S. K. CHATTERJI v. J. N. GHOSHAL — 1966 DIGILAW 114 (DEL)

S. K. Kapur ( 1 ) DURING the pendency of the application for ejectment the Rent Controller proceeded to decide the question of deposit of rent under section 15 of the Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958, and directed the tenants to deposit Rs. 2,750. 00 on account of arrears of rent for the period ended July, 1965, and future rent at the rate of Rs. 200. 00 per month by the 15th of each following month. Aggrieved by the said order the tenants filed an appeal before the Rent Control Tribunal. The Tribunal thought that the Rent Ctroller had directed the tenants under section 15 of the said Act to deposit the arrears and future rent at the agreed rate of Rs. 200. 00 per month treating the same as standard rent. 1 he Tribunal was further of the opinion that in the circumstances of the case it was necessary for the Rent Controller to fix an interim rent for the premises and the tenants could be directed to pay the arrears and future rent only at the interim rate so fixed. The Tribunal observed- "it may be that the landlord had produced some documents which prima facie show that he had constructed the premises in 1961 and that for five years after the date of the first letting the rent at which the premises were first let was to be fixed as the standard rent under section 6 (2) of the Act. The appellant has however not admitted the date of construction of the premises or that the first letting was at the rate of Rs. 200. 00 per mensem or that the first letting was to him or that the agreed rate at the time of first letting was Rs. 200. 00 per mensem. The protection period of five years has also to run from the date of the first letting which is a disputed fact in the present case. Under the circumstances the learned Rent Controller was not justified in accepting the documents produced by the landlord as conclusive evidence without giving the appellant a proper opportunity to rebut all this evidence. The protection period of five years has also to run from the date of the first letting which is a disputed fact in the present case. Under the circumstances the learned Rent Controller was not justified in accepting the documents produced by the landlord as conclusive evidence without giving the appellant a proper opportunity to rebut all this evidence. All that can be said is that in view of these documents the learned Rent Controller may have been justified accepting the agreed rate as the interim rent for the duration of the proceedings but in that case the deposits made by the appellant, in compliance with the order passed under section 15 would be subject to adjustment. . . . . . ". ( 2 ) WITH this observation the Tribunal partly allowed the appeal and fixed Rs. 200. 00 per mensem as interim rent under section 15 (3) of the said Act. Section 15 (3) of the Act reads as under: "if, in any proceeding referred to in sub-section (1) or subsection (2) there is any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant, the Controller shall, within fifteen days of the date of the first hearing of the proceeding, fix an interim rent in relation to the premises to be paid or deposited in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-secti in (2) as the case may be, until the standard rent inrelation thereto is fixed having reward to the provisions of this Act, and the amount of arrears, if any, calculated on the basis of the standard rent shall be paid or deposited by the tenant within one month of the date on which the standard rent is fixed or such further time as the Controller may allow in this behalf". ( 3 ) TO my mind it appears that the words "any dispute as to the amount of rent payable by the tenant" in sub-section (3) of section 15 refer to the dispute arising between the parties on account of claim of a party for fixation of standard rent. The interim rent fixed under subsection (3) of section 15, in accordance with the said provision, is made adjustable on the basis of the Standard rent ultimately fixed. If the dispute therefore be only as to the quantam and not the standard rent section 15 (3) will, in my opinion, not apply. The interim rent fixed under subsection (3) of section 15, in accordance with the said provision, is made adjustable on the basis of the Standard rent ultimately fixed. If the dispute therefore be only as to the quantam and not the standard rent section 15 (3) will, in my opinion, not apply. The artificiality of the other construction may best be demonstrated by the following example. Take a case where there is no controversy about the standard rent and the parties agree that the same is Rs. 100. 00 per month. A dispute, however, arises as to the amount due-the landlord claiming Rs. 2,000. 00 while the tenant maintaining that he had already paid Rs. 1. 000. 00 leaving a balance of Rs. l,000. 00 only. If that dispute between the parties is held to fall under section 15 (3) the latter part of standard rent will, in that event, be reduced to silence. In that situation it will be impossible to give effect to the latter part of section 15 (3) of the said Act. Sub-section (3) of section 15 in express terms contemplates fixation of an interim rent subject to adjustment on the basis of the standard rent fixed. In the circumstance? in which no such adjustment is possible the controversy appears to be outside the pale of section (3) of section 15 of the said Act. There may yet be another category of cases where the parties are at variance both regarding standard lent and the quantum of rent. In such cases the Controller iray fix an interim rent under section 15 (3) and direct deposit or payment of arrears as well at the intrim rate. It was suggested by the learned counsel for the appellant that in such cases no power inhered in the Controller to order payment or deposit of arrears of rent as section 15 (3) was silent in that behalf. In my opinion "the words,. . to be paid or deposited in accordance with the provisions of sub-section (1) or sub-section (2) as the case may be. . . " arc of sufficient amplitude as to confer such a power. If the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants were to be accepted the result would be that by raising disputes as to the standard rent the tenant will be able to avoid payment of arrears of rent. . . " arc