Sant Ram Bhatia v. State of U. P. — 1966 DIGILAW 104 (ALL)

JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - Sri Sant Ram Bhatia, who is an Advocate practising at Kanpur, has filed this application under Section 215, Cr.P.C. for the quashing of an order dated February 10, 1965 of Sri S. N. Sharma, Judicial Officer City I, Kanpur by which the applicant was committed to the court of session of charges under Sections 466 and 471, I.P.C. The proceeding which culminated in the commitment started with an order dated January 20, 1965 passed by the Judicial Officer directing the issue of a notice to the applicant under Section 476, Cr.P.C. The notice related to something which was said to have happened in the court of the Judicial Officer on that date in connection with the filing of surety bonds in respect of an accused person for whom the applicant was appearing as a counsel. What, according to the Judicial Officer, happened and led to the order directing the issue of a notice may be gathered from his order dated January 20, 1965 itself, which is reproduced below: "Sri Sant Ram Bhatia, Advocate presented two bail bonds in respect of accused Doodh Nath. The sureties were Nankoo and Kishore. Since the amounts of bail bonds were not filled in both the cases, the bail bonds were rejected as incomplete. Thereafter he took the bonds from the Reader for seeing the orders passed by the court and he filled in the amounts in both the cases and again presented before me. He, thereby intentionally made interpolations in the record and tried to obtain orders in his favour. This amounts to an offence. Therefore, issue a notice under Section 476, Cr.P.C. against Sri Bhatia to show cause as to why he should not be prosecuted for this. He will, however, execute a p.b. of Rs. 1,000/- for his appearance for the next date. The reply to this notice must come by January 30, 1965." 2. It appears that immediately after the alleged happening the applicant was taken in custody and it was only after he had executed the personal bond required by the order that he was released. 3. 1,000/- for his appearance for the next date. The reply to this notice must come by January 30, 1965." 2. It appears that immediately after the alleged happening the applicant was taken in custody and it was only after he had executed the personal bond required by the order that he was released. 3. On January 30, 1965 the date fixed for reply to the notice the applicant moved an application before the Judicial Officer denying the correctness of the facts noted in the order dated January 20, 1965, stating among other things that from the language of the notice served upon him it was not clear under what section he was alleged to have committed an offence, and praying that the section be made known to him so that he may be in a position to submit a complete explanation. This application was disposed of by the Judicial Officer by an order in the following terms: "The notice order was passed in presence of the O. P. The order is self-explanatory. Reply should have been filed today. He is, however, allowed ten days to do so. He may inspect the file in my presence if he so desires. Fix February 9. 1965." 4. On February 9, 1965 the applicant made an application before the Judicial Officer alleging in para. 1 thereof that at about 1-15 p.m. that day the Judicial Officer had gone to the Basta (seat) of the applicant accompanied by a few persons and had threatened him in a violent language saying Mujh Se Larna Hai (Jhapaktey Huey). Mujh Se Larna Hai. Mai Tumhe Dekh Lunga. Tumharev Jaise Vakil Bahaut Se Dekh Lian Hain.' It was stated that in the circumstances mentioned above the applicant was unable to file his explanation on that date and it was prayed that another date be fixed for filing it. The application was rejected by the Judicial Officer with the following order: "The allegations made in para 1 are entirely baseless and without any foundation. Sufficient time has already been allowed to the opposite party to file W.S. I see no justifiable ground to allow any further time Moreover the application contains a prayer and should have been stamped. As such the application is rejected. Fix February 10, 1965 for evidence of both sides, if any." 5. Sufficient time has already been allowed to the opposite party to file W.S. I see no justifiable ground to allow any further time Moreover the application contains a prayer and should have been stamped. As such the application is rejected. Fix February 10, 1965 for evidence of both sides, if any." 5. On February 10, 1965 the applicant filed reply to the notice giving his version of what had happened in the court of the Judicial Officer on January 20, 1965 in connection with the bonds referred to in the order of that date and stating many other things besides. When the Judicial Officer took up the matter on February 10, 1965 he recorded the statements of Sri M. N. Agnihotri Assistant Public Prosecutor and Sri Daya Shanker Dube Reader, examined the applicant framed charge against him under Sections 466 and 471, I.P.C. and passed the commitment order which is sought to be quashed. 