ORDER :- Shri L. Thanil Singh has filed the writ petition under Arts. 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India, and Ss. 14 and 16 of the Assam Municipal Act, and Rules 19 and 22 of the Rules of Manipur Election of Commissioners of Municipal Board for issuing a writ of mandamus or any other writ of like nature quashing the Annexure "C" and other proceedings relating to the Election in question. 2. The facts are not in dispute. Briefly they may be put thus: The Assam Municipal Act, 1956 was extended to Manipur in the year 1960. After the extension of the Act, the election was held in the year, 1962. The 4 years tenure of the Office of the Commissioners expired on 31-3-66, therefore, the Chief Commissioner by exercising his power under S. 26 (4) of the Act extended the term of the existing Commissioners of the Imphal Municipal Board by an order dated 30-3-66 for a further period of 3 months. This term expired on 30-6-66. The Chief Commissioner again extended the term of the Commissioners for a further period upto 31st July, 1966 by an order dated 1-7-1966. But before the extension of the term by the Chief Commissioner, the District Magistrate of Manipur on 30-6-66 made a notification acting under Rule 19 of the Rules for the Manipur Election of Commissioners of Municipal Board Rules making programme of Imphal Municipal Election 1966. On the issue of this notification, the petitioner who is the resident of Ward No. 12 and carries on his business at Paona Bazar in Ward No. 20, presented the nomination paper for the Ward No. 12 as a Congress candidate. The nomination paper of the petitioner was rejected on 8-7-66 by the District Magistrate. The petitioner, therefore, filed the writ petition for issuing a writ of mandamus for quashing the illegal orders of Chief Commissioner and the District Magistrate. 3. The respondents filed the reply on 27-7-66 denying all the allegations of the petitioner. In the reply it was stated that the Chief Commissioner and the District Magistrate issued the notifications in accordance with the Assam Municipal Act, 1956, and rules framed thereunder. They did not exercise their authority in excess of their respective jurisdiction under the Act or the rules framed thereunder. In the reply it was stated that the Chief Commissioner and the District Magistrate issued the notifications in accordance with the Assam Municipal Act, 1956, and rules framed thereunder. They did not exercise their authority in excess of their respective jurisdiction under the Act or the rules framed thereunder. It was also stated that the term of the Office of the Commissioner was due to expire on 17-4-66, but by notification Annexure A the Chief Commissioner extended the term of the Officer of the Commissioners for a period of 3 months with effect from the mid-night of 17th/18th April, 1966. Subsequently, the Chief Commissioner by notification Annexure B extended the term of the Office of the Commissioners, Municipal Board of Imphal upto 31st July, 1966, in accordance with provisions of sub-section (4) of section 26 of the said Act. In view of these facts, the notifications should be treated as legal and valid. The respondents in the alternative also pleaded that if for the sake of arguments it be taken that the term of the Office of the Imphal Municipal Board expired on 30-6-66, after the extension of its term by Annexure A, the subsequent notification Annexure B became operative with effect from mid-night of 30th June/1st July, 1966, therefore, the term of the existing Municipal Board of Imphal existed upto 31st July, and since election was to be held within 3 months of the expiry of the term of the Office of the Commissioners, the notifications are in accordance with the said Act, and hence they are legal and valid. The respondents also pleaded that the petitioner has got another remedy, therefore, he has no right to invoke the extra-ordinary jurisdiction of this Court by way of writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 4. I heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the Government Advocate on behalf of the respondents at great length and perused the record of the case. 5. The learned lawyers while arguing the writ petition argued only on the points which were left undecided by me while deciding the stay petition. 6. In this case the first point for consideration is whether the term of the Board expired on 30-6-66 or 17-7-66. 7. 5. The learned lawyers while arguing the writ petition argued only on the points which were left undecided by me while deciding the stay petition. 6. In this case the first point for consideration is whether the term of the Board expired on 30-6-66 or 17-7-66. 7. According to the learned lawyer for the petitioner the term of the Board expired on 30-6-66 and the notification B was issued after the expiration of the term of the Board, and according to the Government Advocate, the term of the Board expired on 17-7-66 and the notification was issued before the expiry of the term of the Commissioners. Now I shall determine this point in the light of the arguments advanced by the lawyers. 