D. K. Mahajan, J. ( 1 ) THIS petition for revision has been placed before us in pursuance of the order of Grover J. dated the 8th of February, 1966 in. . view of the importance of the questions involved in the petition. ( 2 ) THE facts giving rise to this petition may now be stated. A suit for recovery of Rs. 6,480. 00 on account of arrears of rent for a period of three years anterior to the institution of the suit at the rate of Rs. 180. 00 per mensern alongwith a prayer for eviction of the defendants from the premises in dispute was filled on the 7th of February, 1959. In this suit, the following defendants were impleaded :- 1. Shri Daulat Ram Mohan Das, Cloth Merchant, (resident of Bombay): 2. Messrs Daulat Ram Mohan Dass, a partnership firm (carrying on business at Bombay) ; and 3. Messrs Daulat Ram Ram Chand Brothers, a partnership firm (carrying on business at the suit-premises ). It will be useful at this stage to set out the partners of defendant No. 2. They are :- (1) Daulat Ram Mohan Dass (2) Ram Chand Daulat Ram (3) Vasu Dev Daulat Ram (4) Amar Chand Daulat Ram (5) Shri Chand Daulat Ram (6) Sham Das Daulat Ram (7) Moti Mal Dwarka Dass (8) Bhagwan Das Daya Ram (9) Mohan Lal Gokal Dass Udeshi (10) Pribh Dass Sant Dass and (11) Naina Mal Chhotan Mal. The partners of defendant No. 3 are :- (1) Ram Chand Daulat Ram (2) Vasu Dev Daulat Ram (3) Amar Chand Daulat Ram and (4) Shri Chand Daulat Ram. Thus the partners of defendant No. 3. in toto are the partners of defendant No. 2. Defendants Nos. 2 and 3 are partnership firms. Defendant No. 2. carries on business at Bombay and defendant No. 3 carries on business in the suit-premises. The property belonged to a Muslim and it was taken on lease by defendant No. 1. On the migration of the Muslim owner to Pakistan, the property was declared evacuee property and defendant No. 1 became a tenant under the Custodian. The plaintiffs Ram Vichar Sethi and Ram Parkash Sethi, purchased the suit-property on 4th of January, 1956 and thus became the landlords of defendant No. 1. The basic rent of the premises is Rs. 120. On the migration of the Muslim owner to Pakistan, the property was declared evacuee property and defendant No. 1 became a tenant under the Custodian. The plaintiffs Ram Vichar Sethi and Ram Parkash Sethi, purchased the suit-property on 4th of January, 1956 and thus became the landlords of defendant No. 1. The basic rent of the premises is Rs. 120. 00 per mensem and if allowance is made for the permissible increase under the law, it is alleged that it would come to Rs. 180. 00. That is how a claim for rent at the rate of Rs. 180. 00 is made with a prayer that it be increased according to law. ( 3 ) THE suit was contested by the defendants and it was pleaded inter alia that firm Messrs Daulat Ram Mohan Dass, defendant No. 2, had taken on lease the suit-premises from the owners over 30 years ago. It was denied that the premises had been taken by defendant No. 1 personally or that defendant No. 1 had become the tenant of the Custodian after the migration of the muslim owner. Firm Daulat Ram Mohan Dass was stated to be the tenant and it has continued to be the tenant until Daulat Ram Mohan Dass retired. It was further submitted that the Custodian had accepted defendant No. 2 as tenant and has been accepting rent from defendant No. 2. It was also pleaded that the Custodian had accepted rent from Messrs Daulat Ram Ram Chand Brothers, defendant No. 3, and, therefore, the Custodian as well as the plaintiffs, who are the successors of the Custodian, were estopped from taking up the plea of subletting or assignment. ( 4 ) THE plaintiffs, during the trial, accepted the position that defendant No. 2 was the tenant. The trial Judge held that the arrears of rent had not been tendered or deposited by defendant No. 2 and on that ground ordered the eviction of the defendants. The ground of subletting was held by the trial Judge to be of no consequence as the property was owned by the Government and was not subject to the provisions of the Rent Control Act of 1952. The standard rent was fixed by the trial Court at Rs. 165. 25 np. with effect from 1st of March, 1961. The plaintiffs were granted a decree for Rs. 4,816. 62 np. and also for ejectment. The standard rent was fixed by the trial Court at Rs. 165. 25 np. with effect from 1st of March, 1961. The plaintiffs were granted a decree for Rs. 4,816. 62 np. and also for ejectment. The plaintiffs as well as the defendants were dissatisfied with this judgment and preferred appeals against the same. The Additional District Judge, before whom these appeals- came up for hearing, allowed the defendants appeal and set aside the decree of ejectment passed against them. He also partly allowed the appeal of the plaintiffs and enhanced the amount decreed in their favour by Rs. 776. 85 np. The learned Additional District Judge, with. regard to the payment of arrears of rent, held that the same had been paid by two deposits made on 26th of May, 1959 of Rs. 8,672. 00 and on the 1st of September, 1959 of Rs. 1,000. 