JUDGMENT : J.C. Shah J. Mahebub Beg, Sardar Beg, Sheikh Baba, Sheikh Habib, Abdul Kadir, Mohamad Yakub, Abdul Hamid, Abdul Khalil and Kallu Natho-who are appellants in this appeal-were tried before the Court of Session, Buldana-the first seven for offences under sections 147, 436 and 428, Indian Penal Code and the remaining for those offences read with section 149, Indian Penal Code. The Sessions Judge convicted the appellants of the offences charged, and the High Court of Bombay confirmed the order of conviction. 2. On September 13, 1962 when a Ganapati immersion procession taken out in the town of Khamgaon by the local Hindu residents reached a place known as 'Farshi' at about 10.30 P.M., there was a quarrel between the processionists and certain muslim residents. Thereafter in the Juna Fail locality which is largely inhabited by muslims stones were thrown at the houses of Hindu residents. Apprehending injury to himself and the members of his family, Ishwar Singh who was a resident of Juna Fail vacated his house and sought shelter in the house of a friend in another locality. It is the case for the prosecution that a crowd of muslims set fire to a part of the house of Ishwar Singh in which a flour-mill is installed, and appellants Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 7 threw lighted torches on the flour-mill and accused Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 8 threw cloth swabs dipped in a kerosene oil tin carried by the 9th accused. Ishwar Singh informed the persons who had assembled near a locality called 'Shivaji Chauk' that his flour-mill was on fire and implored them to save his house and his cattle tied in the house. Thereupon Anha Saolaji, Kisan Ramji, Sahebrao Gangaram and Sukhdeo Gopinath went in the direction of the house of Ishwar Singh and found that on the flour-mill which was already on fire were being thrown, by a large crowd of persons amongst whom were the nine appellants, lighted torches and cloth swabs dipped in kerosene oil. Kisan told the members of the crowd not to indulge in acts of incendiarism, but he was abused and threatened to be beaten. Sahebrao and Sukhdeo then entered the building from the near and released two buffaloes tied in the open space and took out a motor-bicycle. Kisan told the members of the crowd not to indulge in acts of incendiarism, but he was abused and threatened to be beaten. Sahebrao and Sukhdeo then entered the building from the near and released two buffaloes tied in the open space and took out a motor-bicycle. When they were returning with the animals and the motor-bicycle, Sukhdeo was hit between the shoulder by stones and on the right ankle, and Anna was hit by a stone on the right fore-arm. Ishwar Singh's building was completely gutted. It appears that many houses belonging to muslims as well as Hindus were set on fire during that night. Information was given to the police in the morning of September 14, 1962 and on the next day statements of "Ishwar Singh and other persons" were recorded by the Sub-Inspector of Police. On September 16, 1962 the Superintendent of Police deputed one Madhukar Deo to investigate into the offences of arson committed in the night of September 13, 1962. Deo examined several persons amongst whom were Anna Saolaji, Kisan Ramji, Sahebrao Gangaram and Sukhdeo Gopinath, and after completing the investigation submitted a charge-sheet against the nine appellants for the offences of which they have been convicted. 3. At the trial Ishwar Singh admitted that he did not know who set fire to his house. Witness Kisan deposed that he had seen a group of muslims carrying torches and shouting slogans about 25 feet away from the flour-mill of Ishwar Singh, and that when he told those muslims "not to indulge in such acts", they abused him and threatened him, whereupon he ran away from the scene. Kisan admitted that his "eye-sight was defective", and he could not identify the miscreants responsible for acts of incendiarism. Witness Anna deposed that appellant No. 9 was standing at a distance of 15 paces from the flour-mill holding a kerosene oil tin and appellant No. 4 was throwing, flaming torches on the flour-mill and that the latter was also shouting slogans, and that several other muslims did likewise throw torches or swabs of cloth, but he could not identify them. Sahebrao deposed that he had seen a crowd of 25 muslims (in which were the nine appellants) carrying burning torches and sticks, and that he had seen appellants Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 7 throwing burning torches and appellant Nos. Sahebrao deposed that he had seen a crowd of 25 muslims (in which were the nine appellants) carrying burning torches and sticks, and that he had seen appellants Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 7 throwing burning torches and appellant Nos. 1, 3, 5 and 8 dipping cloth swabs in a kerosene oil tin carried by appellant No. 9 and throwing those swabs on the flour-mill. Sukhdeo deposed that he had seen 30 to 35 muslims at a distance of about 50 feet away from the flour-mill, that he had seen appellants Nos. 1, 3 and 5 dipping cloth swabs in a kerosene oil tin carried by appellant No. 9, and appellants Nos. 2, 4 and 7 throwing lighted torches on flour-mill. 4. The Court of Session believed the evidence of the four witnesses, Anna, Kisan, Sahebrao and Sukhdeo. The Sessions Judge observed that the case was one of communal rioting in which properties of Hindus as well as muslims were burnt on the night in question, and that these four witnesses had not given information to the authorities before September 16, 1962. But in his view nothing "tangible was suggested to show" that the witnesses were interested in "telling a falsehood to involve the" appellants, and the testimony of Anna, and Sukhdeo was corroborated by the injuries suffered by them as a result of stone-throwing on the night of the riots. He therefore convicted the appellants. The High Court in appeal substantially agreed with the view of the trial Court. 