8. The learned counsel for the petitioner while advancing his arguments referred to sub-sections (1), (3) and (4) of Section 26 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956. The sub-section (1) runs as follows: "26(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, all the elected and appointed Commissioners shall hold Office for four years commencing from the date of the first meeting of the newly constituted Board after a general election at which a quorum is present. Election shall be held every four years but before the expiry of the fourth year and not earlier than three months prior to such expiry." The sub-section (3) is as follows :- "(3) The term of four years referred to in sub-section (1) shall be held to include any period which may elapse between the expiry of the said four years and the date of the first meeting of the newly constituted Board at which a quorum is present". The sub-section (4) runs as follows :- "(4) The Chief Commissioner may, by notification, for sufficient cause to be stated therein, direct, from time to time, that the term of the Office of the Commissioners be extended by such period not exceeding one year at a time, as may be specified in the notification, provided that the total period of such extension shall not exceed two years." The learned lawyer in order to substantiate his contention averred that there was a Board under the old Act, 1923, and the term of the old Board was to expire on 31-3-61. But before the expiry of the term of the old Board the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 came into force in Manipur from 13-2-1960. But before the expiry of the term of the old Board the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 came into force in Manipur from 13-2-1960. After coming into force of this new Act the Chief Commissioner exercising the power under Section 26 (4) of the new Act, extended the term of the old Board upto 31-3-62. Thereafter, the new Board was constituted on 31-3-62 and its term of 4 years expired on 31-3-66. But in view of sub-section (3) of Sec. 26, the period spent from 31-3-61 to 31-3-62 should also be counted while computing the period of 4 years. By computing the period of 4 years from 31-3-61 the term of the Board expired on 31-3-65. He further said that if sub-sections (1) and (3) are read together in that case it will be clear that the period of 4 years will be counted from the date of Constitution of the Board and not from the date of first meeting of the newly constituted Board. By computing the period of 4 years of the newly constituted Board from 31-3-62 its term expired on 31-3-66, and not on 17-4-66 as suggested now by the respondents. The Chief Commissioner too by keeping in view the sub-s. (3) of Section 26 treated the life of the Board only upto 31-3-66 and, therefore, he extended the further term of the Board from this date. If the Chief Commissioner had treated the life of the Board upto 17-4-66 in that case he would have issued the notification on 17-4-66. But in this case the life of the Board was extended after expiry of the period on 30-6-66, therefore, the Chief Commissioner, contravened Section 26 of the Act, and hence the order of extension of the life of the Board from 1-7-66 being illegal should be set aside. 9. It was further contended on behalf of the petitioner that Section 26 (4) of the Act, empowers the Chief Commissioner to extend the term of the Office of the Commissioners from time to time on account of sufficient cause upto the extent of 2 years. But in case of an Election under Section 26 (1) of the Act, it must be held within 3 months prior to the expiry of the term of the Board. But in case of an Election under Section 26 (1) of the Act, it must be held within 3 months prior to the expiry of the term of the Board. In the instant case the first tenure of the office of the Commissioners expired on 31-3-66 and the Chief Commissioner extended the term of the existing Commissioners of the Municipal Board by his order dated 30-3-66 for a further period of 3 months. This term was again extended upto 31st July, 1966 by an order dated 1-7-66. By this it is evident that the Chief Commissioner extended the term by his order dated 1-7-66 after the expiry of the term on 30-6-66. This is, therefore, a gross error apparent on the face of the record and hence the writ petition should be accepted. 