Judgment :- 1. The petitioner in O. P. No. 1688 of 1965 has been the headmaster of the school in question for the the last 13 years. On 5-7-1965 the 1st respondent, the manager of the school, passed an order suspending him from the post. Ext. P1 is the order. Ext. P2 is a memo dated 3-7-1965 from the 2nd respondent, the Assistant Educational Officer, Kuthuparamba, and addressed to the 1st respondent and that was also served on the petitioner along with Ext. P1. In Ext. P2 it is stated that the Sub Inspector of Police, Kuthuparamba, informed the office of the Assistant Educational Officer that the petitioner has been arrested in connection with the investigation of a case regarding his possession of CARE food articles and directing the manager to place petitioner under suspension until further orders and report the fact to his office. It was in pursuance to the power vested in the 2nd respondent under R.67(1)(b) of Chapter XIV (A) of Kerala Education Rules that he issued the memo directing the suspension of the petitioner. 2. The petitioner in O. P. No. 1903 of 1965 is the headmaster of the St. Joseph's High School. Kizhakkambalam. The 2nd respondent, Regional Deputy Director of Public Instruction, Ernakulam, passed an order on 21-7-1965 placing the petitioner under suspension, pending disciplinary proceedings against him under Chapter XIV (A) of the Kerala Education Rules. Since the order of the 2nd respondent was sent in the address of one Sri. T. M. Joseph, who was not the headmaster of the school at the time, it was returned by the postal authorities. It is stated that the 2nd respondent told the petitioner on enquiry that the mention of the name of Sri. T. M Joseph in the memo is a mistake and that the order was really meant to be against the petitioner. The order was passed in exercise of the power conferred on the 2nd respondent under R.67(1) of Chapter XIV(A) of the Kerala Education Rules. 3. T. M Joseph in the memo is a mistake and that the order was really meant to be against the petitioner. The order was passed in exercise of the power conferred on the 2nd respondent under R.67(1) of Chapter XIV(A) of the Kerala Education Rules. 3. The contentions of the petitioners are that under S.12 (2) of the Kerala Education Act, hereinafter called the Act, the power to suspend a teacher is vested only in the managerial R.67(1) vesting the power of suspension in the educational authorities and Government is beyond the rule making power of Government under S.36 of the Act, that the school in question in O. P. 1903/65 being established by a religious minority, the rule infringed its fundamental right to administer the affairs of the school and that as the rule was not laid before the Legislative Assembly, as required by S.37 of the Act, the Rule is invalid. 4. R.67(1) of Chapter XIV(A) of the Kerala Education Rules was introduced by a notification published in the Gazette dated 2-2-'65. The rule reads: "67. Suspension: (1) The Manager or the Educational Officer, or Regional Deputy Director or Director or the Government may, at any-time place a teacher under suspension (a) when a disciplinary proceeding against him is contemplated or is pending; or (b) when a case against him in respect of any criminal offence is under investigation or trial; or (c) when final orders are pending in the disciplinary proceedings, if the authority considers that in the then prevailing circumstances it is necessary, in public interest, that the teacher should be suspended from service." 5. The first contention of counsel for the petitioners was that the rule has not been laid before the Legislative Assembly as provided in S.37 of the Act and therefore it has not come into operation. S.37 of the Act reads: "37. Rules to be laid before the Legislative Assembly: All rules made under this Act shall be laid for not less than fourteen days before the Legislative Assembly as soon as possible after they are made and shall be subject to such modifications as the Legislative Assembly may make during the session in which they are so laid". Whether the rule has not come into operation because it was not laid before the Legislative Assembly is a question on which different views are possible. Whether the rule has not come into operation because it was not laid before the Legislative Assembly is a question on which different views are possible. Sir Carleton Kemp Alien in'Law and Orders' has expressed the opinion that merely because rules have not been laid before the legislature as enjoined by the parent Act they would not become invalid unless the legislative purpose to that effect is clear. This is what he says at page 164: "The main question is, what is the legal effect of delegated legislation which is made and published in due form, with the important exception that it has never been laid before Parliament for 'quarantine', as required by its parent Act? The answer depends on a perennially-difficult question whether the provisions of an Act are directory or imperative (or, as it is sometimes called, mandatory). I will refrain from discussion which would resolve itself into a perplexing series of examples on both sides of the line, but, in the broadest terms, the effect of the distinction is