JUDGMENT J.N. Takru, J. - This is an application by Ved Prakash Sharma and Satya Deo Sharma under Section 3 of the Contempt of Court Act praying for the taking of contempt proceedings against the opposite parties. 2. Stripped of all necessary details, the case of the applicants is that on March 18, 1964, opposite party No. 5 filed a complaint against them in the court of the Nyaya Panchayat Bahsuma in the distt. of Meerut, alleging that his son was beaten by applicant No. 2 with the connivance of applicant No. 1. The Nyaya Panchayat consisting of opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 took cognizance of the offence and fixed August 25, 1964 for hearing. In the mean time on August 22, 1964 the applicants moved a transfer application before the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mawana, on which he called for a report from opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4, and stayed further proceedings before them till the disposal of that application. When the matter was taken up by the Nyaya Panchayat on August 25, 1964, the applicants made a written application before it informing it of the aforesaid stay order; but opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 due to "their prejudice and bias against the applicants" proceeded with the hearing of the case, and convicted and sentenced the applicants to a fine of Rs. 5/- each. Thereupon the applicants filed an application in the court of the Addl. Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mawana, for the taking of contempt proceedings against opposite parties Nos. 1 to 5, and on their failure there, they filed the aforesaid application in this Court. According to the applicants, opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4, in not staying the hearing of the case in the circumstances narrated above, committed gross contempt of its superior court, and opposite party No. 5, by participating in the proceedings "even after information and knowledge" of the stay order was likewise guilty of committing contempt of the said court. 3. On the application referred to above notice was issued to all the opposite parties, who have entered appearance and filed affidavits. Opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 have filed one affidavit and opposite party No. 5 has filed a separate affidavit. The defence of opposite parties Nos. 3. On the application referred to above notice was issued to all the opposite parties, who have entered appearance and filed affidavits. Opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 have filed one affidavit and opposite party No. 5 has filed a separate affidavit. The defence of opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4, put in a nut sheel is that on August 25, 1964, when the applicants presented an application before them for staying further proceedings in the case, on the ground that an order to that effect had been passed by the Additional Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mawana on August 22, 1964, they did not produce any copy of that order before them. The applicants were asked to give their statements and to bring a copy of the order by the next date of the defence. On this the applicants got very furious and abused and insulted the Nyaya Panchayat. There upon the Njmya Panchayat fined them Rs. 5/- each, for committing contempt of court. The Nyaya Panchayat did not decide the main case which has since then been transferred for disposal by the Additional Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mawana, to the Bench Magistrate , Mawana and is pending there. Opposite party No. 5 in his affidavit stated that he did not take any part in the proceedings held on August 25, 1964, beyond signing the order sheet of the case in token of his having received information of the order passed on that date. The applicants filed a rejoinder affidavit denying the averments made by opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 and opposite party No. 5 in their counter affidavits. 4. Now from the narrative of the case set above it is clear (1) that the applicants brought the fact of the stay order to the notice of the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 on August 25, 1963 but they neither filed a certified copy of that order nor did they file an affidavit or make a statement on oath to that effect. The short question, therefore, is whether in the aforementioned circumstances the Nyaya Panchayat was bound to have stayed further proceedings on pain of being punished for committing contempt of its superior court. 5. On behalf of the applicants, Sri S. N. Misra contended that as the fact of the stay had been brought to the notice of opposite parties Nos. The short question, therefore, is whether in the aforementioned circumstances the Nyaya Panchayat was bound to have stayed further proceedings on pain of being punished for committing contempt of its superior court. 5. On behalf of the applicants, Sri S. N. Misra contended that as the fact of the stay had been brought to the notice of opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 by means of a written application their refusal to stay further proceedings was wilful and deliberate and was prompted by their prejudice and bias against the applicants and as such they were guilty of gross contempt of court. He also contended that it was not necessary that a certified copy of the order should have been filed before the Nyaya Panchayat could take notice of the stay order and if that fact was brought to its knowledge by other reliable means it was bound to stay further hearing of the case. In support of his contention he relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Hoshiar Singh and another v. Gurbachan Singh and others, 1962 A.W.R. 533 (S.C.). After hearing the learned counsel for the parties, I am however, satisfied that this contention has no force. 6. Now so far as the question of prejudice and bias is concerned, it is enough to say that there is not an iota of evidence to prove them. The order sheet of the case shows that the Nyaya Panchayat accommodated the applicants with adjournments on a number of dates before August 25, 1964 and as such no prejudice and bias can be inferred on its part on the mere ground of its disallowing any further adjournment. Learned counsel relied upon the order sheet of August 25, 1964, and urged that it showed that the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 after passing the order of that date and getting the applicants signature thereon made interpolations therein in order to create evidence to show that the statements which the applicants refused to make on that date were in respect of the stay order which they claimed to have obtained, when in fact the statements which they were required to, but they refused to make and which resulted in their punishment for contempt of the court of the Nyaya Panchayat, were in the case itself. In my opinion, it is not necessary to embark upon any enquiry into that matter, in the present proceedings, because even if the applicants allegations that opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 refused to stay the hearing of the case are accepted as correct, no contempt of superior