00. It was noticed that though the money was paid on behalf of defendant No. 3, the deposit was a valid one on behalf of defendant No. 2, as it was made by four of the partner, of the defendant No. 2. For this view, the learned Judge based himself on the well-settled rule that a firm is not a legal entity but is merely a compendious mode of designating the persons who have agreed to carry on business in partnership. On the question of subletting, the learned Judge agreed with the trial Court. On the merits. of subletting, however, the learned Judge took the view that there was no subletting as four of the partners of defendant No. 2. continue occupy the premises in the name of firm Messrs Daulat Ram Ram Chand Brothers. As regards standard rent, it was held that it could be increased by only 37-1 per cent under the second schedule, part A, para 5 of the 1952 Act. It was also held that the Court was entitled to fix any date from which the standard rent was payable. Against this decision, the present petition for revision has been preferred by the plaintiffs. It was also held that the Court was entitled to fix any date from which the standard rent was payable. Against this decision, the present petition for revision has been preferred by the plaintiffs. When this petition came up before the learned Single Judge, the following two matters, on which there was a great deal of controversy, necessitated the reference to a larger Bench :- (1) Whether the deposit made by defendant No. 3, which is a firm consisting of four persons, was a valid deposit by tenant so as to attract the applicability of section 13 (2) of the Act of 1952, it being common ground that the partners of defendant No. 3 were also the partners of defendant No. 2 which consisted of partners ranging between six to ten at different times; and (2) Whether there would be subletting and parting with possession if defendant No. 2, a firmconsisting of six to ten partners, was no longer in possession of the premises and admittedly it was defendant No. 3, a firm consisting of four partners who were also partners of defendant No. 2, which was in possession on the date of the institution of the suit: The learned Single Judge also observed :- "it may be mentioned in connection with the second point that the view of the Courts below that subletting would be of no consequence in the present case is erroneous and cannot be sustained owing to a Bench decision of this Court in Gobind Ram v. Takhat Mal Kanungo. That is how the matter has been placed before us. ( 5 ) THE contentions of Mr. Hardayal Hardy, learned counsel for the plaintiffs, are as follows :- (1) That the payment of rent by defendant No. 3 could not be taken as payment of rent by defendant No. 2, because defendant No. 3 was a different partnership and so was defendant No. 2. The mere fact that all the partners of defendant No. 3 are partners of defendant No. 2 will not be of any consequence ; (2) That there was clear sub-letting of the premises because defendant No. 2 was a tenant in which there were II partners ; whereas the premises are in possession of defendant No. 3 in which there are 4 partners. Moreover, both the firms are different and carry on business at different places; (3. Moreover, both the firms are different and carry on business at different places; (3. That the plaintiffs were entitled to 50 per cent increase under paragraph 4, part A of the second Schedule ; the premises being business premises ; and (4) That no reasons have been given by the Additional District Judge for fixing the rent with effect from 1-3-1961. The rent should have been fixed with effect from the 7th August, 1958 and, in any case, with effect from 7th of February, 1959. ( 6 ) SO far as the first contention is concerned, the learned counsel has placed his reliance on the decision in 1959 Allahabad Weekly Report 18, for the contention that the two firms are separate entities and, therefore, payment of rent by defendant No. 3 will not amount to payment of rent by defendant No. 2. This decision does not really support the contention of the learned counsel. Moreover if it is held to support the contention, it runs counter to the settled course of decisions of this Court and the Supreme Court that a firm or a partnership is not a legal entity; but is merely a compendious mode of describing the partners constituting the same. This Court in Firm Jaikishan Dass Jinda Ram and others v. Central Bank of India at page 2, while dealing with the question, whether a partnership is a legal entity distinct from the members who have composed it, observed as follows :- "the question whether a partnership is a legal entity distinct from the members who compose it, is not entirely free from difficulty. According to one school of thought, a partnership is an artificial person, a legal entity, having peculiar rights and attributes dictinct from the members who compose it. It is separate in estate, in rights and in obligations from the members. It can own property apart from the individual property of its members which it does not; it can owe debts apart from the individual debts of its members which it does not owe. It can buy and sell ; it can sue and be sued ; it can pleaded and be impleaded in a Court of law. A judgment may be passed against a partnership as well as against the partners who compose it. It may be adjudicated an insolvent although the parties who compose it may not be so adjudicated. It can buy and sell ; it can sue and be sued ; it can pleaded and be impleaded in a Court of law. A judgment may be passed against a partnership as well as against the partners who compose it. It may be adjudicated an insolvent although the parties who compose it may not be so adjudicated. This is the general mercantile conception of a partnership and there is a growing tendency on the part of the Courts to adopt this view of the business world. According to another school of thought, a partnership is not an artificial person like a corporation bat a voluntary association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profits. This conception of a partnership springs from the agreement on which it is founded and is supported by the Indian Partnership Act which defines partnership as a relationship between the persons who have agreed to share the profits of a business carried on by all or any of them acting for all. The use of the partnership name is of no value except in so far as it represents natural persons. Amid this conflict of authority preponderance of judicial