Judgment :- 1. Sri. T. L, Viswanatha Iyer, the counsel of the appellant, contends that the reasoning of Velu Pillai J. in Moideen Haji v. Moosa Haji (1965 KLT. 784) will apply to this case. In that case the appellant, who was a purchaser from defendants 1 to 7, claimed benefits of S.106 of Act I of 1964. The landlord, the respondent, issued a notice to defendants 1 to 7 terminating their tenancy; and the appellant purchased from them thereafter. My learned brother has said that for claiming benefits under S.106 a subsisting tenancy has to be predicated; and that there is a distinction between a "tenant" and a "lessee". These are the two grounds on which my learned brother has held that the appellant was not entitled to benefits of S.106. 2. Sri. K. N. Karunakaran, the counsel of the respondent, on the other hand, brings to my notice the Division Bench ruling of this Court in Gopinatha Panicker . Joseph (1965 KLT. 870). In the Division Bench case a decree for eviction was passed against a tenant; and some of the items covered by the decree were also taken delivery by the landlord before Act I of 1964 came into force. Regarding one item there was dispute; and that dispute came up for consideration after the Act came into force, when the judgment-debtor claimed that the item was a "holding" and that by virtue of S.132 (3) of Act I of 1964 he was entitled to benefits of the Act. It was urged on the side of the landlord that since a decree was passed against the tenant and since the tenant even drew the amount of compensation deposited in court by the landlord, there was no subsisting tenancy, so that he could not have claimed relief under the Act. This contention was overruled by Madhavan Nair J. in second appeal; and that decision was confirmed by the Division Bench. The Division Bench has held that the word "tenant" is used in the Act to include quondam tenants as well. 3. The decision of Velu Pillai J. was rendered only on 23rd June 1965, while the decision of the Division Bench was given on 31st March 1965. The Division Bench has held that the word "tenant" is used in the Act to include quondam tenants as well. 3. The decision of Velu Pillai J. was rendered only on 23rd June 1965, while the decision of the Division Bench was given on 31st March 1965. Still, neither the Division Bench ruling nor the decision of Madhavan Nair J. which was questioned before the Division Bench appears to have been brought to the notice of Velu Pillai J. In view of the Division Bench ruling, it is clear that the decision of Velu Pillai J. is not correct. 4. I may now point out two or three instances, which will only add to this conclusion. If a notice terminating a tenancy was issued and a suit was thereafter filed for eviction before the commencement of the Act but the suit ultimately came to be disposed of after the commencement of the Act, will not the tenant get the benefits of the Act? The answer must obviously be in the affirmative because of S.132 of the Act. It is evident that at the time when relief under the Act is claimed the tenancy is not subsisting, because it was already terminated by the notice to quit. Another instance is the one covered by the Division Bench ruling, where there was a decree for eviction and even partial eviction, but, for some reason, the tenant was not evicted from all the items. In such a case also the subsistence of the tenancy at the time when relief under the Act was claimed was not considered as the criterion. Yet another instance is a case where an original tenant, whose tenancy was terminated by a notice to quit, dies and his heirs continue in possession of the property. In such a case if the heirs claim benefits under the Act, can it be said that they are not entitled to any benefit because they have not inherited anything from the original tenant as he died after the termination of the tenancy? Obviously, the answer should be in the negative. I may also point out that there is no warrant for drawing a distinction between a "tenant" and a "lessee". 5. Therefore, the decision of the lower appellate court is correct, as it is in conformity with the Division Bench ruling already referred to. Obviously, the answer should be in the negative. I may also point out that there is no warrant for drawing a distinction between a "tenant" and a "lessee". 5. Therefore, the decision of the lower appellate court is correct, as it is in conformity with the Division Bench ruling already referred to. The second appeal is dismissed, but, in the circumstances, without costs. Dismissed.