this. If a provision is held to be imperative, failure to comply with it wholly invalidates action which purports to have been taken under it If,on the other-hand the provision is held to be directory only, failure to comply with it, though it may expose the responsible person to a penalty, does not invalidate the whole proceeding or transaction, not even if there is no known penalty which can be applied to the person in fault nor any remedy for a person aggrieved". He seems to prefer the view expressed in the West Indian Case of Springer v. Deerly (1950) 66 LQR. 299), where it was held that a provision as regards the laying of rules before the Legislature is not mandatory unless the language of the parent Act is clear. From the wording of S.37, it is not possible to say what is the time within which Government should place the rules before the Legislative Assembly. The words 'as soon as may be possible' are susceptible of meaning an indefinite time. What exactly is reasonable time for Government to obey a statutory direction to lay the rules before the Legislative Assembly is itself a matter not for the Court to decide but for the Government themselves. The truth is that, it is impossible to attach any firm meaning to this rubric. What exactly is reasonable time for Government to obey a statutory direction to lay the rules before the Legislative Assembly is itself a matter not for the Court to decide but for the Government themselves. The truth is that, it is impossible to attach any firm meaning to this rubric. The point has been elaborately considered in "Delegated Legislation in India" published by the Indian Law Institute at pages 153 to 161. The authors seem to take the view that the object of the provision to lay is to provide for parliamentary control, and the Government's failure to comply with the provision, does, no doubt, defeat the object, but ineffectiveness of parliamentary control in stray cases where Government may fail to lay the rules, may not be so great an evil as the uncertainty of law that results from holding the requirement to be mandatory. The Supreme Court in Express Newspapers v. Union of India 1958 SCJ. 113 at 118 has observed: "The rule was framed by the Central Government ...and was a piece of delegated legislation, which, if the rules were laid before both the Houses of Parliament acquired the force of law. After the publication of the rules, they became a part of the Act itself". It would appear that the Court was of the view that both laying and publication were essential for the rules to acquire the force of law, even though there is nothing in the parent Act pointing to that result. In Narendra Kumar v. Union of India 1960 SCJ. 214 it was held that both publication and laying before legislature were essential for the rules to come into operation. In in re Kerala Education Bill, 1959 SCJ. 321 at 344, Das CJ. 214., observed: "After the Rules are laid before the Legislative Assembly they may be altered or amended and it is then that the Rules, as amended, become effective. If no amendments are made the rules come into operation after a period of 14 days (the period for which they were required to remain before Legislature) expired". Here, the Court seems to be of the definite view that the rules would only come into operation after the expiry of the laying period. The matter came up for consideration in Muthuswamy Kounden v. State of Kerala and Another 1960 KLJ.1319 where M. S. Menon J., as he then was, observed: "9. Here, the Court seems to be of the definite view that the rules would only come into operation after the expiry of the laying period. The matter came up for consideration in Muthuswamy Kounden v. State of Kerala and Another 1960 KLJ.1319 where M. S. Menon J., as he then was, observed: "9. S.17 does not provide for any affirmative or negative resolution by the Legislature and there is no doubt that the notification under sub-section (1) of that Section will come into effect on the date of its publication in the Gazette. It is not stated in the Act.that the omission to comply with the provision of sub-section (2) will in any way affect the validity of the notification or its continued operation. 10. In these circumstances we cannot but hold that the provision is only directory in character, that the notification of 8-2-58 issued by the Government is valid and operative and that the acts of the Collector in pursuance thereof-and impugned before us-have to be sustained." Sub-section (2) of S.17 of the Act there in question is as follows: "All notifications issued under sub-section (1) shall be laid as soon as may be possible before the Legislative Assembly". The court followed the decision of Subba Rao, C.J. in Krishnan v. Secretary, Regional Transport Authority, AIR. 1956 Andhra 129, where the learned judge after referring to all the relevant decisions expressed the view that a provision in the parent Act requiring the laying of rules before the Legislature and subjecting them to a negative resolution by it, is directory in character. The learned judge observed at page 137, as follows: "The following briefly are the principal kinds of statutory instruments (1) those which are subject to negative resolution, (2) those