ORDER P.V. Dixit, C.J. This order will also govern the disposal of Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 311 and 353 of 1965. The question raised by these three petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution is as to the validity of two Schemes described as Scheme No. 16 and Scheme No. 22 published by the State Government u/s 68-D (3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 68-C of the Act the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation (hereinafter called the Corporation) published proposals in the Gazette dated 22nd May 1984 propounding Scheme No. 16 for the running and operation by the Corporation of road transport services on the routes specified in the Scheme. On the same date, another notification u/s 68-C containing proposals propounding another Scheme, namely, Scheme No. 22, was published by the Corporation for the running and operation by the Corporation of services on the routes specified in that Scheme. These notifications invited persons affected by the Schemes to file objections, if any, before the Respondent No. 2, Special Secretary to Government in the Home Department, in accordance with Rule 4 of the Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport services (Development) Rules, 1959 (hereinafter referred to as the Rules) The Petitioners filed objections u/s 68-D of the Act which were heard and decided by the Special Secretary, he being the person appointed by the Government to hear and decide the objections. On 8th June 1965 the Special Secretary passed an order u/s 68-D (2) rejecting the Petitioners' objections to Scheme No. 16 and approving that Scheme with some modifications. He directed that that Scheme would come into force from 15th September 1965. Thereafter, on 11th June 1965 Scheme No. 16 "as approved and modified" under Sub-section (2) of Section 68-D was published in the Gazette as required by Sub-section (3) of Section 68-D. This publication of Scheme No. 16 was, however, superseded by another publication of the Scheme in the Gazette dated 18th June 1965 u/s 68-D of the Act. The order approving with some modifications Scheme No. 22 and making it effective from 15th August 1965 was passed by the Special Secretary on 25th May 1965. Thereafter, the Scheme was published in the Gazette dated 28th May 1965 as required by Section 68-D (3). The order approving with some modifications Scheme No. 22 and making it effective from 15th August 1965 was passed by the Special Secretary on 25th May 1965. Thereafter, the Scheme was published in the Gazette dated 28th May 1965 as required by Section 68-D (3). The Petitioners who operate transport services wholly or partly on the routes covered by the two Schemes question the validity of the Schemes and pray that by issue of writs of certiorari the two Schemes as published u/s 68-D (3), as also the orders dated 8th June 1965 and 25th May 1965, be quashed and the Respondents be restrained from giving effect to the Schemes. The Schemes have been attacked on several grounds, which are common to all the three petitions. Some of the grounds of challenge are similar to those raised in Premchand Jain v. State of M.P. 1965 MPLJ 434 : A I R 1965 M P 196. and Premchand Jain v. State of M.P. 1966 MPLJ 305 : A I R 1966 M.P. 117 and are concluded by the decisions of this Court in two cases of Premchand Jain. It would be convenient to deal first with the concluded points; but before doing that the context in which they have been raised must be stated briefly. Section 68-D, in its application to the State of Madhya Pradesh, has been modified by the Motor Vehicles (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act, 1962 (No. 2 of 1963). By the Amending Act an Explanation has been added to Sub-section (1) of Section 68-D defining the words "person affected" as meaning and including: (a) a person already providing transport facilities by any means along or near the area or route covered by the scheme; (b) an association representing persons interested in the provisions of road transport facilities recognised in this behalf by the State Government; and (c) any local authority within whose jurisdiction any area or route covered by the scheme or any part thereof lies. A new Sub-section (2-a) has also been inserted in Section 68-D. That is as follows: (2-a) The State Government may, by notification, authorise any officer not below the rank of a Secretary to Government for the purpose of hearing objections under Sub-section (2). A new Sub-section (2-a) has also been inserted in Section 68-D. That is as follows: (2-a) The State Government may, by notification, authorise any officer not below the rank of a Secretary to Government for the purpose of hearing objections under Sub-section (2). The appointment of Shri R.S. Shukla, Special Secretary to Government in the Home Department, to dispose of the objections received to the two Schemes was made by the Chief Minister on 12th July 1963 in pursuance of Supplementary Instruction No. 2 issued under Rule 13 of the Rules of Business of the Executive Government of Madhya Pradesh made under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. Supplementary Instruction No. 2 was amended on 1st January 1965 so as to provide expressly that any particular item of business allocated to a Department may be disposed of by the Special Secretary and that the power to dispose of a case includes the power to: (i) hear the parties; (ii) make such inquiry and take such other action as may be necessary for or incidental to reaching a final decision in the case; (iii) pass final orders and take such further action as may be necessary in exercise of powers conferred on the State Government by or under any provision of law; and (iv) approve or modify a scheme and take all further steps towards that end including publication with or without the approval of the Central Government, as the case may be, u/s 68-D of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. Rule 7 of the Rules of Business was also amended on 1st January 1965 so as to empower the Special Secretary to sign an order or instrument of the Government and providing that such signature shall be deemed to be the proper authentication of the order or instrument. Rule 6 of the M.P. State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1959, as originally framed, required the giving of notice by registered post to individual objectors of the date, time and place of hearing of the objections. Rule 6 of the M.P. State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1959, as originally framed, required the giving of notice by registered post to individual objectors of the date, time and place of hearing of the objections. Later on, on 23rd February 1963 an amendment was made in the rule abrogating the requirement of individual notices to the objectors and providing that a notice in the prescribed form specifying the date, time and place of the hearing of objections shall be published by the Special Secretary not less than seven days before the date of hearing (a) in the Gazette and (b) by affixing a copy thereof on the notice-board in the office of the Collector of the District in which area or routes covered by the Scheme or part thereof lies and (o) in the office of the Regional Transport Authority within whose jurisdiction the area or routes covered by the Scheme or part thereof lies. The Petitioners contend that Shri R.S. Shukla, the Special Secretary, had no jurisdiction to hear the objections or to approve or modify the Schemes for the reasons: (1) that the power conferred in that behalf on the State Government u/s 68-D (2) and (3) of the Act could not be delegated; (2) that if the power could be delegated at all, it could be only u/s 68-D (2-a) and not under the Rules of Business; (3) that even the delegation under the Rules of Business was bad as on the dates on which the Special Secretary issued to the Petitioners notices to file their objections, he was only invested with the power of disposing of the objections and not with the power of "approving or modifying the schemes"; (4) that