opinion appears to favour the proposition that a partnership is a contractual association with certain incidents recognised by law for the convenient transaction of legitimate trade and business and that its status as a legal entity is limited and incomplete. This conclusion finds support from the fact that although these associations have been in existence for countless years the legislature has not thought fit to designate them as corporations but has preferred TO call them as partnerships. In this view of the case it seems to me that although two separate firms are involved in the present litigation, they are not two separate legal entities and cannot be distinguished from the members who compose them. It follows as a corollary that although two separate accounts were opened with the Bank, one in the name of firm No. 1 and the other in the name of firm No. 2, the customers in both the cases were the same namely, the appellants. The Bank was a creditor of the appellants in one case and a debtor of the appellants in the other. It is manifest that mutual demands existed between the Bank on the one hand and the appellants on the other. The Bank was a creditor of the appellants in one case and a debtor of the appellants in the other. It is manifest that mutual demands existed between the Bank on the one hand and the appellants on the other. " Suhbarao,cj,in Thellula Jalavya v. Namana venkateswara Rao and others, on page 659, observed as follows :- "it is settled law that a firm is not a legal entity but only consists of the individual partners for the time being. The essential characteristic of a firm is that each partner is a representative of the other partners. Each of the partners is an agent and a principal. He is an agent so far as he can bind the other partners by his acts within the scope of the partnership business and he is a principal to the extent that he is bound by the acts of the other partners. The liabilities of the firm can be enforced against each of the partners personally. Imarn J. , in Furushettam Umedbhai and Company v. Messrs Manilal and Sons, laid down the following two propositions :- " (1) that the word firm or the firm name in section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act is merely a compendious description of all the partners collectively. Where a suit is filed in the name of a firm it is still a suit by all the the partners of the firm unless it is proved that all the partners had not authorised the suit. (2) that it is not necessary that the power of attorney should be signed by all the partnersof the firm. A partner is an agent of the firm and there is no prohibition to a partner executing a power of attorney in favour of an individual authorising him to institute a suit on behalf of the firm. " To the same effect are the observations of their Lordships of the Sup erne Court in Her Highness Maharani Mandalsa Devi and others v. M. Ramnarain Private Limited and other, and Addanki Narayanappa and another v. Bhaskara Krishnappa. Mr. Hardy, learned counsel lor the petitoners, contended that the real tenant was defendant No. 2, which had, besides the 4 partners of defendant No. 3, other persons ; and, therefore,the payment by the four partners would not be payment by all the partners of defendant No. 3, who are more than four. Mr. Hardy, learned counsel lor the petitoners, contended that the real tenant was defendant No. 2, which had, besides the 4 partners of defendant No. 3, other persons ; and, therefore,the payment by the four partners would not be payment by all the partners of defendant No. 3, who are more than four. This contention has no force because the learned counsel was constrained to admit that the liability of the partners is joint and several. The landlord could recover the entire rent due from one of the partners and, therefore, the entire rent could be paid by one of the partners and the landlord would not be justified in refusing to accept the same. Mr. Hardy then relied upon the challan forms to show that rent had been deposited by defendant No. 3, which was a different firm. The fact, however, remains that the rent was deposited by four of the. partners who are partners in defendant No. 2 and the mere fact, that the rent was deposited in a different firm name, would not, in any manner, affect the legal position. So long as partnership is not a legal entity and it merely denotes the partners, there is no escape from the conslusion that the rent was deposited by some of the partners of defendant No. 2. It is not a case where a person, who is not partner of defendant No. 2, has deposited the rent. Mr. Hardy then sought to rely on the provisions of section 3 (42) of the General Clauses Act, which provides that- "persons shall include a company or association or body of individuals whether incorporated or not. " According to the learned counsel, the firm will be a person within the meaning of the definition and, therefore, it is maintained that -tenant would be the firm because the definition of tenant in 2 (j) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for any premises. Thus according to the learned counsel, the rent was payable by defendant No 2 and defendant No. 3 being not the same person as defendant No. 2, there was no valid deposit of rent in accordance with law. A similar contention in Duli Chand Laximinaryan v. Income-Tax-Commissioner, Nagpur was negatived by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. Thus according to the learned counsel, the rent was payable by defendant No 2 and defendant No. 3 being not the same person as defendant No. 2, there was no valid deposit of rent in accordance with law. A similar contention in Duli Chand Laximinaryan v. Income-Tax-Commissioner, Nagpur was negatived by their Lordships of the Supreme