Judgement KHARE, J. : This is a first appeal from an order, dated 1st June 1962, passed by the learned Civil Judge, Moradabad, in a suit for declaration for setting aside a partition decree directing the plaintiff to pay a court-fees of Rs. 26,757.50 after deducting Rs. 200 already paid by him. 2. The facts, briefly stated, are that Lalit Porwal, a minor brought the suit for declaration through a next friend against the members of his family including his mother also. The declaration sought is that the compromise decree passed in civil suit No. 27 of 1960 of the Court of the Civil Judge, Moradabad, is void, inoperative and bas been obtained fraudulently. The plaintiff paid a court-fee of Rs. 200 only although he valued the entire property, in which he was claiming only 1/12th share, at Rupees 3,36,000. At first the office reported that the court-fee paid was sufficient and the suit was ordered to be registered on the same day it was filed. However, on the next day the Munsarim on second thought reported that the court-fee paid by the plaintiff was insufficient, that it was payable under S. 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act and there was a deficiency of Rs 26,657.50 only. The learned Civil Judge, after having heard both the parties, accepted the Munsarim's report. The appeal is directed against that order. "It is contended on behalf of the appellant that- (a) the plaintiff, being a minor was not properly represented in the earlier suit and, therefore, should not be deemed to be a party to the decree; and (b) in any case the plaintiff could not be required to pay court-fees on more than his share of the value of the property involved in the decree." 3 Original Suit No. 27 or 1960 or the Court of Civil Judge, Moradabad, had been brought by the mother of the plaintiff, both in her name as well as in the name of the plaintiff. She acted as the next friend of the plaintiff. A compromise was arrived at in that suit. It is clear from the averments made in Para. 14 of the plaint that although no application was moved on behalf of the plaintiffs next friend to grant permission for arriving at a compromise on behalf of the minor plaintiff the Court passed a routine order giving such permission. A compromise was arrived at in that suit. It is clear from the averments made in Para. 14 of the plaint that although no application was moved on behalf of the plaintiffs next friend to grant permission for arriving at a compromise on behalf of the minor plaintiff the Court passed a routine order giving such permission. It is evident that the compromise decree was passed after that permission had been granted. 4. It is in these circumstances that the question arises whether the plaintiff, who was a minor, could be considered to be a party to the decree within the meaning of S. 7(iv-A) of the Court-fees Act. The plaintiff's mother could have brought a suit acting as the next friend of her minor son when she thought that the interest of her son would be best safeguarded by getting partition effected. It could not therefore, be contended that the suit filed in the name of the minor plaintiff by his mother acting as the next friend was not properly instituted. The plaintiff was thus a party to the suit in which the decree was passed. 5. There is no force in the contention raised on behalf of the appellant that no permission had been given to the next friend of the minor to arrive at a compromise. A perusal of the averments made in Para. 14 of the plaint clearly show that such permission was granted by the Court. It has been assailed on two grounds only; firstly, that it was a routine order passed by the Court, and secondly, that no application had been moved on behalf of the next friend of the minor to obtain that permission. In our opinion there is no force in either of these contentions. Once the permission to compromise the suit on behalf of the minor was granted by the Court, the provisions of O. 32, R. 7, C.P.C. were fully complied with. There is nothing on record to show that the Court did not apply its mind when it granted that permission. 6. In the circumstances the plaintiff was a party to the decree in suit No. 27 of 1960, and, therefore, ad valorem court-fee was payable under S. 7(iv)(a) of the Court-fees Act, according to the value of the subject-matter. 7. The next question that arises for consideration is: what was the value of the subject-matter. 6. In the circumstances the plaintiff was a party to the decree in suit No. 27 of 1960, and, therefore, ad valorem court-fee was payable under S. 7(iv)(a) of the Court-fees Act, according to the value of the subject-matter. 7. The next question that arises for consideration is: what was the value of the subject-matter. The relief claimed by the plaintiff is that it might be declared that the compromise decree in suit No. 27 of 1960 of the Court of Civil Judge, Moradabad, Lalita Porwal and another v. Narain Das and others, decided on the basis of the compromise, dated 16th February 1961, was null and void and inoperative as against the plaintiff as the same had been obtained in an irregular manner and by fraud against the interest of the plaintiff. The plaintiff is, therefore, seeking a declaration only so far as his interest in the decree is concerned. 8. The suit was valued by the plaintiff at the value of his own share. The plaintiff claimed only 1/12th share in the property which was the subject-matter of the compromise decree. In other words, the claim had been valued by the plaintiff at Rs. 28,000 only, which Is one-twelfth of Rs. 3,36,000. 9. In our opinion the value of the subject-matter should be considered to be Rs. 28,000 only which s the value of the plaintiff's share in the entire property involved in the decree. 10. It was contended by the learned Standing Counsel that the entire value of the property involved in the decree should be considered to be the subject-matter for purposes of S. 7(iv-A)(1) of the Court-fees Act. His argument is that after the plaintiff's suit had been decreed the shares of the defendants also shall have to be disturbed and for that reason it must be held that the value of the subject-matter is Rs. 3,36,000 and not Rs. 28,000 only. It may be that the shares of the defendants also might be disturbed after the plaintiff's suit is decreed, and a fresh partition is ordered. However, that can be no consideration for holding that the subject-matter for purposes of Section 7(iv-A)(1) must be valued at Rs. 3,36,000 and not at the plaintiff's share which comes to Rs. 28,000 only. It may be that the shares of the defendants also might be disturbed after the plaintiff's suit is decreed, and a fresh partition is ordered. However, that can be no consideration for holding that the subject-matter for purposes of Section 7(iv-A)(1) must be valued at Rs. 3,36,000 and not at the plaintiff's share which comes to Rs. 28,000 only. It would be most inequitable to hold otherwise, because there might arise a case in which the entire property might be valued at crores but the plaintiff's share might be of a few thousand only; and in such a case the plaintiff can be non-suited if he is required to pay in court-fees an amount larger than the value of his claim. That could not be the intention of the legislature. In our opinion the subject-matter for purposes of S. 7(iv-A)(1) must be the value of the plaintiff's share in the property comprised in the decree. 11. The appeal is partly allowed. The plaintiff shall be required to pay ad valorem court-fee under S. 7(iv-A)(1) of the Court-fees Act on Rs. 28,000 only, which is the value of his share in the property comprised in the decree. The parties shall bear their own costs. Two months' time is allowed to the plaintiff to deposit the court-fee in the Court below. Appeal partly allowed.