M. U. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) THE aforesaid are the material observations of the learned Assistant Judge. In substance the learned Judge finds that the three material incidents (i) of December 30 1954 which had relation to the earlier turning out of the wife and reinstatement of the wife in the matrimonial home at the intervention of a common friend (ii) of February 19 1955 when the husband had forced the wife to return the ornaments other father and obtained a receipt Ex. 46. and (iii) of April 18 1955 when the wife was cruelly dealt with eked pushed down. and turned out of the house and the house was bolted were proved satisfactorily. As regards the incident relating to the receipt of ornaments Ex. 4n the learned judge has found that it was not a normal incident that a son- in-law would return the ornaments to the father-in-law and obtain a receipt and this showed the estrangement between the parents of the two spouses. The learned judge has also found that as a result of the incident of April 18 1955 the wife had received injuries on her person which were observed by Dr. Dangi and are stated in the medical certificate. The learned Judge has also found that the subsequent conduct of the husband in walking in an Advocates office straightway instead of trying a rapprochement with the wife who was living with her parents just on the other side of the road was not a normal conduct that is expected of a husband who wants the Court to believe that the husband was not responsible for the final incident of driving away the wife The learned Judge has clearly found that the under-current of discord between the spouses had reached its climax on April 18 1955 He has also found that the husband has made no attempts at rapprochement after the final incident. The explanation of the husband has been found by the learned Judge to be false unbelievable and clearly unacceptable. He had found that the petitioner was forced to take shelter in the parental home. Thus the learned Judge has found the incident of April 18 1955 as proved. This was an incident in which according to the wife from the very morning of the day she was subjected to ill-treatment and indignities. She was asked to go away from the matrimonial home. Thus the learned Judge has found the incident of April 18 1955 as proved. This was an incident in which according to the wife from the very morning of the day she was subjected to ill-treatment and indignities. She was asked to go away from the matrimonial home. On her insistence to stay in the matrimonial home she was kicked slapped and pushed down on the ground. She was then compelled to go out of the house carrying the infant girl. She waited outside for sometime hoping that she would be welcome back in the house. Some time thereafter the husband dressed himself and went outside and the door was opened. After the husband had left she tried to get in the house with the infant girl; but only to be told by the mother-in-law that she was not a wanted member in the family and she must walk out and go to her parents. This incident has been completely accepted by the learned Assistant Judge. The learned Judge has also accepted the medical evidence which relates to the three injuries found on the person of the wife and these injuries according to the medical opinion are clearly attributable to fist or kick blows given with force and to a push. This is an act of cruelty and a course of conduct of the husband on the fateful morning found to have been proved by the learned Assistant Judge. It is an act of violence and of bodily danger and as such an act of cruelty. However the learned Judge seems to have taken the view that this was an isolated incident although it was strictly proved by the petitioning wife as stated in para 12 of his judgment. It is in this view of the matter that he took that the learned Judge has negatived the case of the wife of legal cruelty to her by the husband. In my view this is clearly an erroneous conclusion in law and it overlooks the other material findings of fact arrived at by the learned Judge himself as aforesaid. ( 2 ) THE learned Judge has found that there was a prior incident of December 30 1954 and that was a grave incident. In my view this is clearly an erroneous conclusion in law and it overlooks the other material findings of fact arrived at by the learned Judge himself as aforesaid. ( 2 ) THE learned Judge has found that there was a prior incident of December 30 1954 and that was a grave incident. This it may be remembered has relation to the wifes allegation that she was turned out of the matrimonial home some time in the last months of the year 1954 and that it was only at the intervention of one Mr. Natverlal who was a common friend of the two families that she was taken back in the house. Another material fact to be remembered is that this was the time when the marriage of a brother of the husband was to be celebrated and it is therefore very reasonable to infer that having regard to the popular opinion and the reaction that might otherwise have the husband had taken back the wife in his home; but this was only for a short duration as it subsequently turned out to be. The second incident of February 19 955 when the husband had forced the wife to return the ornaments which she had received from her father to wear on the ceremonial occasions of the marriage of the husbands brother and especially the fact that a receipt was obtained from the father and this was through the intervention of a third party goes to show that the estrangement between the parties and between the two families was deepening. This again has been found by the learned trial Judge to be a grave incident. The third and the last incident which the learned Judge himself has found to be grave and to be true is the incident of April 18 1955 These are the three incident which the learned Judge himself has found to be true and grave. The learned Judge has as aforesaid also found that the domestic life of the two spouses was unhappy during the last half of 1954 and the first half of 1955. The