court can be held to have been committed by them. I shall therefore proceed to give my reason for coming to that conclusion beginning with an exposition of the law on that subject. In B. A. Kar v. Hon'ble the Chief Justice and his companion Judges of the Orissa High Court & another, 1961 A.W.R. 514 (S.C.) the Supreme Court laid down the law on this matter in the following terms :- "Before a subordinate court can be found guilty of disobeying the order of the superior court and thus to have committed contempt of court, it is necessary to show that the disobedience was intentional. There is no room for inferring an intention to disobey an order unless the person charged had knowledge of the order. If what a subordinate court has done is in utter ignorance of an order of a superior court, it would clearly not amount to intentional disobedience of that courts order and would, therefore, not amount to a contempt of court at all ........... What is, therefore necessary to establish in a case of this kind is that the subordinate court knew of the order of the High Court and that knowing the order it disobeyed it, The knowledge must, however, be obtained from a source which is either authorised or otherwise authentic. In the case before us it is not clear as to who the person who signed the application dated November 27, 1957, was because the signature is illegible. It was not countersigned by a pleader nor is there anything to show that it was presented in court by a pleader authorised to appear on behalf of the complainant. Furthermore, it was not accompanied by an affidavit. Therefore, there could be no guarantee for the truth of the facts stated therein. No doubt, it was accompanied by a telegram and even though it was addressed to a pleader there is nothing to indicate that he was authorised to appear for the complainant. Further, it is not possible to say as to the capacity of the sender. Therefore, there could be no guarantee for the truth of the facts stated therein. No doubt, it was accompanied by a telegram and even though it was addressed to a pleader there is nothing to indicate that he was authorised to appear for the complainant. Further, it is not possible to say as to the capacity of the sender. Had the telegram been received from the court or from an advocate appearing on behalf of the complainant before the High Court and addressed either to the court or pleader for the complainant different considerations would have arisen and it may have been possible to take the view that the information contained therein had the stamp of authenticity. Of course, we do not want to lay it down here as law that every telegram purporting to be signed by an advocate or a pleader is per se guarantee of the truth of the facts stated therein and also of the fact that it was actually sent by the person whose name it bears. In order to assure the Court about these matters an affidavit from the party would be necessary. Upon the materials before us we are satisfied that the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was entitled to ignore the telegram as well as the application. We, therefore, hold that his refusal to act on the telegram did not amount to contempt of court." Thus from the observations made in-the aforesaid passage it is clear that knowledge of the order of the superior court must be obtained by the subordinate court from a source which is, either authorised or otherwise authentic further that in order to assure the court about the truth of the facts concerning the stay order passed by the superior court an affidavit from the party would be necessary. In the case before us neither was a certified copy of the order, produced nor was an affidavit to that effect filed. If, as the learned counsel for the applicants contends there is no provision for the filing of affidavits in the Nyaya Panchayat, then, one of the applicants should have offered to make a statement on oath in that behalf, but until one. or the other of these courses was adopted, it cannot be said that the opposite parties Nos. If, as the learned counsel for the applicants contends there is no provision for the filing of affidavits in the Nyaya Panchayat, then, one of the applicants should have offered to make a statement on oath in that behalf, but until one. or the other of these courses was adopted, it cannot be said that the opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 were bound to take notice of the alleged stay order and their refusal to do so amounted to gross contempt of court. 7. As stated earlier reliance on behalf of the applicants was placed on the decision in Hoshiar Singh (1). In that case it was held that :- "Where the appellants who were officers concerned in their official capacity with the allotment and management of land for displaced persons were informed not merely by interested. parties but by an Advocate (who was an officer of the Court) that the High Court had passed a valid order staying delivery of possession of certain lands to certain allottees and a formal application supported by an affidavit was made to that effect........the appellants had no real justification (for doubting the authenticity of the order and it was their duty to carry out that order. If the appellants disobeyed that order there was, in the eye of law a wilful disobedience of the High Court staying delivery of possession and they were guilty of contempt of court. The appellants could not take up the plea that as the order had not been officially communicated to them they were at liberty to ignore it." 8. The aforesaid decision does not lay down anything different from what has been said in B. K. Kar (2). It is, however, clearly distinguishable on facts from the present case, as not only the person informing the opposite parties. Nos. 1 to 4 about the stay order in question is an interested party, but no affidavit in support of the application containing that information was filed. Hence I am satisfied that opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4, and consequently Opposite party No. 5, also cannot be held to. have committed contempt of court. 9. The result, therefore, is that: none of the opposite parties can be held to have committed contempt of the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mawana. This application, therefore, has no force and is dismissed with Rs. 1 to 4, and consequently Opposite party No. 5, also cannot be held to. have committed contempt of court. 9. The result, therefore, is that: none of the opposite parties can be held to have committed contempt of the court of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate, Mawana. This application, therefore, has no force and is dismissed with Rs. 100/- as costs to the Government Advocate, and the same amount as costs to opposite party No. 5. I would have allowed cost to opposite parties Nos. 1 to 4 also, but since their averments, that the applicants did not make their statements, suffers from an ambiguity in that it does not clearly disclose whether the statement which,they were required to make was in connection with the stay order or in the case itself, I am not prepared to grant them any costs. The applicants are given one months time for paying up the costs.