10. The Government Advocate in order to meet this argument of the learned lawyer for the petitioner averred that under Section 26 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 as extended to the Union Territory of Manipur, the Commissioners were to hold Office for 4 years commencing from the date of the 1st meeting held on 18th April, 1962 and the term of the Commissioners elected for the first time after the commencement of the Assam Municipal Act commenced as such with effect from 18th April, 1962 and was due to expire on 17-4-66 as is evident by Annexure A/1, filed by the respondents. He further averred that as the term of the Office of the Commissioners of the Municipal Board of Imphal was due to expire on 17-4-66, the Chief Commissioner in exercise of his powers conferred on him under sub-section (4) of Sec. 26 of the Assam Municipal Act, 1956 as extended to the Union Territory of Manipur, by notification No. 153/1/62-LSG (MUC) dated 30th March, 1966, Secretariat; LSG Department, Government of Manipur, which was published in the extra-ordinary Gazette of Manipur No. 2-E-2 dated 1st April, 1966, extended the term of the Office of the Commissioners for a period of 3 months from the due date of expiry of the term, for reasons stated therein. But in the preamble of the said notification, through clerical error the term of the Office of the Commissioners of the Municipal Board of Imphal was said to have expired on 31st March, 1966 although the term was to expire on 17-4-66, in accordance with the provision of sub-section (1) of Sec. 26 of the said Act. Accordingly, the term of the Office of the Commissioners of the Municipal Board of Imphal was extended for a further period of 3 months, with effect from the midnight of 17th/18th April, 1966 and not from 1st April, 1966. He further said that the Chief Commissioner in exercise of the powers conferred on him by sub-section (4) of Sec. 26 of the said Act. further extended the term of the Office of the Commissioners of the Municipal Board of Imphal for another period upto 31st July, 1966 by a notification dated 1st July, 1966 in continuation of the Government Notification of even number dated 30th March, 1966. In these circumstances, it should be taken that the Chief Commissioner issued the notification before the expiration of the term of the Board. 11. The learned counsel for the petitioner in reply urged that the way in which the Government Advocate has tried to interprete the notification is not correct. As a rule, it is the duty of the Court in construing a statute to give effect to the intention of the Legislature. In the instant case the intention of the person issuing the notification has to be taken into consideration. In this case from the facts and circumstances it is obvious that the Chief Commissioner extended the first period from 31st March, 1966 to 30-6-66, and the second period from 1-7-66 to 31-7-66. According to the Chief Commissioner the first term expired on 31-3-66, therefore, he extended the second period from this date. By this it should be taken that the intention of the Chief Commissioner was to extend the second term only upto 30-6-66. If he had the intention to extend it upto 17-7-66, in that case he would have mentioned this date. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the following rulings: (i) Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871 , (ii) Sheik Gulfan v. Sant Kumar Ganguly, AIR 1965 SC 1839 . If he had the intention to extend it upto 17-7-66, in that case he would have mentioned this date. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the following rulings: (i) Kanwar Singh v. Delhi Administration, AIR 1965 SC 871 , (ii) Sheik Gulfan v. Sant Kumar Ganguly, AIR 1965 SC 1839 . (iii) Shamrao v. Parulekar, AIR 1952 SC 324 , and (iv) Poppatlal Shah v. State of Madras, AIR 1953 SC 274 . 12. The learned Government Advocate, on the other hand, averred that there is no dispute regarding the principles laid down in these rulings, but the facts of these cases are not applicable to the present case. He further stated that in such cases the intention of the person issuing the notices has to be looked into. But in the instant case the wrong intention of the Chief Commissioner cannot change the real facts of the case. In order to support his contention he stated that according to Section 26 of the Act all the elected and appointed Commissioners shall hold office for 4 years commencing from the date of 1st meeting of the newly constituted Board after a general election at which a quorum is present. In the instant case, according to Annexure A/1, the first meeting of the newly constituted Board took place on 18th April 1962. The period of 4 years from this date was to expire on 17th of April, 1966. But the Chief Commissioner by calculating the period wrongly shortened the period of 4 years of the Board by 17 days. Under Section 26, the Chief Commissioner has power to extend the period only on sufficient cause, but he has no power to shorten the prescribed period of the Board. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, acted illegally in shortening the period of 4 years of the Board. He further said that in this case the Chief Commissioner has acted against the facts of the case, therefore, the opposite party should not be allowed to take advantage of Chief Commissioners mistake, and the Court should decide the case according to its merit. 13. He further said that in this case the Chief Commissioner has acted against the facts of the case, therefore, the opposite party should not be allowed to take advantage of Chief Commissioners mistake, and the Court should decide the case according to its merit. 