relations between the spouses had already deteriorated in the first quarter of 1955 and as has been found by the learned Judge it had reached a breaking point when the final incident had happened. The relations between the spouses had already deteriorated in the first quarter of 1955 and as has been found by the learned Judge it had reached a breaking point when the final incident had happened. Now the final incident has to be viewed in light of the obtaining atmosphere and the wifes capacity for endurance. It must have been known to the husband and the husbands mother that the wife had a poor physique and that she was subject to hysterical fits after the marriage. Knowing this the wife would require a sympathetic treatment at the hands of the husband and his relations. The husband acting as a husband to the wife would ordinarily cherish and support his wife as a husband should in the circumstances. Instead this is a case in which a husband with; the knowledge of the poor health and the poor physique of the wife the background of the deteriorating relations between the two families the past history the death of the first child and the obtaining atmosphere instead of consoling the wife has on the very morning of the fateful day picked up a quarrel asked the wife to walk out of the house and on her refusal to do so has beaten her kicked her slapped her and given her a push which felled her down on the ground and all this cruel treatment resulted in the injuries that were found on her person by Dr. Dangi even on the next day of the incident. And at the top of it the husband gives an Advocates notice to the wife on the very next day instead of going to the wife and consoling her or making amends for his and his mothers inhuman treatment towards her on the previous day. When this final act of April 18 1955 is considered as it should have been in this relevant context conclusion is irresistible that the husband was guilty of a conduct of cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioning wife that it will be harmful or injurious for her to live with the respondent. In my opinion therefore the learned Judge was clearly in error of law in reaching a wrong conclusion that the incident of April 18 1955 was an isolated incident and therefore would not amount to cruelty within the meaning of sec. In my opinion therefore the learned Judge was clearly in error of law in reaching a wrong conclusion that the incident of April 18 1955 was an isolated incident and therefore would not amount to cruelty within the meaning of sec. 10 (1) (b) of the Act. The established evidence on record leaves no manner of doubt in my mind that the conduct of the husband was a conduct of cruelty which would cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioning wife that it will be harmful or injurious for her to live with the husband. This is apart from the fact that the husbands insupportable acts of violence and of turning out of the wife and the infant girl from the house on the morning of April 18 1955 in themselves constitute cruelty within the meaning of sec. 10 (1) (b) of the Act. This is also apart from the fact that the learned Judge himself has found that the husbands offer to the wife to return to the matrimonial home was not a bona fide offer. ( 3 ) AGAIN the observation of the learned Judge that there was no general background of ill-treatment is not borne out by his own findings aforesaid and is contrary to the evidence on record. It is not necessary to repeat the findings. Having regard to the nature and manner of the incident of April 18 1955 which has been strictly proved according to the finding of the learned Judge himself the contention of Mr. Patel that it was not a treatment of cruelty cannot be said to have any merit. It is not necessary that there should be repeated acts of physical violence before the guilty spouse can be held to be guilty of cruelty. It may depend upon the nature of the act the prevailing atmosphere and other surrounding circumstances. As aforesaid the April incident was such as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioning wife about her own safety. It has been found proved on evidence by the learned Assistant Judge that the final incident has caused suffering in body to the petitioning wife. There can be no doubt that this incident must have caused suffering in her mind as well. It has been found proved on evidence by the learned Assistant Judge that the final incident has caused suffering in body to the petitioning wife. There can be no doubt that this incident must have caused suffering in her mind as well. A poor wife who is driven out of the matrimonial home in the aforesaid circumstances and with an infant girl with her and is compelled to take shelter in the parental home after 13 years of married life must necessarily have fact humiliation and mental anguish. The petitioning wife therefore can be inferred to have suffered bodily pain as well as mental pain. The apprehension of danger to her life and safety if she were to return to her matrimonial home would be resultant and a natural reaction in the mind of the petitioning wife. It can therefore be legitimately inferred that the last incident in itself was an act of cruelty which when viewed in the background of the circumstances then obtaining would amount to a treatment of cruelty within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 10 of the Act. Now in the instant case the physical violence to the wife at the hand of the husband and in the matrimonial home and the immediate turning her out of the house and the subsequent refusal of an entry to the wife in the matrimonial home are facts which are established on record and found proved by the learned Judge who has for the purpose sought corroboration from the medical evidence and found that the corroboration was available In these circumstances the proper legal inference from this incident itself would be that the husband was proved to have been guilty of cruelty to the wife. ( 4 ) IN Raydens Law of Divorce Eighth Edition in paragraph 79 the term Legal