Court. At page 358 of the judgment, the following observations occur :- "it is clear from the foregoing discussion that the law, English as well as Indian, has, for some specific purposes some of which are REFERRED TO above, relaxed its rigid notions and extended a limited personality to a firm. Nevertheless the general concept of partnership, firmly established in both systems of law, still is that a firm is not an entity or person in law but is merely an association of individuals and a firm name is only a collective name of those individuals who constitute the firm. In other words, a firm name is merely an expression, only a compendious mode of designating the persons who have agreed to carry on business in partnership. According to the principles of English jurisprudence, which we have adopted, for the purposes of determining legal rights there is no such thing as a firm known to the law as was said by James L. J. in- ex parte Corbett . (1880) 14 Ch. D. 122 at p. 126. In these circumstances to import the "definition of the word person, occuring in section 3 (42) of the General Clauses Act, 1897, into section 4 of the Indian Partnership Act will,. according to lawyers English or Indian, be totally repugnant to the subject of partnership law as they know and understand it to be. It is in this view of the matter that it has been consistently held in this country that a firm as such is not entitled to enter into partnership with another firm or individuals. It is not necessary to refer in detail to those decisions many of which will be found cited in 1955-27 I T R 88 to which a reference has already been made. We need only refer to the case of- bhagwanji Morarji Goculdas v. Alembic Chemical Works Co. It is not necessary to refer in detail to those decisions many of which will be found cited in 1955-27 I T R 88 to which a reference has already been made. We need only refer to the case of- bhagwanji Morarji Goculdas v. Alembic Chemical Works Co. Ltd. 1948 PC 100 (AIR V. 35 where it has been laid down by the Privy Council that Indian Law has not given legal personality to a firm apart from the partners. This view finds support from and is implicit in the observations made by this Court in the commr. of Income-tax West Bengal v. A. W. Figgies and Co. , 1953 SC 455 (AIR V. 40, Therefore, from whatever perspective the matter is examined, there can be no manner of doubt that there was a proper deposit of rent in the present case because it was deposited by the persons who, in law, were liable for it and thus could deposit it. ( 7 ) SO far as the second contention is concerned, there can be no question of subletting because the possession of the premises is with the persons who were liable to pay the rent. It hardly matters whether they are part of defendant No. 2 or defendant No. 3. There is no denying the fact that they are part of defendant No. 2 and as such are in possession of the premises. There is no stranger with them. Moreover, in the case of business, there is no subletting if the tenant takes a partner with himself to run the business. The person taken as a partner will not become the tenant of the landlord; but it would not amount to subletting. The second contention of the learned counsel is also, therefore, devoid of force. ( 8 ) SO far as the third contention is concerned, it is sound and must prevail. The learned Additional Judge held that the property was being used for commercial as well as residential purposes and, therefore, the rent could be increased only by 37 per cent under the Second Schedule, Part A, Clause 5. Clause 5 contemplates that the premises must be mainly used as a residence ; whereas the premises in the present case are mainly used for shop purposes vide statement of DW-l, Ram Chand Daulat Ram, of which there is no rebuttal. Clause 5 contemplates that the premises must be mainly used as a residence ; whereas the premises in the present case are mainly used for shop purposes vide statement of DW-l, Ram Chand Daulat Ram, of which there is no rebuttal. To such premises, the provisions of Clause 4 of Part A of Schedule Second apply and the permissible increase is 50 per cent. The Courts below were not right in granting increase by 37 per cent the premises being not mainly used for purposes of residence. The decision of the Courts below on this part of the case is, therefore, set aside. ( 9 ) SO far as the last contention is concerned, it also must succeed. The Additional District Judge refused to interfere with the decision of the trial Court with regard to the matter of increase on the short ground thet the trial Court was at liberty to fix any date and that no notice, as required by section 7 had been given for the increase by the landlord. It may be mentioned that the discretion conferred on the Court to fix a date cannot be arbitary exercised. Moreover, there is no reason why the increase should not have been allowed from the date of the suit when the claim to it was made- In our opinion, the landlord would be entitled to the increase with effect from the date of the suit. There would, however, be no justification for allowing the increase as contemplated by law for the period of six months anterior to the suit as contended for by the learned counsel for the petitioners. The last contention, therefore, partly succeeds. The decision of the Courts below on the same is modified to this extent that the increase will take effect from the date of the suit and not from 1st of March, 1961. ( 10 ) FOR the reasons given above, this petiton is partly allowed. The dismissal of the suit for ejectment will stand; but the landlords will be entitled to increase of rent by 50 per cent with effect from the date of the suit. In the circumstances of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs.