JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - The suit out of which this appeal arises was filed on the following averments: T.S. No. 19/57 in the Court of the Additional Subordinate Judge, Berhampur was filed by the Plaintiff for recovery of possession of the disputed lands on the allegation that the Defendant and his vendor were trespassers. Defendant Bhima Padhi was Defendant No. 6 in that suit. He claimed to have purchased the disputed lands from Kaviraj Madhusudan Sarma who had purchased the same from Honnu Padhi, both of whom, bad been impleaded as Defendant Nos. 1 and 4 in that suit. All those Defendants were held to be trespassers and a decree for eviction was passed. In execution of the decree, Plaintiff was put in possession on 3-3-1959 (see Amin's report-Ex. 7 (b)). Defendant'" vendor filed F.A. No. 7/59 wherein the Defendant was Respondent No. 6. While the First Appeal was pending and the Plaintiff kept the disputed lands in his khas cultivation, Defendant threatened the Plaintiff with violence and gave out that he would remove the crop by force. Plaintiff accordingly filed T.S. No. 198/59 in the Court of the Munsif, Berhampur against the Defendant for permanent injunction to restrain the Defendant from interfering with the possession and cultivation of the suit lands. An interim injunction was issued. Defendant was, however, permitted to cut the crop on his depositing in Court Rs. 300/ - tentatively fixed as the value of the crop. On 1-8-1960, that suit was compromised. Defendant was allowed to cultivate the disputed lands till the disposal of F.A. No. 7/59 on his agreeing to give half of the yield of paddy to the Plaintiff by a specified date. Defendant did not give the paddy for the year 1960 to the Plaintiff. The latter accordingly filed M. S No. 69/61 in the Court of the Munsif, Berhampur for recovery of the value of the paddy. After service of notice in that suit, Defendant filed O.T. R case No. 32/61 in the Court of the O.T.R. Collector, Berhampur praying amongst other reliefs for a declaration that he was the tenant of the disputed lands and for permitting him to deposit the profits of the suit lands under the provisions of the O.T.R. Act (hereinafter to be referred to as the Act). Plaintiff's case is that there is no relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant as landlord and tenant. Plaintiff's case is that there is no relationship between the Plaintiff and the Defendant as landlord and tenant. The latter was bound by the decree in T.S. No. 19/57 in the Court of the Addl. Subordinate. Judge and by the decree in T.S. No. 198/59 on the file of the Munsif, Berhampur. Further, an identical plea of the Defendant raised in O.T.R. case No. 19/59 had been previously withdrawn. F.A. No. 7/59 was dismissed for default on 21-9-1961. O.T.R. case No. 32/61 was dropped on 14-5-1962 as stated by Mr. P.V. Ramdas. As per the terms of the compromise decree in T.S. No. 198/59, Defendant was liable to vacate the disputed lands. On the Defendant's failure to leave possession, the suit was filed for recovery of possession and permanent injunction. 2. Defendant pleaded that Honnu Padhi had occupancy rights in the suit lands which he transferred to Madhusudan Sarma, who in his turn, sold the same to the Defendant in 1954. Ever since then, the Defendant has been enjoying occupancy rights peacefully. Plaintiff is entitled only to receive Rajbhagam. The suit was not maintainable till disposal of O.T.R. Case No. 32/6l. 3. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the Defendant and his predecessors-in-interest were trespassers and had no tenancy rights and the decree passed in T.S. No. 19/51 against which F.A. No. 7 /59 had been dismissed for default on 21-9-1961 is res judicata, so far as the defence is concerned. He accordingly decreed the Plaintiff's suit. This appeal has been filed by the Defendant. 4. The following questions arise for consideration in this appeal: (a) Is it open to the Defendant to raise the defence that he is a tenant of the disputed lands in view of the decree in T.S. No. 19/57 that he was a trespasser? (b) Is the jurisdiction of the Civil Court ousted by the Defendant having filed an application in O.T.R. Case No. 32/61 that he was a tenant of the disputed lands? 5. In T.S. No. 79/57, the learned Additional Subordinate Judge held that the Defendant and his predecessors-in-interest were trespassers and had no tenancy right in the disputed lands. Honnu Padhi, Madhusudan Sarma and Bhima Padhi were all parties to that suit. They are bound by the decree which became final as a result of the disposal of F.A. No. 7/59 by the High Court on 21-9-1961. Honnu Padhi, Madhusudan Sarma and Bhima Padhi were all parties to that suit. They are bound by the decree which became final as a result of the disposal of F.A. No. 7/59 by the High Court on 21-9-1961. They had taken the identical defence in the previous suit. The judgment. (Ex. 1) and the decree (Ex. 2) in that suit constitute res judicata for the defence taken in this suit. On the law as pronounced in The Union of India (UOI) Vs. Ram Kanwar and Others, the Civil Court had jurisdiction to decide the dispute regarding the existence of relationship landlord and tenant despite the pendency of O.T.R. Case No. 32/61 which was dropped on 14-5-1902. 