cruelty has been defined and the law on the point has been summarized as under at page 120;legal cruelty may be defined as conduct of such a character as to have caused danger to life limb or health (bodily or mental) or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. In this case the aforesaid conduct of the husband as evidenced by the last incident will certainly bring the act within the definition of the term cruelty required to be proved under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. In this case the aforesaid conduct of the husband as evidenced by the last incident will certainly bring the act within the definition of the term cruelty required to be proved under clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. (10) of the Act. Here we have a clear case of physical violence having been used and found to be grave and therefore there is no difficulty in reaching the conclusion that the husband had acted with cruelty in the matter ( 5 ) IN cases however where there is no particular act of physical violence and a petitioner relies upon the conduct of cruelty the question assumes a different complexion. In such cases the whole matrimonial relations must be considered and that rule will be of special value when the cruelty would consist not of violent acts but of injurious reproaches complaints accusations or taunts. In determining what constitutes cruelty regard must be had to the circumstances of each particular case keeping always in view the mental and physical conditions of the parties and the character of social status. This is the summary of the law on the point to be found in para 82 of Raydens Law of Divorce. Again on the question of quantity of evidence under the caption Quantity victims capacity for endurance in paragraph 85 at page 128 we find it stated in Raydens Law of Divorce that:although one act may be so grievous as by itself to constitute cruelty this is seldom the case; but a blow followed by minor acts may be enough. There can hardly be a more grave matrimonial offence than to set out on a course of conduct with the deliberate intention of wounding and humiliating the other spouse and making his or her life a burden and then to continue in that course of conduct in the knowledge that it is seriously affecting his or her mental health; such conduct may consist of a number of acts each of which is serious in itself but it may well be even more effective if it consists of a long continued series of minor acts no one of which could be regarded as serious if taken in isolation. It is thus clear that in a case where a serious act of physical violence is not the ground of the petitioner to prove the cruelty at the hand of the other spouse there must be a systematic course of conduct which would reasonably lead to an inference that the conduct of the guilty spouse was such as to endanger the safety of the other spouse or to cause a reasonable apprehension of his or her safety. In the case before me there is a clear act of physical violence proved strictly to the satisfaction of the learned Assistant Judge who has found it to be grave enough. Therefore it is not necessary to enquire into the course of conduct of the husband any further. However while dealing with this question of physical act of violence I have earlier viewed it in the context of the atmosphere prevailing the mental condition of the petitioning wife and the other relevant circumstances In my view considering the case either from the angle of the last act of physical violence singly or considering it in the context of the earlier two incidents and the prevailing atmosphere and the surrounding circumstances as found by the learned Judge himself the conduct of the husband was such as to had to a reasonable legal inference that the husband was guilty within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 10 of the Act. ( 6 ) THE concept of cruelty in modern progressive society has undergone transformation. A Hindu wife can no longer be treated as a chattel. Her right to receive a proper and humane treatment must now be recognised. Acts of violence or assault on women must be treated with disapproval. The cruelty in the legal sense need not be necessarily physical violence to the complaining spouse. Even a single act of gross cruelty may be enough to constitute legal cruelty if it is such as to lead to a reasonable apprehension or danger of further acts of cruelty towards the aggrieved spouse However it is not any and every improper behaviour of the guilty spouse that constitutes a ground for judicial separation. Even a single act of gross cruelty may be enough to constitute legal cruelty if it is such as to lead to a reasonable apprehension or danger of further acts of cruelty towards the aggrieved spouse However it is not any and every improper behaviour of the guilty spouse that constitutes a ground for judicial separation. It must be a behaviour of such a nature as to make it impossible for the husband and the wife to live together in future and have conjugal happiness consistent with the basic notions of human dignity and self respect. Allowance must of course be made for what may be called the reasonable wear and tear of married life. But it must now be recognized that the progressive tendency of law and the requirements of modern civilized life have left mere physical violence or threatened injury or danger to life and limb in the background and has broadened the basis of legal cruelty. There may be cases in which a wife fears that there will be the exercise of tyranny by the husband subjecting her to constant insults indignities abuses and accusations. This would make a state of married life impossible to be endured and cause a very unhappy and miserable state of existence This is a cruelty of a worse kind than that of physical violence. The safest course where physical violence is not complained of is to consider the conduct of each other during their married life and to consider whether the complaining party has shown just ground for asking a decree for judicial separation. As aforesaid isolated act