JUDGMENT KOTVAL C. J.-In all these Special Civil Applications a. common question of law has been referred for decision by the Full Bench. As referred, that question was in somewhat wide terms and we have with the consent of ooUll8el for both the parties modified the question as shown below to make it applicable exclusively to the facts of the cases before us as follows : Whether the applications filed under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 prior to its amendment by the Central Act 36 of 1964, are governed by the period of limitation laid down in Article 137 of the Limitation Act; 1963 (Act 36 of 1963). The question arises under the following circumstances: On 11th June, 1958 the State Government issued a Notification revising the wages of Bidi workers working in Bidi factories in the Vidarbha Region of the State. The Notification was published in the Gazette of June 14, 1958, but effect was given to it from 1st July, 1958. The Notification purported to make a certain revision in regard to the notifications previously operating which restricted the right of the employer to reject bad work by the employee and not pay for it. This right is otherwise referred to as the right of "chhat". The employers found the revision of their right of chhat to be commercially unworkable and, therefore, the petitioners in each of the three cases before us closed their Bidi factories at Kamptee in Nagpur District. Later on for certain reasons they reopened their factories. The factories thus remained closed from 1st July 1958 to the 9th of August, 1958. Upon reopening, the workers were taken back in service. For the period for which the petitioners factories remained closed the workers put in applications under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 (prior to its amendment by Act 36 of 1964) for computation of the benefit of retrenchment compensation for the 39 days during which the factories remained closed. Each worker claimed a different amount according to the daily average earning to which he was entitled and the number of years of service he had already put in with the employer. 2. In answer to the applications of the workers, the petitioners raised several preliminary objections. One such objection was that the applications were all barred by time. Each worker claimed a different amount according to the daily average earning to which he was entitled and the number of years of service he had already put in with the employer. 2. In answer to the applications of the workers, the petitioners raised several preliminary objections. One such objection was that the applications were all barred by time. The period for which the claim was made in the applications was from 1st July, 1958 to 9th August 1958 but the respective applications put in by the workers were on 16-4-1964 in Special Civil Application No. 932 of 1965; on 19-5-1964 in Special Civil Application No. 931 of 1965 and on 11-11-1964 in Special Civil Application No. 933 of 1965. The Labour Court at Nagpur rejected all the preliminary objections raised by the employers. The preliminary objection relating to limitation was covered by the Issue "Is the application barred by time1, is it an over delayed claim1" and the answer was in the negative. 3. In coming to this conclusion the Labour Court merely relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva (1). It also held that even under the new Limitation Act 36 of 1963, Article 137 of the Limitation Schedule did not lay down a period of limitation for applications under section 33-C (2) of the Central Act. The employers preferred Special Civil Applications before this Court which came up before a Division Bench (Wagle and Padhye J.J.) and the Division Bench has by a common order passed on the 22nd December, 1965 referred the question as to limitation for decision by a Full Bench. In their opinion whatever may be the position prior to the new Limitation Act having come into force, under the new Limitation Act it was clear that the residuary Article viz. Article 137 of the Third Division of the Limitation Schedule, would apply to applications in respect of special laws including section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 4. In order to reach a correct decision as to the scope and effect of Article 137 of the new Act it is necessary to delve into the• rather peculiar history of the interpretation put upon the Article 181 of the old Act. For convenience we reproduce below the two Articles side by side:- Third Division: Applications. (Old Act) Description of Application. Period of Limitation. For convenience we reproduce below the two Articles side by side:- Third Division: Applications. (Old Act) Description of Application. Period of Limitation. Time from which period begins to run. 181. Applications for which Three Years. When the right to apply accrues no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this schedule or by section 4.8 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Third Division: Applications. (New Act) 137.Any other application Three Years. When the right to apply accrues. for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division. 