JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is by the tenant defendant and it arises out of a suit for ejectment. 2. THE suit was instituted on December 20, 1961. It is, admittedly, governed by the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956, and the ground, taken under that Act for the defendant's eviction was the plaintiff's reasonable requirement of the disputed premises for own occupation. The plaintiff is, in. substance, a trust estate, Sakhisona Trust Estate, although the suit is brought by and in the name of the sole trustee, Sakhisona dassi in her capacity as sole trustee. 3. THE suit was instituted in the local City Civil Court, There were, in the main, three defences: (i) that the city Civil Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit ; (ii) that the plaintiff's case of reasonable requirement, as alleged in the plaint, was not genuine and the suit was a mala fide suit; and (iii) that the notice of ejectment was defective and invalid in law. 4. ALL the above defences were overruled by the learned trial Judge and the plaintiff's suit was decreed, hence this appeal by the defendant. On the question of jurisdiction, the matter has been put by Mr. Mukherji, learned Advocate for the appellants as follows: that the instant suit, as stated above, was by a trustee or, in essence, by a trust estate as landlord and it will, on the allegations in the plaint itself, involve questions, relating to and arising out of a trust. It is, accordingly, excluded from or beyond the jurisdiction of the city Civil Court in view of item 9 of the first Schedule of the City Civil courts Act and in support of this submission, Mr. Mukherji relies on the decision of this Court, reported in (1) Neetai Charan Bagchi v. Suresh Chandra paul, 66 C. W. N, 767, which interpreted the same expression "relating to or arising out of. " used in item 7 of the said Scheduled in relation to mortgages. 5. FOR our present purpose, it is not necessary to say anything on the question of the above interpretation and we will assume for purposes of this appeal that, if the matter had rested solely on the City Civil Courts Act, for the present suit the proper forum would have been the Original Side of this Court and not the City Civil Court. The position, however, was changed by the West Bengal Act XXVII of 1957, which amended the West Bengal Premises tenancy Act, 1956,-a special statute, providing for forum, in respect of ejectment suits within the local limits within which the disputed promises in the instant case falls. Under that amending statute, in respect of ejectment suits between landlords and tenants, irrespective of the question as to who is the landlord and who is the tetant, within certain limits of valuation, which cover the present case, such suits are to be instituted in and entertained by the City Civil Court. 6. BOTH the above statutes are of the same legislature. The latter statute, the amending Act XXVII of 1957, is not only a later statute but also a special statue dealing with the question of forum in ejcetment suits and conferring exclusive jurisdiction on the city Civil Court to entertain such suits within limits, which cover the instant case. On the Interpretation, suggested by Mr. Mukherji to item no. 9 of the first Schedule of the City Civil Courts act, as mentioned hereinbefore, a suit, of he present type. but for the above amending Act, would have probably lain in the Original Side of this Court, but the above amending statute clearly provides that such jurisdiction of the original Side of this Court would no longer he available but would be taken away by the exclusive jurisdiction, conferred or the City Civil Court in respect of ejectment suits within limits, covering the present ease, irrespective inter alia of the slates of the landlord. In this view, we hold that the learned trial Judge was right in entertaining this suit and no legitimate objection can be taken to his jurisdiction on the point. This content on of Mr. Mukherji is, accordingly, overruled. Mr. Mukherji next urges that, in the instant case, the plaintiff's plea of reasonable requirement is merely an eye-wash and it is a device to oust the defendant from the disputed premises. It is clear however that there is a valid trust deed, providing for the purpose, for which the disponted premises is required by the plaintiff in the instant case. Mukherji next urges that, in the instant case, the plaintiff's plea of reasonable requirement is merely an eye-wash and it is a device to oust the defendant from the disputed premises. It is clear however that there is a valid trust deed, providing for the purpose, for which the disponted premises is required by the plaintiff in the instant case. The plaintiff as we have said above is the trustee, or, in essence, the trust, and a requirement for a purpose, provided for and specified in the trust deed is obviously a reasonable requirement for purposes of the Trust, for which the property in question is held by the trustee plaintiff. On the materials, before us, we ore unable to hold that there is anything to show that the plea of such requirement is main fide on the part of the plaintiff and we are in complete agreement with the learned trial Judge on this point of the plaintiff's requirement of the disputed premises for own occupation. It is unnecessary for us to go into any more detail under this head, as we fully agree with the learned trial Judge in his discussion on the point. 7. THE last question is the question of notice. Having regard to the text of the said notice, no objection can be taken to its legality, validity or sufficiency, either under sec. 106 of the transfer of Property Act or under sec. 13 (6) of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 particularly in view of the decisions of this Court on the point. The point of notice, also, as raised by the appellant, accordingly, fails. 8. IN the premises, all the points, urged in support of this appeal, must fail and this appeal will he dismissed subject to this that, in view of the prevailing conditions of accommodation in the city and having regard to the status of the defendant, we will be prepared to give him time till the end of June. 8. IN the premises, all the points, urged in support of this appeal, must fail and this appeal will he dismissed subject to this that, in view of the prevailing conditions of accommodation in the city and having regard to the status of the defendant, we will be prepared to give him time till the end of June. 1967, to vacate the disputed premises and make over vacant and peaceful possession of the same to the plaintiff trustee, provided he files in this Court, within a fortnight from this date, an appropriate undertaking in that behalf to vacate the disputed premises and deliver up vacant and peaceful possession of the same to the plaintiff decree-holder within June, 1957, and provided further that he goes on depositing, in the trial court, to the credit of the said decree-holder a sum of Rs. 45/- per month, month by month, regularly, in accordance with the Bengali calendar, within the 15th of the next succeeding mouth according to the same calendar, on account of current mesne profits and, in default of any two of such deposits, the above provision for time or grace period will automatically lapse and this decree for ejectment will become executable forthwith. Subject as above, this appeal fails and it will be dismissed. 9. THERE will be no order for costs either in this Court or in the court below.