or acts of violence may amount to cruelty. In Gurcharan singh v. Smt. Waryam Kaur w/o Gurcharan Singh A. I. R. 1960 Punjab 422 Mr. Justice Dua had an occasion to consider the question and has in this connection made the following relevant and material observations at page 425 with which I am in respectful agreement:. . . . . Whether or not isolated acts of violence amount to cruelty normally depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the modern tendency of the society is at least to treat with disapproval acts of violence or assault towards women. . . . . Whether or not isolated acts of violence amount to cruelty normally depends on the facts and circumstances of each case and the modern tendency of the society is at least to treat with disapproval acts of violence or assault towards women. New rules of social behaviour and conduct must therefore be recognized by the Courts in determining what would amount to cruelty in the present set up and I would be disinclined to dismiss lightly the so-called isolated acts of violence and assault as not amounting to cruelty if the victims of such assaults resent and take exception to them. Thus it will be seen that the whole concept of cruelty has undergone a vast change during the last years. Cruelty does not necessarily mean physical violence. It may be a course of conduct of the husband which would create a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the wife as regards her safety if she further continued to live with the husband. In the case before me there is evidence of such a conduct. Besides the evidence relating to the gross act of physical violence the wife was subjected to humiliation. All this in my. view would clearly come within the purview of the expression legal cruelty. Therefore viewing the case from any aspect the legal inference from the aforesaid acts of the husband and the treatment meted out by him to his wife would go to show that the petitioning wife was treated by the respondent-husband with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in her mind that it would be harmful or injurious or her to live with the husband. The learned Judge was therefore clearly in error of law in drawing a contrary inference from the facts found to be proved by the learned Judge himself as aforesaid. ( 7 ) MR. Patel had contended that the law required that the matromonial offence must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt. In this connection he has invited my attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bipinchandra Jaisingbhai Shah v. Prabhavati A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 176 where Sinha J. speaking for the Court has made the following observations at page 184 :-IT is also well settled that in proceedings for divorce the plaintiff must prove the offence of desertion like any other matrimonial offence beyond all reasonable doubt. Hence though corroboration is not required as an absolute rule of law the Courts insist upon corroborative evidence unless its absence is accounted for to the satisfaction of the Court In this connection the following observation of Lord Goddard C. J in the case of Lawson v. Lawson 1955 All E. R. 341 at p. 342 (A) may be referred to:-These cases are not cases in which corroboration is required as a matter of law. It is required as matter of precaution. . . . . . . The point has been further considered by the Supreme Court in the recent decision in Lachman Utamchand Kirpalani v. Meena alias Mota A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 40 where the Supreme Court has reiterated the earlier observations aforesaid made in Bipinchandras ease (supra ). Subba Rao J. as he then was has in his judgment in this connection made the following observations at page 56: heavy burden lies upon a petitioner who seeks divorce on the ground of desertion to prove four essential conditions x x x x x x x the offence of desertion must be proved beyond any reasonable doubt and as a rule of prudence the evidence of the petitioner shall be corroborated. In short this Court equated the proof required in a matrimonial case to that in a criminal case. The position of the law is thus well settled. In a case of cruelty as well as in a case of any other matrimonial offence the petitioner must prove beyond all reasonable doubt the offence. The corroboration is required as a matter of prudence. It all depends upon the availability of the corroborative evidence. In a given case corroboration may be available and possible. In such a case the Court must insist upon corroboration to the petitioners own deposition. It may be that in another case no corroboration is possible or available. In such a case the Court need not throw out the petitioners case on the ground of want of corroboration. Now it is well settled that even in a criminal case the charge against an accused person can be held to be established on the evidence of a single witness when the quality the strength and the character of the evidence is such as to inspire confidence. Now it is well settled that even in a criminal case the charge against an accused person can be held to be established on the evidence of a single witness when the quality the strength and the character of the evidence is such as to inspire confidence. Therefore it is not necessary that in all cases the Court without examining the possibility of the corroborative evidence should throw out the petitioners case on the mere consideration that no corroboration is forthcoming and that no corroborative evidence or circumstance has been produced by the petitioner. However in the instant case all this is more of academic consideration. As aforesaid it has been found by the learned Assistant Judge himself that the evidence of the petitioning wife showed that she was man-handled on the morning of April 18 1955 and a grave act of physical violence was committed on her and she was turned out. These facts receive corroboration from the medical evidence in the shape of the evidence of Dr. Dangi supported by the certificate of the injuries to the wife the police yadi