the power of approving or modifying the schemes which was given to the Special Secretary subsequently on 12th January 1965 should have been given simultaneously along with the power of disposal with which he was invested on 12th January 1963; and (5) that as the State Government did not establish a separate Motor Vehicles Department as required by Section 133-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, that department could not be allocated under the Rules of Business and consequently no action under Chapter IV-A of the 1939-Act could be taken under the Rules of Business. The applicants further submit that the Explanation to Sub-section (1) of Section 68-D of the Act inserted by the local Amending Act No. 2 of 1963 is ultra vires and that the amended Rule 6 of the Rules giving to the objectors only seven days' notice before the date of hearing is not consistent with Section 68-D (2) and did not give them an effective opportunity of hearing. All these paints were raised in the two cases of Premchand (supra) and rejected by this Court. So far as this Court is concerned, they are concluded by the decisions in Premchand Jain v. State of M.P. 1965 MPLJ 434 : A I R 1965 M.P. 196. and Premchand Jain v. State of M.P. 1966 MPLJ 365 : A I R 1966 M.P. 117 and must, for the reasons given in the two decisions be rejected. Shri Phadke, Learned Counsel appearing for the Petitioners, however, submitted formally that they were all decided wrongly in Premchand Jain v. State of M.P. 1965 MPLJ 434 : A I R 1965 M.P. 196 and Premchand Jain v. State of M.P. 1966 MPLJ 365 : A I R 1966 M.P. 117 in order to keep the points open in the Supreme Court. Coming to the grounds of attack which are not concluded by the decisions in the two cases of Premchand, the Petitioners' first objection is that the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, under which the Respondent-Corporation was established does not authorise the Corporation to undertake any Scheme of nationalisation of road transport or to publish any Scheme u/s 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, and further that when the Corporation passed resolutions formulating proposals of the two Schemes and authorizing the publication u/s 68-C of the draft Schemes, the Corporation was not validly constituted and consequently the very initiation of the Schemes was illegal. These contentions are unsubstantial. The Respondent-Corporation has been established and constituted under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. It is, therefore, a "State Transport Undertaking" as defined by Clause (b) (ii) of Section 68-A of the Act. It is manifest from Sections 18 and 19 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, that the Corporation is competent to initiate and take up Schemes for the purpose of an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport services. It is manifest from Sections 18 and 19 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, that the Corporation is competent to initiate and take up Schemes for the purpose of an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport services. The objection that under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, the Respondent-Corporation was not authorized to initiate any Scheme must, therefore, fail. Before dealing with the argument that the Corporation was not validly constituted at the time it passed the resolutions propounding the two Schemes, it is necessary to refer to certain facts having a bearing on the constitution of the Corporation. By Rule 3 of the Rules framed by the State Government u/s 44 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, it is provided that the Corporation shall consist of eleven members out of whom six shall be official members and five non-official members. That rule further provides that four of the official members shall be nominated by the State Government as its representatives and the other two official members shall be nominated by the Central Government as its representatives. According to Rule 12 of the aforesaid rules, official members hold office "at the pleasure of the Government whom they represent". On 19th May 1962 the Government issued the following notification: No. 6708-1527-XX-C. - In exercise of the powers conferred by Rule 3 of the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation Rules, 1962, the State Government are pleased to appoint the following persons as Members of the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation:- CHAIRMAN-Representative of the State Government- 1. Shri R.C. v. P. Noronha, Additional Chief Secretary to the Government of Madhya Pradesh. Non-Official Members- * * * * * * * * * * Representatives of the Central Government- * * * * Representatives of the State Government- Shri R.C. Murab, Secretary to Government, M.P., Home Department (Ex- Officio). * * * * On 27th November 1962 a notification appointing Shri Chaudhary, Secretary, Home Department, in place of Shri Murab was issued. Shri Noronha resigned Chairmanship on 15th February 1964. By a letter of that date addressed to the Secretary to Government of Madhya Pradesh, Home Department, he said: I hereby submit my resignation from the post of Chairman, Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, u/s 7 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. Shri Noronha resigned Chairmanship on 15th February 1964. By a letter of that date addressed to the Secretary to Government of Madhya Pradesh, Home Department, he said: I hereby submit my resignation from the post of Chairman, Madhya Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation, u/s 7 of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. On 17th February 1964 the Government issued two notifications, one accepting Shri Noronha's resignation of the office of Chairman and the other appointing Shri B.N. Verma, Additional Chief Secretary to Government as Chairman of the Corporation. The resolutions propounding the Schemes and authorizing their publication were passed by the Corporation at its meetings held on 3rd April 1964 and 8th May 1964. The argument of Shri Phadke, Learned Counsel for the Petitioners, is that on the material dates the Corporation was not validly constituted inasmuch as Shri Noronha resigned the Chairmanship of the Corporation but not his membership; and that, therefore, Shri Verma could not be validly appointed as a member as then the strength of the members of the Corporation would exceed the maximum number of 11 prescribed by Rule 3 of the Rules framed under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950. It was further submitted that the appointment of Shri Murab as member was never cancelled; that, therefore, Shri Chaudhary could not be appointed in his place; and that the appointment of Shri Verma as Chairman of the Corporation was invalid as he was never appointed as a member of the Corporation. It was said that under Rule 3 (4) of the Rules framed u/s 44 of the Act of 1950 the State Government can appoint only one of the members of the Corporation as Chairman. Learned Counsel proceeded to say that as on 3rd April 1964 and 8th May 1964 Shri Noronha and Shri Murab were legally members of the Corporation and the appointment of Shri Verma as Chairman and Shri Chaudhary as a member was invalid, notices of the meeting of the Corporation held on 3rd April 1964 and 8th May 1964 should have been issued to Shri Noronha and Shri Murab; that no such notices were issued to them and they were not present at the meetings with the result that there was no valid quorum at the meeting; and that, therefore, the resolutions passed by the Corporation initiating the Schemes were invalid. It was also said that the two representatives of the Central Government were not properly and legally appointed as members of the Corporation. In our judgment, the whole argument of Learned Counsel for the Petitioners attacking the constitution of the Corporation is based on a misconception of the relevant provisions of the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, dealing with the constitution