5. Now so far as this Court is concerned the position as it existed under the old Act is clear. It was consistently held that Article 181 of the Limitation Schedule was limited to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure only. It was so held in Bai Manekbai v. Manekji Kavasji (1), where Sir Michael Westropp Chief Justice ruled (vide page 214), that "An examination of all the other Articles in the Second Schedule relating to "applications," that is to say, of the third division of that schedule, shows that the applications therein contemplated are such as are made under the Civil Procedure Code. Hence it is natural to conclude that the applications referred to in Article 178 are applications ejusdem generis, i. e. applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. The preamble of the Act, moreover, purports to deal with "certain applications" only, and not with all applications: Despite powerful dissents from this view, most other High Courts followed Bai Manekbais case (1) and the Supreme Court has now laid at rest the controversy by its decision in Sha Mulchand & Co. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd. (2). 6. As will appear from the quotation from Sir Michael Westropps judgment the principle arising which prevailed for holding that Article 181 was applied only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, was that all other Articles in the third division of the First Schedule to the Limitation Act were confined to applications under that Code. To that contention a Division Bench of then Judicial Commissioners Court at Nagpur in Shekh Kaudu v. The Berar Ginning Co. Ltd. (3) had given inter alia the following answer, which so far as we can find from the authorities has nowhere been met:- "But section 29 of the Limitation Act puts the matter beyond all doubt. To that contention a Division Bench of then Judicial Commissioners Court at Nagpur in Shekh Kaudu v. The Berar Ginning Co. Ltd. (3) had given inter alia the following answer, which so far as we can find from the authorities has nowhere been met:- "But section 29 of the Limitation Act puts the matter beyond all doubt. It provides that nothing in the Act shall affect or alter any period of limitation prescribed for any application by any special or local law in force in British India. If the Act did not apply in the first place to all applications even under special and local laws, it would be mere waste of time to say that it was not to apply to those of them for which special periods were prescribed by those laws. It is clear that Article 181 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act governs the limitation (If every application made to a Court under any Act except those for which different periods are prescribed in the Act B under which they are made." 7. In 1940 by section 41) of Act 10 of1940 the two Articles of the third division of the Schedule under the old Limitation Act were substituted by new Articles. They were Articles 158 and 178 both of which dealt with applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940; the one "to set aside an award or to get an award remitted for reconsideration" and the other "for the filing in Court of an Award". With that amendment the controversy as to the interpretation of Article 181 came to be revised because it was suggested that the very basis of the decision of Sir Michael Westropp in Bai Manekbais case (1) was taken away. It was urged that the ejusdem generis rule could no longer apply because now all Articles in the Third Division were not confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure and the reasoning in Sheikh Kaudus case (2) should apply. It was urged that the ejusdem generis rule could no longer apply because now all Articles in the Third Division were not confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure and the reasoning in Sheikh Kaudus case (2) should apply. To that of course answer was made that applications under the Arbitration Act are nevertheless applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, because the Arbitration Act was enacted after repeal of the Second Schedule of the Code of Civil Procedure which dealt with arbitrations and the effect of the re-enactment was that though the applications under the Arbitration Act must be treated for the purposes of the applicability of the Limitation Act as if they were applications under Schedule II of the Code of Civil Procedure. We need not, however, go into the pros and cons of this controversy because the controversy was set at rest by the decision of the Supreme Court in Sha Mulchand &, Co. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd. (3). 8. In that decision it was held that even after the amendment of Articles 158 and 178 of the Limitation Schedule the position would still remain the same, namely that Article 181 would apply only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. Chief Justice S. R. Das stated the rule in the following words at page 104:- "It does not appear to us quite convincing, without further argument, that the mete amendment of Articles 158 and 178 can ipso facto alter the meaning which, as a result of a long series of judicial decisions of the different High Courts in India, came to be attached to the language used in Article 181. This long catena of decisions may well be said to have, as it were, added the words "under the Code" in the first column of that Article. If those words had actually been used in that column then a subsequent amendment of Articles 158 and 178 certainly would not have affected the meaning of that Article. This long catena of