with which the wife was sent to the hospital as a complaint was contemplated to be lodged and the case papers produced by Dr. Dangi. The learned Judge has in para 12 of his judgment in terms referred to this as corroborative evidence to the wifes say that she was given a push and thrown down and had received injuries at the hands of the husband. This is clearly satisfactory evidence and need not detain me any further. ( 8 ) I must say that Mr. Patel has attacked this very finding of the learned Judge in para 12 of his judgment namely that the husband was guilty of this particular act of violence on the morning of April 18 1955 as an erroneous inference. This is inconsistent with Mr. Patels own earlier contention that the learned Judge has considered all the relevant facts and circumstances and therefore it is not open to me sitting in second appeal to go behind the findings of fact. However I have permitted Mr. Patel to take me through the relevant evidence as desired by him. Mr. Patel has read out before me the evidence of the wife the evidence of Dr. Dangi the police yadi the medical certificate and the medical case papers. Relying on this Mr. However I have permitted Mr. Patel to take me through the relevant evidence as desired by him. Mr. Patel has read out before me the evidence of the wife the evidence of Dr. Dangi the police yadi the medical certificate and the medical case papers. Relying on this Mr. Patel has urged that although it was true that the wife has referred to the act of physical violence of the husband on the relevant morning and although there was corroborative evidence of Dr. Dangi on this point supported by the medical certificate and other relevant papers Dr. Hiralal who is said to have been the doctor to have earlier examined the petitioning wife was not examined as witness in the case. This in Mr. patels submission was a serious infirmity in the case of the petitioning wife. Relying on this single omission Mr. Patel wanted me to reappreciate the evidence and to reach a different finding than the one arrived at by the learned Judge in para 12 of this judgment. I have carefully scrutinized the evidence of the wife. I have also scrutinized the evidence of Dr. Dangi. The wife has described the way in which she was treated by the husband on the relevant morning. She has referred to the kicks; she has referred to the fist blows; she has referred to the push being given to her; she has stated that she had fallen down as a result of this treatment to her; she has also stated that she was driven out of the house by the husband along with the infant child; she says that she was waiting outside for an opportunity if any available to her to be welcome in the house of the husband; she had again sought a re-entry in the house after the husband had left the house but her mother-in-law had turned her out. The wife has stated that she had received the injuries on her person. The fact that she had received the injuries is corroborated by the evidence of Dr. Dangi who had examined the wife on the next day. There is no reason to doubt the evidence of Dr. Dangi. His evidence has remained unshaken in the cross-examination. The evidence of the wife in my view even if I were to reappreciate the evidence is such as to inspire complete confidence. Dangi who had examined the wife on the next day. There is no reason to doubt the evidence of Dr. Dangi. His evidence has remained unshaken in the cross-examination. The evidence of the wife in my view even if I were to reappreciate the evidence is such as to inspire complete confidence. Hers is a straightforward version of a simple unsophisticated woman and there is no reason to doubt her testimony. It is true that she has stated that she was first examined by Dr. Hiralal. But it appears that the advisers of the petitioning wife did not think it proper to examine Dr. Hiralal. It appears that the incident had happened in April 1955 and the evidence was recorded some time in July 1959. It is also in evidence that the wife wanted to lodge a police complaint and she was taken to the Police Station. It is also in evidence that she was sent to the hospital with a police yadi which is produced on record. She was examined by Dr. Dangi who had found the three injuries. I have referred to his opinion earlier and I need not repeat it here. This evidence is in my view sufficient to show that the husband was guilty of this particular physical act of violence which had resulted in the aforesaid injuries. This would be sufficient to bring home the charge of cruelly to the husband. Therefore even if I were to accept Mr. Patels submission that the particular finding of the learned Judge relating to this particular act of violence requires to be reappreciated I would have reached the same conclusion namely that the husband was guilty of an act of physical violence to the wife which was grave enough. There is therefore no force in the aforesaid contention of Mr. Patel which must be rejected. ( 9 ) MR. Patel has then urged that the learned Assistant Judge had at the end in para 12 of his judgment found that except for the unhappy state of affairs during the last quarter of 1954 and the later half of 1955 I do not find that any constant trouble persisted between the parties from February 1942 till the 3rd quarter of 1954 This observation or finding as Mr. Patel would have it cannot help him in any way. Patel would have it cannot help him in any way. This has relation only to the period prior to the 3rd quarter of the year 1954 Mr. Patel then urged that the evidence of Mr. Choksi was found by the learned Assistant Judge on a discussion made in para 14 of the judgment to be unhelpful to the petitioner. I must confess I have not been able to understand the relevancy of Mr. Patels reference to the deposition of Mr. Choksi and the observations of the learned Assistant judge in that connection. The learned Judge has not relied upon Mr. Choksis evidence. Nor do I propose to reconsider his evidence in this second appeal and rely upon the evidence. However I must say that the learned Assistant Judge