The relevant portion of Section 128 (1) of the U. P. Municipalities Act, as it stood on 19-4-1952-when the offence is alleged to have been committed-reads as under: Subject to any general rules or special orders of the State Govern merit in this behalf, the taxes which the Board may impose in the whole or any part of a Municipality are- ........................................................................... (viii) an octroi on goods or animals brought within the Municipality - for consumption or use therein." From the language of Section 128(l) (viii) quoted above, it is abundantly dear that the Municipal Board of Allahabad could have imposed control on catechu in question, only if it had been brought here for the purposes of consumption or use within the limits of the Municipality. It is significant that by U. P. Amending) Act No. VII of 1953 the word "sale was also added in sub-clause (viii) after the word 'use', with the result that after the amendment, the said sub-clause reads: 'an octroi on goods or animals for consumption, us or sale therein.' It can hardly be doubted that the connotation of 'consumption or use' is materially different from that of 'sale'. Before the amendment it was necessary that, in order to make them leviable, the goods introduced into the Municipal limits should have been meant for the purposes of consumption or use within the said limits. In other words, if they were meant for sale only, octroi duty was not leviable on them. It was only after the aforesaid amendment that the goods meant for sale have also become leviable to tax or octroi duty. 6. It is a recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that no word is superfluous or redundant therein nor can any word be added thereto without its actually being there. The very fact that by Act VII of 1953 the Legislature considered it expedient to add the word 'sale' in sub-clause (viii) of Cl. 6. It is a recognised principle of interpretation of statutes that no word is superfluous or redundant therein nor can any word be added thereto without its actually being there. The very fact that by Act VII of 1953 the Legislature considered it expedient to add the word 'sale' in sub-clause (viii) of Cl. (1) of Section 128 of the Municipalities Act further shows that originally tax or Octrol was not leviable on goods introduced into the Municipal limits if the same were meant only for sale. As noted above, the evidence of P. W. 1 Zahurul Haq also indicates that the catechu in question had been brought into the city of Allahabad, for sale. It is equally well established that fiscal or penal provisions of law have to be interpreted very strictly and as far as possible in favour of the citizen. That being so, the Municipal Board (now Nagar Mahapalika) had miserably failed to establish that the goods in question had been introduced into its Municipal limits for the purpose of consumption and use therein. The huge quantity of catechu, which had been brought by the applicant here and the fact that it 1 had been actually sold to Ram Ji Lal Arhatiya (whole-sale dealer) further corroborate the theory of the applicant that it was really meant for sale and was not liable to octroi. 7. The inordinate delay with which the accused was prosecuted is also a factor in his favour. A penalty should not normally be allowed to hang over the head of an accused for a long period. In order to avoid itch a situation, a provision has been made in Section 493 of the U. P. Nagar Mahapalika Adhiniyam to the effect that a Magistrate shall not take cognizance of any offence punishable under that Act or any rule, regulation or bye-law, unless the complaint of such offence was made before him within a period of six months, after the date of the commission of such offence; and if such date is not known or the offence is a continuing one, then within six months after the discovery of such offence. It is true that this provision would not apply to the instant case which is under the Municipalities Act. But there can be no speck of about that the present prosecution of the applicant suffered from long laches and delay. 8. It is true that this provision would not apply to the instant case which is under the Municipalities Act. But there can be no speck of about that the present prosecution of the applicant suffered from long laches and delay. 8. In the end, my attention has been invited to the decision of Desai, J. (as lie then was) in State v. Jagannath, Cr. A No. 1076 of 1951. But, in that case, it was not denied by the accused that the catechu had not been brought for consumption or use within the Municipality of Allahabad. In the instant case, the plea of the accused and the evidence of the prosecution is just to the contrary. Therefore, the above case of Jagannath does not really help the prosecution, being clearly distinguishable. 9. In the result, I allow the revision, set aside the conviction and sentence of the applicant and direct that the fine, if paid, shall be refunded.