JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Chandru had four sons-Judhistir, Basu, Shiba and Baraju. Plaintiffs are the Bons of Baraju. Defendants represent the three other branches. The suit was for partition of the ancestral properties by metes and bounds. In the plaint itself, there is an averment that the four sons of Chandru were separate and in separate possession of different portions of the suit properties for the sake of convenience. Defendants 6 and 7 supported Plaintiff's case. The main contest is that the disputed properties were partitioned by metes and bounds amongst the four branches long before the settlement of 1322 V.S. (1915 A.D.) Defendant No. 1 claimed holding No. 12 as the self-acquired, property of Judhisthir. Both the Courts below concurrently found that there was no partition by meter and bounds and that holding No. 12 was not the self-acquired property of Judhisthir. The second appeal is against the confirming judgment of the learned Subordinate Judge of Kenosha. 2. Mr. Mohapatra advanced two contentions- (i) Severance of joint status being admitted, the onus is on the Plaintiffs to establish partition by metes and bounds and Plaintiffs have failed to discharge their onus; and (ii) The courts below acted contrary to law in not properly appreciating the admitted features in the evidence which would lead to the irresistible conclusion that there was a partition by metes and bounds. Both the contentions require careful examination. 3. Mr. Mohapatra's first contention is presented on the authority of Bhagwati Prasad Sah and Others Vs. Dulhin Rameshwari Kuer and Another, thus-Though every Hindu family is presumed to be joint unless the contrary is proved, the presumption does not continue after one member separated from the others. It would be a question of fact to be determined in each case upon the evidence relating to the intention of the parties whether there was separation amongst the other coparceners, or they remained umted, and the burden would he on the party who asserts existence of a particular state of things on the basis of which he claims relief. Though the correctness of the aforesaid principle is unquestionable, it has no application to the facts of this case. The lower appellate Court has found that there was severance of' status amongst the members, but there was no partition by metes and bounds. Though Mr. Though the correctness of the aforesaid principle is unquestionable, it has no application to the facts of this case. The lower appellate Court has found that there was severance of' status amongst the members, but there was no partition by metes and bounds. Though Mr. Roy made a faint attempt to assail the finding regarding severance of joint status, he ultimately abandoned it. The question of onus must therefore be answered on the accepted position that there was a severance of joint status in the family without any partition by metes and bounds. The question to be answered is whether the onus is on the Plaintiffs to establish that there was a partition by metes and bounds if they accept the position that there was a severance of joint status. Mr. Mohapatra fairly conceded that he was unable to cite a single decision in support of his view that the onus was on the Plaintiffs. The only decision which supports the Plaintiffs' contention is Guru Prasad Mukherji v. Kali Prasad Mukherji 5 W.R. 121. In that case, there was a suit for partition between two Hindu brothers. Plaintiff had alleged that he and the Defendant became separate in food in 1959 V.S. (1852 A.D.) and remained separate ever since then without partition of the joint properties. Defendant's case was that there was a partition by metes and bounds and the parties were in separate possession. A Bench of the Calcutta High Court held- The Defendant, on whom lay the onus of proof, has not proved partition. This decision is clearly against Mr. Mohapatra's contention. He accordingly contended that the decision as not based on any reasoning or discussion and, as such, was not correct in law. Doubtless the decision completely lacks reasoning. There is not a single sentence in the judgment giving reasons in support of the view. With respect, I must, however, say that the decision lays down a principle which is unimpeachable. In a joint Hindu family, while the members are joint, not only their properties are joint and the share of each individual coparcener cannot be predicated at a particular point of time, but the status is joint. When there is severance of joint status, only the status breaks. Severance of joint status does not necessarily postulate that there is a partition of the properties by metes and bounds. When there is severance of joint status, only the status breaks. Severance of joint status does not necessarily postulate that there is a partition of the properties by metes and bounds. An admission of a part does not amount to an admission of the whole. When the Plaintiffs admit, or there is proof, that there is a severance of a joint status, the admission or proof must be confined to what is admitted or proved and cannot be extended beyond its