has considered witness Mr. Choksi as a person of integrity high education and reliable It is in evidence that Mr. Choksi was a next-door neighbour of the respondent with only a common wall dividing the two houses. Mr. Choksi was residing in the house since about three years prior to the incident of April 1955. He has stated that the petitioning wife was suffering from hysteria and that whenever she had actual attack nobody in the matrimonial home used to attend to her. Ho has also stated that he had heard Lilavati crying out. Ho has stated that he used to hear the noise of beating and cries of the petitioning wife. He had heard such cries on two or three occasions. In relation to this evidence of Mr. Choksi the learned Judge has observed that he did not hold Mr. Choksi to be in any way a biased witness in favour of the petitioner and against the opponent. The learned Judge has however observed that his evidence suffered from the absence of quality of precision and the reason given by the learned Judge in so finding is that Mr. Choksi had not intervened on any of the occasions in any dispute between the parties although he says he had heard the noise of beating and cries of the petitioner. The learned Judge has therefore rejected Mr. Choksis evidence. Sitting in second appeal although my attention is invited to this evidence I do not think it proper or necessary having regard to the aforesaid view that I have taken in the matter to go into this evidence of Mr. Choksi. Mr. The learned Judge has therefore rejected Mr. Choksis evidence. Sitting in second appeal although my attention is invited to this evidence I do not think it proper or necessary having regard to the aforesaid view that I have taken in the matter to go into this evidence of Mr. Choksi. Mr. Patel then vaguely referred to the observations of the learned Judge in paragraph 15 of the judgment relating to the evidence of one Kalyandas a maternal uncle of the wife examined at Ex. 64. The observations referred to are His evidence of general maltreatment of the petitioner over a period of several years prior to 1955 did not inspire my confidence. These observations I am told were made in connection with the evidence of Kalyandas that the respondent was ill-treating and harassing the petitioning wife and that some time after the death of the first child the respondent had driven out the wife and after 3 or 4 years the respondent was persuaded to take her back in his house. Again after about 4 or 5 months the respondent began to ill-treat and harass the wife and some time in the year 1951 the petitioner was again driven out and the wife had again to go and stay with her parents. In 1951 Kalyandas had gone to the respondent and persuaded him to take back the wife. The petitioner then stayed for 3 to 4 months and again she was turned out. I do not propose to rely on or reappreciate the evidence of Kalyandas although the respondent himself has admitted that Kalyandas was a good man and he had nothing to say against him If Mr. Patels reference to this evidence is to show that there was no proof of general ill-treatment I must say that at the highest it would merely show that evidence of witnesses Choksi and Kalyandas is not relied upon by the learned Assistant Judge. This cannot carry the respondents defence any further; nor can it affect the otherwise reliable evidence of the petitioning wife corroborated as it has been found by the medical evidence and other surrounding circumstances. I must say that I have drawn the legal conclusions on the basis of the very findings of fact aforesaid as they have been arrived at by the learned Assistant Judge himself. I must say that I have drawn the legal conclusions on the basis of the very findings of fact aforesaid as they have been arrived at by the learned Assistant Judge himself. J have for the purpose excluded from my consideration the evidence read out before me by Mr. Patel on behalf of the respondent-husband. ( 10 ) MR. Patel then urged that the circumstance of the return of ornaments by the respondent-husband to the wifes father under receipt Ex. 46 was of no consequence. It appears that the learned Judge has considered this incident as showing the tense atmosphere obtaining at the time between the two spouses as also between their parents and has found it to be a grave event. Sitting in second appeal I would not like to reappreciate this evidence and go behind this finding which is not shown to be perverse ( 11 ) MR. Patel lastly contended that the finding of cruelty was a finding of fact and therefore there was no case for my interference in second appeal. Now legal cruelty is not a pure finding of fact. It is a legal conclusion to be drawn from proved facts. Where a legal conclusion is drawn from the findings a second appeal will lie under clause (a) of sec. 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that the legal conclusion was erroneous. As aforesaid the learned Judge has arrived at certain findings of fact and the material findings are in favour of the wife. However as aforesaid the learned Judge has failed to draw proper legal conclusion from the proved facts. it would therefore be open to me to interfere with the conclusion so arrived at on the question of cruelty. Bearing in mind the incidents of cruelty and the matters that are to be considered to reach a legal conclusion in all questions of legal cruelty I must say that Mr. Patel was in this case in a rather unenviable position. He first contended that I should not go behind the findings of fact and I should not reappreciate the evidence. But when faced with the adverse findings of the learned Judge himself referred to in paragraph 12 of the judgment and to some other relevant findings considered by me above Mr. He first contended that I should not go behind the findings of fact and I should not reappreciate the evidence. But when faced with the adverse findings of the learned Judge himself referred to in paragraph 12 of the judgment and to some other relevant findings considered by me above Mr. Patel contended that those findings were not