6. In his evidence Sri M. N. Agnihotri. Assistant Public Prosecutor stated that on January 20, 1965 the applicant Sri Sant Ram Bhatia filed two surety bonds in the case against Doodb Nath accused but the bonds were rejected as the amounts of the bonds had not been filed in. He also stated that after a short time the applicant presented the same bonds again and on being asked by the Judicial Officer as to why he had filled in the amounts in the rejected bonds the applicant replied that the entries relating to the amounts were already there from before. Sri Daya Shanker Dube Reader supported the above statements of Sri M. N. Agnihotri in his evidence, and further stated that the Judicial Officer had passed orders of rejection in writing on the surety bonds and had handed them over to him, but thereafter while he was busy in putting up other papers before the Judicial Officer the applicant silently picked up the bonds and presented them again before the Judicial Officer after filling in the amounts. 7. According to the written reply filed by the applicant in answer to the notice and his statement in his examination by the Judicial Officer, what happened on January 20, 1965 in the court of the Judicial Officer in connection with the bonds was this. 7. According to the written reply filed by the applicant in answer to the notice and his statement in his examination by the Judicial Officer, what happened on January 20, 1965 in the court of the Judicial Officer in connection with the bonds was this. The Judicial Officer granted bail on that date to Doodh Nath who was in the judicial lock up and on whose behalf an application for bail had been moved by the applicant on January 1, 1965. On being informed by his clerk that his presence for a few minutes in the court of the Judicial Officer was necessary for getting the surety bonds in respect of Doodh Nath accepted, the applicant went in a hurry to the court of the Judicial Officer from the court of the Munsif where he was engaged in a civil suit. He handed over the bonds to the Reader for being put up before the Judicial Officer. On examining the bonds the Reader asked the applicant to fill in the amounts. The applicant did so accordingly, whereupon the Judicial Officer got infuriated and asked the applicant in an intimidating manner as to how the applicant had dared to take the papers from the table. The Judicial Officer also passed some insulting and improper remarks against the applicant, called near the applicant two constables who were present in the court-room and said that the applicant was being taken in custody. For more than an hour the applicant was kept detained in that position. During this interval the Judicial Officer passed no order in writing for taking the applicant in custody, and he looked and laughed at the applicant and in reply to the protests humbly made by him said: Chup Raho, Mujhe Samjhao Nahin, Abhi Tumhe Seedha Karta Hun. Bahaut Din Ke Bad Aj Hath Aye Ho. Ab Tumhe Nahin Chhorun Ga. Jagoi Bahu se Mujhe Sab Kuchh Tumari Babat Malum Hai. After repeated requests by the applicant that he may be allowed to go to attend to his case in the Munsifs court, the Judicial Officer dictated an order to the Reader, and after having got it typed he read it out to the applicant and handed it over to the Reader for obtaining the applicants signature. After repeated requests by the applicant that he may be allowed to go to attend to his case in the Munsifs court, the Judicial Officer dictated an order to the Reader, and after having got it typed he read it out to the applicant and handed it over to the Reader for obtaining the applicants signature. At that juncture the applicant submitted an application to the Judicial Officer whereupon he took back the typed order from Reader and got another order typed, and a copy of that fresh order was given to the applicant. According to the applicant, the order that the Judicial Officer had originally dictated did not provide for the applicants appearance on the next date. 8. It would thus be seen that the point of difference between the prosecution version and the applicants version is whether the bonds had been rejected by the Judicial Officer as incomplete by an order in writing and the applicant had thereafter presented them again for acceptance after filling in the amounts of the bonds or whether the bonds had not been rejected by the Judicial Officer and they had been given back to the applicant by the Reader for being completed and the applicant had thereupon filled in the amounts. In disposing of this application I can not enter into any question of fact and I have set out the two versions only with a view to give a complete idea of this rather unusual case. 9. I may also mention that on the day on which the order of commitment was passed by the Judicial Officer another proceeding was also taken by him against the applicant. In the course of his examination by the Judicial Officer in the proceeding which resulted in his commitment the applicant made certain statements which, in the opinion of the Judicial Officer, constituted an offence under Section 228, I.P.C. The Judicial Officer purporting to act under Section 480, Cr.P.C., took cognizance of it, convicted the applicant under Section 288, I.P.C., and sentenced him to a fine of Es. 300/- and in default of payment of fine to one months simple imprisonment. In the disposal of the application before me I am not concerned with the proceeding taken under Section 480, Cr.P.C. and I have made mention of it in this order because Mr. 300/- and in default of payment of fine to one months simple imprisonment. In the disposal of the application before me I am not concerned with the proceeding taken under Section 480, Cr.P.C. and I have made mention of it in this order because Mr. Asif Ansari, learned counsel for the applicant, laid considerable stress on it in connection with an aspect of his argument which I will notice at the appropriate stage. 