decisions may well be said to have, as it were, added the words "under the Code" in the first column of that Article. If those words had actually been used in that column then a subsequent amendment of Articles 158 and 178 certainly would not have affected the meaning of that Article. If, however, as a result of judicial construction, those words have come to be read into the first column 8S if those words actually occurred therein, we are not of opinion, as at present advised, that the subsequent amendment of Articles 158 and 178 must necessarily and automatically have the effect of altering the long acquired meaning of Article 181 on the sole and simple ground that after the amendment the reason on which the old construction was founded is no longer available". Thus it was held that the construction put upon Article 181 in Bai Manekbais case (1) was the correct construction in spite of the amendment of Articles 158 and 178 by Act 10 of 1940. 9. Despite the above decision a bold attempt was made in the Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva (1), to apply Article 181 of the old Act directly to applications under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, but it was also negatived by the Supreme Court. At page 757 the Supreme Court held:- "The failure of the Legislature to make any provision for limitation cannot, in our opinion, be deemed to be an accidental omission. In the circumstances, it would be legitimate to infer that Legislature deliberately did not provide for any limitation under section 33-C (2). It may have been thought that the employees who are entitled to take the benefit of section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it would not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the said provision. It may have been thought that the employees who are entitled to take the benefit of section 33-C (2) may not always be conscious of their rights and it would not be right to put the restriction of limitation in respect of claim which they may have to make under the said provision. Besides, even if the analogy of execution proceedings is treated as relevant, it is well-known that a decree passed under the Code of Civil Procedure is capable of execution within 12 years, provided, of course it is kept alive by taking steps in Bid of execution from time to time as required by Article 182 of the Limitation Act; so that the test of one year or six months limitation prescribed by the Payment of Wages Act cannot be treated as a uniform and universal test in respect of all kinds of execution claims. It seems to us that where the Legislature has made no provision for limitation, it would not be open to the Courts to introduce any such limitation on grounds of fairness or justice. The words of section 33-C (2) are plain and unambiguous and it would be the duty of the Labour Court to give effect to the said provision without any considerations of limitation. Mr. Kolah no doubt emphasised the fact that such belated claims made on a large scale may cause considerable inconvenience to the employer, but that is a consideration which the Legislature may take into account, and if the Legislature feels that fair play and justice require that some limitation should be prescribed, it may proceed to do so. In the absence of any provision, however, the Labour Court cannot import any such consideration in dealing with the applications made under section 33.C (2)." In coming to this conclusion the Supreme Court also referred to the previous history of the interpretation of Article 181 from Bai Manekbais case (1) down to their decision in the case of Sha Mulchand Co. (2) and relying upon that construction of Article 181 held that it was not possible to accede to the argument that the limitation prescribed by Article 181 can be invoked in dealing with the application under Article 33-C (2) of the Act. (2) and relying upon that construction of Article 181 held that it was not possible to accede to the argument that the limitation prescribed by Article 181 can be invoked in dealing with the application under Article 33-C (2) of the Act. An anomaly was pointed out to the Supreme Court namely that while the same claim could be made at any time under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, that very claim was liable to be rejected as barred by time if made under the Payment of Wages Apt (section 15) and as to that the Supreme Court observed in paragraph 12 of their judgment that "It does appear to be somewhat anomalous" and in the passage which we have quoted suggested that if there was any inconvenience or that if the Legislature felt that fair play and justice require it, the Legislature may introduce some limitation. It was urged as one of the arguments before us that it was in direct consequence of this suggestion made by the Supreme Court in the Bombay Gas Co.s case (3) that the Legislature deliberately made a change while enacting the new Limitation Act No. 36 of 1963 and made the new Article 137, which substantially reproduces the provisions of Article 181 of the old Act, applicable to applications like these under section 33-C (2). This was the reasoning which prevailed under Article 181 of the old Limitation Act 9 of 1908. We have deliberately reproduced in detail the reasons which impelled the conclusion that the old article 181 applied only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure because one or the other of those reasons was relied on by each party to support its own construction of Article 137. 