of a Road Transport Corporation and of the effect of the Rules framed by the Government u/s 44 of that Act. Section 5 of the Act runs as follows: 5. Constitution of Road Transport Corporation. - (1) Subject to rules made under this Act, a Corporation shall consist of a Chairman and such number of other members as the State Government may think fit to appoint. (2) The State Government may, if it so thinks fit, appoint one of the other members as the Vice-Chairman of the Corporation. (3) Rules made under this Act shall provide for the representation both of the Central Government and of the State Government concerned in the Corporation in such proportion as may be agreed to by both the Governments and of nomination by each Government of its own representatives therein, and where the capital of a Corporation is raised by the issue of shares to other parties under Sub-section (3) of Section 23, provision shall also be made for the representation of such share-holders in the Corporation and the manner in which the representatives shall be elected by such share-holders. (4) The term of office of, and the manner of filling casual vacancies among members of the Corporation shall be such at may be prescribed. It is clear that the constitution of a Corporation under the Act of 1950 is provided by Section 5(1) itself. According to that provision, the Corporation consists of a Chairman and such number of other members as the State Government may think fit to appoint. The words "other members" occurring in Sub-section (1) of Section 5 are significant and they indicate that the Chairman is a member of the Corporation. A person appointed as Chairman thus becomes a member of the Corporation and he ceases to be a member when he resigns his office as Chairman. The words "other members" occurring in Sub-section (1) of Section 5 are significant and they indicate that the Chairman is a member of the Corporation. A person appointed as Chairman thus becomes a member of the Corporation and he ceases to be a member when he resigns his office as Chairman. The true construction of Section 5(1) is that it is not necessary to appoint a person first as a member of the Corporation before appointing him as the Chairman, nor is it necessary that the Chairman should be appointed from one of the existing members of the Corporation. The Chairmanship of the Corporation is not an office apart from membership. The Chairman is only a person primus inter paras. That a person appointed as Chairman automatically becomes a member of the Corporation is made further clear by the use of the words "any other member" in Sections 7 and 8 of the Act of 1950 which deal with resignation of office by Chairman or a member and removal of Chairman. The constitution of a Corporation provided for in Section 5(1) is no doubt subject to rules made under the Act as the Sub-section itself says. The rules contemplated are those dealing with matters mentioned in Sub-sections (3) and (4) of Section 5. But the Government cannot by framing a rule override, abrogate or modify the provision contained in Section 5 (1), namely, that a Corporation shall consist of a Chairman and such number of other members as the Government may think fit to appoint. So to do would be in violation of the settled principle that rules made under an Act must be consistent with it and cannot neutralize the provisions of the statute under which they came to be made. Sub-rule (4) of Rule 3 of the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation Rules, 1962, framed u/s 44 of the Act of 1950 no doubt lays down that the State Government shall appoint one member of the Corporation as Chairman. It is obvious that this rule is ultra vires and invalid inasmuch as by it the Government purported to modify the provision contained in Section 5(1) with regard to the constitution of a Corporation which it could not do. Learned Advocate-General appearing for the State and Shri Chitale, Learned Counsel for the Corporation, did not dispute that the aforesaid Rule 3 (4) was invalid. Learned Advocate-General appearing for the State and Shri Chitale, Learned Counsel for the Corporation, did not dispute that the aforesaid Rule 3 (4) was invalid. This being the position of the statutory constitution of the Corporation, when Shri Noronha tendered his resignation from the office of Chairman on 15th February 1964 and the resignation was accepted by the State Government, he ceased to be the Chairman as well as member of the Corporation. The appointment, therefore, of Shri Verma, Additional Chief Secretary to Government, as Chairman of the Corporation in place of Shri Noronha was valid. Shri Murab was a member of the Corporation as a representative of the State Government and by virtue of his holding the post of Secretary to Government in the Home Department. When he ceased to be the Secretary of the Home Department and was succeeded by Shri Chaudhary, then Shri Murab could not continue as a member and the Government acted within its right in appointing Shri Chaudhary who then became Secretary, Home Department, as an ex-officio member of the Corporation. If the appointments of Shri Verma as Chairman and Shri Chaudhary as a member of the Corporation are held to be valid, as they must be, then it follows that the objection of the Petitioners that notices of meetings at which the resolutions propounding the two Schemes were passed should have been given to Sarvashri Naronha and Murab and that because of their absence there was no quorum at the meetings must fall to the ground. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners referred us to the notification dated 19th May 1962 reproduced earlier appointing certain persons as members of the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation and said that by that notification Shri Noronha was appointed as a member; and that in terms of this appointment of Shri Noronha, it could not be held that when he resigned the Chairmanship of the Corporation, he ceased to be a member. There is no force in this contention. It will be seen that in the aforesaid notification the membership of Shri Noronha was shown under the category of 'Chairman-Representative of the State Government'. That notification cannot in any way be construed as showing that the membership of Shri Noronha was quite independent of his office as Chairman. There is no force in this contention. It will be seen that in the aforesaid notification the membership of Shri Noronha was shown under the category of 'Chairman-Representative of the State Government'. That notification cannot in any way be construed as showing that the membership of Shri Noronha was quite independent of his office as Chairman. Shri Chitale, Learned Counsel for the Corporation referred us to Section 9 of the Act of 1950 and urged that even if the constitution of the Corporation was defective at the time the resolutions propounding the two Schemes were passed, the initiation of the Schemes could not be held to be invalid. In our opinion, Section 9 is of no help in meeting the objections raised by the Petitioners. That section, inter alia, says that no act or proceeding of a Corporation shall be invalid by reason only of any defect in the constitution thereof. Here, the real objection of the Petitioners is that at the time the resolutions propounding the Schemes were passed, Shri Noronha and Shri Murab continued to be members of the Corporation and that Shri Verma and Shri Chaudhary could not be regarded as members of the Corporation and, therefore, without notices to Sarvashri Noronha and Murab of the meetings at which the resolutions were passed and their presence at the meeting the resolutions could not be said to have been validly passed. This is an objection to the validity of the meetings for want of quorum and not an objection related to any defect in the constitution of the Corporation. A defect in the constitution of a Corporation means want or absence of something necessary or essential for legal completeness or perfection of the Corporation. The Petitioners have not placed any material before us in support of their contention that the two representatives of the Central Government were not properly and legally appointed as members of the Corporation. In the returns filed by the Corporation it has been stated that the Central Government nominated the Road Superintendent, Central and Western Railways, Bombay and the Deputy Chief Accounts Officer, Central Railway, Bombay, as representatives of the Central Government on the Corporation. In our view, the Petitioners' objection against the validity of the resolutions passed by the Corporation initiating the two Schemes cannot be accepted. In our view, the Petitioners' objection against the validity of the resolutions passed by the Corporation initiating the two Schemes cannot be accepted. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners then put forward the argument that the draft Schemes and the approved Schemes were vitiated inasmuch as in the draft Schemes the materials on which the Respondent-Corporation formed the opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport services, it was necessary in the public interest to propound the two Schemes, was not disclosed. To support this contention he referred us to certain observations in Gullanalli Mangeswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation A I R 1959 S C 308 : (1959) Supp. (l) S C K 319., Kondala Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation A I R 1961 S C 82 : 1961 (1) S C R 642., Malik Ram v. State of Rajasthan A I R 1961 S C 1575 : 1962 (1) S C R 978., C.S. Rowjee v. State of Andhra Pradesh A I R 1964 S C 962 and Aswathanarayana v. State of Mysore A I R 1965 S C 1848. In our opinion, there is nothing anywhere in the decisions cited by Learned Counsel or in the language of Section 68-C to support the contention. Section 68-C is in the following terms:- 68-C. Preparation and publication of scheme of road transport service of a State Transport undertaking. Where any State Transport undertaking is of opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinate road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class of such service in relation to any area or route or portion thereof should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking whether to the exclusion, complete or partial, of other persons or otherwise, the State Transport undertaking may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed, and shall cause every such scheme to be published in the Official Gazette and also in such other manner as the State Government may direct. Section 68-D (1) provides: 68-D. Objection to the scheme. Section 68-D (1) provides: 68-D. Objection to the scheme. (1) Any person affected by the scheme published u/s 68 C may, within thirty days from the date of the publication of the scheme in the Official Gazette, file objections thereto before the State Government. Then Sub-section (2) of Section 68-D says that the State Government may, after considering the objections and after giving an opportunity to the objectors to be heard in the matter, if they so desire, approve or modify the scheme. It will be seen that for the initiation of a scheme u/s 68-C, it is first necessary for the State transport undertaking to form the opinion that for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinate road transport service, it is necessary in the public interest that road transport services in general or any particular class should be run and operated by the State transport undertaking. When such an opinion is formed, the State transport undertaking can prepare a scheme of the road transport services intended to be run by the undertaking. The scheme prepared by the undertaking must contain particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered, and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed. Rule 3 (1) of the M.P. State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1959, enumerates the matters that should be provided in a scheme published u/s 68-C. Neither Section 68-C nor Rule 3 imposes on the State transport undertaking any obligation to disclose in the scheme the materials on which the undertaking formed the opinion that was necessary to frame a scheme of road transport services for the fourfold objectives mentioned in Section 68-C and in the public interest. The "particulars" which are required to be given by Section 68-C are particulars "of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered, the area or route proposed to be covered and such other particulars respecting thereto as may be prescribed". The meaning of the expression "particulars of the nature of the services proposed to be rendered" has been explained by the Supreme Court in Aswathanarayan v. State of Mysore A I R 1965 S C 1848. These particulars do not clearly envisage any details of the material on which the State transport undertaking formed the requisite opinion for the preparation of the scheme. These particulars do not clearly envisage any details of the material on which the State transport undertaking formed the requisite opinion for the preparation of the scheme. The purpose underlying the provision in Section 68-C about the setting out in the scheme of the particulars relating to it is clearly to enable the transport operators and objectors to the scheme to know how they would be affected by the proposed scheme and to enable them to formulate their objections to the scheme on public grounds or on personal grounds. The Supreme Court has observed in paragraph 21 of the majority judgment in Gullanalli Mangeswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation A I R 1959 S C 308. that "the citizen may object to the scheme on public grounds or on personal grounds, He may oppose the scheme on the ground that it is not in the interest of the public or on the ground that the route which he is exploiting should be excluded from the scheme for various reasons". Again in Malik Ram v. State of Rajasthan A I R 1961 S C 1575 : 1962 (1) S C R 978. it has been said: The objections are all made to show that the scheme does not provide for an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinate road transport service. In order therefore to arrive at the conclusion that the draft scheme provides for a transport service of this nature, the State Government as a quasi-judicial authority may require materials to come to that conclusion. The quasi-judicial enquiry and investigation which is held u/s 68-D is into such objections to the scheme and does not cover an examination into the question whether there was or was not any material or adequate material before the State transport undertaking to form the requisite opinion before initiating the scheme. This is clear from Section 68-D. The objections that are lodged under that provision are to the scheme published u/s 68-C and not to the opinion formed by the undertaking initiating the scheme; and the objections that are considered by the State Government under Sub-section (2) are objections to the scheme. This is clear from Section 68-D. The objections that are lodged under that provision are to the scheme published u/s 68-C and not to the opinion formed by the undertaking initiating the scheme; and the objections that are considered by the State Government under Sub-section (2) are objections to the scheme. When the State Government, after considering the objections, takes a decision approving or modifying the draft scheme, the decision may imply that the scheme so approved is for an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service and in the public interest and that the opinion formed to that effect by the State transport undertaking to initiate the scheme was correct. If the scheme is rejected by the State Government after considering the objections, the decision of the Government rejecting the scheme may carry the implication that the scheme is not of the nature contemplated by the first part of Section 68-C and the opinion formed by the undertaking for initiating the scheme was not correct. But this does not mean that the enquiry u/s 68-D (2) has been into the correctness