JUDGMENT G. C. Mathur, J. - Respondent No. 3 (Daya Ram Verma) was appointed a temporary clerk in the Eduucation Department of the Zila Parishad, Faizabad, on December 26, 1962, in the leave vacancy of one Ram Kishore. After Ram Kishore rejoined duties on February 28, 1963, Daya Ram Verma was appointed in temporary capacity in a vacancy caused by the suspension of one amuna Chaubey from March 1963 On November 4, 1963, the nominated Adhyaksha confirmed the appointment of respondent No. 3. hereafter there were elections and he elected Adhyaksha took charge the office from the nominated Adhyaksha. On December 18, 1963, he elected Adhyaksha passed an or that the order of the nominated Adhyaksha, confirming Daya Ram Verma, was void, being against the revisions of Sec. 43(3) of the Zila Pairishads Act, that as such he may continue as a purely temporary and on the post on which he was originally appointed and that, after the expiry of the period for which he had been temporarily appointed, he would cease to function if he was not confirmed under Sec. 43(3) of the Act or removed before that period. Against this order Daya Ram Verma filed an appeal before the Commissioner, Faizabad Division. By an order dated October 9, 1964, the Commissioner allowed the appeal, set aside the order of the elected Adhyaksha dated December 18, 1963, and directed that Daya Ram Verma be reinstated forthwith and treated as having been confirmed with effect from November 4, 1963. The Zila Parishad thereupon filed this writ petition, challenging the order of the Commissioner as being wholly without jurisdiction. 2. Before coming to the points in controversy between the parties, it is necessary to refer to the position and powers of the nominated Adhyaksha. The U.P. Kshettra Samitis and Zila Parishads Adhiniyam, 1961, was enacted in 1961 and, admittedly came into force on November 30,1961. Paragraphs 4 to 11 of the writ petition state the position as it progressively developed after the enactment of this Act till the setting up of the Zila Parishads. The contents of these paragraphs have been admitted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 as well as in the counter-affidavit filed by Daya Ram Verma. Paragraphs 4 to 11 of the writ petition state the position as it progressively developed after the enactment of this Act till the setting up of the Zila Parishads. The contents of these paragraphs have been admitted in the counter-affidavit filed on behalf of respondent No. 2 as well as in the counter-affidavit filed by Daya Ram Verma. From these paragraphs it appears that the Kshettra samitis constituted under the Zila Parishads Act began functioning under the Zila Ptrishads Act from July 18,1962, that from July 18, 1962, under the provisions of Sec. 271 of the Act, the Antarim Zila Parishad and the Adhyaksha of the Antarim Zila Parishad were to perform the duties of the Zila Parishad and the Adhyaksha of the Zila Parishad under the Zila Parishads Act, that the Zila Parishads were established from June 30, 1963, and that the nominated Adhyaksha was appointed by a notification dated June 29, 1963. It is, therefore, an admitted fact that,on November 4, 1963, when the nominated Adhyaksha passed the order of confirmation of Daya Ram Verma, he was exercising powers of the Adhyaksha under the Zila Parishads Act. 3. Two submissions have been made by Sri S.C. Khare on behalf of the petitioner: The first is that no appeal lay against the order of the Adhyaksha to the Commissioner and the order of the Commissioner is without jurisdiction. The second contention is that the order of confirmation, which really amounted to a permanent appointment by the nominated Adhyaksha, was made in violation of the provisions of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43 of the Act and as such the order was void and was properly so treated by the elected Adhyaksha. I will deal with these contentions in this order. 4. Shri Khare has stated that there is no provision in the Act providing for any appeal against the order of the Adhyaksha, setting aside a previous order of the nominated Adhyaksha. Sri Prakash Gupta appearing for Daya Ram Verma contended that the right of appeal was conferred by the proviso to sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43 and also by the proviso to Cl. (b) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 46. Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43 reads thus: - "43(3) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Act, appointments to posts under the Parishad, other than those covered by sub-Secs. (b) of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 46. Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43 reads thus: - "43(3) Except as otherwise provided elsewhere in this Act, appointments to posts under the Parishad, other than those covered by sub-Secs. (1) and (2), shall be made by the Adhyaksha on the advice of the Chunao Samiti constituted under Sec. 45: Provided that if, in any case, the Adhyaksha is of the opinion that the advice of the Chunao Samiti is improper or unfair, he may make a reference to the commissioner of the division whose decision in the matter shall be final and binding on the Adhyaksha." 5. I fail to see how this proviso conferred any right of appeal upon Daya Ram Verma. The proviso only gives a right of reference to the Adhyaksha and that too only in cases where he is of opinion that the advice of the Chunao Samiti is proper or unfair. Sec. 46(2) (b) is as follows : - "46(2) - The following procedure shall be adopted in appoint in the officers and servants referred t in sub-Sec. (1) to the posts create under Sec. 39: - (a )......................... (b) appointments to other posts shall be made by the Adhyksha in accordance with rules mad in this behalf: Provided that any officer or servant aggrieved by any appointment made by the Adhyaksha may, within thirty days of the date of the order by which the appointment made, make a representation to the Commissioner of the division and that case the decision of the Commissioner of the division shall be final and binding." 