10. And so in the light of the history of the interpretation of the old Article 181 we proceed to consider the provisions of the new act and particular, Article 137. The new Limitation Act is as its preamble indicates "an Act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceeding and for purposes connected therewith". The preamble of the old Act was "An Act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits, and for other purposes". The new Limitation Act is as its preamble indicates "an Act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits and other proceeding and for purposes connected therewith". The preamble of the old Act was "An Act to consolidate and amend the law for the limitation of suits, and for other purposes". The first important change is, therefore, indicated by the preamble it self namely that the new Act applies to "other proceedings and for purposes connected therewith". Previously it applied to "limitation of suits, and for other purposes". It is clear, therefore, that proceedings other than suits and purposes connected therewith are now covered by the law of limitation. Another important change to be noticed is that in the preamble of the old Act, were the words "limitation of suits, appeals and certain applications to Courts". Thus the preamble itself limited that Act to certain applications only and those applications also were applications to Courts only. That part of the preamble is now dropped by the new Act. This is the second indication of the intention of the legislature to widen the application of the new law of limitation, making it applicable to all applications. 11. The next important change which, in our opinion, is of vital significance is that contained in the definition of "applicant" in section 2(a) of the new Act. The definition of "applicant" in the old Act was "applicant" includes any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply". In the present Act the definition of "applicant" is widened as follows:- "2 (a) "applicant" includes- (i) a petitioner; (ii) any person from or through whom an applicant derives his right to apply; (iii) any person whose estate is represented by the applicant as executor administrator or other representative." The difference brought about is that a "petitioner" is now included in the definition of "applicant". Similarly in section 2 (b) of the new Act the word "application" is defined to include a "petition". There was no separate definition of "application" in the old Act Therefore the intention of the Legislature is clear. When the Act speaks of "applicant" and "application", it necessarily includes a "petitioner" and a "petition". Similarly in section 2 (b) of the new Act the word "application" is defined to include a "petition". There was no separate definition of "application" in the old Act Therefore the intention of the Legislature is clear. When the Act speaks of "applicant" and "application", it necessarily includes a "petitioner" and a "petition". We put it to counsel whether in the light of this amended definition it could still be urged that the Third Division which deal with applications could now be possibly limited to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure, for, the very word "petition" or the word "petitioner" does not appear in any part of the Code of Civil Procedure. None of the counsel were able to point out that the word "petitioner" or the word "petition" is used in the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore, by the amendment in the definition of the word "applicant" and by the incorporation of the new definition of "application" as including a "petition" the intention of the Legislature is made clear. It was not intended to confine the word "application" to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. Since this change was brought about by express legislation we do not think that the ratio decided of the decisions under the old Act to which we have referred above, can now prevail. 12. Apart from this we may say that the substratum of the decision in Bai Manekbais case (I) is now taken away for two other important reasons. The first is that viewing the third division as a whole, it is no longer confined to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure or even to applications which may be deemed to be under the Code of Civil Procedure. We have already shown what was the argument advanced regarding Articles 158 and 178 of the old limitation schedule. Now these Articles have been consolidated into one Article, namely Article 119. We have already shown what was the argument advanced regarding Articles 158 and 178 of the old limitation schedule. Now these Articles have been consolidated into one Article, namely Article 119. While no doubt so far as this Article relating to applications under the Arbitration Act, 1940 is concerned the argument can still be justified that these applications must also be deemed to be applications under the Code of Civil Procedure because of the repeal of the second Schedule to the Code of Civil Procedure and its reenactment in the shape of the Arbitration Act, 1940, the same argument cannot possibly prevail regarding several new Articles introduced in the third division, which beyond any shadow of doubt deal