or otherwise of the requisite opinion which the State Transport undertaking is required to form u/s 68-C before initiating a scheme. No doubt, in Malik Ram's case A I R 1861 S C 1575 : 1962 (1) S C R 978 the Supreme Court observed: The purpose of the hearing is that the State Government has to satisfy itself that the opinion of the State Transport Undertaking formed u/s 68-C, namely that the scheme is for the purpose of providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service, is correct. But, if these observations which have been relied on by Learned Counsel for the Petitioners, are read, as they must be, along with what has been said by the Supreme Court immediately thereafter, there can be no doubt that the enquiry and objections u/s 68-D are all for the purpose of showing that the scheme does not provide for an efficient, adequate, economical and properly coordinated road transport service. It is one thing to say that the scheme is good or bad because the opinion formed by the State Transport Undertaking u/s 68 C for initiating the scheme is correct or incorrect. It is one thing to say that the scheme is good or bad because the opinion formed by the State Transport Undertaking u/s 68 C for initiating the scheme is correct or incorrect. It is, however, altogether a different thing to say that the opinion formed by the State Transport Undertaking is correct or incorrect because the scheme framed is or is not of the nature spoken of in Section 68-C. To put the matter in other words, when a scheme is framed and objections are filed to the scheme, the lis that the State Government is required to decide with reference to the yardstick formulated in Section 68-C is the scheme itself and not the opinion formed by the State Transport Undertaking leading to the initiation of the scheme. The matter in respect of which a quasi-judicial behaviour is called for is the consideration and determination of the objections to the scheme. This becomes clear from the following observations of the Supreme Court in Gullanalli Mangeswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation S C R 978. (1) A I R 1959 S C 308 at p. 322.: There are two parties to the dispute. The State Transport Undertaking, which is a statutory authority under the Act, threatens to infringe the rights of a citizen. The citizen may object to the scheme on public grounds or on personal grounds. He may oppose the scheme on the ground that it is not in the interest of the public or on the ground that the route which he is exploiting should be excluded from the scheme for various reasons. There is, therefore, a proposal and an opposition and the third party, the State Government is to decide that lis and prima facte it must do so judicially. The position is put beyond any doubt by the provision in the Act and the Rules which expressly require that the State Government must decide the dispute according to the procedure prescribed by the Act and the Rules framed thereunder, viz., after considering the objections and after hearing both the parties. It, therefore, appears to us that this is an obvious case where the Act imposes a duty on the State Government to decide the act judicially in approving or modifying the scheme proposed by the Transport Undertaking. It, therefore, appears to us that this is an obvious case where the Act imposes a duty on the State Government to decide the act judicially in approving or modifying the scheme proposed by the Transport Undertaking. (underlining is ours.) The lis is not the opinion formed by the State undertaking for the initiating of the scheme. If this opinion, as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Gullanalli Mangeswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh Stale Road Transport Corporation A I R 1959 S C 308 at p. 322. and Kondala Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation A I R 1961 S C 82 : 1961 (1) S C R 642. and other cases, is a subjective opinion and is not the lis, then the foundation for the argument that the scheme should have contained materials on the basis of which the State Transport undertaking formed the opinion so as to enable the objectors to formulate their objections altogether disappear. Learned Counsel also referred us to the observations made by the Supreme Court in paragraph 14 at page 319 in Gullanalli Mangeswara Rao v. Andhra Pradesh Stale Road Transport Corporation A I R 1959 S C 308 at p. 322. pointing out that an express recital of the formation of the opinion by the undertaking in the scheme is not made a condition of the validity of the scheme, that the State Transport undertaking can form a scheme only if it is of opinion that the State transport service should be run or operated by the undertaking and that when it proposes, for the reasons mentioned in Section 68-C, a scheme providing for such a transport undertaking, it is a manifest expression of its opinion in that regard. These observations do not in any way lend support to the contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioners about the disclosure in the scheme of the material on the basis of which the State transport undertaking formed the requisite opinion for initiating a scheme On the other hand, if, as held by the Supreme Court, an express recital of the formation of opinion by the undertaking in the scheme is not necessary and further if the preparation of a scheme pursuant to Section 68-C itself sufficiently demonstrates that in the opinion of the undertaking it was necessary to prepare the scheme to provide for an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service and that it was necessary to do so in the public interest, then it would necessarily follow that it is wholly unnecessary to disclose in the scheme the material on the basis of which the State Transport undertaking formed the requisite opinion. Learned Counsel pressed into service the statement appearing in paragraph 12 at page 88 in Kondala Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation A I R 1961 S C 82 : 1961 (1) S C R 642 namely, "the State Transport Undertaking, before propounding a scheme, arrives at the decision on objective criteria". No doubt, there must be some material before the undertaking for forming the requisite opinion referred to in Section 68-C and if the undertaking forms the opinion without there being any material, a ground may arise for attacking the fides of the undertaking in initiating the scheme. Nonetheless, the opinion formed by the undertaking would remain subjective and would not become a matter for investigation and decision u/s 68-D. The validity of the opinion formed by the undertaking is ipso facto decided by an adjudication of the merits of the scheme on the tests laid down in Section 68-C. But that does not mean that the State Government enquires and determines the correctness or otherwise of the opinion of the State Transport undertaking Learned Counsel for the applicants also invoked the aid of the following observations in paragraph 37 at page 976 of C.S. Rowjee v. State of Andhra Pradesh A I R 1964 S C 962: Besides, as the provisions of Ch. IV-A made rights of private operators to carry on business and are justified as a reasonable restriction on their rights in public interest, it might very well have been considered that a more precise indication should be afforded by the scheme to enable its procedure which has to be followed before the scheme becomes effective. It was said that these observations emphasized the need of giving "precise indication" in the draft scheme to enable the operators to test its validity judged by the principles laid down in Section 68-C. We are unable to see how these observations made by the Supreme Court in passing while dealing with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Andhra Pradesh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1957, lead to the conclusion that the material forming the basis of the undertaking's opinion must be disclosed in the scheme. It may be mentioned here that the argument that in the draft scheme materials to show as to how an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service would be disclosed was rejected by the Patna High Court in Deen Narayan v. State of Bihar A I R 1960 Pat 575. by just observing that "there is no point in the argument". A perusal of the draft schemes is sufficient to show that they contain all the particulars which are required to be given by Section 68-C and Rule 3 of the M. P, State Road Transport Services (Development) Rules, 1959. The contention, therefore, that as the draft schemes published were not in conformity with Section 68-C and so the approved sohemes were invalid, must be rejected. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners further submitted that the Respondent No. 2, the Special Secretary, did not give to the applicant any real and effective opportunity to show that the schemes published by the Corporation were not in the public interest and that they did not provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service and thus he violated the mandatory provisions of Section 68-D (2) rendering the final and approved schemes invalid. The applicants' grievance is that the Special Secretary rejected without any justification their prayer for examination of certain witnesses and for production of certain documents and statements by the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation. The applicants' grievance is that the Special Secretary rejected without any justification their prayer for examination of certain witnesses and for production of certain documents and statements by the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation. Learned Counsel took us through the printed objections which is of the Petitioners filed u/s 68-D (1) and said that all these objections were aimed at indicating that the schemes published by the Corporation were not in the public interest and would not serve the fourfold purposes mentioned in Section 68-C. The Petitioners desired to examine certain operators, some local bodies and members of the public, the Manager of Sanghi Brothers Ltd. and Pair Deal Motors, the General Manager and some Depot Managers of the Corporation, and Editors of certain papers. The documents which they wanted the Corporation to produce were those disclosing the financial position of the Corporation, its vehicular position and the adverse record of the Corporation in the form of convictions as an operator under the Motor Vehicles Act and the Rules made thereunder. It is true that the Special Secretary rejected the prayer of the Petitioners for the examination of the witnesses whom they intended to tender in evidence. But he did so taking the view, on the strength of the decision in Premchand Jain v. State of M.P. 1965 MPLJ 434 : A I R 1965 M P 196 and Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan A I R 1961 S C 1572 : 1962(1) S C R 978, that in an enquiry u/s 68-D (2) the objectors were not entitled to show that the transport services which they were providing were far more efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated than the services proposed to be provided according to the draft schemes. The Corporation did place on record statements of its financial position and its vehicular position. They also stated that vehicles for operating the routes specified in the draft schemes would be purchased after the schemes are approved and that they have sufficient finances for purchasing the vehicles. In our opinion, the complaint of the Petitioners that, by rejecting their prayer for production of oral evidence and documents, the Special Secretary denied to them an opportunity of hearing contemplated by Section 68-D(2), is not substantial. In our opinion, the complaint of the Petitioners that, by rejecting their prayer for production of oral evidence and documents, the Special Secretary denied to them an opportunity of hearing contemplated by Section 68-D(2), is not substantial. A perusal of the objections lodged by the Petitioners show that they are all of a uniform nature and kind; and all of them were intended to show that the Petitioners were better operators than the Corporation. It is now firmly settled by the decisions of the Supreme Court in Ramnath Verma v. State of Rajasthan 1963 (2) S C R 152., Malik Ram v. State of Rajasthan A I R 1961 S C 1572 : 1962(1) S C R 978 and Samarth Transport Company v. R.T, Authority A I R 1961 S C 93 : 1961 (1) S C R 631. that the State Government or the officer giving the hearing u/s 68-D(2) is entitled to decide whether the evidence intended to be led by the objector is necessary and relevant to the enquiry before it; and that the relevant evidence would be that going to show that the draft schemes were not efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated and in the public interest and not that indicating that the objectors were providing more efficient, adequate, economical and properly Co-ordinated services. These decisions of the Supreme Court were followed by this Court in Premchand Jain v. State of M.P. 1965 MPLJ 434 : A I R 1965 M P 196. where also the objections filed by the existing operators were no different in kind and character from those filed by the Petitioners in the present cases, and it was held that the Special Secretary was right in excluding oral and documentary evidence to substantiate those objections which were all intended to point out that those operators were providing better transport services. Learned Counsel for the Petitioners placed reliance on the following observations of the Supreme Court in Samarth Transport Company v. R.T. Authority A I R 1961 S C 93 : 1961 (1) S CR 631. "Under Section 68-C the question that arose for consideration before the Chief Minister was whether the transport service should be run by the State Transport Undertaking to the exclusion of the Petitioner and whether it was necessary to do so in public interest to provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service. "Under Section 68-C the question that arose for consideration before the Chief Minister was whether the transport service should be run by the State Transport Undertaking to the exclusion of the Petitioner and whether it was necessary to do so in public interest to provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service. The Chief Minister found on the material placed before him that it was necessary in the public interest that the scheme submitted by the Provincial Transport Services should be approved. In support of his conclusion, he took into consideration that the Provincial Transport Services were in possession of sufficient resources and were in a better position to provide amenities to the public and therefore in public interest they should be given preference over the private operators of buses. We cannot say that the Chief Minister took any extraneous circumstances into consideration in coming to that conclusion". and said that the statement in the above observations, namely, that the fact that "the Provincial Transport Services were in possession of sufficient resources and were in a better position to provide amenities to the public," was not an extraneous consideration in deciding whether the scheme proposed by the State Transport undertaking was in the public interest, meant that evidence to show the comparative merits of the objectors and the State Transport undertaking could be led in an enquiry u/s 68-D (2) and that by such evidence the objectors were entitled to show that having regard to their financial and vehicular position and their operational record they were better operators than the State Transport undertaking. We do not agree. If the observations relied on by the Petitioners in the case of Samarth Transport Company A I R 1961 S C 93 : 1961 (1) S C R 631 are read consistently with the observations in the case of Ramnath Verma 1963 (2) S C R 152. as they must be, then there is no justification for spelling out from those observations the broad proposition placed before us by Learned Counsel for the applicants. as they must be, then there is no justification for spelling out from those observations