JUDGMENT G. C. Mathur, J. - October 5, 1954, the Rev. E. B. Steiner, representing the Tibetan Frontier Mission, executed a deed of settlement in favour of the petitioner representing the Tibetan Frontier Field of the Evangelical Alliance Mission in respect of certain property. The property was valued in the deed at Rs. 4,000/- and the deed was executed on stamp paper of the requisite value. The deed was registered by the Sub- Registrar of Pithoragarh on October 9, 1954. It appears that some suit had been filed by respondent no. 4 (Swami Pranvanand) against the petitioner and, in that suit, the petitioner had taken the plea that the value of the property involved therein was Rs. 12,000/- and not Rs. 4,000/- shown by the Swami in the plaint. The Swami seems to have been annoyed at this. Some time in April, 1955, he addressed letters to the Deputy Commissioner, Almora, to the Minister for Revenue, to the Intelligence Bureau at New Delhi and to the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pithoragarh, stating that the Rev. E. B. Steiner and the petitioner had got a deed of settlement registered in which the property had been deliberately and fraudulently undervalued at Rs. 4,000/-only though the real approximate value thereof was Rs. 1,28,000/-. On the basis of these letters, enquiries were started and the Tahsildar, Pithoragarh, was called upon to make a detailed report. The Tahsildar made an ex parte report valuing the property at Rs. 72,680/-. The matter was then referred by the Deputy Commissioner, Almora, to the District Government Counsel, Almora, who was of the opinion that the valuation was not proper. The Deputy Commissioner then ordered the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pithoragarh, to hear the executant of the deed and then report whether the document was under-valued. The Sub-Divisional Officer, on Sep. 5, 1955, sent a notice to the Rev. E. B. Steiner. The notice reads as under:- "Whereas it has come to my notice that a deed termed as settlement deed was executed by you in favour of Sri R. A. Remington which is under-stamped, you are, therefore, directed to produce the said document in original in my court at Pithoragarh at 11 A.M. on 30-9-1955 either personally or through any duly authorised agent. You are further directed to produce evidence on that date showing how the total value of the property in the deed in question has been estimated at Rs. 4,000/-". You are further directed to produce evidence on that date showing how the total value of the property in the deed in question has been estimated at Rs. 4,000/-". 2. The Rev. E. B. Steiner was lying ill there in a hospital in Mussoorie and the notice was re-directed to him there. From Mussoorie he directed the petitioner to comply with the notice. Thereupon, on October 5, 1955, the petitioner produced the original deed before the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pithoragarh. On October 6, 1955, the Sub-Divisional Officer ordered the Tahsildar to make a correct valuation. Thereafter proceedings dragged on. Several reports were made regarding the valuation and rejected. Ultimately, the Sub-Divisional Officer made a report on September 3, 1959. The petitioner's case is that this report was made behind the petitioner's back and without giving him an adequate opportunity of being heard and, when he asked for a copy of the report, the copy was refused to him. This report was forwarded to the Board of Revenue on September 18, 1959. The Board of Revenue directed that the deed be impounded and the deficient duty of Rs. 390/- along with suitable penalty be levied and realised from the executant. On November 30, 1959, the Deputy Commissioner, Almora, sent a notice to the Rev. E. B. Steiner, who had died long before, to produce evidence against the report of the Sub-Divisional Officer dated September 3, 1959, valuing the property at Rs. 35,320.83 N.P. The notice indicated that the case had been registered as Stamp Case No. 3 of 59-60. The first paragraph of this notice stated that the valuation had been got verified through the Sub-Divisional Officer, Pithoragarh, on the report of Swami Pranvanand. A reply was filed to this notice on January 4, 1960. A copy of this reply is annexed to this petition as Annexure-D and the very first ground taken therein is that the enquiry regarding the alleged deficient stamp duty on the deed of settlement was not warranted either on facts or in law. At the instance of the Swami, the case was transferred to the Deputy Commissioner, Pithoragarh. By the impugned order dated December 30, 1960, the Deputy Commissioner, Pithoragarh, held that the property mentioned in the deed of settlement was of the value of Rs. 9,313.33 N. P. and called upon the petitioner to pay the stamp duty of Rs. 5,313.33 N.P. within one month. By the impugned order dated December 30, 1960, the Deputy Commissioner, Pithoragarh, held that the property mentioned in the deed of settlement was of the value of Rs. 9,313.33 N. P. and called upon the petitioner to pay the stamp duty of Rs. 5,313.33 N.P. within one month. The petitioner thereupon filed the present writ petition. 