proper inferences and conclusions and for the purpose he took me through the petitioners evidence as aforesaid. However I have drawn my conclusions strictly from the very facts found by the learned Judge himself as observed earlier. But I must say that even if I were to reappreciate the evidence as Mr. Patel on behalf of the respondent wants me to and to go behind the findings of fact I would have no hesitation in holding that the petitioning wife has proved beyond all reasonable doubt the charge of cruelty against the guilty spouse namely the respondent-husband. In any view of the matter therefore the respondent-husband is satisfactorily proved to have been guilty of legal cruelty against the petitioning-wife. ( 12 ) THIS will take me to the next question of desertion. Mr. Patel has contended that the offence must be proved beyond all reasonable doubt and further that the ingredients of the offence of desertion as laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Bipinchandra v. Prabhavati and followed in the case of Lachman v. Meena must be followed. The law is well settled and I am bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. As aforesaid the learned Judges own findings clearly bring out in prominence the material fact that there was a physical act of violence consisting of kicks slaps and push given with some force which was the penultimate act of the husband immediately followed by the turning out of the wife and the innocent child from the matrimonial home and the subsequent refusal of an entry in the house by the mother-in-law. All this was preceded by the husbands and mother-in-laws insistence that the wife should leave the matrimonial home. Again the learned Assistant Judge has found that the husband had at no time subsequent to the turning out of the wife approached the wife or made amends to her or tried to bring about rapprochement. All this was preceded by the husbands and mother-in-laws insistence that the wife should leave the matrimonial home. Again the learned Assistant Judge has found that the husband had at no time subsequent to the turning out of the wife approached the wife or made amends to her or tried to bring about rapprochement. It is unthinkable that the husband should not have oven cared to go to the wife at her parents house and even cared to enquire about the poor infant girl It may be that he may have aversion to the wife. But he had no reason to transfer this aversion to the infant girl. The learned Judges view is that the respondent was not a normal husband. Instead of trying at reconciliation the husband straightway walked into his Advocates chamber and instructed him to serve the petitioning wife with the notice as aforesaid. The learned Judge has found that the husbands offers made in the notice were not genuine offers and did not show his bona fides. It must be remembered that this is not a case of the wife leaving the matrimonial home of her own accord and against the wish of the husband. The wife was forcibly turned out of the house with the child and the house bolted behind her as aforesaid. Furthermore there was wilful neglect of the wife and the child by husband. This case therefore has to be considered as a case not of simple desertion but of constructive desertion of the petitioning wife by the respondent-husband There is no substantial difference between the case of a man who intends to cease cohabitation and leaves his wife and the case of a man who compels his wife by his conduct with the same intention to leave him (vide Rayden on Divorce Para 129 ). The respondents conduct was clearly explusive. In Lang v. Lang (1955) A. C. 402 it has been observed that if one spouse expels the other from the marital home or if he by his or her words and conduct compels the other spouse leave the marital home the former would be guilty of desertion though it is the latter who has physically separated from the other and has been made to leave the marital home. Once it is found that one of the spouses has been deserted and here it is found proved that the petitioning wife was the expelled and deserted spouse the presumption of continuous desertion of her by the respondent-husband must arise. In Bipinchandras case the Supreme Court has at page 190 of the report observed that It is true that once it is found that one of the spouses has been in desertion the presumption is that the desertion has continued and that it is not necessary for the deserted spouse actually to take steps to bring the deserting spouse back to the matrimonial home. Referring to the doctrine of constructive desertion Rayden on Divorce Eighth Edition has in para 129 summarized the position in the following words Desertion is not to be tested by merely ascertaining which party left the matrimonial home first. If one spouse is forced by the conduct of the other to leave home it may be that the spouse responsible for the driving out is guilty of desertion Again under the caption of Presumptions in para 132 Rayden has extracted the following summary from the English decisions. Where conduct of the required nature is established the necessary intention is readily inferred for prima facie a person is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of his acts and it is not necessary to show in a case of constructive desertion some definite evidence of a clear intention on the part of one spouse to drive the other away. The instant case is one of constructive desertion in which the presumption is readily attracted. The wife herself has not left the matrimonial home and has not deserted the husband. She has been deserted by the husband by expelling her. The desertion is presumed to continue and the presumption is not rebutted. Apart from raising a presumption of continued desertion I would say that the findings of the learned Assistant Judge clearly show that the husband was at no time willing to take back the wife in the matrimonial home The learned Judge himself has found the husbands offers contained in his advocates notices not to be bona fide ones. Apart from raising a presumption of continued desertion I would say that the findings of the learned Assistant Judge clearly show that the husband was at no time willing to take back the wife in the matrimonial home The learned Judge himself has found the husbands offers contained in his advocates notices not to be bona fide ones. The conduct of the husband in not making any attempts at reconcilliation in not taking care of the infant girl in not enquiring about the health of the wife and in not caring for their maintenance or providing for them in between the period from April 18 1955 and the date of filing of the petition which appear from the judgment of the learned Judge is the conduct of a husband who clearly intends to desert his wife with the animus deserendi. The factum of separation cannot be denied. There was no animus deserendi on the part of the wife who is not shown to have been guilty in the matter. The act of separation of the wife is clearly attributable to the husbands animus deserendi. I have considered the essential requirements to be proved in the case of desertion as laid down by the Supreme Court in Bipinchandras case (supra) and in my view this is a case which clearly fulfils all the requirements and the case clearly falls within the definition of the expression desertion as envisaged by clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 10 of the Act. Again in this case it is to be noted that desertion has relationship to cruelty. It was as a result of the cruel conduct and the aforesaid penultimate physical act or acts of violence and the turning out of the wife from the matrimonial home by the husband that the wife was compelled to leave the matrimonial home as found by the learned Judge himself. The legal inference is therefore inevitable that the husband was guilty of desertion within the meaning of clause (a) of sub-sec. (1) of sec. 10 of the Act. The learned Judge was therefore clearly in error of law in finding to the contrary. ( 13 ) IT appears that the learned Judge has approached the question from a manifestly wrong angle. (1) of sec. 10 of the Act. The learned Judge was therefore clearly in error of law in finding to the contrary. ( 13 ) IT appears that the learned Judge has approached the question from a manifestly wrong angle. He appears to have considered that here was a husband who was an educated husband with a good social background; that the mother who was instrumental in instigating the husband was now dead and therefore there was no reason for the wife to apprehend that her future conjugal rights in the matrimonial home were in danger. This is a new case made out by the learned Judge himself. The learned Judge has committed an apparent error of law in not approaching the case in a proper perspective namely that it was a case of constructive desertion where the wife had proved that the husband had committed acts of violence on her and turned her out of the matrimonial home and had never cared for her thereafter. Further the learned Judge has failed to draw proper legal conclusion from the proved subsequent conduct of the husband. The Supreme Court has observed in Bipinchandras case that the conduct of the erring spouse both anterior and subsequent to the actual act of separation has to be viewed. The learned Judge has at different places in his judgment referred to the conduct of the husband. He has found that the conduct was not of a normal husband. He has further found that after the incident of April 18 1955 the respondent- husband did not make any move to bring about cohabitation between him and the petitioning wife. He has found that the factum of separation for over two years was proved. But as the learned Judge puts it in para 17 of his judgment but the intention of bringing cohabitation permanently to an end cannot be said to be proved because the charge of legal cruelty against the opponent is not substantiated and established. It is therefore that this issue is held not proved. In my view this is not a correct legal approach and not a proper legal inference from proved facts aforesaid. Desertion is an independent ground by itself and entitles the wife to a decree for judicial separation. The charge of desertion is proved independently of the charge of cruelty. It is therefore that this issue is held not proved. In my view this is not a correct legal approach and not a proper legal inference from proved facts aforesaid. Desertion is an independent ground by itself and entitles the wife to a decree for judicial separation. The charge of desertion is proved independently of the charge of cruelty. The learned Judge has thus taken a view contrary to and insupportable in law. ( 14 ) AS aforesaid in my view the findings of facts arrived at by the learned Assistant Judge himself clearly lead to the proper legal inference that the respondent-husband was guilty of cruelty; that he was guilty of such gross act of cruelty that it would raise a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioning-wife that it would be harmful and injurious for her to live with the husband in the matrimonial home. The last physical act of violence (incident of April 18 1955 the turning out of the wife from the home the bolting of the door behind her the earlier course of treatment above referred to the subsequent neglect by the husband to take care of the wife as also of the child the course of conduct of the husband as evidenced by the notice correspondence and his offer held to be not bona fide clearly lead to the inevitable legal conclusion that the husband was guilty also of desertion of the wife. In my view the learned Judge was clearly in error of law in not finding that the husband was the guilty spouse and that he was guilty of the matrimonial offences of cruelty and desertion. I am satisfied that the grounds for granting relief viz. cruelty and desertion do exist in the case. No legal ground is shown why relief should not be granted to the petitioning wife. The decree for judicial separation must therefore follow. [ The rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] appeal allowed: Judicial separation granted. .