13. The Government Advocate next averred that for the sake of argument it may be taken that the term of the Office of Imphal Municipal Board expired on 30th June, 1966 and the notification Annexure B extending the period of the Board upto 31st July, 1966 was issued on 1-7-66, even in that case it has to be taken that the notification Annexure B became operative from the mid-night of 30th June. In support of his contention he referred to the following cases :- (i) Chenchiah v. Commissioner of Police, Madras, AIR 1948 Madras 288, and (ii) Prahalad Jena v. State of Orissa, AIR 1950 Orissa 157. (iii) AIR 1924 Mad 257 (SB). 14. The learned counsel for the petitioner in order to meet this contention of the Government Advocate contended that the period of the notification expired on the mid-night of 30th June, 1966 and the Chief Commissioner extended it from 1-7-66, therefore, it should be taken that he extended the period after the expiry of the period fixed by him. As a rule, the extension of the period should have been made prior to the expiry and just at the midnight at Zero hour. In support of his contention he placed reliance on the following cases :- (1) Harpal Singh v. State, AIR 1950 All 562 . (2) Malojirao Shitole v. C. G. Matkar, AIR 1953 Madh B. 245. 15. After having given my most careful and anxious consideration to the arguments advanced on both sides I am constrained to remark that the learned Chief Commissioner did not properly comply with Section 26 of the Act. According to Section 26 (1) the term of 4 years of all the elected and appointed Commissioners commences from the date of the 1st meeting of the newly constituted Board after a general election at which a quorum is present. In this case according to Annexure A, produced by the respondents the first meeting of the newly constituted Board took place on 18th April, 1962. In this case according to Annexure A, produced by the respondents the first meeting of the newly constituted Board took place on 18th April, 1962. On computing the period of 4 years from this date the term of the Board was to expire on the 17th of April, 1966. But the learned Chief Commissioner by calculating the period wrongly shortened the life of the Board by 17 days. Under Section 26 (4) the Chief Commissioner has power to extend the period only on sufficient cause, but he has no power to shorten the prescribed period of the Board as laid down in Section 26 (1) of the Act. I, therefore, hold that the learned Chief Commissioner acted illegally in shortening the period of Board by acting against the actual facts. 16. Now the question arises whether the petitioner can take advantage of the illegality committed by learned Chief Commissioner. I, find that there is no bar for the petitioner to take advantage of this illegality committed by the Chief Commissioner. But the Court cannot act against the facts of the case as well as the law even if the Chief Commissioner has committed an illegality. As pointed out above the Chief Commissioner can extend the term of the Board but he cannot shorten the life of the members of the Board. Therefore, this illegal order of Chief Commissioner cannot be binding on the members of the Board. When it is not binding on the members of the Board being illegal in that case the period of 4 years shall be taken to expire on the 17th of April, 1966. In this case the learned Chief Commissioner extended the term of the Office of the Commissioners of the Municipal Board for a further period of 3 months. By this extension of 3 months the term of the members of the Board was to expire on 17-7-66. The Chief Commissioner again extended the term of the members of the Board upto 31st July, 1966 by Annexure B. I, therefore, in view of these facts, hold that the term of the members of the Board shall expire on the 31st July, 1966. 17. In view of my above finding I need not decide the question whether the notification B become operative from the mid-night of 30th June. This is an academical point and it needs an elaborate discussion. 17. In view of my above finding I need not decide the question whether the notification B become operative from the mid-night of 30th June. This is an academical point and it needs an elaborate discussion. Besides, there has been a great diversity of opinion as regards Section 5 (3) General Clauses Act. The Allahabad and Madhya Bharat High Courts are of the opinion that the rule laid down in Section 5 (3) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 only applies to construction of Act and Regulations and is not applicable to any notification that may be issued under an Act, while the High Courts of Orissa and Madras are of the opinion that Section 5 (3) of the General Clauses Act is applicable to Ordinances and Orders. But in view of the reasonings given by the Allahabad High Court in AIR 1950 All 562 I find that this case should be followed in deciding the point raised under Section 5 (3) of the General Clauses Act. But I leave this point undecided. 