Hari Singh v. State of Rajasthan — 1966 DIGILAW 110 (RAJ)

MODI, J.—This is a writ application by Hari Singh and Mallu under Art. 226 of the Constitution praying that the order of the State Government conveyed by the secretary to the Government in the Revenue B Department, Jaipur, to the Collector, Ganganagar, under his letter No. F. 2(19) Rev/B/Gr. II/62 dated the 24th October, 1962, and certain proceedings taken prior thereto after the 26th April, 1960, and all subsequent proceedings taken in consequence thereof be quashed. By this order, a revision petition filed by the respondents Mahendra Singh against the judgment of the Revenue Appellate Authority, Bikaner, dated the 17th January, 1962, was partly allowed and it was decided that the prayer of the said respondents not to allow square No. 36 to the petitioners here (who were non-petitioners before the Government) be allowed and the respondents were left free to apply for the allotment of the aforesaid land to them if they so chose and a direction was further given that on their doing so, their application for such allotment be considered on the merits. Respondent Kaila Singh having died during the pendency of this writ application is represented by his widow and other heirs. 2. The dispute between the parties relates to the allotment of 24-1/2 Bighas of land Sq. No.36 in Chak 3 K.K. in Tehsil Padampur under the Rajasthan Colonisation Act, 1954 (Act No. XXVII of 1954, hereinafter called the Act of 1954) and the Rules made thereunder known as the Rajasthan Colonisation (Gang Canal Lands Permanent Allotment) Rules, 1956 (hereinafter called the Rules). It is common ground between the parties that the petitioner Hari Singh who is a resident of Chak 3 K.K. and Mallu who is a resident of Chak 5 K.K. in Tehsil Padampur had applied for the allotment of certain land in Chak 3 K.K. on a permanent basis on the 25th August, 1957 and 22nd August, 1957, vide their applications Ex. 1 and 2 to the Tehsildar Padampur under the Rules. It is further admitted that neither of them had asked for allotment of land in Sq. No. 36 in this Chak. It is also not in dispute between the parties that the respondents Mahendra Singh and Kaila Singh had likewise made applications for allotment of land to them in Chak 5 K.K. on the 17th August, 1957 and 27th September 1957, respectively (See their applications Exs. No. 36 in this Chak. It is also not in dispute between the parties that the respondents Mahendra Singh and Kaila Singh had likewise made applications for allotment of land to them in Chak 5 K.K. on the 17th August, 1957 and 27th September 1957, respectively (See their applications Exs. 3 and 4) Both of them had applied for allotment of land in square No. 36. 1 he total area of this square is admittedly 24-1/2 bighas. These applications remained pending upto the 25th April, 1960. In the meantime on the 7th April, 1958 one Mst. Basant Kanwar who held Square No. 3 in Chak 3 K.K. had applied for the exchange of her land with Square No. 36 for certain reasons into which it is unnecessary to go for the decision of this writ application, and the Government had sanctioned this exchange by its order dated the 20th November, 1959. The respondents who were in temporary possession of Square No. 36 filed a review application before the Government as a result of which the order of exchange was cancelled by an order dated the 4th/8th July, 1960, and their possession over Square No. 36 was left undisturbed. On the 26th April, 1960, the Additional collector, Ganganagar, allowed the applications of both the petitioners for allotment of land to them and allotted 12-1/2 bighas of land in Murabba No. 36 to the first petitioner vide Ex. 5 and allotted the remaining 12-1/2 Bighas to the second petitioner in the same square vide Ex. 6. On the same day the applications of respondents Mahendra Singh and Kaila Singh were rejected vide Exs.7 and 8. It does not appear from the record that these applications were disposed of by the Tehsildar after hearing the parties or,in their presence. The case of the petitioners is that after he allotment had been made in their favour, they applied for possession of the land to the Collector, Ganganagar,when the respondents who were in possession of the said land raised objections before the Collector that this should have been allotted to them and not to the petitioner. Meanwhile the Tehsildar Padampur by his proceeding dated the 3rd October, 1960, Ex. A-6 made a reference to the Collector that according to the decision of the Government on the respondents review petition against Mst. Meanwhile the Tehsildar Padampur by his proceeding dated the 3rd October, 1960, Ex. A-6 made a reference to the Collector that according to the decision of the Government on the respondents review petition against Mst. Basant Kanwar, the exchange which had earlier been granted in her favour had been recalled and it was Ordered that Square No. 36 be allowed to remain in their possession, whereas by the order of the Additional Collector dated the 26th April, 1960, the said land had been allotted to the petitioners, namely, Hari Singh and Mallu, and consequently the Tehsildar prayed for a clarification as to whom the land may be treated as allotted. The Collector disposed of this reference by his order dated the 6th April, 1961, Ex. 9. Both parties appear to have been heard by the Collector before this order was passed. The Collector took the view that the order of the Additional Collector permanently allotting Square No. 36 to the petitioners had become final as no appeal against those orders had been filed to the higher authorities and that the order of the Government in the review case of the respondents against Mst. Basant Kanwar was not really concerned with the question of the permanent allotment of Sq. No. 36 to any body, and in this view of the matter the Collector ordered that further action be taken accordingly. 