6. Mr. P.V. Ramdas did not present any argument that there are materials in support of the defence plea of occupancy right. The written statement itself also bristles with contradictions. In paragraph 2 thereof, Defendant claimed a right of occupancy, while in paragraph 4, he claimed that he was a tenant under the Act. It is elementary that an occupancy raiyat has much higher rights than a tenant under the Act. If the Defendant claims occupancy right, then the fact that he filed an application under the Act, would be no bar to 'oust' the jurisdiction of the Civil Court. A claim of occupancy right by the Defendant would be governed in this case by the provisions of the Madras Estates Land Act. When there is a dispute whether the Defendant is an occupancy raiyat or a trespasser, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted. On the Defendant's claim that he is an occupancy tenant, the Civil Court has complete jurisdiction to decide whether in fact, he was an occupancy raiyat or a trespasser. 7. On the finding that Defendant has no occupancy right, Court has still to examine if he is a tenant under the Act, see Jagannath v. Jogi I.L.R 1960 Cutt. 47 : (1960) 26 C.L.T. 437 . In this suit, Defendant has failed to prove such a case. 8. On the aforesaid findings, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. 7. On the finding that Defendant has no occupancy right, Court has still to examine if he is a tenant under the Act, see Jagannath v. Jogi I.L.R 1960 Cutt. 47 : (1960) 26 C.L.T. 437 . In this suit, Defendant has failed to prove such a case. 8. On the aforesaid findings, the appeal is liable to be dismissed. But Defendant filed an application under Order XLI Rule 27, CPC to admit an application flied by him on 12-10-1963 during the pendency of this first appeal O.T.R. Case No. 29/63 in the Court of the O.T.R. Collector, Berhampur asking for protection from eviction and the order dated 20-2-1964 passed thereon. The documents were admitted and marked as Exs. A and B without objection. The application was dismissed by the O.T.R. Collector with the following observation: Parties present Seen the petition of the Petitioner and heard the Advocate for the Respondent. It appears that the matter relating to the relationship between the landlord and the tenant has been already decided in the Civil Court and an appeal is pending against this order in the Hon'ble High Court. In the circumstances, the present petition needs no consideration. The Petitioner may come up after the final decision in the appellate Court. Case disposed of accordingly. The party is informed. Thus, by the time the first appeal was heard and Exs. A and B were brought to the notice of the Court, no application under the Act was pending. 9. Mr. P.V. Ramdas, however, contended that even though the dispute which raised during the pendency of the first appeal, was not pending, the Civil Court had no jurisdiction to continue the suit. This contention based on Section 11-A of the Act requires careful examination. 10. Section 11-A, so far as relevant, may be quoted: 11-A. (1) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary in any of the other provisions of this Act the Collector shall decide all disputes regarding the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant arising in course of any of the proceedings under this Act. (2) Where a dispute of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) is raised or is pending before the Collector, no proceedings relating to such dispute shall be maintainable or be continued in any Civil Court arid the decision of the Collector shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (4) and (5), be final. 11. (2) Where a dispute of the nature specified in Sub-section (1) is raised or is pending before the Collector, no proceedings relating to such dispute shall be maintainable or be continued in any Civil Court arid the decision of the Collector shall, subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (4) and (5), be final. 