the broad proposition placed before us by Learned Counsel for the applicants. The observations in Samarth's case A I R 1961 S C 93 : 1961 (1) S C R 631 on which the Petitioners relied only dealt with the narrow point that in the determination of the question whether the operation of the transport services as proposed in the draft schemes by the State Transport undertaking would provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated transport services and whether the schemes would be in the public interest, the financial resources of the State Transport undertaking is a relevant consideration. In Samnrth's case A I R 1961 S C 93 : 1961 (1) S C R 631 the question whether the objectors were entitled to lead evidence to show that they were better operators did not arise for consideration and the approval which the Supreme Court gave by the observations reproduced earlier was to the conclusion of the Chief Minister, Bombay, that "on merits it is quite clear to me that having regard to the resources of the P.T. S. and the amenities that it provides to the public, it is in the public interest that the scheme submitted by the P.T. S. Nagpur, should be approved". That being so, the mere use of the expressions "in a better position" and "should be given preference over the private operators of buses" in the observations in Samarth's case A I R 1961 S C 93 : 1961 (1) S C R 631 approving the conclusion of the Chief Minister, Bombay, can afford no justification whatsoever to build up an argument, contrary to the proposition laid down in Ramnath Verma's case 1963 (2) S C R 152. that in an enquiry u/s 68-D (2) evidence to show that the objectors were better operators and were providing far more adequate, efficient, economical and properly co-ordinated services was not relevant. In any case, so far as this Court is concerned, the contention of the Petitioners that the Special Secretary wrongly excluded the oral and documentary evidence they intended to produce is concluded by the decision in Premchand Jain v. State of M.P. 1965 MPLJ 434 : A I R 1965 M P 196. In any case, so far as this Court is concerned, the contention of the Petitioners that the Special Secretary wrongly excluded the oral and documentary evidence they intended to produce is concluded by the decision in Premchand Jain v. State of M.P. 1965 MPLJ 434 : A I R 1965 M P 196. It must be noted that none of the Petitioners objected to the scheme on personal grounds that the routes which they were exploiting should be excluded from the schemes. They did not make any attempt to show, with reference to the particulars given in the schemes and the statements filed by the Respondent-Corporation about their financial and vehicular position, that the proposed schemes were not in the public interest and did not provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated services. All their efforts were for showing that they were better operators. It may be that the Special Secretary did not pass orders with promptitude on the Petitioners' prayer being allowed to lead evidence which they wanted to. But taking into consideration the Petitioners' objections and the scope and extent of the enquiry u/s 68-D (2) just explained, it cannot be said that the Petitioners have been prejudiced by the slackness of the Special Secretary in disposing of promptly their prayer for production of documents and for being allowed to tender evidence which, as we have endeavoured to point out, was not relevant. The reason why in an enquiry u/s 68-D(2) the question of considering the comparative claims of the existing operators and of the Corporation for running transport services cannot be considered and evidence to show that the existing operators are better than the Corporation is not relevant, is not far to seek. It, as suggested by Shri Chitale, Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent-Corporation, lies in the very concept of monopoly. When a Road Transport Corporation is established under the Road Transport Corporation Act, 1950, for the purpose of providing or securing or promoting the provisions of an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated system of road transport services and a scheme is framed u/s 68-C of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, for the running of transport services by the State Transport undertaking, then, undoubtedly, a monopoly in respect of the road transport business is created in favour of the State Transport undertaking. The law relating to the creation of this monopoly has to be presumed to be in the interest of the general public as is evident from Article 19(6). So also the monopoly in favour of the State Transport undertaking in respect of the road transport business must be presumed to be reasonable and in the interest of the general public. It is inherent in the very concept of a monopoly that the body in whose favour a monopoly has been statutorily created is in a separate category by itself so far as the running of the business on a monopoly basis is concerned. This being the position, the question of the State Transport undertaking being required to compete with operators for running of transport services under Chapter IV-A does not arise. If there is no such competition, it follows that in regard to a scheme publish u/s 68-C the question of comparing the claims of the existing operators and the State Transport Service for the running of transport services specified in the scheme cannot arise and any evidence to show that the existing operators are better than the Corporation would not be relevant. The only question that can legitimately be considered in an enquiry u/s 68-D(2) is whether having regard to the nature of the soheme published u/s 68-C and the resources and the means at the disposal of the State Transport undertaking, the scheme would be one providing an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated service and would be in the public interest. The view that under Chapter IV-A the element of competition between the State Transport undertaking and the existing operators does not arise for consideration is supported by the comparison made between the provisions of Chapter IV and Chapter IV-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, in Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society v. R.T. Authority A I R 1960 S C 801 and Kondala Rao v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation A I R 1961 8 C 82. In Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society v. R.T. Authority A I R 1960 S C 801 it has been said that Chapter IV-A is intended to give the State Transport undertaking a special advantage. In Parbhani Transport Co-operative Society v. R.T. Authority A I R 1960 S C 801 it has been said that Chapter IV-A is intended to give the State Transport undertaking a special advantage. In the case of Akadasi v. State of Orissa A I R 1963 S C 1047 also, it has been observed that the State monopoly created by law, which is valid under Article 19(6), in respect of any trade or business must be presumed to be reasonable and in the interest of the general public so far as Article 19(1)(g) is concerned. The contention of the Petitioners that the approved schemes are vitiated because there was no hearing of the objections in conformity with Section 68-D (2) must, therefore, be rejected. The next submission of Learned Counsel for the applicants was that the orders passed by the Special Secretary approving the schemes with some modifications do not show that he applied his mind to the question whether the schemes were in the public interest and would provide an efficient, adequate, economical and properly co-ordinated road transport service. It was said that the Special Secretary had nowhere in his orders stated that these requirements laid down by Section 68-C were satisfied in the present cases. It was suggested that if the orders had contained a statement by the Special Secretary in so many words that he was satisfied that the schemes were in the public interest and would fulfil the four-fold purposes mentioned in Section 