3. Thereafter the petitioner Hari Singh paid the first instalment of money amounting to Rs. 240/- in lieu of this allotment on the 2nd "May, 1961, and he paid the second instalment also of Rs. 240/- on the 9th April. 1962, and consequently the Collector passed an order on the Tehsildar Padampur to give him possession. Similar orders are alleged to have been passed in favour of the other petitioner Mallu. 4. Against the order of the Collector dated the 6th April, 1961, the respondents filed an appeal before the Government on the 5th May, 1961, though according to them the appeal lay to the Commissioner which post had in the meantime been abolished. It appears that the Government forwarded the appeal later to the Revenue Appellate Authority (which authority had by that time replaced the Commissioner for purposes of appeal) who by his order dated the 17th January, 1962, dismissed the appeal. See Ex. 10. The operative part of this order, curiously enough, is extremely short. It appears that the Government forwarded the appeal later to the Revenue Appellate Authority (which authority had by that time replaced the Commissioner for purposes of appeal) who by his order dated the 17th January, 1962, dismissed the appeal. See Ex. 10. The operative part of this order, curiously enough, is extremely short. After narrating the facts of the case and the respective contentions of the parties, all that it said was this™ "A perusal of the order under appeal clearly shows that the counsel for the appellant was given enough opportunity of submitting his case and I do not think that there is any thing in the order which needs interference at this state." Against this order the respondents filed a revision to the Government on the 20th January, 1962. This revision was heard in the presence of both parties by the Revenue Secretary who with his opinion placed it before the Deputy Revenue Minister and it was the latter who finally disposed of it by his order dated the 19th June, 1962 (Ex A 8) by which be cancelled the allotment of Square No. 36 to the petitioners and gave a direction that the respondents if they felt so advised should apply for the same to the authority concerned upon which it should dispose of the matter on the merits as a result of which the letter of the, Revenue Secretary to the address of the Collector. Ganganagar, dated the 24th October, 1962 Ex. 11 came to be written. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioner preferred the present writ application to this Court on the 6th December, 1962. 5. The case of the petitioners, put in a nut-shell, is that the order of the Collector dated the 26th April, 1960, by which the whole of square No. 36 had been allotted to the petitioners half and half had become final, inasmuch as an appeal lay against it under R. 10 of the Rules and no such appeal was filed by the respondents against that order within the time prescribed in that rule, to wit, 30 days of the date of the order, and, therefore, the order of the State Government was entirely without jurisdiction. Their further grievance is that according to R. 10 the decision of the Revenue Appellate Authority is final and on that ground also the Government had no jurisdiction to entertain and allow any revision against that order It was further contended in this connection that the order of the Collector dated the 26th April, 1960, having become final inasmuch as it was not appealed from, any further proceedings by way of an appeal or revision against the subsequent order of the Collector dated 6th April, 1961, were of no avail whatsoever, and that the Government had in any case no revisional jurisdiction to interfere with the orders that had been passed in favour of the petitioners. For these reasons it is prayed that the order of the Government of Rajasthan was patently erroneous and unjust and without jurisdiction, and, therefore, it be quashed, and along with it all the proceedings taken by the respondents after the order of the Collector dated the 26th April, 1960, and, those taken further in consequence of the order of the Government be also quashed. 