18. The learned counsel for the petitioner strongly contended that according to Section 26 (4) it is incumbent on the Chief Commissioner to give sufficient reasons for the extension of the term of the members of the Municipal Board. In the Annexure A, the Chief Commissioner has given the reasons for extending the period upto 30th June, 1966. But in the Annexure C he has not given reasons for extending the period upto 31st July, 1966, therefore, this Annexure is contrary to Rule 26 (4) and hence the term of the members of the Board cannot be extended by this Notification. 19. The learned Government Advocate in order to meet this argument of the learned counsel for petitioner contended that this notification was issued in continuation of the notification of even number dated 30th March, 1966, therefore, the reasons given in that notification should be taken as the reasons of this notification. 20. On the perusal of the notification Annexure B, I find that it was issued in continuation of the notification dated 30th March, 1966. But the notifications A and B are two separate notifications, therefore, as a rule the learned Chief Commissioner should have given separate reasons in Annexure B for extending the term upto 31st July, 1966. 20. On the perusal of the notification Annexure B, I find that it was issued in continuation of the notification dated 30th March, 1966. But the notifications A and B are two separate notifications, therefore, as a rule the learned Chief Commissioner should have given separate reasons in Annexure B for extending the term upto 31st July, 1966. As no reasons are given in notification B, therefore, it is clear that the learned Chief Commissioner did not properly comply with Section 26 (4) of the Act. This amounts to an irregularity. But it does not come within the mischief of a serious irregularity, therefore, by mere non-mention of the reasons it does not became illegal. But I must mention that in view of the Supreme Court rulings the reasons must be given. 21. The learned counsel for the petitioner further advanced the arguments that the notification Annexure C issued by the District Magistrate is illegal as it contravened the provisions of Rule 22 of the Rules. The Government Advocate failed to rebut this contention. Besides, on this point, I had already given my finding while deciding the stay petition that the District Magistrate has not properly complied with the Rules 19 and 22. This is an illegality which makes the notification C void. 22. The learned lawyer for the petitioner next averred that in this case the District Magistrate fixed the date of the programme of the Imphal Municipal Election on 30th June, 1966, before the extension order dated 1-7-66 was issued by the Chief Commissioner. There is also no explanation from the side of the respondents as to how the District Magistrate came to know that the Chief Commissioner will extend the period on 1-7-66. By this it should be taken that the District Magistrate was acting on his own accord without bothering about the notification of the learned Chief Commissioner about the extension of time. This notification, therefore, should be treated to have been issued without jurisdiction. 23. The learned Government Advocate in order to meet this argument contended that the notification Annexure C issued by District Magistrate is irregular and not illegal. This notification, therefore, should be treated to have been issued without jurisdiction. 23. The learned Government Advocate in order to meet this argument contended that the notification Annexure C issued by District Magistrate is irregular and not illegal. He further said that if the life of the Board is taken to expire on 17-7-66 in that case the date of scrutiny, and the date of filing the nomination papers were within the term of the Board, but the date of polling (28-7-66) was beyond the time. The notification is, therefore, irregular only to that extent. 24. After having given my serious consideration to the arguments advanced on both sides keeping in view my above finding regarding the term of the Board upto 17-7-66, the dates mentioned in the notification which fall upto 17-7-66 are within time, while the dates falling after 17-7-66 are beyond time, therefore, this notification is partly valid and partly void. But as I have observed above the notification "C" contravened the Rules 19 and 22 of the Rules, therefore, it is an illegal notification. When it is an illegal notification it cannot be validated by the subsequent notification issued by Chief Commissioner. I, therefore, find that this illegality committed by District Magistrate goes to the root of the case. I am, therefore, left with no other alternative but to quash this Notification (Annexure C). 25. No other point worth mentioning was raised before this Court. 26. In view of the foregoing reasons, the writ petition is allowed and the notification Annexure C issued by District Magistrate is quashed and the learned Chief Commissioner and the District Magistrate are directed to hold the Municipal Election according to the Municipal Act and the rules framed thereunder. In view of the facts of the case, the parties are left to bear their own costs. Petition allowed.