which are subject to affirmative resolution, (3) those which are required to be laid before Parliament but are not payable and (4) those in regard to which Parliament in clear terms made laying of the rules as a condition precedent or a condition subsequent specifying the consequences of its non-compliance. The same variations of Parliamentary control are also adopted in the Indian Statutes. The same variations of Parliamentary control are also adopted in the Indian Statutes. Where the Statute makes the laying of the rules before Parliament a condition precedent or the resolution of the Parliament a condition subsequent, there is no difficulty as, in the former case, the rule has no legal force at all till the condition precedent is complied with and in the latter case, it ceased to have force from the date of non-compliance with the condition subsequent. Nor can there be any difficulty in a case where the Parliament or the legislature, as the case may be specifically prescribes the legal effect of non-compliance with that condition. But more important question arises when the Parliament directs the laying of the rules before the Parliament without providing for the consequences of non-compliance with the rule. As aforesaid, learned authors are inclined to take different views on the effect of non-compliance wish such a rule. We must concede there is force in the view expressed by Bernard Schwartz in his book on "The Law and Executive in Britain" that the rule is mandatory. But, after considering the question carefully, we are inclined to adopt the view that, in the case of a statute directing rules to be laid before the Parliament or the Legislature without any condition attached, the rule is only directory. Though the statute says that the rules shall be laid before the Parliament as the provision in the statute is conceived in public interests, the dereliction of the duty by the Minister or other officer concerned in not following the procedure should not be made to affect the members of the public governed by the rules." The rule in question here is only subject to negative resolution by the Legislative Assembly. It is not necessary that the rule should be affirmed by a resolution of the Assembly for come into operation it to. Even now, it is open to Government to place the rule before the appropriate Legislative Authority for the State and I am told steps have been taken for that purpose. I have already indicated that no firm meaning can be attached to the words "as soon as may be possible" in S.37. Even now, it is open to Government to place the rule before the appropriate Legislative Authority for the State and I am told steps have been taken for that purpose. I have already indicated that no firm meaning can be attached to the words "as soon as may be possible" in S.37. If that be so, if the rule is laid before the appropriate Legislative Authority now, what is to happen to an act done in pursuance of the rule, before the rules have been laid before the appropriate Legislature as in these cases. If the dictum of the Supreme Court in 1959 SCJ. 321 is to govern the situation, I must hold that the rule has not come into operation. But I refrain from deciding the question in view of my cor elusion on the next point. 6. The next submission of counsel for the petitioners was that under S.36 of the Act the rule making authority has power to make rules only to carry out the provisions in the Act and that since the rule in question seeks to vest the power of suspension in the various educational authorities also when the presupposition on which the legislature enacted S.12 (2) was that the power was only in the manager, the rule is repugnant to the provision of that sub-section. S.12 reads: "12. Conditions of service of aided School teachers: 1. The conditions of service of teachers in aided schools, including conditions relating to pay, pension, provident fund, insurance and age of retirement, shall be such as may be prescribed by the Government. 2. No teacher of an aided school shall be dismissed, removed or reduced in rank by the manager without the previous sanction of the officer authorised by the Government in this behalf, or placed under suspension by the manager for a continuous period exceeding fifteen days without such previous sanction". It is clear from sub-section (2) that the manager has power to suspend a teacher and if the order of suspension is to be operative for a continuous period exceeding 15 days, then, the previous concurrence of the appropriate educational authority is required. The point for consideration is whether the legislative aim was that the power should be exercised only by the manager. The point for consideration is whether the legislative aim was that the power should be exercised only by the manager. The learned Advocate General submitted that no inference can be drawn from the language of sub-section (2) that the power can be exercised only by the manager, that the sub-section does not exclude the possibility of the power being exercised by the Educational authorities also. He submitted that the rule does not negate the power of the manager to suspend, in which case alone it can be said that the rule is repugnant to the sub-section and that what the rule does is to vest the power concurrently in the educational authorities also and that it is not contrary but supplemental to the sub-section and is conducive to advance the object of the Act. 7. I think the Act recognised and affirmed the power of the manager to appoint teachers in aided schools, subject to the rules and conditions laid down by Government, and to dismiss, or suspend them subject to the restriction mentioned in the sub-section. S.11 of the Act reads: 11. Appointment of teachers in aided Schools'. Subject to the rules and conditions laid down by the Government, teachers of aided schools shall be appointed by the managers of such schools from among persons who possess the qualifications prescribed under S.10". The power of appointment generally carries with it the power of dismissal. Here, it is not left to be inferred by mere implication. It is expressly provided in subsection (2) of S.12. The underlying purpose of the legislature in enacting S.11 and 12 was to put restrictions upon the exercise of the power of appointment, dismissal or suspension by the manager. It was not contended that the power was exercised by any agency other than the manager, when the Act came into force. There is no provision in the Act visualising the vesting of the power in any other agency. Then, why not I presume that the purpose of the Legislature was to recognise and affirm the power as the exclusive power of the manager but subject to the restriction? There is no provision in the Act visualising the vesting of the power in any other agency. Then, why not I presume that the purpose of the Legislature was to recognise and affirm the power as the exclusive power of the manager but subject to the restriction? If the object of the Legislature was that the manager alone is to have the power of appointment, dismissal or suspension, no doubt, subject to the restriction envisaged in the sub-section, is it competent for the rule making authority authorised to frame rules to carry out the provisions of the Act to frame a rule vesting concurrent powers in this behalf in any other Agency? I think not. The question is not whether the power of the manager to suspend under S.12 (2) can co-exist with the power of the educational authorities or Government under R.67(1), but whether the underlying purpose of the Legislature was to recognise and affirm the exclusive power of the manager in this behalf and put restrictions upon its unbridled exercise. If the paramount aim evinced by the Legislature was to recognise and affirm the pre-existing exclusive power of the manager in this behalf, a rule making authority cannot thwart it by a rule vesting the power concurrently in other agencies also. That will be repugnant to the legislative aim. The power cannot be wielded by a hand different from the hand recognised and affirmed by the Legislature. The theoretical possibility of the coexistence of this power in the abstract in diverse hands need not deter me in coming to this conclusion since the exclusive power in this behalf was in the manager when the Act was passed and a concurrent power was not intended to be given to any other agency by the Act. I think the policy of the Act was to affirm the pre-existing power of the manager in the matter of appointment, dismissal or suspension but subject it to the restrictions mentioned in the Act and not partition it among the manager, the educational authorities and Government, so that it may be exercised by all. 8. Then, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner in O. P. 1903/65 that the rule would violate the fundamental right of the religious minority to establish and administer the school in question and therefore the rule is invalid. 8. Then, it was submitted on behalf of the petitioner in O. P. 1903/65 that the rule would violate the fundamental right of the religious minority to establish and administer the school in question and therefore the rule is invalid. It was argued that the rule is an unreasonable restriction upon its fundamental right. Counsel relied upon the observations in Para.31 of the opinion of the Supreme Court in AIR. 1958 SC. 956. The observations relied are: "(11) We are thus faced with a problem of considerable complexity apparently difficult of solution. There is, on the one hand the minority rights under Art.30 (1) to establish and administer educational institutions of their choice and the duty of the Government to promote education, there is. on the other side the obligation of the State under Art.45 to endeavour to introduce free and compulsory education. We have to reconcile between these two conflicting interests and to give effect to both if that is possible and bring about a synthesis between the two. The directive principles cannot ignore or override the fundamental rights but must, as we have said, subserve the fundamental rights. We have already observed that Art.30 (1) gives two rights to the minorities. (1) to establish and (2) to administer educational institutions of their choice. The right to administer cannot obviously include the right to maladminister. The minority cannot surely ask for aid or recognition for an educational institution run by them in unhealthy surroundings, without any competent teachers possessing any semblance of qualification, and which does not maintain even a fair standard of teaching or which teaches matters subversive of the welfare of the scholars. It stands to reason, then, that the constitutional right to administer an educational institution of their choice does not necessarily militate against the claim of the State to insist that in order to grant aid the State may prescribe reasonable regulations to ensure the excellence of the institutions to be aided. Learned Attorney General concedes that reasonable regulations may certainly be imposed by the State as a condition for aid or even for recognition. Learned Attorney General concedes that reasonable regulations may certainly be imposed by the State as a condition for aid or even for recognition. There is no right in any minority, other than Anglo-Indians, to get aid, but, he contends, that if the State chooses to grant aid then it must not say "I have money and I shall distribute aid but I shall not give you any aid unless you surrender to me your right of administration". The State must not grant aid in such manner as will take away the fundamental tight of the minority community under Art.30 (1). Sri. G. S. Pathak appearing for some of the institutions opposing the Bill agrees that it is open to the State to lay down conditions for recognition, namely, that an institution must have a particular amount of funds or properties or number of students or standard of education and so forth and it is open to the State to make a law prescribing conditions, for such recognition or aid provided, however, that such law is constitutional and does not infringe any fundamental right of the minorities. Recognition and grant of aid, says Shri. G. S. Pathak, is the governmental function and therefore, the State cannot impose terms as condition precedent to the grant of recognition or aid which wilt be violative of Art.30(1). According to the statement of case filed by the State of Kerala, every Christian School in the State is aided by the State. Therefore, the conditions imposed by the said Bill on aided institutions established and administered by minority communities, like the Christians, including the Anglo-Indian Community, will lead to the closing down of all these aided schools unless they are agreeable to surrender their fundamental right of management. No educational institution can in actual practice be carried on without aid from the State and if they will not get it unless they surrender their rights they will, by compulsion of financial necessities, be compelled to give up their rights under Art.30 (1). The legislative powers conferred on the legislature of the States by Art.245 and 246 are subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and certainly to the provisions of Part III which confers fundamental rights which are, therefore, binding on the State Legislature. The legislative powers conferred on the legislature of the States by Art.245 and 246 are subject to the other provisions of the Constitution and certainly to the provisions of Part III which confers fundamental rights which are, therefore, binding on the State Legislature. The State legislature cannot, it is clear, disregard or override those provisions merely by employing indirect methods of achieving exactly the same result. Even the Legislature cannot do indirectly what it certainly cannot do directly. Yet that will be the effect of the application of these provisions of the Bill and according to the decisions of this court already referred to it is the real effect to which regard is to be had in determining the constitutional validity of any measure." Counsel said that the restrictions upon the power of manager in the matter of appointment, dismissal and suspension themselves came perilously near the line of permissible restrictions upon the fundamental right of religious minorities under Art.30 but that the rule in question has crossed the zone of permissible restrictions and has gone into forbidden reaches. Looking at the language of Art.30, it would appear that the right under the Article is absolute. Unlike Art.19, and several other articles in Part III of the Constitution, the right under Art.30 is not subject to any restrictions, reasonable or otherwise. But it is said that no right is absolute, that all rights are limited by the neighbourhood of principles of policy which are other than those on which the particular right is founded, and that even though the Constitution has declared the right under Art.30 in terms absolute, the Court must construe it as being limited. There may be considerable difficulties in accepting this line of argument in the face of the language of the Article. However, it is not necessary for me to decide it for the reason that the authority for imposing restrictions is sought not in the so-called police power of the State but in consensual character of the restrictions themselves. It is said that although the right under Art.30 is absolute, there is no right for recognition or aid for educational institutions established and administered by religious minorities if they are not prepared to submit themselves to reasonable regulations as regards the standard to be maintained in such institutions, the discipline and other matters of common concern, required in the interests of public. It would rather appear paradoxical that a fundamental right, which breaks no restrictions, may, nevertheless, be subjected to them on the basis that recognition and aid assumed to be privileges in the context are conditional upon surrender of the guaranteed constitutional right. It is urged that if Government may withhold recognition or aid or both, they may withhold or revoke it or them though the reason for doing so may be the refusal of the religious minority to surrender its constitutional right. The argument runs as follows: If the legislature may withhold a particular benefit, it may grant it in a limited form since the greater power of withholding absolutely must necessarily include the lesser power of granting it with restrictions. As a corollary, it is submitted that the recipient of the benefit is not deprived of any right since he may retain the right by simply rejecting the preferred benefit; If this logic is applied in all cases, dangerous consequence may follow. The potential erosion of fundamental rights through the use of this bargaining technique has prompted the development in America of the doctrine of unconstitutional conditions. In Frost v. Railroad Commission (271 US. 1101 at 104 1105), justice Sutherland speaking for the majority said: "It would be a palpable incongruity to strike down an act of state legislation which, by words of express divestment, seeks to strip the citizen of rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, but to uphold an act by which the same result is accomplished under the guise of a surrender of a right in exchange for a valuable privilege which the State threatens otherwise to withhold. It is not necessary to challenge the proposition that, as a general rule, the State, having power to deny a privilege altogether, may grant it upon such conditions as it sees fit to impose. But the power of the State in that respect is not unlimited; and one of the limitations is that it may not impose conditions which require the relinquishment of constitutional rights. If the State may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favour, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embodied in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence". If the State may compel the surrender of one constitutional right as a condition of its favour, it may, in like manner, compel a surrender of all. It is inconceivable that guarantees embodied in the Constitution of the United States may thus be manipulated out of existence". It is difficult to find any articulate principle, which satisfactorily refutes the logic of the argument that the right to recognition and aid are conditional, if necessary, upon the surrender of the constitutional right of the religious minority under Art.30. But there is nothing preventing Courts from evading logic and explaining the invalidation of irrelevant restrictions on the ground that permitting Government to bargain for waiver of fundamental rights conflicts with policies implicit in the Constitution. The power to impose restrictions has its basic justification in the unlimited power of State to withhold recognition or grant. An absolute prohibition of participation in an activity and permission to engage in it conditioned upon the waiver of fundamental rights are simply alternative techniques of regulation, which must satisfy the test of suitability to the achievement of the objective for the exercise of governmental regulatory power. Withdrawal of recognition or aid based on assertions of initially waived rights may be improper unless the exercise of the rights waived in the context adversely affect a recognised public interest. Since the Government is under no obligation to grant recognition or aid, failure to grant may appear to be a positive power to withhold. The arbitrary character of the power would seem to justify the withholding or revocation of recognition or aid where a religious or linguistic minority fails to comply with the conditions requiring the surrender of constitutional rights but it is arguable that the spending power of a State cannot be exercised to buy up rights guaranteed by Constitution. It is also arguable that denying a benefit because of the insistence to exercise a constitutional right in effect penalises that exercise. It is urged for the petitioner that denial or withholding of recognition or aid to religious minorities, because they insist upon their fundamental right under Art.30 would be discriminatory. It is also arguable that denying a benefit because of the insistence to exercise a constitutional right in effect penalises that exercise. It is urged for the petitioner that denial or withholding of recognition or aid to religious minorities, because they insist upon their fundamental right under Art.30 would be discriminatory. The argument is that precluding from participation in the enjoyment of certain benefits to those who wish to retain their fundamental rights would be an unreasonable classification violative of the equal protection of the laws, but the Government say that they are not denying equal protection because the condition or burden applies to all recipients. Their argument is that the benefit-burden package is being offered without discrimination; the State is not withholding the benefit from any person, but the person decides whether to accept or reject it. As against this, it might be said that every person is not being offered the same package since the conditions serve as significant restrictions on the activities only of those who presently desire to exercise the right required to be waived as a condition to receipt of the benefits. 9. The following propositions emerge from the discussion; that the power to impose condition is not a lesser part of a greater power to withhold, but a distinct power which must find its own justification. "The argument used, that the greater always includes the less, and, therefore, if the State may exclude the appellees without any cause, it may exclude them for a bad cause, is not sound. It is just as unsound as it would be for me to say, that, because I may without cause refuse to receive a man as my tenant, therefore I may make it a condition of his tenancy that he shall take the life of my enemy, or rob my neighbour of his property". (See Dayle v. Continental Insurance Co. (94 U. S.535 at 543 (1877). Granting recognition or aid on condition that the religious minorities should waive their fundamental right under Art.30 is really an assertion of power to govern their educational institutions. By granting recognition or aid or both the recipient is placed in a position which gives government a legitimate interest in restricting his rights. It would appear that there are two legitimate interests which may justify such restrictions. By granting recognition or aid or both the recipient is placed in a position which gives government a legitimate interest in restricting his rights. It would appear that there are two legitimate interests which may justify such restrictions. First is the interest in ensuring that recognition or aid or both are maintained for the purposes intended, in order to protect the effectiveness of the benefits and, second the. social interest must be protected against those whose capacity for inflicting harm is increased by possession of the benefit. The power to withhold or revoke recognition or aid is not an arbitrary power; rather, as in any other case where Government confers advantages on some, it must justify their denial to others by reference to a constitutionally recognised reason. The fact that a religious minority is not prepared to give up its fundamental right under. Art.30 is hardly a reason, which can be recognised for refusing recognition or aid to it. It would also seem logical that for violation of the regulatory conditions attendant on recognition or aid the only consequence should be the forfeiture of the benefit of recognition, or aid or both, as the case may be, and not interference in the internal man agreement of the educational institutions. 10. Analytically it may not be possible to reconcile an unlimited power in Government to withhold recognition or aid and the claim of religious minorities for recognition or aid while insisting upon their absolute right under Art.30. The logical difficulty for the two to co-exist did not deter the Supreme Court in their opinion in AIR. 1958 S. C. 956 in accommodating the contending rival claims by saying that the religious minorities who require recognition or aid will have to subject themselves to reasonable regulation in the administration of their educational institutions but that the regulation should not infringe upon their fundamental right under Art.30. This is a pragmatic solution of a vexed question. 11. I do not think that I should decide the point in this case for two reasons: firstly, I do not think it open to the petitioner in O. P. No. 1903/65 to challenge the validity of the rule on the ground that it is violative of the fundamental right of religious minorities under Art.30. 11. I do not think that I should decide the point in this case for two reasons: firstly, I do not think it open to the petitioner in O. P. No. 1903/65 to challenge the validity of the rule on the ground that it is violative of the fundamental right of religious minorities under Art.30. The religious minority affected is the only entity competent to challenge the rule on the ground that it violates its right under Art.30. The petitioner has no standing to challenge the rule on this ground. Secondly, it is a wise tradition with courts not to adjudicate an issue involving a constitutional question, if the case can be disposed of on other grounds. As this case can be decided on the ground that the rule is repugnant to S.12 (2), it is not necessary for me to express a final opinion on this aspect of this case. 12. R.67(1) in so far as it authorises the various educational authorities and Government to suspend a teacher cannot be taken cognizance of by me for disposing of the cases as it is repugnant to S.12(2). If that be so, there is no power in the educational Authorities concerned to suspend the petitioners. I quash the orders of suspension in these cases and allow the writ petitions, but without any order as to costs. Allowed.