11. Under Sub-section (1), the Collector shall decide all disputes regarding- the existence of the relationship of landlord and tenant arising in course of any of the proceedings under this Act. The ban on Civil Court's jurisdiction under Sub-section (1) is restricted by the insertion of Sub-section (2). Collector gets jurisdiction, if a dispute is raised or pending before him. The language of the Sub-section is plain and only means that if the Revenue Court is in seisin of the and has taken cognizance thereof, then alone the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, is ousted in respect of that dispute. The dispute before the Collector might precede the civil suit or might be raised at any time subsequent to the institution of the suit before the determination of the lis. One thing, however, is certain that there must be a dispute raised or pending before the Collector. As a necessary logical corollary, it follows that in the absence of any dispute pending before the Collector, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted. Had it not been so, there was no necessity for the Legislature to use the words putting restriction on the jurisdiction of the Civil Court in the circumstances enumerated in Sub-section (2). To give a different construction would render the expression "is raised or is pending" in Sub-section (2) redundant. Under Sub-section (2), the decision of the Collector shall be final subject to the provisions of Sub-sections (4) and (5). Sub-sections (4) and (5) provide the forum for a first and second appeal respectively. Sub-section (6) vests the High Court with revisional jurisdiction, if any question of law is raised. 12. Mr. P.V. Ramdas contends that the moment a dispute was raised by Ex. A, the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the dispute in this first appeal was ousted. The dispute which was raised was not entertained and enquired into by the Collector. Defendant did not choose to file first appeal, second appeal and revision under Sub-section (4), (5) and (6). A, the jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the dispute in this first appeal was ousted. The dispute which was raised was not entertained and enquired into by the Collector. Defendant did not choose to file first appeal, second appeal and revision under Sub-section (4), (5) and (6). The result was that though a dispute was raised before the Collector, it was not kept alive. 13. The question for consideration is whether the: jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted even after disposal of the dispute adversely to the disputant. The conclusion depends upon the construction of the' expression "is raised or is pending" in Sub-section (2). That the dispute must be raised or would be pending in a proceeding before the Collector to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is concluded by the decision of a Division Bench of this Court in Radhacharan Das Babaji Vs. Bhima Patra. The further question for consideration in this case is whether a dispute raised and concluded negativing the claim of tenancy would still be a bar. An illustration would clarify the discussion. Suppose, Plaintiff files a civil suit for possession against the Defendant as a trespasser. Defendant raises a dispute before the Collector claiming that there is relationship of landlord and tenant. The Collector negatives the defence contention and holds that there was no relationship of landlord and tenant and that Defendant is a trespasser. The Defendant pursues the remedy of first appeal, second appeal and revision under Sub-sections (4), (5) and (6) and the claim was consistently rejected. Can it be said that the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is ousted to pass a decree for eviction of the trespasser? The answer would be in the negative. The same would be the conclusion, if the dispute which was raised is allowed to be concluded without filing any appeal against the adverse order or the application raising the dispute is not pursued and is allowed to be dismissed. The expression a dispute "is raised", must be given the construction that a dispute "is raised and is kept alive". Where the dispute is not kept alive by allowing the pro ceding to remain pending, the conclusion would be that no dispute was raised in the proceeding before the Collector and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted. 14. Where the dispute is not kept alive by allowing the pro ceding to remain pending, the conclusion would be that no dispute was raised in the proceeding before the Collector and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not ousted. 14. The disjunctive word 'or' in between "is raised" and "is pending" carries the connotation of the conjunctive "and". That in particular context it can carry such meaning is well settled. Maxwell in his Interpretation of Statutes (11th Edition) states as follows: To carry out the intention of the legislature, it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions "or" and "and" one for the other. The Bankruptcy Act, 1603 (c. 15) which made it an act of Bankruptcy for a trader to leave his dwelling-house "to the intent, or, whereby his creditors might be defeated or delayed," if construed literally, would have exposed to bankruptcy every trader who left his home even for an hour, if a creditor called during his absence for payment. This absurd consequence was avoided and the real intention of the legislature was beyond reasonable doubt effected by reading "or" as "and" so