of sufficient amplitude as to confer such a power. If the arguments of the learned counsel for the appellants were to be accepted the result would be that by raising disputes as to the standard rent the tenant will be able to avoid payment of arrears of rent. That would defeat the obvious intention of the legislature and the purpose of the Act. If on the other hand there is no dispute about the standard rent and the controversy is about the agreed rate of rent, the order of deposit will necessarily have to be made under section 15 (1) and the rent last paid will he taken as the rate of rent. In short the power to fix interim rent coires into play only when there exists a dispute about standard rent. There is also no merit in Mr Safeer s contention that even when dispute relates to standard rent the power to order deposit of arrears can be exercised only under section 15 (1) on the basis of the rent last paid. Mr Safeer s suggestion is that for ordering payment or deposit of arrears the Controller should have first dertermind the rent last paid about which there was disagreement between the parties and not having done so the order suffered from a serious infirmity. I am afraid I cannot agree. . As I have said earlier section 15 (3) in terms confers power to order payment or deposit of arrears at the interim rate of rent. If the disagreement between the parties be both as to agreed rent and the standard rent, the power will be exercised under section 15 (3) because thestandard rent will prevail over the agreed rent. ( 4 ) THE above is my interpretation of the provisions of section 15 based on the reading of entire section 15 together in the light of the scheme of the Act. In doing so I have followed the well recognised principle that the language of a statute constitutes the depository or reservoir of the Legislative intent and in order to ascertain or discover that intent the statute must be read as a whole and taken by itsfour. . corners. In doing so I have followed the well recognised principle that the language of a statute constitutes the depository or reservoir of the Legislative intent and in order to ascertain or discover that intent the statute must be read as a whole and taken by itsfour. . corners. In this case there has been a controversy about the standard rent and the appeal has proceeded before me on the assumption that the claim for fixation of standard rent was properly made by the tenants. In that situation the Tribunal rightly applied the provisions of section 15 (3) and rightly fixed the interim rent. ( 5 ) MR. Safeer s next grievance n that in the matter of fixation of interim rent the appellants had not been given an adequate opportunity of being heard and this was done in disregard of the implied mandate of section 15 (3) and the express prescription of section 37. The same is his argument regarding the direction to deposit arrears. Mr. Safeer then contended. that the appellants had. raised a plea regarding deprivation of a part of tenanted premises and decision on this aspect has alto been made without hearing. He drew my attention to certain observations of the Tribunal regarding the inadequate opportunity of being heard given to the appellants. I think the short answer to these arguments is that there is nothing on the record to. show that the appekkants ever asked for an opportunity to lead evidence. But apart from that, the Tribunal in fixing the interim rent and the arrears acted on sufficient material before it. The landlord had filed an affidavit claiming the rent due and specifying the period for which the tenants were in arrears. No affidavit was filed by the tenants denying that affidavit. The Tribunal also took note of the rent deed dated 2nd January 1964. It appears that in the course of arguments the signatures of the tenant on that document were adrnitted and the Tribusal has so observed. If that were not correct I should have expected an affidavit denying the correctness of the observation. None having been filed I must presume that the observation is correct. The rent deed mentions Rs. 200/ per month as the rate of rent for the premises for which a suit has been filed. Again, in the affidavit, dated 19th May 1965, the landlord has stated that Rs. None having been filed I must presume that the observation is correct. The rent deed mentions Rs. 200/ per month as the rate of rent for the premises for which a suit has been filed. Again, in the affidavit, dated 19th May 1965, the landlord has stated that Rs. 150/ were due from the month of June 1964 and no amount had been paid thereafter. In my opinion, the Tribunal could legitimately act on this material and determine the interim rate of rent and the arrears. Regarding the argument of Mr. Safeer based on section 37, I am not in agreement with Mr. Safeer that every party, who is likely to be prejudicially affected by the order, must be given a reasonable opportunity to lead the entire evidence as required by section 37. Enquiry under section 15 therefore, provides a Code by itself as to the nature of enquiry and to that extent would override section 37. This view finds support from a decision of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in V. N. Vasudeva v. Kirori Mal Luhariwala. Under section 15 (3) the Controller is required to fix an interim rent within IS days of the date of the first hearing of the proceedings. If this had to be done after a full fledged enquiry, compliance with section l5 (3) would become impossible. This by itself indicates that the authorities constituted under the Act are to make an enquiry in a summary manner. Of course, while doing so, they cannot act arbitrarily or without any material. Bat having; regard to the circumstances of this case I think the Tribunal had sufficent material to come to the above conclusion. ( 6 ) IN the result, this appeal falls and is dismissed with no order as to costs. The tenants will, in the circumstances, deposit with the Controller within one month of the date of this order the arrears of rent due by them up to 1st November 1966, and also deposit with the Controller future rent, month by month, by the 15th of each succeeding month at the rate fixed by the Tribunal. I have given this further time to the appellants having regard to the fact that an appeal is a continuation of the proceedings.