6. Apart from other consideration the proviso confers a right of representation only against orders of appointments. It confers no right of appeal against an order reviewing previous order confirming an employee in the post temporarily held by him. The order made by the elected Adhyaksha on December 1963, was not an order by which a person was appointed. This provision also did not confer any right of appeal on Daya Ram Verma in the present case. The learned Junior Standing Counsel contended that the appeal lay under Sec. 280 of the District Boards Act. The order made by the elected Adhyaksha on December 1963, was not an order by which a person was appointed. This provision also did not confer any right of appeal on Daya Ram Verma in the present case. The learned Junior Standing Counsel contended that the appeal lay under Sec. 280 of the District Boards Act. He relied upon Sec. 270 of the Zila Parishads Act for contending that this saving provision kept alive Sec. 280 of the District Boards Act, Sec. 270 of the Zila Parishads Act does not continue the District Boards Act or any provisions thereof. It merely continues certain appointments, delegation, notifications, bye-laws, regulations etc. made under the District Boards Act till such time as they were not made afresh under the Zila Parishads Act. The District Boards Act was specifically repealed by Sec. 274 of the Zila Parishads Act from the date on which the establishment of the kshettra samitis was completed in a district. Kshettra samitis, admittedly were completed in this district on July 18, 1962, and from that date the District Boards Act stood repealed. There is thus no substance in this contention that a right of appeal was conferred on Daya Ram Verma by Sec. 280 of the District Boards Act. It is, therefore, clear that no appeal lay against the order daed December 18, 1963, of the elected Adhyaksha and the order passed in appeal by the Commissioner was without jurisdiction and is liable to be quashed. 7. This brings us to the second contention of Shri Khare. It has been contended by the respondents that the order of the nominated Adhyaksha dated November 4, 1963, was a proper and valid order under Sec. 43(3) of the Zila Parishads Act, that the elected Adhyaksha acted illegally in setting aside that order and that the order of the Commissioner results in the just and proper order being restored and does not cause any manifest injustice. On the other hand, Shri Khare has contended that the order of the nominated Adhyaksha was against the provisions of Sec. 43(3), was invalid and was rightly characterised as void by the elected Adhyaksha. Sec. 43 (3) has already been set out above. It empowers the Adhyaksha to make an appointment only on the advice of the Chunao Samiti constituted under Sec. 45. Sec. 43 (3) has already been set out above. It empowers the Adhyaksha to make an appointment only on the advice of the Chunao Samiti constituted under Sec. 45. Admittedly, no Chunao Samiti had been constituted at the time when the order was made by the nominated Adhyaksha. Therefore, since the Adhyaksha could only make a permanent appointment on the advice of the Chunao Samiti, he was not empowered to make any appointment until the Chunao Samiti was constituted and gave its advice regarding somebody's appointment. Shri Prakash Gupta for Daya Ram Verma contended that, under Sec. 45, the Chunao Samiti consisted of the Adhyaksha himself, of a member of the Karya Samiti to be nominated by the Karya Samiti and of the head of the department for which the appointment was to be made who, in the present case, was the Shiksha Adhikshak and that, since the Adhyaksha and the Shiksha Adhikshak were both of the opinion that Daya Ram Verma should be appointed permanently, the appointment was in accordance with the provisions of sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 43. Sec. 43(3) contemplates the advice of the Chunao Samiti as the Chunao Samiti. The advice of two persons who, under the Act, are to be the members of the Chunao Samiti and who will, when the Chunao Samiti is constituted, constitute the majority cannot be equated with the advice of the Chunao Samiti. The advice contemplated in this section is the advice of the Chunao Samiti after it has been constituted and is made by the Chunao Samiti as the Chunao Samiti. The advice of two or even all the three members given independently cannot take the place of the advice of the Chunao Samiti. It must accordingly be held that the nominated Adhyaksha made the appointment of Daya Ram Verma without the advice of the Chunao Samiti and the appointment was invalid as it was not made in accordance with the provisions of Sec. 43(3). Since the confirmation which amounted to a permanent appointment was invalid, it was open to the elected Adhyaksha to treat it as non-existent or even to set it aside. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the contention of the respondents that the order of the Commissioner, even though made without jurisdiction, should not be interfered with as it merely restored a proper and valid order. I am, therefore, unable to agree with the contention of the respondents that the order of the Commissioner, even though made without jurisdiction, should not be interfered with as it merely restored a proper and valid order. The order passed on December 18, 1963, by the elected Adhyaksha was, in my opinion a valid order which the Commissioner could not interfere with. 8. I accordingly allow this writ petition and quash the order of the Commissioner, Faizabad Division, dated October 9, 1964, as well as his order, dated December 19, 1964.There will be no order as to costs.