10. The first ground on which Mr. Asif Ansari has attacked the order of commitment is that no inquiry was held by the Judicial Officer under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. He has urged that the proceeding taken against the applicant commenced as one under Section 476, Cr.P.C. and it retained that character throughout and never acquired the character of an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. He has further urged that at no stage of the proceeding until it came to the framing of the charge did the Judicial Officer give the slightest indication to the applicant that the proceeding was in the nature of an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C., although it was in law incumbent upon him to do so. I may at once state that the contention is well founded and must be accepted. 11. The proceeding, as I have noted above, was initiated on January 20, 1965 by a notice purporting to be under Section 476, Cr.P.C. and calling upon the applicant to show cause why he should not be prosecuted. When on January 30, 1965 the applicant prayed that he may be informed of the section under which he was said to have committed an offence the Judicial Officer described the order of January 20, 1965 as a notice order, observed that the reply ought to have been filed by that date (January 30, 1965), and allowed ten days time for doing so. On February 9, 1965 as well when the Judicial Officer rejected the prayer of the applicant for fixing another date for filing his explanation, he observed that sufficient time for filing written statement had been given and there was no justifiable ground for allowing further time. On February 9, 1965 as well when the Judicial Officer rejected the prayer of the applicant for fixing another date for filing his explanation, he observed that sufficient time for filing written statement had been given and there was no justifiable ground for allowing further time. It is, therefore, incontrovertible that till February 9, 1965 the Judicial Officer did not contemplate or at least given any indication of contemplating an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. and treated the proceeding as one under Section 476, Cr.P.C. It is equally incontrovertible that the applicant believed that the proceeding against him was under Section 476, Cr.P.C. In the order dated February 9, 1965 the Judicial Officer certainly fixed February 10, 1965 evidence of both sides if any, but this was quite compatible with a proceeding under Section 476, Cr.P.C. in which too the court may, if it thinks necessary, take evidence. The reply filed by the applicant on February 10, 1965 was expressly stated to be in the matter of notice to show cause under Section 476, Cr.P.C., and it ended with a request that the proceeding taken under Section 476, Cr.P.C. be dropped and the notice be vacated. The Judicial Officer ordered the reply of the applicant to be put up with the file at 3-30 p.m. and did not even at that stage note or indicate that he would be proceeding with the case as an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. In para. 12 of the affidavit filed by the applicant in this Court he has stated that on February 10, 1965 the Judicial Officer directed him to appear at 3-30 p.m. saying that he would then decide the question of filing a complaint against the applicant. The Judicial Officer, who has been impleaded as an opposite party in the present application, has filed a counter-affidavit in which he has denied having said that he would decide the question of filing a complaint against the applicant, but nowhere in the counter-affidavit it has been stated by him that he informed the applicant or in any manner indicated to him that the inquiry was one under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. Thus, there is no escape from the conclusion that before the framing of the charge against the applicant there was nothing which could suggest that the nature of the proceeding which the Judicial Officer had purported to start under Section 476, Cr. P.C. had undergone a change and the inquiry was under Chapter XVIII, Cr. P.C. Even the Judicial Officer has not been able to assert that he ever abandoned the idea of holding an inquiry under Section 476, Cr.P.C. and he has stated in para. 23 of his counter-affidavit that the inquiry held by him was an inquiry in connection with the proceedings under Section 476, Cr.P.C. for committing the accused to the court of sessions in case a prima facie case was made out. I must, however, confess my inability to understand this description of the nature of the proceeding. 12. It cannot be disputed that a proceeding under Section 476, Cr.P.C. can only lead to the results mentioned in that provision and to no other. Commitment to the court of session not being provided for in Section 476, Cr.P.C., it is not possible to suggest that it can follow as a direct consequence of a proceeding under that section without resort to any other proceeding. Under Section 347, Cr.P.C. as well commitment can only be under the provisions of the preceding sections of the Code and it naturally follows that Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. would govern the procedure relating to the commitment, and an inquiry in accordance with it cannot be dispensed with. Patently, therefore, an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. is an essential preliminary to a commitment and in no circumstance can an inquiry under Section 476, Cr.P.C. be a substitute for it. It should be equally indisputable that the same proceeding cannot simultaneously partake of the nature of an inquiry under Section 476, Cr. P.C. and also of an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. The objects and the natures of these two kinds of inquiries, the procedures regulating them, the questions which they require to be determined, the orders to which they may lead, and the remedies provided against such orders are so different that it is inconceivable that a proceeding may possess the dual character of an inquiry under Section 476, Cr.P.C. and also of an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. 13. In this connection there is another question to be considered, and that is whether a proceeding under Section 476, Cr.P.C. could at all have been taken against the applicant in respect of the offence which he was said to have committed. In this connection there is another question to be considered, and that is whether a proceeding under Section 476, Cr.P.C. could at all have been taken against the applicant in respect of the offence which he was said to have committed. The application of Section 476, Cr.P.C. is limited to offences referred to in Section 195, sub-section (1), Clause (b) or Clause (c), Cr.P.C. It has, therefore, to be seen whether the offence alleged to have been committed by the applicant fell within the purview of Section 195 sub-section (1), Clause (b) or (c). It is not suggested that the alleged act of the applicant constituted an offence under any of the sections enumerated in Clause (b), and the charges framed against the applicant are also only under Sections 466 and 471, I.P.C. Consequently, it is only Clause (c) which may be said to have been applicable. But Clause (c), unlike Clause (b), requires that the offence should be alleged to have been committed by a party to a proceeding. The applicant, who was only acting as a counsel for Doodh Nath accused for whom the surety bonds were filed, was obviously not a party to the proceeding. Having regard to the nature of the statute and the context in which the word party has been used, it must be construed in its ordinary sense and it cannot be given an extended meaning so as to include a counsel for the party by recourse to the doctrine of agency. The point does not, to my mind, need any elaboration. I may, however, refer to Ponnusami Udayar v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1929 Mad. 115 and Lala Mathur Prasad v. Pitambar Singh, A.I.R. 1945 Pat. 362 in which it was held that a counsel appearing for a party to a proceeding cannot be considered to be himself a party to the proceeding. 14. The position, thereof, is that really speaking no proceeding under Section 476, Cr.P.C. could have been taken, and yet the fact remains that only a proceeding purporting to be under that section was taken. It is noteworthy that even in the order of commitment passed by him, the Judicial Officer observed that it was, in his opinion expedient in the interest of justice to prosecute Sri Bhatia. This observation clearly appears to have been made in order to comply with the requirements of Section 476, Cr.P.C. According to para. It is noteworthy that even in the order of commitment passed by him, the Judicial Officer observed that it was, in his opinion expedient in the interest of justice to prosecute Sri Bhatia. This observation clearly appears to have been made in order to comply with the requirements of Section 476, Cr.P.C. According to para. 23 of the counter-affidavit of the Judicial Officer the inquiry was in connection with the proceedings under Section 476, Cr.P.C. for committing the accused to the court of session in case a prima facie case was made out. From this the Judicial Officer should be taken to have thought that an inquiry in connection with a proceeding under Section 476, Cr.P.C. could by itself lead to a commitment. This, as I have said above, was not possible. 15. The question then is whether the proceeding should be regarded as really an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. The answer, I think, must be in the negative. Here it is not a case of a proceeding which without expressly purporting to be under any provision happened to conform to the requirements of an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C., although even in that case it would be difficult to uphold the commitment if the accused could have had no knowledge of the nature of the proceeding. In the instant case the proceeding clearly and unequivocally professed to be a proceeding under Section 476, Cr.P.C. By the nature of the orders passed by the Judicial Officer, the applicant was throughout given to understand and led to believe that the proceeding was only in the nature of an inquiry under Section 476, Cr.P.C., and at no stage before the framing of the charge did the Judicial Officer try to dispel the impression for which he was himself responsible and inform the applicant that the proceeding was also in the nature of an inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr. P. C. or had been converted into such an inquiry. There is one very remarkable thing which has to be noted in this connection. The last two sentences in the statement of the applicant recorded by the Judicial Officer on February 10, 1965 were: Is Ke Alava Jo Kuchh Kahna Hoga Complaint File Karne Per Kahun Ga. Is Samaya 6.00 p.m. Hai. There is one very remarkable thing which has to be noted in this connection. The last two sentences in the statement of the applicant recorded by the Judicial Officer on February 10, 1965 were: Is Ke Alava Jo Kuchh Kahna Hoga Complaint File Karne Per Kahun Ga. Is Samaya 6.00 p.m. Hai. There could be no clearer proof of the fact that even after the recording of the statements of Sri M. N. Agnihotri and Sri Daya Shanker Dube and his own examination the applicant continued to believe that the proceeding might only result in the filing of a complaint against him. In these circumstances the only course which justice and fairness could dictate to the Judicial Officer was to correct the belief which, as I have said, he was himself responsible for creating and to inform the applicant of the true nature of the proceeding. The attitude of the applicant might in that case have been different; he might have cross-examined Sri M. N. Agnihotri and Sri Daya Shanker Dube in greater detail, produced witnesses in defence or prayed for time to summon them, given a more detailed statement instead of reserving further statement as he did, or taken such objections as he could to the legality of the proceeding. An accused person is entitled to be apprised of the nature of the proceeding which a court takes against him so that he may know the consequences to which it may lead and may by taking such steps as are permitted by law avert those consequences if he can. The Court cannot keep the nature of the proceeding a secret from him or allow him to labour under a misapprehension, particularly when it is caused by the court itself, and leave him to discover the real nature of the proceeding from what happens to him as its result in the end. This would be a shocking violation of the fundamental principles of justice in criminal cases. But, I am constrained to observe, this is what appears to have happened in the present case. In his order in English dated February 10, 1965 on the order-sheet, the Judicial Officer has certainly noted that the applicant told him that he would summon only Mr. R. K. Garg and that too in the court of session. But, I am constrained to observe, this is what appears to have happened in the present case. In his order in English dated February 10, 1965 on the order-sheet, the Judicial Officer has certainly noted that the applicant told him that he would summon only Mr. R. K. Garg and that too in the court of session. But this was after the charge had been framed and it cannot, therefore, by any means show that the applicant knew of the nature of the proceeding prior to the framing of the charge. When the applicant came to know that he was being committed to session, he might have, in answer to an enquiry under Section 211, Cr.P.C., told the Judicial Officer that he would examine the abovenamed witness in the court of session. That, however, does not change the situation. 16. In the view that take on this aspect of the case I am supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in Chhadami Lal Jain v. State of Uttar Pradesh, A.I.R. 1940 S.C. 41. In that case the Magistrate had issued summons to the accused persons requiring them to answer a charge under Section 406, I.P.C. After recording the statements of prosecution witnesses and examining the accused, however, the Magistrate framed charges under Sections 409 and 465 read with Sections 471 and 477, I.P.C., and ordered commitment of the accused to the court of session on these charges. The Supreme Court quashed the commitment and, while dealing with the procedure adopted by the Magistrate, observed: "It is true that it is open to a Magistrate to hold an inquiry from the beginning under Chap. XVIII in a case not exclusively triable by the Court of Session. But the mere fact that the Magistrate has such power does not necessarily indicate to the accused that he is holding an inquiry under Chapter XVIII rather than a trial before himself. Where the case is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the accused would naturally conclude that the proceedings before the Magistrate are in the nature of a trial and not an inquiry under Chapter XVIII. Where the case is not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the accused would naturally conclude that the proceedings before the Magistrate are in the nature of a trial and not an inquiry under Chapter XVIII. If the Magistrate intends to use his powers under Section 207 and hold an inquiry from the beginning in a case not exclusively triable by the Court of Session, the only way in which the accused can know that he is holding an inquiry and not a trial is by the Magistrate informing the accused that he is holding an inquiry under Chapter XVIII and not a trial. If he fails to do so, the accused can reasonably conclude that a trial is being held. In this case undoubtedly the Magistrate did not indicate to the accused from the beginning that his proceedings were in the nature of an inquiry under Chapter XVIII. Therefore the accused would naturally conclude that the proceedings before him were in the nature of a trial of a warrant case as the summonses that they had received were under Section 406 of the Penal Code only. The fact that in the complaint Section 467, which is exclusively triable by a Court of session, was mentioned is of no consequence for the summonses to the accused were only for a trial under Section 406 of the Penal Code. It must, therefore, be held that the proceedings before the Magistrate began as in the trial of a warrant case and if the Magistrate at a subsequent stage of the proceedings was of the view that the case should be committed to the Court of Session, he would have to act under Section 347 (1) of the Code. We have been at pains to refer to this aspect of the matter for considerations would be different if the case was exclusively triable by the Court of Session and began from the outset as an inquiry under Chapter XVIII. What we shall say hereafter must, therefore, be taken to apply only to a case which began as a proceeding in a warrant or summons case and in which the Magistrate at a later stage takes action under Section 347 (1)." 17. What we shall say hereafter must, therefore, be taken to apply only to a case which began as a proceeding in a warrant or summons case and in which the Magistrate at a later stage takes action under Section 347 (1)." 17. At a later stage in its judgment the Supreme Court said: "All that he has to do when he decides that the case ought to be committed is to inform the accused and see that the provisions of Chapter XVIII are complied with upto the stage at which he decides that there ought to be a commitment." 18. The principle laid down in the above case is fully applicable to the instant case. From whatever point of view the case may therefore, be looked at it must be held that there was no inquiry under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. and the order of commitment was illegal. 19. Mr. Asif Ansari has pressed another ground also for quashing the commitment. He has contended that the material on record clearly establishes that the Judicial Officer was personally interested in the case and, therefore, under Section 556, Cr.P.C. he was incompetent to commit the case for trial. What has been said by the learned counsel to substantiate this contention is as follows. On January 20, 1965 the Judicial Officer took the applicant in custody and allowed him to be released only after his executing a personal bond. The applicant is an Advocate practising at Kanpur and no personal bond was, therefore, called for in order to ensure his attendance in a proceeding which at that stage at least purported to be only under Section 476, Cr.P.C. From an application filed by the applicant before the Judicial Officer on that date after he had been taken in custody it would appear that he had requested the Judicial Officer to let him go and attend to a case of his in the court of the Munsif, but he was not allowed to do so. It also appears that originally the Judicial Officer had passed an order which did not contain any direction for the execution of a personal bond but this order was taken, back by the Judicial Officer and it was substituted by another order containing such a direction with the object of justifying the detention of the applicant. It also appears that originally the Judicial Officer had passed an order which did not contain any direction for the execution of a personal bond but this order was taken, back by the Judicial Officer and it was substituted by another order containing such a direction with the object of justifying the detention of the applicant. In this connection reliance was placed on the fact that in the application filed by the applicant before the Judicial Officer on that date there was a mention of this change in the order. Further, there is on the record of the case copy of an application dated January 22, 1965 purporting to have been sent by the applicant to the Judicial Officer. On this application there is a note that since the Judicial Officer refused to receive the application it was despatched under certificate of posting and there is also a note dated January 25, 1965 purporting to be by the Judicial Officer showing that the application was received by post. The application also contains an endorsement by the applicant that a copy of it was being sent to the District Magistrate with reference to the applicants personal interview with the District Magistrate on January 21, 1965. In this application it was alleged that the Judicial Officer had been bearing ill-will towards the applicant for some time past and the proceeding against the applicant had been taken only with a view to cause harm to the applicant and damage his reputation as a lawyer. In his application dated February 9, 1965 the applicant alleged that the Judicial Officer had gone to his seat on that day and had threatened him. Again, in the reply filed by the applicant on February 10, 1965 to the notice issued against him, the applicant stated among other things that the case was one of personal vendetta and had been started by the Judicial Officer with the object of injuring the applicants reputation and it was actuated by a feeling of revenge. Again, in the reply filed by the applicant on February 10, 1965 to the notice issued against him, the applicant stated among other things that the case was one of personal vendetta and had been started by the Judicial Officer with the object of injuring the applicants reputation and it was actuated by a feeling of revenge. It has also been pointed out that on the view that the Judicial Officer took of the statements of the applicant in his examination by the Judicial Officer, the allegations made in the reply could themselves have been made the subject matter of proceedings under Section 480, Cr.P.C., but the Judicial Officer purposely ordered the reply to be put up with the file at 3-30 p.m., and it has been suggested that the object that the Judicial Officer had in his mind was that he should first take up the proceeding for which notice had been given so that he could order the commitment of the accused to the court of session without any obstruction. According to the learned counsel, the Magistrate took up the hearing of the case designedly at 3-30 p.m. so that the order of commitment might be passed long after the court hours and the applicant might be taken in custody without a chance of his being released on bail by the court of session that day. The statement of the applicant, it was pointed out, itself shows that it finished at 6-00 p.m. and naturally, therefore, the framing of the charge and the passing of the order of commitment must have been done at a later hour still. After passing the order of commitment a proceeding under Section 480, Cr.P.C. was drawn up against the applicant and he was convicted and sentenced to a fine of Rs. 2001-. The contention of Mr. Asif Ansari is that irrespective of the correctness or otherwise of the allegations made by the applicant regarding previous ill-will and improper conduct on the part of the Judicial Officer on February 9, 1965 the facts on record are in themselves positively indicative of a revengeful attitude adopted by the Judicial Officer towards the applicant and a design on his part to put the applicant into trouble and humiliate him. I cannot, however, go into questions of fact which include inferences of fact, because under Section 215, Cr.P.C. a commitment can be quashed only on a point of law. Mr. Asif Ansari has urged that the question of the bar of Section 556, Cr.P.C. is a question of law and if for deciding that question a determination of facts becomes necessary, Section 215, Cr.P.C. does not preclude the determination. The argument, to my mind, is untenable. An investigation of facts even though they bear on a question of law, is outside the purview of Section 215, Cr.P.C. which excludes in emphatic terms the quashing of commitment on any point other than a point of law. Mr. Asif Ansari has, however, based his argument on the bar of Section 556, Cr.P.C. on another ground as well. He has urged that the Judicial Officer should be regarded as having become personally interested by reason of the fact that he had initiated the proceeding against the applicant by directing the issue of a notice to him to show cause why he should not be prosecuted. This part of the argument of the learned counsel appears to me to be quite correct. 20. What is meant by personally interested in Section 556, Cr.P.C. has been explained by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of Rameshwar Bhartia v. The State of Assam, A.I.R. 1952 S.C. 405. In that case a Magistrate, who had granted a sanction for the prosecution of the accused under Section 38 of the Assam Food Grains Control Order in his capacity as a Director under that Order, had tried the case himself. It was held that he had not become personally interested within the meaning of Section 556, Cr.P.C. by reason of the sanction and the trial was not vitiated. Their Lordships, however, said that personal interest within the meaning of the section is not limited to private interest and that it may well include official interest also, and they pointed out the distinction between sanction and direction in the following terms: "In both cases of sanction and direction, an application of the mind is necessary, but there is this essential difference that in the one case there is a legal impediment to the prosecution if there be no sanction, and in the other case, there is a positive order that the prosecution should be launched. For a sanction, all that is necessary for one to be satisfied about is the existence of a prima facie case. In the case of a direction, a further element that the accused deserves to be prosecuted is involved. The question whether a Magistrate is personally interested or not has essentially to be decided on the facts in each case. Pecuniary interest, however small, will be a disqualification, but as regards other kinds of interest, there is no measure or standard except that it should be a substantial one, giving rise to a real bias or a reasonable apprehension on the part of the accused of such bias. The maxim Nome Debt esse judex in propria sua causa applies only when the interest attributed is such as to render the case his own cause. The fulfilment of a technical requirement imposed by a statute may not, in many cases, amount to a mental satisfaction of the truth of the facts placed before the officer. Whether sanction should be granted or not may conceivably depend upon considerations extraneous to the merits of the case. But where a prosecution is directed, it means that the authority who gives the direction is satisfied in his own mind that the case must be initiated. Sanction is in the nature of a permission, while a direction is in the nature of a command." 21. At a later stage in their judgment their Lordships summoned up the position as follows: "As stated already, the question whether the bar under Section 556 comes into play depends upon the facts and circumstances of each particular case, the dividing line being a thin one somewhat but still sufficiently definite and tangible, namely, the removal of a legal impediment by the grant of sanction and the initiation of criminal proceedings as the result of a direction. In the present case before us, we have nothing more than a sanction, and consequently we are unable to hold that the trial has become vitiated by reason of the provisions of Section 556, Cr.P.C." 22. In the light of the principle enunciated in the above case it must be held that the Judicial Officer had become personally interested within the meaning of Section 556, Cr.P.C. He directed the issue of notice under Section 476, Cr. P.C. calling upon the applicant to show