68-C, then such a statement would have been an indication of the fact of application of his mind to the question he had to consider while approving the schemes. In this connection Learned Counsel referred us to Witchita Railroad and L. Go. v. Public Utilities Commission 260 U S 48 : 67 L ed. 124, Mahler v. Eby 264 U S 32 : 68 L ed 549 and Panama Refining Company v- Ryan 293 U S 388 : 79 L ed. 446. This contention is devoid of any substance. In this connection Learned Counsel referred us to Witchita Railroad and L. Go. v. Public Utilities Commission 260 U S 48 : 67 L ed. 124, Mahler v. Eby 264 U S 32 : 68 L ed 549 and Panama Refining Company v- Ryan 293 U S 388 : 79 L ed. 446. This contention is devoid of any substance. In our opinion, the absence of an express finding by the Special Secretary in his orders approving the schemes with some modifications, that he was satisfied that the schemes were in the public interest and would serve the purposes mentioned in Section 68-C cannot be regarded as a circumstance showing that the Special Secretary did not apply his mind to the question he had to determine and cannot render the approved schemes invalid. When, after giving reasons disposing of the Petitioners' objections and after considering the details of the schemes, as also after considering the financial resources and the means at the disposal of the Corporation for implementing the schemes, the Special Secretary concluded that the schemes as modified will come into force from certain dates, that conclusion must be taken as sufficiently demonstrating that in his opinion the schemes were in the public interest and would serve the four objectives mentioned in Section 68-C. The American decisions cited by Learned Counsel for the Petitioners are not in point. Those cases, inter alia, lay down that when an authority is empowered to take action only under certain facts and conditions, then an express finding as to the existence of those facts must be given for sustaining the validity of the action taken by the authority. In other words, what the American cases decided is that when the jurisdiction and power of an authority to take an action depends on certain facts, then findings with regard to those facts and jurisdiction must be given. In other words, what the American cases decided is that when the jurisdiction and power of an authority to take an action depends on certain facts, then findings with regard to those facts and jurisdiction must be given. Here, there is no question of the jurisdiction of the Special Secretary to approve or modify a scheme being dependent on the fact of the propounded scheme being in the interest of the public and satisfying the other requirements mentioned in Section 68-C. Lastly, it was submitted in regard to scheme No. 16 that the publication of the said scheme in the Gazette dated 18th June 1965 u/s 68-D (3) was totally invalid and ineffective as the scheme having been published earlier in the Gazette dated 11th June 1965 could not be superseded by a subsequent publication of the scheme and that a scheme once published could be cancelled or modified only in accordance with Section 68-E. We are unable to accede to this contention. What happened was that in his order dated 8th June 1965, approving scheme No. 16 with some modifications, the Special Secretary directed his office to prepare a copy of the modified scheme and send it to the Government Press for publication u/s 68-D (3). The office prepared a scheme and sent it to the Press for publication. In the modified scheme as prepared by the office, the cancellation and curtailment of permits were not at all in conformity with the directions given by the Special Secretary in his order dated 8th June 1965. This mistake was not discovered until one of the operators applied for a certified copy of the order dated 8th June 1965 of the Special Secretary after the scheme was published on 11th June 1965. Thereafter, a scheme corresponding to the order passed by the Special Secretary on 8th June 1965 and to the directions contained therein was published in the Gazette. The notification by which the second publication was made said that the earlier notification had been superseded. Thereafter, a scheme corresponding to the order passed by the Special Secretary on 8th June 1965 and to the directions contained therein was published in the Gazette. The notification by which the second publication was made said that the earlier notification had been superseded. The publication of the scheme twice may be a legitimate comment on the perfunctory manner in which the Special Secretary and his office functioned in the matter of the publication of the schemes, but, as will be shown presently, there was no cancellation or modification of scheme No. 16 as approved by the Special Secretary on 8th June 1965 so as to attract the provisions of Section 68-E. In this connection the material provisions to be considered are Sub-sections (2) and (3) of Section 68-D which are as follows: 68-D. (2) The State Government may, after considering the objections and after giving an opportunity to the objector or his representatives and the representatives of the State transport undertaking to be heard in the matter, if they so desire, approve or modify the scheme. (3) The scheme as approved or modified under Sub-section (2) shall then be published in the Official Gazette by the State Government and the same shall thereupon become final and shall be called the approved scheme and the area or route to which it relates shall be called the notified area or notified routes. * * * * It will be seen that under Sub-section (3) the publication in the Gazette is of the scheme "as approved or modified under Sub-section (2)". It is the scheme as approved or modified under Sub-section (2) that becomes final under Sub-section (3) when it is published in the Gazette. The scheme that was published on 11th June 1965 was admittedly not the scheme as approved or modified under Sub-section (2) by the Special Secretary. The publication of that erroneous and defective scheme cannot be regarded as a publication of the scheme as approved or modified under Sub-section (2) by the Special Secretary by his order dated 8th June 1965. No validity or finality was thus attached to that publication. Under Sub-section (3) finality attached to that scheme which, as approved or modified under Sub-section (2), is published. No validity or finality was thus attached to that publication. Under Sub-section (3) finality attached to that scheme which, as approved or modified under Sub-section (2), is published. If the condition precedent to the publication under Sub-section (3) of Section 68-D is not complied with, then the publication is not, in our opinion, of a scheme as is said by Section 68-D (3) to be final. It must, therefore, be held that when the defective and erroneous scheme was published on 11th June 1965, there was no publication at all of scheme No. 16 as approved with some modifications by the Special Secretary by the order dated 8th June 1965. The scheme was validly published only on 18th June 1965. Section 68-E deals with cancellation or modification of that scheme which has been validly published under Sub-section (3) of Section 68-D. Section 68-E presupposes that it is the scheme as approved or modified under Sub-section (2) that has been published. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention advanced on behalf of the Petitioners that the publication of scheme No. 16 on 18th June 1965 is totally invalid. For the foregoing reasons, all these three petitions are dismissed with costs of the Respondents, the State of Madhya Pradesh and the M.P. State Road Transport Corporation. The fee of the learned Advocate-General is fixed in each case at Rs. 250. So also the fee of the Learned Counsel appearing for the Respondent-Corporation is fixed at Rs. 250 in each case. The outstanding amount of the security deposit after deduction of costs shall be refunded to the Petitioners in Miscellaneous Petitions Nos. 311 of 1966 and 351 of 1966. Final Result : Dismissed