6. This application has been opposed both by the State, respondent No. 1, and other two respondents, viz., respondents Nos. 2 and 3. Their defence is more or less common. In the first place, it is contended that the respondents Mahendra Singh and Kaila Singh had never been given any intimation of the orders of allotment passed in favour of the petitioners by the Additional Collector dated the 26th April, 1960 and, therefore, these were of no effect or validity against them. It was further contended in this connection that the respondents were also not informed of the orders rejecting their application for allotment which applications came to be rejected more than 2/1/2 years after the same had beed filed. In the second place, it is contended that the Collector had no jurisdiction at the time he did so to allot the land to the petitioners which had been ordered to be given in exchange to Mst. Basant Kanwar by an order of the Government dated the 20th November, 1959, though this order was subsequently set aside on review by the Government by its order dated the 4th August, 1960. In the third place, it was contended that the Government was competent to entertain the respondents application under sec. Basant Kanwar by an order of the Government dated the 20th November, 1959, though this order was subsequently set aside on review by the Government by its order dated the 4th August, 1960. In the third place, it was contended that the Government was competent to entertain the respondents application under sec. 83 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act No. 15 of 19.% (hereinafter called the Act of 1956 ) as the matter was a non-judicial one and was not connected with settlement operations, and, therefore, the order of the Government was not without jurisdiction and was perfectly proper having regard to all the merits of the case. Lastly it is contended that the petitioners were not entitled to any allotment in their favour under the Rules and the respondents application for such allotment had been refused wholly arbitrarily and under a mis-apprehension of the true facts of the case and contrary to the Rules. 7. We may state at the very outset that when this case first came up for arguments before us on the 1st and 2nd December, 1965, we found it necessary to direct the learned Deputy Government Advocate appearing for the Slate to produce some further material before us which had not been made a part of the record, and the particulars of which were specified in our order dated the 2nd December, 1965. In compliance with this order, the learned counsel for the State laid before us the entire record for our perusal including the file relating to the revision which was instituted by the respondents to the Government against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority dated the 17th January, 1962. As a result of our perusal, it was discovered by us that after notice had been served to the parties for the hearing of this revision the revenue secretary (Shri R.C. Chaturvedi) granted a. hearing to the parties and recorded a proceeding and placed before the Deputy Revenue Minister, who, it is admitted before us, had the power to dispose of the revision. It is further conceded before us that the Deputy Revenue Minister had not heard the parties at all and passed his final order on the 19th of June, 1962. It is further conceded before us that the Deputy Revenue Minister had not heard the parties at all and passed his final order on the 19th of June, 1962. On these facts, a further question arose for our determination whether assuming for this purpose that a revision lay to the Government, the procedure adopted for the heating thereof was not illegal and we gave full opportunity to learned counsel for the State to meet this position. 8. But before we deal with the last-mentioned objection, the first and foremost question which falls for determination in this case is whether the Government had the jurisdiction to entertain the revision filed by the respondents before it on the 20th January, 1962. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners was twofold. In the first place, he submitted that the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority made on appeal was final according to the express language of rule 10 of the Rules, and, therefore, it did not admit of any further challenge. In the second place, his contention was that there was no provision under the Rules for a revision before the Government, and, therefore, also no such revision could be filed nor had the Government any authority to entertain it and decide it. 9. The matter seems to us to be primarily governed by sec. 5 of the Act of 1954 which we would read hear : "5. Applicability of tenancy and land revenue. laws—(1) Except as otherwise provided in this Act, the laws relating to agricultural tenancies, land, the powers, duties, jurisdiction and procedure of revenue courts, the survey and record operation, the settlement and collection of revenue, rent and other demands and the partition of estates and tenancies, for the time being in force in a colony, shall, in so far as may be applicable, apply to tenancies held and to proceedings conducted under this Act. (2) Nothing in such laws shall, however, be so construed as to vary or invalidate any rule made, or any condition entered in any statement of conditions issued, by the State Government under this Act." By this provision, the powers, duties, jurisdiction and procedure of revenue of courts have been made applicable to proceedings arising under the Act of 1954 so far as possible. 10. 