JUDGMENT Bishambhar Dayal, J. - This is an execution first appeal by the judgment-debtor. The question for decision is one of limitation. The relevant facts are that a preliminary decree for partition was passed on 18th, May 1933. An appeal against the preliminary decree was ultimately decided by the Judicial Committee on 6th April 1948. In the mean while a final decree had been passed on 28th April 1945. The present application for execution was made on 11th December 1949. On these facts it was contended for the judgment-debtor that the execution had become barred under Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code as it was beyond twelve years from the date of the final decree, namely 28th April 1945. The court below, however, has repelled this contention on the ground that after the decision of the appeal against the preliminary decree by their Lordships of the Privy Council on 6th April 1948, an application was made by the decree-holder for bringing the final decree in conformity with the ultimate preliminary decree and the final decree was amended and brought in conformity with the Privy Council decree on 28th May 1949. According to the court below, the limitation under Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code for executing this final, decree would start, from 28th May 1949 and from that date the application was within limitation. 2. Learned counsel for the judgment-debtor in this appeal has contended that the court below was wrong in starting a (fresh period of limitation from 28th May 1949. He contends that a final decree having been passed on 28th April 1945 that remained the date of the final decree and for the purposes of Sec. 49 for the Civil Procedure Code no other date can be taken into consideration. 3. After hearing learned counsel for the parties we find that it is difficult to accept the contention of learned counsel for the appellant. There can be no doubt that a final decree has to conform to the preliminary decree as ultimately passed in appeal and it cannot be said that a final decree passed before the rights of the parties had been finally adjusted in appeal against the preliminary decree is the only decree which can be executed. The final decree passed before the decision of the appeal is liable to be corrected and brought in conformity with the decision in appeal. The final decree passed before the decision of the appeal is liable to be corrected and brought in conformity with the decision in appeal. Since fresh rights are incorporated in the decree on that date this decree must be deemed to be a fresh decree and the right to execute must start from that date. 4. In execution of this very decree at an earlier stage an objection had been raised by the judgment-debtor that the execution was barred under Article 182 of the Limitation Act. That matter came up to this Court and after discussing the law including Mahadeo B. Madhave etc. v. Fatumiya etc., 1948 AIR Bom. 337, (relied upon by appellant before us). "It would indeed be futile to hold that the starting point of limitation for an application for the execution of a final decree should not be taken from the date of the decision of an appeal from the preliminary decree, because the decree-holder could very well apply for the preparation of a fresh final decree in which, case undoubtedly the starting point of limitation would be the date of the fresh final decree and the execution application would not be time barred." 5. We respectfully agree with this observation. Although this observation was made in relation to Article 182 of the Limitation Act, but the remarks equally apply to the limitation under Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code. Since the decree-holder has a right to obtain a fresh final decree after the preliminary decree had been finalised in appeal the final decree, when brought in conformity with the appellate decree, must be deemed to be a fresh final decree and limitation must start from that date. A similar point has been decided by the Nagpur High Court in Balkishan Dhanraj v. Dhanraj Jainarayan, A.I.R. 1956 Nag. 200. That was a case under Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Code and it was held that limitation would start after the preliminary decree had been finalised in appeal. 6. We, therefore, see no force in this Appeal and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.