with applications totally unconnected with the Code of Civil Procedure. These are for example, Article 131 "To any Court for the exercise of it is powers of revision under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898"; Article 132, "To the High Court for a certificate of fitness to appeal to the Supreme Court under clause (1) of Article 132, Article 133 or sub-clause (c) of clause (1) of Article 134 of the Constitution or under any other law for the time being in force"; Article 133, "To the Supreme Court for special leave to appeal (a) in a case involving death sentence, (b) in a case where leave to appeal was refused by the High Court; (c) in any other case." 13. In the case of each one of these Articles the application could never be under the Code of Civil Procedure. They lie under the Code of Criminal Procedure or under the provisions of the Constitution. The legislative drafts man must be presumed to have known the previous history of the interpretation of Article 181 and the view taken that the applications in the third division of the Limitation Act in the old Act were confined only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure and yet deliberately there have been introduced in the third division applications under the Criminal Procedure Code and the Constitution. We think that the change read in conjunction with the change in the definition of "applicant" and the introduction of the new definition "application" in section 2 (a) and 2 (b) of the new Act indicate a clear intention to put an end to the ratio decidendi of the decision in Bai Manekbais case (1) and the long catena of cases which followed it including the decision of the Supreme Court in Sha Mulchand & Co. v. Jawahar Mills Ltd. (2) and Bombay Gas Co. v. Gopal Bhiva (3), in so far as they held that Article 181 applied only to applications under the Code of Civil Procedure. The reasoning adopted in those cases cannot prevail so far as the analogous Article 137 is now concerned. 14. The next consideration which leads to the same conclusion is the deliberate division of the third division of the new limitation schedule into two parts, Part I dealing with applications in specified cases and Part II with other applications. This sub-division was not there in the old Act in which the third division dealt with all applications. The splitting up of the division into two parts, "applications in specified cases" and "other applications" seems to us to have been deliberately made so that the reasoning whatever it may be with regard to Part I on lines analogous to those adopted in Bai Manekbais case (1) should not apply to the other applications in Part II of the third division. The second part of the third division contains only one Article namely Article 137 and we can see no point in relegating that solitary Article to the second part except to take away the possibility of similar reasoning as was adopted in Bai Manekbais case (1) which the Legislature must be presumed to have known when it enacted the new legislation. 15. 15. For these various reasons and taking into account (1) the intention expressed in the preamble when the law of limitation was amended and reenacted, (2) the amendment made in the definition of "applicant" and the addition of the definition of "application", (3) the introduction of new Articles in the third division unconnected with the Code of Civil Procedure, (4) the sub-division of the third division of the new schedule into two parts and (5) the relegation of Article 137 alone to a second part, we think that the Legislature has clearly made Article 137 applicable to applications under laws other than those contained in the Code of Civil Procedure. Article 137, would, therefore, apply to an application under section 33-C (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. 16. In the conclusion which we have reached we are fortified by a consideration of the statement of objects and reasons which accompanied the Bill No. XI of 1962 before it was introduced in the Rajya Sabha as published in the Gazette of India, Extraordinary, Part II Section 2, No. 20 dated 19th June, 1962. In the notes on clauses dealing with the new definition 01 "application", the following note was made:- "A new definition of application is being inserted so as to include a petition, original or otherwise. The object is to provide a period of limitation for original applications and petitions under special laws as there is no such provision now. Consequential changes have been made in the definition of "applicant"." We note also that a Division Bench of this Court has in Civil Reference No.8 of 1964 applied the provisions of Article 137 of the new Act to applications under the Employees State Insurance Act but it does not appear that the applicability of the new Article was disputed or seriously discussed before them. 17. There is no doubt that the new Act will govern the present applications which were all made in 1964 after it came into force. The present Act came into force on 5th October, 1963. By virtue of section 1 (3) a notification was issued by the Central Government on 9th November, 1963 bringing into force the rest of the provisions of the• Act from 1st January 1964. On the date on which the applications by the workers were made the new Act was in force. By virtue of section 1 (3) a notification was issued by the Central Government on 9th