that an absence from home was an act of bankruptcy only when coupled with the design of delaying or defeating creditors-Fowler v. Padget (1798) 7 T.R. 509. In Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj Vs. The State of Rajasthan and Others their Lordships held that "or" in Section 5(2)(g) of Rajasthan Nathdwara Temple Act (13 of 1959) must mean "and" as the context clearly indicated that way. In this case, it is clear from the context that "or" in between "is raised" and "is pending" in Sub-section (2) of Section 11-A must carry the meaning "and". In other words, in order to oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court, not only a dispute must be raised, but it must also be pending. The expression "is raised" does not necessarily mean that it must be raised subsequent to the institution of the suit. It would also cover cases where the dispute had been raised before the Collector in a proceeding under the Act by the time the civil suit was filed. 15. The next question for consideration is as to what would happen to the civil suit or appeal if a dispute is raised during their pendency and the matter is brought to the notice of the Court. 15. The next question for consideration is as to what would happen to the civil suit or appeal if a dispute is raised during their pendency and the matter is brought to the notice of the Court. When a Plaintiff sues a trespasser for eviction, the forum is the Civil Court. The plaint cannot be thrown out as not maintainable merely because the tenant starts a proceeding in the Revenue Court under the Act raising a dispute that there is relationship of land-lord and tenant. Under Sub-section (2) of Section 11-A, the proceeding relating to such dispute shall not be maintainable or continued in the Civil Court. The expression "shall not be continued" in any Civil Court is clear and the Civil Court would Dot proceed further in the suit after it is brought to its notice that a dispute had been raised before the Collector asserting that there is relationship of landlord and tenant and riot of owner and trespasser. What is the meaning to be ascribed to the expression "not maintainable"? It cannot be given a meaning that the suit would be dismissed or that the plaint would be returned. Here also, the word "or" would carry the meaning "and" and the entire expression would mean that the plaint would lie over and the proceeding would be stayed from the stage when the matter was brought to the notice of the Civil Court that a dispute has been raised before the Collector. Otherwise, it would lead to fantastic results. When the owner brings a suit against a trespasser, no useful purpose would be served to ask him to take back the plaint and file it before the revenue authorities for recovery of possession. If the trespasser is allowed to remain in possession of the land for more than twelve years, he would acquire a title by prescription. In view of this difficulty, the civil suit or appeal would be stayed, until determination of the dispute by the Collector. If the Collector decides that there is relationship of landlord and tenant, the decision would be binding on the Civil Court and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be ousted and the suit would be dismissed. The legislature has conferred special jurisdiction on the Revenue Court to determine such disputes and such decision is final. If the Collector decides that there is relationship of landlord and tenant, the decision would be binding on the Civil Court and the jurisdiction of the Civil Court would be ousted and the suit would be dismissed. The legislature has conferred special jurisdiction on the Revenue Court to determine such disputes and such decision is final. u/s 9, CPC Code, the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature whose cognizance is not barred either expressly or impliedly. By Section 11-A, the jurisdiction of the Civil Court is not absolutely but conditionally ousted, the conditions being that the dispute has been raised and pending before the competent revenue authorities. This will not however preclude an owner to file a suit before the Civil Court and have it stayed to avoid the rights being barred by limitation resulting in acquisition of title by prescription by a trespasser. The same view had been taken in Rangadhar v. Dukhei C.R. No. 237 of 1964. In Brundaban v. Koti S.A. No. 562 of 1964, there is an observation to the following effect: After Revenue Court gets jurisdiction to determine the dispute, all that has been decided till now in the trial Court is without jurisdiction. This observation is slightly inaccurate. The correct legal position is that if a dispute is raised and pending before the Collector, the civil suit or appeal would be stayed at the very stage it was pending. 16. In the result, the appeal fails and is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs of this Court. Das, J. 17. I agree Final Result : Dismissed