10. This brings us to the Act of 1956, Sec. 83 of this Act deals with the power of the Government to call for records and revise orders and sec. 84 deals with a like power of the Revenue Board. These sections read as follows : "83. Power of Government to call for records and revise orders—The State Government may call for the record of any non-judicial proceeding not connected with settlement held by any officer subordinate to it, and may pass thereon such orders as it thinks fit. 84. Power of Board to call for records and revise orders—The Board may call for the record of any case of a judicial nature or connected with settlement in which no appeal lies to the Board if the court or officer by whom the case was decided appears to have exercised a jurisdiction not vested in it or him by law, or to have failed to exercise a jurisdiction so vested, or to have acted in the exercise of its or his jurisdiction illegally or with material irregularity, and may pass such orders in the case as it thinks fit." 11. It seems to us to be clear from a comparative reading of these two provisions that while the Revenue Board has been vested with authority to exercise revisional powers in connection with judicial matters or those connected with settlement in which no appeal lies to the Board and provided that any court or officer by whom the case is decided has committed an error of jurisdiction, that is, an error amounting to assumption of jurisdiction not vested or refusal to exercise jurisdiction where it may be so vested, or a material irregularity or illegal exercise of jurisdiction and in such a case the Board has the power to pass such orders as it thinks fit. On the other hand, where a proceeding is a non-judicial one or is not connected with settlement, then the revisional jurisdiction has been vested in the Government, and it has the authority to pass such orders as it thinks fit in such a case. We may also invite attention in this connection to sec. 23 of the Act of 1956 which reads as follows : "23. Controlling power. We may also invite attention in this connection to sec. 23 of the Act of 1956 which reads as follows : "23. Controlling power. — (1) The control of all non-Judicial matters connected with revenue in the State, other than matters connected with settlement, is vested in the State Government and the control of all judicial matters and of all matters connected with settlement is vested in the Board. (2) The expression "judicial matter" means a proceeding in which a revenue court or officer had to determine the rights and liabilities of the parties thereto and the proceedings and orders as well as appeals, revisions and references in the cases specified in the First Schedule shall be deemed to be judicial matters for the purposes of this Act." The first Schedule then gives the list of judicial matters within the meaning of Sec. 23. These are : "1. Claims under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 88. 2. Disputes with respect to the right of grazing cattle on pasturage land. 3. Disputes as to the right of user over forest growth and exclusion from forest land. 4. Settlement of boundary disputes. 5. Disputes as to entries in the recordof rights and annual registers. 6. Disputes respecting the class or tenure of tenants. 7. Mutation upon succession, transfer or otherwise. 8. Disputes regarding the rent or revenue payable. 9. Disputes concerning Wajib-ul-arz or Dastoor Ganwai. 10. Inquiry into and assessment of lands held free of revenue or rent. 11. Partition and consolidation of estates. 12. Imposition of fines, penalties forfeitures and confiscations under this Act. 13. Determination of compensation. 14. Sales and auctions under this Act. 15. Such other matters as may be prescribed by the State Government." The matter of allotment of lands under the Act does not seem to fall within any of these items, and, therefore, we think that revisional jurisdiction in a matter of this kind stands vested in the Government and not in the Board. 12. The next question is whether such revisional jurisdiction is excluded by any thing contained in rule 10 of the Rules made under the Act. 12. The next question is whether such revisional jurisdiction is excluded by any thing contained in rule 10 of the Rules made under the Act. Rule 10 reads as follows : — ule 6 relates to decisions on applications for allotment and inter alia lays down that the Collector shall consider all applications for allotment on the merits in accordance with the Rules and allot the land applied for or any other suitable land if available on payment of price fixed under R. 7 and grant the applicant Khatedari rights therein. It also lays down that in making allotment of fresh land, the Collector shall strictly follow the order of priority laid down in rule 3, and where there are more than one applicant of the same class for any land, it shall be allotted by drawing lots between all such applicants. 13. The precise question which thus falls for determination is whether this rule excludes the revisional jurisdiction of the State in such matters. It was strongly contended before us on behalf of the petitioners that by the very wording of rule 10, it prohibits any further challenge against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority which has thus been invested with the attribute of complete finality. We have given this contention our careful and anxious consideration and are unable to accept it as sound. 