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1966 DIGILAW 103 (KER)

P. K. TRANSPORT, CALICUT v. CALICUT-WYNAD MOTOR SERVICE (P) LTD. AND OTHERS

1966-04-29

P.GOVINDA MENON, P.GOVINDA NAIR

body1966
Judgment :- 1. The question arising for determination in this appeal is whether the grant of a temporary permit to the appellant by the Secretary to the Regional Transport Authority, the third respondent, on the route Calicut-Pudu-vayal is either against the first proviso to S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act or is an attempt to circumvent that proviso. The learned judge who dealt with the writ application, moved by the first respondent contending that the grant is against the proviso above mentioned, took the view that the proviso was infringed by the grant and hence allowed the writ application. 2. The facts necessary for the disposal of this appeal are succinctly stated by the learned judge in his judgment in Para.1 and 2, which we extract below: "The validity of a temporary permit granted to the third respondent is being questioned by the petitioner on the ground that the grant was in contravention of the first proviso to S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The petitioner was operating a stage carriage on the route Calicut-Koduvally, 14 miles in length. On 16 81962 the petitioner applied for a variation of the permit in respect of the route Calicut-Koduvally to enable it to ply up to Manipuram, one mile and 7 furlongs away from Koduvally. The first respondent notified this application inviting objections, if any. to the proposal. By order dated 30 31963 the first respondent approved the proposal. In the order instead of the direction 'approved' the authority used the word 'sanctioned'. The third respondent filed revision petition (No. M. V. R.5/64) before the S. T. A. T. complaining that the application of the petitioner was allowed without complying with the procedure prescribed by S.57 of the Motor Vehicles Act. The revision was allowed with a direction to the first respondent to dispose of the petitioner's application for variation of the permit in accordance with law. It was also observed that it would be more proper if the first respondent considered the proposal for the introduction of a pucca service in the route Calicut-Manipuram along with the application for variation. In the meanwhile petitioner's application was again notified in the Gazette for objections under S.57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The First respondent took up the application for consideration and passed an order on 24 91963 deferring consideration of the same. In the meanwhile petitioner's application was again notified in the Gazette for objections under S.57(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act. The First respondent took up the application for consideration and passed an order on 24 91963 deferring consideration of the same. At the same meeting a proposal was sponsored by the third respondent for the introduction of a service between Calicut and Manipuram and that was approved by the first respondent. Against this order the petitioner filed a revision petition before the State Transport Authority, Trivandrum challenging its correctness. In the revision petition the third respondent was not made a party. The revision petition was allowed by the order of the State Transport Authority, dated 20 11964. That authority found that the need of the travelling public would be amply met by allowing the variation of the permits and that there was no necessity for a full-fledged service in the route Calicut to Manipuram. To quash this order the third respondent filed O. P. No, 450 of 1964 on the file of this court contending that the order was invalid as it was not made a party to the revision petition. The High Court dismissed the original petition on the ground that the entire proceedings relating to the necessity for service in a route is administrative in character. In dismissing the writ petition this court observed that the order of the State Transport Authority should not be a bar to the third respondent for applying for a permit as it was not a party.to the revision petition, and if the third respondent applies for a permit in the route that application should be disposed of in accordance with law. Thereafter the first respondent invited applications for the grant of variation of all the permits in the route Calicut-Koduvally as Calicut-Manipuram. The petitioner again applied for variation. This application was notified under S.57(3). The first respondent published a notification in the very same gazette inviting representations in respect of an application for a pucca permit on the route Calicut-Manipuram via Koduvally. Thereafter the first respondent at its meeting held on 24 21966 considered both sets of applications together and by its order dated 25 21966 the applications for variations were allowed. Ex. P-2 is a copy of the order. Thereafter the first respondent at its meeting held on 24 21966 considered both sets of applications together and by its order dated 25 21966 the applications for variations were allowed. Ex. P-2 is a copy of the order. Therein the first respondent found that there was also need for a regular pucca service On the route Calicut-Manipuram Via Koduvally and invited applications for the same. The decision on the application for permit of the third respondent was deferred. It was observed in the order that steps would be taken to grant temporary permit till pucca permit is granted. It appears that the temporary permit on the route Calicut-Puduvayal has been granted in pursuance to this order. Puduvayal is one furlong away from Manipuram." 