5. When this appeal was taken up for hearing on February 3, 1965 this Court called for the diaries of the investigating officers, to ascertain whether there was any investigation in the case before September 16, 1962 when Sub-Inspector Madhukar Deo took over the case. The diaries have been received, and it appears that nothing substantial was done in the matter of investigation. Mr. Nuruddin Ahmed appearing on behalf of the appellants urged that the witnesses Kisan, Anna, Sukhdeo and Sahebrao on whose testimony the trial Court and the High Court founded the conviction were unreliable, for those witnesses had not made statements before the police soon after the commission of acts of incendiarism attributed to the appellants. Counsel also submitted that the record of earlier statements made by those witnesses to the police on September 14 and 15, 1962 were not furnished to the appellants. Counsel also submitted that the record of earlier statements made by those witnesses to the police on September 14 and 15, 1962 were not furnished to the appellants. In support of his submission that the witnesses Anna, Kisan, Sahebrao and Sukhdeo were examined by the Police on the 14th and 15th of September, counsel relied upon the statements made by Sub-Inspector Karimuddin who had reached Khamgaon at 3 A.M. on September 14, 1962, that he had recorded statements on September 15, 1962 of Ishwar Singh and others. Counsel also relied upon the statement of witness Kisan that he had met Ishwar Singh after the motor-bicycle and the cattle were rescued from the burning flour-mill, upon the statement of witness Anna that he had been called by the police in the evening of September 14, 1962 and that at that time he was accompanied by Sahebrao, Kisan and Sukhdeo and upon the admission made by Sukhdeo that he had not disclosed to Ishwar Singh or the police, when he was called to the police-station next day after the house of Ishwar Singh was burnt, the names of the persons who were responsible for setting fire to the house of Ishwar Singh. Counsel submitted that the witnesses were themselves involved in acts of incendiarism and were interrogated by the police, and thereafter they were giving false testimony against the appellants. Delay in the disclosure of information which was within the knowledge of the witnesses was indeed a matter of considerable importance, and if it turned out that the witnesses had in their earliest statements made by them in the course of the investigation of this case not disclosed the names of the culprits, the testimony of the witnesses would in the absence of adequate explanation be regarded as of doubtful value. There is however no evidence on the record that before the 16th of September statements of any of the four witnesses were recorded. It is true that Anna and Sukhdeo have admitted that they were called before the police and that they were accompanied by Kisan and Sahebrao when they went to the police station in the evening of September 14,1962. The witnesses also admitted that Sukhdeo when he was called by the police did not inform them about the names of the accused. The witnesses also admitted that Sukhdeo when he was called by the police did not inform them about the names of the accused. But no question was asked to Sub-Inspector Karimuddin about the names of persons of whom he made the inquiries in regard to the setting fire to Ishwar Singh's house. In any event, the Sessions Judge was conscious of the apparent infirmity in the evidence of those witnesses and still accepted the testimony. He observed that those witnesses gave evidence which was "fairly consistent and straightforward" and "very little material was brought forth in cross-examination to show that they were interested in falsly implicating the accused persona in the act of arson". The learned Judge said that "the accused persons, no doubt, maintained that they had disclosed to the police authorities the names of Anna, Sahebrao, Kisan and Sukhdeo as the persons responsible for setting fire to the house of Mohomedan people and Anna, Sahebrao, Kisan and Sukhdeo were, therefore, involving the accused persons, out of spite and revenge, in the act of setting fire to Ishwar Singh's building. But there seems to me no foundation for this claim. As far as Anna, Sahebrao, Kisan and Sukhdeo were concerned, they very categorically denied that they were so implicating the accused persons when suggestions in that behalf were put to them in cross. examination. Sukhdeo admitted that the police authorities had inquired from him about the persons who were responsible for setting fire to the houses of Mohomedans. But it does not appear that any inquiry was made because he was himself named as one of the persons responsible for setting fire to the flourmill. Indeed, there is no material on record to show that Anna, Sahebrao, Kisan or Sukhdeo were ever named as persons responsible for tire to any of those houses. They appear to me very independent persons disclosing the event as actually seen by them". 6. The High Court also regarded the evidence of those witnesses as trustworthy. 