14. In the first place, we should like to point out that but for this provision contained in the Rules, namely, that the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority under Rule 10 shall be final, such an order would have been subject to a second appeal under Sec. 76 of the Act of 1956. See clause (d) of this section which provides for an appeal from the decision of the Revenue Appellate Authority to the Board. What was, therefore, intended under the Rules was that no further appeal against the order of the Revenue Appellate Authority shall lie. But from this it would be going too far to hold that the supervisory power of the Government under Sec. 83 has been altogether excluded. The more so, as Sec. 7 of the Act of 1954 lays down that "7. (1) The State (Government may grant land in a colony to any person on such conditions as may be prescribed. But from this it would be going too far to hold that the supervisory power of the Government under Sec. 83 has been altogether excluded. The more so, as Sec. 7 of the Act of 1954 lays down that "7. (1) The State (Government may grant land in a colony to any person on such conditions as may be prescribed. (2) The State Government may issue a statement or statements of the conditions on which it is willing to grant land in a colony to tenants. (3) Where such statements of conditions have been issued, the Collector may, subject to the control of the State Government, allot land to any person, to be held subject to such conditions contained in the statement issued under sub-sec. (2) of this section as the Collector may, by written order, declare to be applicable to the case. (4) No person shall be deemed to be a tenant or to have any right or title in the land allotted to him until such a written order has been passed and he has taken possession of the land with the permission of the Collector, and after possession has been so taken, the grant shall be held subject to the conditions declared applicable thereto." It would be observed that the over all control of the State Government on allotment of land under the Act has been particularly safeguarded; and to hold that in a matter like this, the revisional jurisdiction of the State Government is barred by any thing contained in the Act or the Rules would be, in our opinion, little short of indulging in an entirely self-contradictory situation. We are, therefore, strongly disposed to hold the view that there is nothing in the Act or the Rules which should induce us to hold that the supervisory jurisdiction of the State under Sec.83 of the Act of 1956 is excluded by anything contained therein. 15. Our attention has also been invited in this connection to a bench decision of this Court in Punamchand vs. Municipal Board Jhalawar (1) and an unreported decision in Jasram vs. State of Rajasthan and another decided on the 29th March, 1965, which are decisions pertaining to certain other laws. 15. Our attention has also been invited in this connection to a bench decision of this Court in Punamchand vs. Municipal Board Jhalawar (1) and an unreported decision in Jasram vs. State of Rajasthan and another decided on the 29th March, 1965, which are decisions pertaining to certain other laws. But as those laws happen to be modelled on more or less the same pattern as Rule 10 in the present case, we think that the principle of these decisions is squarely applicable to the present case also. 16. We should like to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in a special appeal from our own Court in State of Rajasthan vs. Mrs. Leela Jain(2), the. principle of which in our opinion considerably fortifies the conclusion at which we have arrived. 17. As examples of similar cases though relating to the revisional jurisdiction of a High Court where the decision of the lower appellate court was enacted by statues to be final, we may refer to the full bench decision of the Madras High Court in Parthasaradhi Naidu vs. Koteswara Rao (3), of the Allahabad High Court in Chaturbhuj vs. Manji Ram (4) and of the Kerala High Court in P. Therappan vs. P.M.P. Nambudiri (5). 18. The correct legal position thus appears to us to be that where the decision of a particular court or authority has been made final, all that it properly means is that there will be no further appeal from it; but it does not and cannot mean that it shall not be amenable to the revisional jurisdiction of the High Court or any other revisional authority as the case may be. Indeed, the entire object of revisional jurisdiction is to prevent a court or authority from whose decisions there is no appeal from acting, say, contrary to its jurisdiction or a like cause; and, if so, the provision that the decision of such authority shall be final should not be construed to prevent the revisional authority within its proper bounds. Any other view, in our considered opinion, should be untenable on the very principles on which revisional jurisdiction is, as a rule,, founded. 19. In this view of the law, we conclude that the Government had revisional jurisdiction in this case under Sec 83 of the Act of 1956. Any other view, in our considered opinion, should be untenable on the very principles on which revisional jurisdiction is, as a rule,, founded. 