November, 1963 bringing into force the rest of the provisions of the• Act from 1st January 1964. On the date on which the applications by the workers were made the new Act was in force. Now it is axiomatic that an application made after the Act came into force would be governed by its provisions. Statutes of limitation must be given a retrospective effect in the cause that they must be applied to all applications filed after they come into force. This general rule has one qualification that where the statute of limitation, if given a retrospective effect, destroys a cause of action which was vested in a party or makes it impossible for that party to exercise his vested right of action, the Courts will not give retrospective effect to it. See the decision of Chagla J. (as he then was) in District School Board of Belgaum v. Mohamad Mulla (1) and the several cases cited there. This decision was later accepted but distinguished in Chotmal Ganeshram v. Ramchand (2) by the same learned Judge sitting in Division Bench. There is no argument possible here that the new Act will destroy a cause of action which was vested in a party or make it impossible for that party to exercise his vested right of action if the Act is given retrospectives effect. The new Limitation Act was first published and then received the assent of the President on 5-10-1963. Its main provisions were brought into force much later by the notification of the Central Government dated 9-11-1963 as from 1st January 1964. The respondents thus had ample opportunity to put in their claims before the newly enacted bar of limitation began to operate against them. Their right of action was thus not destroyed by the new Act. In that view we can neither see any difficulty in the retrospective application of the new Act to these applications nor /any particular hardship being worked. 18. Their right of action was thus not destroyed by the new Act. In that view we can neither see any difficulty in the retrospective application of the new Act to these applications nor /any particular hardship being worked. 18. Then we turn to examine whether an application under section 33-C (2) as it stood before its amendment by Act 36 of 1964 would fall within the ambit of the words used in Article 137 "any other application for which no period of limitation is provided elsewhere in this Division"; It is not disputed that since the claims involved in these special civil applications are between the period 1st July 1958 to 9th August, 1958 it is the section 33-C of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 prior to its amendment by Act 36 of 1964 that falls to be considered. 19. Section 33-C, sub-sections (1) and (2) ran as follows:- "33-. (1) Where any money is due to a workman from an employer under a settlement or an award or under the provisions of Chapter VA, the workman may, without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application to the appropriate Government for the recovery of the money due to him, and if the appropriate Government is satisfied that any money is so due, it shall issue a certificate for that amount to the Collector who shall proceed to recover the same in the same manner as an arrear of land revenue. (2) Where any workman is entitled to receive from the employer any benefit which is capable of being computed in terms of money the amount at which such benefit should be computed may, subject to any rules that may be made under this Act, be determined by such Labour Court as may be specified in this behalf by the appropriate Government and the amount so determined may be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1)," It is clear from the 2nd sub-section of section 33-C that the amount has to be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1) and that sub-sections (1) and (2) are inter-related, but what is sought to be argued is that sub-section (2) is couched in language which does not require any application whatever from the worker and the duty is that of the Labour Court to determine the amount at which the particular benefit should be computed and recover the amount for the worker as provided for in sub-section (1). We do not think that we can accede to this argument, for sub-section (1) in terms says "the workman may without prejudice to any other mode of recovery, make an application" and by sub-section (2) the amount "so determined" has to be recovered as provided for in sub-section (1). Therefore, without an application we do not think that the worker can claim that the amount determined under sub-section (2) can be recovered. Rule 67 of the Industrial Disputes (Bombay) Rules, 1957 also indicates the same thing. It says "An application under section 33-C shall be delivered personally or forwarded by registered post in triplicate to the Secretary to Government of Bombay, Labour and Social Welfare Department, Bombay." Rule 62 of the Industrial Disputes (Central) Rules, 1957 also shows that the worker has to apply for the recovery of the money due to him or for the computation of an amount in respect of any benefit due to him. 20. For these reasons, we hold that the applications of the workers in each case would be barred by limitation. We answer the question referred in the affirmative. The papers will now be returned to the Division Bench for final disposal, of the Special Civil Applications. Reference answered in the affirmative.