7. Counsel for the appellants suggested that the house of Ishwar Singh might have caught fire from the sparks falling on that house from the houses of muslims round about, which had been set fire to by Hindu mobs and thereafter with the aid of the four witnesses, Anna, Kisan, Sahebrao and Sukhdeo the appellant have been falsely implicated. 7. Counsel for the appellants suggested that the house of Ishwar Singh might have caught fire from the sparks falling on that house from the houses of muslims round about, which had been set fire to by Hindu mobs and thereafter with the aid of the four witnesses, Anna, Kisan, Sahebrao and Sukhdeo the appellant have been falsely implicated. That some houses of the muslims in this locality were burnt down by riotous mobs cannot be gainsaid. But the trial Court as well as the High Court have accepted the testimony of the eye witnesses who have deposed that the nine appellants before the Court were responsible for throwing burning cloth swabs dipped in kerosene oil and also throwing lighted torches on the house of Ishwar Singh and the flour-mill. If that evidence is believed, the hypothetical suggestion that the house of Ishwar Singh may have caught fire accidentally must be ruled out. 8. We have been taken through the entire evidence of all the important witnesses by counsel for the appellants and we do not think that the conclusion recorded by the Sessions Judge and confirmed by the High Court was one which could not reasonably be arrived at by those Courts. There are undoubtedly certain discrepancies in the statements of the four witnesses, Anna, Kisan Sahebrao and Sukhdeo. But what weight should be attached to the evidence of the witnesses was essentially a matter with which the Court of First Instance before whom the witnesses were examined was concerned, and if the view taken by that Court is confirmed by the High Court, even assuming that this Court may, if the case were tried before it, have taken a different view (though we do not say that in this case we would have so done) we would not be justified in making a departure from the settled practice of this Court and proceed to review the evidence. 9. The conclusion of the trial Court as confirmed by the High Court is based entirely upon appreciation of evidence. An appeal against an order of conviction recorded by a High Court does not lie to this Court, except in cases covered by Article 134(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution, as a matter of right. 9. The conclusion of the trial Court as confirmed by the High Court is based entirely upon appreciation of evidence. An appeal against an order of conviction recorded by a High Court does not lie to this Court, except in cases covered by Article 134(1)(a) and (b) of the Constitution, as a matter of right. This Court is not required by the Constitution to re-try every criminal case brought before it, and in dealing with criminal appeals normally it does not concern itself with the weight of evidence, conflict of evidence, inferences drawn from evidence, and questions about corroboration or contradiction of testimony. If evidence has been believed by the High Court, this Court is not required to enter upon a re-appraisal of the evidence to ascertain whether the evidence was sufficient to discharge the burden of proof which lay upon the prosecution, nor is this Court concerned to review the evidence for ascertaining whether the order passed by the High Court was warranted on the evidence. 10. In Kapildeo Singh v. The King, AIR 1950 FC 80 : (1949-50) FCR 834. the Federal Court laid down principles which are generally accepted by this Court in dealing with criminal appeals. It was observed by the Federal Court that even though it was not bound by the Privy Council practice and precedents, it saw no reason to depart from the principles which had been laid down by that Tribunal defining the limits within which interference with the course of criminal justice dispensed in the subordinate Courts was warranted. 11. In Mohinder Singh v. The State, (1950) SCR 821 this Court observed that it will not entertain a criminal appeal except in special and exceptional cases, where it is manifest that by a disregard of the forms of legal process or by a violation of the principles of natural justice or otherwise substantial and grave injustice has been done. It is now firmly recognised that the general principles on which the Privy Council entertained criminal appeals will furnish a sound basis for exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136. It is now firmly recognised that the general principles on which the Privy Council entertained criminal appeals will furnish a sound basis for exercising its jurisdiction under Article 136. Generally speaking this Court will not allow facts to be reopened, especially when two Courts agree in their conclusions in regard to them and when the findings of fact which are challenged depend upon the weight to be attached to the testimony of witnesses who have been believed by the trial Court which had the advantage of noting their demeanour and hearing their evidence. 12. This Court undoubtedly exercises its power in case where by a disregard of the form of legal process or by a violation of the principles of natural justice, or for any other special reason, there has resulted substantial or grave injustice see for instance Tej Narain and others v. The State of Uttar Pradesh, Cr. As. Nos. 81,112 and 132 of 1964. decided on 23.11.1964. The regularity of the trial is not challenged, and there is no other ground on which the judgment may be regarded as open to review by this Court. The appeal therefore fails and is dismissed. Appeal dismissed.