19. In this view of the law, we conclude that the Government had revisional jurisdiction in this case under Sec 83 of the Act of 1956. We further hold that this jurisdiction would be available to the Government in an appropriate case notwithstanding the consideration that the respondents might or might not have attacked the order by which they were aggrieved by an appeal within the prescribed time. The partys failure to prefer an appeal, assuming that such an appeal could be filed, may conclude his rights but that would not conclude the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction of the revisional authority in a proper case. In these circumstances, the petitioners are not entitled to any relief from this Court on the ground that the order of the Additional Collector dated the 26th April, 1960, had become final as no appeal was preferred against it within the prescribed time. We hold accordingly. 20. That however, does not conclude the matter. For the order passed by the Government in the present case has been discovered by us to suffer from a breach of a fundamental rule of natural justice. As we have adverted to above, from a perusal of the revision file which was placed before us by learned counsel appearing for the State we found that after the parties had been notified that they would be heard, a hearing was granted to them by the Revenue Secretary, who, after such hearing, recorded a note expressing his own opinion on the case and submitted it to the Deputy Minister who was admittedly empowered to pass final orders in the case. The Deputy Minister, however, did not hear the parties and passed an order the gist of which we have given above and which is impugned before us but he had not given any hearing himself to the parties. The question is whether a procedure like this was or was not grossly violative of a fundamental principle of natural justice. 21. This brings us to the question whether the matter before the Deputy Minister whether it was administrative or otherwise, called for a judicial approach. The question is whether a procedure like this was or was not grossly violative of a fundamental principle of natural justice. 21. This brings us to the question whether the matter before the Deputy Minister whether it was administrative or otherwise, called for a judicial approach. We will assume, for this purpose, as has been argued before us by the learned Deputy Government Advocate, that the question of allotment of lands by the Collector or the Additional Collector was an administrative matter. The authority concerned had allotted square No. 36 to the petitioners of which the two respondents had been in temporary possession since a fairly long time. As soon as their possession was sought to be interfered with, they disputed the allotment before the Collector who turned down their request. From there they to the Revenue Appellate Authority but without any success. Thereafter they filed a revision before the Government in which the petitioners had been impleaded as respondents. The contention of the respondents (who were petitioners before the Government) was that their right to be granted a permanent allotment of the land in question had been negatived under a mis-apprehension of facts and the petitioners here (who were respondents before the Government) had been granted the allotment ex parte without any intimation to them respondents and further that the petitioners were not entitled to the allotment of the said land in accordance with the Rules. 22. It is not for us sitting as a court exercising our writ jurisdiction to go into merits of this controversy; but from what we have stated above, it is clear that the matter before the Government called for a judicial approach determining the rival rights put forward by the parties according to the rules governing the matter. The Government or the Deputy Revenue Minister who was in charge of the case was, therefore, acting in a quasi-judicial capacity. There were two parties before him opposing each other, and there was also a lis as between the persons to whom the allotment had been granted by the authorities below and the persons to whom it had been refused. We should also like in this connection to refer to sec. 85 of the Act of 1956 which inter alia lays down that no order under sec. We should also like in this connection to refer to sec. 85 of the Act of 1956 which inter alia lays down that no order under sec. 85 shall be passed to the prejudice of any person unless such person has had an opportunity of being heard. 23. Now the view which has been consistently taken by this Court in a matter like this is that the authority which has the power to dispose of a case finally must be the authority who also gives the hearing to the parties concerned, and that where the hearing is given by one authority which has not the power to finally dispose of it and the case is disposed of by another authority, though a competent one but who has not given the hearing, it does not amount to a valid hearing at all and amounts to procedure which is little short of a farce or a mockery of hearing and consequently an order passed as a result of this kind of hearing cannot be sustained in law and must be struck down as illegal. A bench of this Court to which one of us was a party had occasion to consider this question at considerable length in Mrs. Leela Jain vs. State of Rajasthan (6) and we need not repeat all that we said there beyond saying that we are in entire concurrence with the view propounded there if we may say so, with all respect. 