3. Shri Yudhisthira, learned counsel for the petitioner, has raised the following three contentions before me: - 1. That the Deputy Commissioner had no jurisdiction to take proceedings under Sec. 33 of the Indian Stamp Act as he had no power to summon the deed of settlement for the purposes of finding out whether proper stamp duty had been paid thereon or not; 2. That the report made by the Sub-Divisional Officer dated September 3, 1959, was made without giving the petitioner an opportunity of producing his evidence and it was used by the Deputy Commissioner against the petitioner without giving him a copy thereof or giving him any opportunity of contesting it on merits; and 3. That there are manifest errors in the order of the Deputy Commissioner in the valuation of the property. 4. Since I am of the view that this petition must succeed on the first ground, it will not be necessary to consider the second and the third ground, raised by Shri Yudhisthira. 5. Sec. 33(1) of the Indian Stamp Act stands thus: - "33(1) - Every person having by law or consent of parties authority to receive evidence, and every person in charge of a public office, except an officer of police, before whom any instrument, chargeable, in his opinion, with duty, is produced or comes in the performance of his functions, shall, if it appears to him that such instrument is not duly stamped, impound the same." 6. The petitioners contention is that Sec. 33 does not empower the authorities to direct a party to produce the document for the purpose of ascertaining whether it was properly stamped or not. The provisions of this section are only attracted when a document is produced or comes before an authority, mentioned in the section, in the performance of its functions. The petitioners contention is that Sec. 33 does not empower the authorities to direct a party to produce the document for the purpose of ascertaining whether it was properly stamped or not. The provisions of this section are only attracted when a document is produced or comes before an authority, mentioned in the section, in the performance of its functions. In view of the decision of the Full Bench of this Court reported in Raja Muhammad Amir Ahmad Khan v. The Deputy Commissioner, Sitapur, 1956 ALJ 220 and of the Supreme Court reported in Government of Uttar Pradesh v. Raja Muhammad Amir Ahmad Khan, 1961 ALJ 613 where the decision of this Court was upheld, the provisions of Sec. 33 are applicable only when a document is either produced for purposes of evidence or it comes before a court or authority when that court or authority is performing its normal functions. That was not the case here. The document was neither produced as a piece of evidence nor did it come before the Sub-Divisional Officer or tire Deputy Commissioner in the performance of their functions. Shri K. B. Garg, learned Junior Standing Counsel did not seek to justify the impugned order under Sec. 33 of the Indian Stamp Act and, therefore, it is unnecessary to examine this question in any greater detail. It is, however clear that the authorities had no power to summon the deed for purposes of finding out whether it had been properly stamped or not. 7. Shri Garg contended that the impugned order was passed either under Sec. 31(1) or Sec. 41 of the Act. Sec. 31(1) reads thus: - "31(1) When any instrument, whether executed or not and whether previously stamped or not, is brought to the Collector, and the person bringing it applies to have the opinion of that officer as to the duty (if any) with which it is chargeable, and pays a fee of such amount (not exceeding five rupees and not less than fifty naye paise) as the Collector may in each case direct, the Collector shall determine the duty (if any) with which, in his judgment, the instrument is chargeable." In my opinion, this section is wholly inapplicable to the facts of the present case. The petitioner did not voluntarily produce the deed to obtain the opinion of the Collector as regard the duty payable thereon. The petitioner did not voluntarily produce the deed to obtain the opinion of the Collector as regard the duty payable thereon. The deed was produced in response to a notice requiring its production. The executant or the petitioner did not have any doubt about the duty payable and did not seek the opinion of the Collector. The impugned order can, by no stretch of imagination, be justified under Sec. 31(1) of the Act. Sec. 41 of the Act is as follows :- "41 - If any instrument chargeable with duty and not duly stamped, not sent being an instrument chargeable with a duty not exceeding ten naye paise only or a bill of exchange or promissory note, is produced by any person of his own motion before the Collector within one year from the date of its execution or first execution, and such person brings to the notice of the Collector the fact that such instrument is on for a number of years, causing not duly stamped and offers to pay to the Collector the amount of the proper duty, or the amount required to make up the same, and the Collector is satisfied that the omission to duly stamp such instrument has been occasioned by accident, mistake or urgent necessity, he may, instead of proceeding under Sec. 33 and 40, receive such amount and proceed as next hereinafter prescribed. " 8. It is obvious from a plain reading of this section that it can have no application to the present case. This section applies to a case where a deed or instrument is produced by any person of his own motion. This was not so in the present case. The deed was produced in response to a notice by the Sub-Divisional Officer. Then again, it was not the case of the petitioner that the omission to duly stamp the instrument had been occasioned by accident, mistake or urgent necessity. None of the conditions required for the application of this section is present in this case. The impugned order cannot be justified under this section either. 9. It was contended by Shri Garg that Rule 12 of the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue permitted the summoning of such documents and then dealing with the case as thought it fell under Sec. 41 of the Act. The impugned order cannot be justified under this section either. 9. It was contended by Shri Garg that Rule 12 of the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue permitted the summoning of such documents and then dealing with the case as thought it fell under Sec. 41 of the Act. The Standing Order of the Board of Revenue are mere executive instructions and they cannot confer upon the authorities any powers beyond those conferred by the Indian Stamp Act or the rules framed thereunder. Sec. 41 not being applicable to the Standing Orders of the Board of Revenue cannot make it applicable. 10. In my opinion, the entire proceeding that were taken in this case were without jurisdiction and the impugned order is liable to be quashed. These unjustifiable proceedings were unnecessarily dragged on for a number of years, causing great harassment to the Petitioner and unnecessary expenditure of his time and money. It is alleged by the Petitioner that the authorities played into the hands of the Swami who had his own axe to grind. It is apparent from the proceedings of this case that there is justification for this complaint. Even the Deputy Commissioner has adversely commented upon the manner in which these proceeding were carried on. The petitioner has made allegations against the Swami and the authorities which dealt with the case but neither the Swami nor those authorities have filed any counter-affidavit to contest those allegations. A counter-affidavit has been filed by a Sub-Divisional Magistrate who never dealt with the case. It is regrettable that a person, like the petitioner who was doing missionary and charitable work, should have been put to such harassment and unnecessary expenditure of time and money. 11. Admittedly, the extra stamp duty demanded from the petitioner was paid by him, one of the prayers made in the writ petition is to refund the excess duty paid under the impugned order. This prayer was opposed on the ground that the petitioner should first proceed under the Act and, if he is unable to claim a refund thereunder, then he should approach this Court. I do not find any provision in the Indian Stamp Act for claiming a refund in the circumstances of this case. This prayer was opposed on the ground that the petitioner should first proceed under the Act and, if he is unable to claim a refund thereunder, then he should approach this Court. I do not find any provision in the Indian Stamp Act for claiming a refund in the circumstances of this case. Though, normally, this Court does not order refund of amounts paid or recovered in its writ jurisdiction, I consider that this is a fit case in which a refund should be directed. 12. I accordingly allow this writ petition and quash the order of the Deputy Commissioner, Pithoragarh dated December 30, 1960. I further direct respondent Nos. 1 to 3 to return the deed of settlement to the petitioner and to refund the excess amount of duty paid by him in pursuance of the impugned order. The petitioner will be entitled to his petition from respondent Nos. 1 to 3. Petition allowed.