3. On the above facts, the only question is whether relying on the decision of the Privy Council in AIR. 1946 PC. 157 it is possible to say that the Calicut-Pudvayal route is entirely a distinct and separate route from the Calicut-Manipuram route and whether, even if it be so, it can be held that there has been a clear attempt to circumvent the first proviso to S.62 of the Motor Vehicles Act. 4. We do not wish to express any definite opinion on the first part of the question formulated above, though we are fully in agreement with the learned judge that these two routes are substantially the same. We feel, however, no doubt in our minds, on the facts and in the circumstances, that the grant is a clear attempt to circumvent the first proviso to S.62 of the Act. The difference in the length of the route is after all only about a furlong. But for this short distance of about a furlong the remaining part of the routes run along the identical highway. There has been a contest between the first respondent in this appeal and the appellant for a long period of three or four years. The Regional Transport Authority decided to postpone consideration of an application of the appellant for a regular permit on the route Calicut-Manipuram after the application was duly published and after a hearing as anticipated by S.57 (5). We wish to say nothing about this procedure in view of the pendency of a writ application challenging Ex. P-2 order by which this has been done. We wish to say nothing about this procedure in view of the pendency of a writ application challenging Ex. P-2 order by which this has been done. It appears that in order to get over the delay thus created by postponing the hearing of the regular application a temporary permit was granted to the first respondent. We do not, however, go into the details of these matters. It is sufficient to say that there is a clear attempt to circumvent the first proviso to S.62 of the Act by making it appear that the grant of the temporary permit is for a route different from the one for which an application for a regular permit is pending. 5. Learned counsel for the appellant invited our attention to the fact that the first respondent has been applying for and getting temporary permits for vehicles on the route Calicut-Puduvayal for a considerable length of time till 1963. It may be noted that during that period admittedly there were no applications for regular permits on the route Calicut-Manipuram pending and those grants are not material. 6. Nor are we impressed by the argument of counsel for the appellant that there is no application for a regular permit pending. This suggestion was made on the basis of S.57 (5). After the publication of an application under S.57 (3) it should be disposed of as envisaged by S.57 (5) and the Regional Transport Authority has no jurisdiction, it is contended, to postpone the hearing of the application or to call for or invite fresh applications in the middle of the hearing. The procedure adopted by the Regional Transport Authority under Ex. P. 2 may be correct or incorrect. We are not called upon to decide about the correctness or otherwise of Ex. P. 2 in these proceedings, and we express no opinion on that matter. But we are clear that the application that was not disposed of by the Regional Transport Authority is still pending and should be considered and disposed of in accordance with law at the earliest opportunity. That being so, during the pendency of that application, no temporary permit can be granted. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the writ applicant, the first respondent, is not a person aggrieved by the grant of the temporary permit to the appellant. The first respondent had a permit on the route Calicut-Koduvally. That being so, during the pendency of that application, no temporary permit can be granted. 7. Learned counsel for the appellant argued that the writ applicant, the first respondent, is not a person aggrieved by the grant of the temporary permit to the appellant. The first respondent had a permit on the route Calicut-Koduvally. He had applied for variation of that permit as one from Calicut to Manipuram. This variation was granted. He is a person very much interested in preventing unauthorised operation on this part of the route. The Motor Vehicles Act is only regulatory but in so far as regulations have been imposed, it must be followed and applied equally to all persons concerned. In other words, every operator operating under the provisions of the Act has got a right to insist that the statute is complied with so far as the other operators are concerned. If it is not done it will be a clear discrimination. Apart from that, it is a clear case of infringement of the right to operate in accordance with the provisions of the Statute. The only question then is whether this is a case of manifest injustice. Based on the ruling reported in 1961 KLT. 584 it was contended that there was no manifest injustice. The existence of manifest injustice must depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. A learned judge of this court has apparently taken the view that there has been manifest injustice and exercised discretion by interfering with the order granting the temporary permit. We do not think that the interference by the learned judge is such as would, in the circumstances, justify upsetting his order in appeal. On that short ground we negative this contention. 8. In the result, this appeal cannot be sustained, and we dismiss it. There will be no order as to costs. Dismissed.