field. Admission by the Plaintiffs that there was a severance of joint status does not therefore, lead to the conclusion that there was a partition by metes and bonds. The onus must, therefore, rest on the Defendants who assert that there was a partition by metes and bounds. The aforesaid authority is, therefore, based on sound principle. This view can be supported by an observation in Bhagwan Dayal Vs. Mst. Reoti Devi. In paragraph 16, their Lordships held- In the case of old transactions, when no contemporaneous documents are maintained and when most of the active participants in the transactions have passed away, though the burden still remains on the person who asserts that there was a partition, it is permissible to fill up gaps more readily by reasonable inferences than in a case where the evidence is not obliterated by passage of time. Thus two principles have been laid down: (i) Where there is a disruption of the status, the burden would still remain on the person who asserts that there was a partition; and (ii) the rigour of proof in all where the severance is long before the suit cases would very much be thinned down by keeping the approach in view while assessing evidence that there was no contemporaneous document and that other evidence in support of respective cases has disappeared in course of time. For the purpose of the present discussion the first principle, so laid down, clearly supports my view. Mr. Mohapatra's first contention that the onus rests on the Plaintiffs to Establish that there was no partition by metes and bounds, has no force. The onus is on the Defendants to establish that there was a partition by metes and bounds. 4. For the purpose of the present discussion the first principle, so laid down, clearly supports my view. Mr. Mohapatra's first contention that the onus rests on the Plaintiffs to Establish that there was no partition by metes and bounds, has no force. The onus is on the Defendants to establish that there was a partition by metes and bounds. 4. The second contention is that the Defendants have discharged the onus and on the materials on record, the Courts below should have held that there was a partition by metes and bounds. The learned advocates for both the parties conceded that a finding in the case as to whether there was a partition by metes and bounds must be determined with reference to the following admitted facts. The admitted features may be noted: (i) Excepting Khata No. 18, all other Khatas have been separately recorded in the names of different members of the family. (ii) Khata No. 18 stands jointly record in the names of the four branches. Only the homestead and the Gadia (tank) have been jointly recorded. In respect of rest of the lands under this Khata, there is separate note of possession. (iii) Division for convenience of possession or partition by metes and bounds, whichever be the story, took place before 1915 settlement. (iv) In respect of Khata No. 12, rent receipts stand separately in the name of Judhisthir's branch; and Khata No. 12 I stands separately in their names. (v) The witnesses examined for the parties have no knowledge of the facts when separation took place. There were either young or not born by that time. (vi) Parties have constructed separate houses on the lands allotted to their share. (vii) One of the Plaintiffs admits that the four branches are in separate possession to the extent of four annas share each. On the aforesaid admitted features, Mr. Mohapatra contends that that principle laid down in Bhagwan Dayal Vs. Mst. Reoti Devi, that it is permissible to fill up gaps more readily by reasonable inferences when there is no contemporaneous document and the evidence has been obliterated by passage of time, fully applies to the facts and circumstances of this case, and that the Courts below should have held that there was a partition by metes and bounds. If these were the only features in the case, I would have been inclined to accept his contention. If these were the only features in the case, I would have been inclined to accept his contention. There is no docent in evidence of the arrangement made amongst the parties for separate possession. Oral evidence is also not available. In such circumstances, the fact that each of the branches is in possession to the extent of four annas share for over 40 years would have rendered a very strong probability to the defence version of partition by metes and bounds. Nanda Rout (Defendant No. 1 as d.w. 3), however, stated in cross-examination- I have interest in the ancestral lands in Mouza Sankhana, but that is in exclusive posseision of other co-sharers. This statement completely demolishes the defence version which is to the effect that each branch is in exclusive possession of the lands allotted in partition by metes and bonds. The evidence, taken as whole, therefore, leads to the conclusion that there was no partition by metes and bounds. Though on both the questions the Courts below were not alive to the correct law, there ultimate conclusion is unassailable. 5. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed. Final Result : Dismissed