24. In support of the view that we have fell persuaded to take that the revision before the Government called for a judicial approach, we would invite attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Shivji Nathubhai vs. Union of India(7). The question raised there was whether an order of the Central Government under rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, framed under sec. 6 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act No. 53 of 1948 is quasi-judicial or administrative. The question raised there was whether an order of the Central Government under rule 54 of the Mineral Concession Rules, 1949, framed under sec. 6 of the Mines and Minerals (Regulation and Development) Act No. 53 of 1948 is quasi-judicial or administrative. The question whether the order of the Government granting a lease under the Rules was an administrative or a quasi-judicial one was not decided, but it was held that the position of the case where after the Government had granted the lease to one of the applicants before it and had refused the lease to others and the aggrieved party then filed a review application before the Central Government under rule 54 undoubtedly was that it raised a matter which was of a quasi-judicial nature and called for a judicial approach in the sense that the Government must have granted a hearing before disposing of his review application. We are citing this case to emphasize the legal position that even where the matter may not be of a quasi-judicial nature at its inception, it may acquire such a shape later on when it comes-to be litigated between the two parties thereto and the matter has to be decided in accordance with certain rules which have been laid down on the subject. 25. Now so far as the case before us is concerned, it is governed by the provisions contained in the rules and these rules, broadly speaking, relate to the categories of persons who are eligible for allotment of land, the extent of allotment which may be made to them, the necessity of an. application as an ordinary rule for allotment of lands, the priorities according to which the same should be decided, the fixation of price therefore and the special power of the Government to reserve land for Harijans and to any other person as a special case. Finally comes R. 10 which makes the provision for appeal to the Revenue Appellate Authority whose decision shall be final. Then, there is the revisional power of the Government under sec. 83of the Act of 1956 and the further provision contained in sec. 85 unmistakably lays down that no order under that section shall be passed to the detriment of any person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the revision before the Government under sec. 83of the Act of 1956 and the further provision contained in sec. 85 unmistakably lays down that no order under that section shall be passed to the detriment of any person unless he has had an opportunity of being heard. Our conclusion, therefore, is that the revision before the Government under sec. 83 was a quasi-judicial matter and not a mere administrative one and a proper hearing should have been granted to the petitioners before it was decided against them. Such a hearing was never granted. It is correct that this specific point has not been raised by the petitioner in his writ application but it is equally correct that it has come to our own notice and it goes to the very root of the case and so it is impossible for us to shut our eyes thereto in the exercise of our supervisory jurisdiction u/Art. 226 of the Constitution. In the circumstances we cannot but quash the order which thus stands vitiated owing to failure to observe a basic rule of natural justice. We order accordingly. 26. There is one more point which was raised before us by learned counsel for the petitioner and before we conclude our judgment, we think it important to deal with it. That point relates to the true ambit and scope of the revisional jurisdiction of the Government under sec. 83 of the Act of 1956. The contention of learned counsel for the petitioners is that the State Government should exercise such jurisdiction on the same or analogous lines as have been laid down in the case of the Board under the next following sec. 84, that is, only where there is an illegal refusal to exercise jurisdiction or illegal assumption of jurisdiction or illegal or material irregular exercise of jurisdiction by a subordinate authority, and not otherwise. 27. Now we are not quite sure whether on the obvious difference in the language of the two secs. 83 and 84 we would be justified in laying down that the State Government while exercising its revisional jurisdiction must exercise the same within the limits set down for the Board and no further. Fortunately or unfortunately the power of revision conferred on the State Government by sec. 83 and 84 we would be justified in laying down that the State Government while exercising its revisional jurisdiction must exercise the same within the limits set down for the Board and no further. Fortunately or unfortunately the power of revision conferred on the State Government by sec. 83 of the Act is of a very wide amplitude and no limitations for the exercise of such power power have been laid down in the section itself or otherwise in the Act of 1956. 