cause why he should not be prosecuted. In the light of the principle enunciated in the above case it must be held that the Judicial Officer had become personally interested within the meaning of Section 556, Cr.P.C. He directed the issue of notice under Section 476, Cr. P.C. calling upon the applicant to show cause why he should not be prosecuted. In the order for issue of notice he stated what, according to him, had happened in connection with the filing of the surety bonds, and he categorically stated in the order that by doing the act mentioned therein the applicant intentionally made interpolations in the records and tried to obtain orders in his favour. He also expressed the opinion that the act of the applicant amounted to an offence. The Judicial Officers order did not therefore merely amount to removing a legal impediment as a sanction does; it recorded this as a fact that the act mentioned in the order was committed by the applicant and it also incorporated the definite conclusion of the Judicial Officer that the act amounted to an offence. The order was thus clearly akin to a direction, and at any rate it is manifest that the Judicial Officer initiated the proceeding which ultimately led to the commitment of the applicant. Besides this, the Judicial Officer was in this case dealing with what had taken place in his presence and he was himself a witness of the alleged act. In para. 22 of his counter-affidavit the Judicial Officer has stated that for the purpose of filing the complaint no evidence was necessary because everything happened in the presence of the deponent. In para 6 of his counter-affidavit he has repudiated the applicants version of facts and has affirmed the correctness of the prosecution version. In para. 8 of the counter-affidavit it has been stated by him that the surety bonds were handed over to him by applicant and he crossed the blank spaces meant for filling in the amount and rejected the bonds. All the contents of the counter-affidavit have been sworn by the Judicial Officer on personal knowledge. In these circumstances acceptance of the defence version by the Judicial Officer should be regarded as having been a foregone conclusion, and indeed a finding may be said to have been already given by him in his order dated January 20, 1965. 23. All the contents of the counter-affidavit have been sworn by the Judicial Officer on personal knowledge. In these circumstances acceptance of the defence version by the Judicial Officer should be regarded as having been a foregone conclusion, and indeed a finding may be said to have been already given by him in his order dated January 20, 1965. 23. Commitment to the court of session made by a Magistrate who claims to be himself a witness of the alleged commission of the offence which forms the subject matter of the inquiry, who has already made a record of facts which are said to have happened and constituted the offence in an order passed by him before the starting of the inquiry and 1 has expressed in the order a definite opinion that the facts do constitute an offence, and who has also himself initiated the criminal proceeding which has directly led to the commitment, is nothing short of a traversity of judicial procedure. If a proceeding under Chapter XVIII, Cr.P.C. is to have any meaning and purpose and is not to be reduced to a mere ceremony, the Magistrate must in a case of this kind be regarded as disqualified under Section 556, Cr.P.C. for having become personally interested.1 The expression personally interested used in Section 556, Cr.P.C. is not to be understood as carrying any sinister implication and a Magistrate may be personally interested within the meaning of the section even if there is nothing wrong or improper in his interest, I may in this connection draw attention to Mudkaya Andanaya-In re, A.I.R. 1927 Bom. 35, Sai v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1927 Lahore 671, Chhinnaswami Reddiar v. K. Kuppuswamy, A.I.R. 1955 Mad. 534, Mamoon v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1922 Lahore 30, Rahimbux Karimbux v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1935 Sindh 1 Emperor v. Mahomed Shah Kamil, 8 Cr.L.J. 356, Faiz Muhammad v. Emperor, 14 Cr.L.J. 385, Bisheshar Bhattacharya. v. King Emperor, 7 A.L.J. R. 749 and The State v. Pyarey Lal Srivastava, AIR 1953 Allahabad 694. 534, Mamoon v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1922 Lahore 30, Rahimbux Karimbux v. Emperor, A.I.R. 1935 Sindh 1 Emperor v. Mahomed Shah Kamil, 8 Cr.L.J. 356, Faiz Muhammad v. Emperor, 14 Cr.L.J. 385, Bisheshar Bhattacharya. v. King Emperor, 7 A.L.J. R. 749 and The State v. Pyarey Lal Srivastava, AIR 1953 Allahabad 694. These cases illustrate what kinds of action taken for initiating criminal proceedings have been held as amounting to personal interest and attracting the operation of Section 558, Cr.P.C. In the instant case, as I have noted above, the Judicial Officer had not merely initiated the proceeding but he claimed to have witnessed the commission of the offence by the applicant and had also made a record to that effect in his order dated January 20,1965. The interest of the Judicial Officer was, therefore, of a far more disqualifying nature and he was clearly barred by Section 556, Cr.P.C. from committing the case for trial. On this ground too the order of commitment passed by the Judicial Officer has to be quashed. 24. The application is accordingly allowed and the order dated February 10, 1965 committing the applicant to the Court of Session is hereby quashed.