28. Even so, we are clearly of opinion that there is an inherent distinction between the exercise of appellate jurisdiction and of revisional jurisdiction, and the one cannot be simply equated with the other for obvious reasons. We have also no hesitation in saying that where the statute itself limits the scope and/or the manner of the exercise of such jurisdiction, such limits must needs be held to be obligatory and acted up to. A case in point is furnished by the revisional jurisdiction exercisable by a High Court under sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 29. The revisional power conferred on the Board under sec. 84 has been cast in the same mould and the same considerations would be applicable to it as would govern the exercise of such power under sec. 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure. A certain amount of difficulty however seems to arise in the other class of cases where the revisional jurisdiction conferred upon the revisional authority by a statute is of very extensive import and no statutory limitations have been provided specifically for the exercise of such power. Can it be argued in such cases that the revisional authority, be it the State Government or any other,can exercise such power at its own sweet will and pleasure? Or, putting it in a somewhat different manner, is such power unfettered and uncanalised by any regulatory consideration? We do not think so. The Legislature could not have possibly entertained such an intention. As we have adverted to above, there is an inherent distinction between the exercise of the two jurisdictions—appellate and revisional. Or, putting it in a somewhat different manner, is such power unfettered and uncanalised by any regulatory consideration? We do not think so. The Legislature could not have possibly entertained such an intention. As we have adverted to above, there is an inherent distinction between the exercise of the two jurisdictions—appellate and revisional. In the first case such jurisdiction is exercised only at the instance of the party aggrieved by the order under appeal and the entire case is as a rule at large before the appellate authority on facts as well as law once the right of appeal arises and comes into play and any mistake of law or fact committed by the authority below can and indeed ought to be as a rule set right. On the other hand revisional jurisdiction may be exercised by the authority in which such jurisdiction is vested not only at the instance of a party but by the authority suo moto, and it can call for the record itself and it would be going too far to hold in the case of such a proceeding that the authority can or should interfere with the proceeding of the subordinate officers before it on account of a mere mistake of law or fact. Nay. speaking as a rule, it is not the function of a revisional court to reappreciate evidence in the exercise of such jurisdiction and substitute its conclusion for that of the authority below. It seems to us that such jurisdiction would be properly exercisable only in cases where the order of the authorities below is manifestly and palpably wrong, or where a grave failure of justice has occurred or where a clear and important rule of procedure has been violated or where there is a serious error of law or fact apparent on the face of the record ; and in such cases it would be not only the proper province but the duty of the revisional authority to interfere and set the matter right for the purpose of preventing a clear abuse of justice. It would also be a matter for consideration in such cases whether the party had an alternative remedy which he should have availed himself of and why he failed to do so, and whether there has been any considerable delay in invoking the revisional jurisdiction and whether and how the same stands explained, and where no satisfactory explanation is forthcoming as to these or analogous matters, revisional jurisdiction may not be exercised. But it seems to us that even these should not be treated as an insurmountable bar to the exercise of such jurisdiction provided an appropriate case is otherwise made out for the exercise of such power. Basically and in its ultimate analysis, revisional jurisdiction is of a supervisory nature and cannot be claimed as a matter of right. Indeed, what we feel is that the exercise of this power is a matter of high discretion, and it is impossible to reduce it to a hard and fast or a rigid formula nor would it perhaps be desirable to do so. In fact, the very wide and comprehensive nature of this jurisdiction is perhaps the measure of the caution and circumspection with which it ought to be exercised. Putting the whole matter tersely what we would like to lay down is that this power in its very nature ought to be sparingly exercised and where the exercise of this power is not hedged round by statutory limitations, it should be exercised only to correct a manifest and serious failure of justice occasioned by a grave error of law or jurisdiction. 30. The net result is that on our finding that the procedure adopted by the Government in disposing of the revision before it was violative of one of the most fundamental rules of natural justice we allow this writ application, quash the order of the Government dated the 19th June, 1962, as illegal and inoperative and hereby direct that the case shall go back to the Government for being disposed of in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in our judgment. As this writ application succeeds on a point which was not raised by the petitioners themselves in their writ application, we make no order as to costs.