Judgment :- 1. This appeal filed by the plaintiff arises out of a suit for partition and separate possession of the plaintiff's 1/3rd share in the plaint B and C schedules. The appeal relates to the partibility of plaint schedule item 5 on the ground that it was a joint family acquisition by Mayan, the plaintiff's father when he was the manager of the joint Hindu family. The courts below disallowed the claim for partition of item 5 on the ground that it is the separate property of Mayan. The parties to the action are governed by Hindu Mitakshara Law. The plaintiff is the son of Mayan and defendants 1 and 2 are the brothers of Mayan. Plaint item 5 was taken on lease by Mayan under Ext. B 5 on 19 51933. No premium was paid by Mayan for taking Ex. B-5 and the rent payable by Mayan under Ex. B-5 was Rs. 4/- per annum. Though Mayan was in possession of certain joint family properties at the time when he took Ex. B-5 there is absolutely nothing to show that any portion of joint family funds was utilised for taking Ex. B-5. It is therefore not possible to draw any presumption in favour of the plaintiff, that item 5 is a joint family property. On the other hand, the presumption is that item 5 was taken by Mayan for his own benefit. But it was contended by the learned advocate for the appellant that the subsequent conductor Mayan would show that item 5 was treated by him as the property belonging to the joint family. The first document relied on by the learned counsel was Ex. A-1 dated 161958 a copy of the hypothecation bond executed by Mayan in favour of Malu in respect of item 5 and also the joint family properties. There is no recital in Ex. A-1 that item 5 is a joint family asset. Mayan undertook to be personally liable for the amount under Ex. A-1. The mere fact that a joint family manager included his own properties along with joint family properties in a mortgage document executed by him for raising funds for the family does not establish that he treated his own properties as joint family properties. The next document relied on is Ex. A-1. The mere fact that a joint family manager included his own properties along with joint family properties in a mortgage document executed by him for raising funds for the family does not establish that he treated his own properties as joint family properties. The next document relied on is Ex. B-4 dated 6111940 which is termed a deed of surrender executed by Mayan in favour of the second defendant in respect of the plaint schedule and some other items. The contention of the learned counsel for the appellant was that Mayan had stated in Ex. B-4 that the plaint schedule items are the joint family properties. We do not find anything in Ex. B-4 to justify this contention of the learned counsel for the appellant. The following clauses in Ex. B 4 were emphasised by the learned advocate to spin out a statement on the part of Mayan that item 5 is a joint family asset. We are not impressed with this argument. The properties dealt with under Ex. B-4 are not stated to be the joint family properties, but the joint properties of Mayan and the second defendant. The fact that at the time of the decree in the trial court the second defendant conceded that items 1 to 4 were joint family properties available for division cannot in any way militate against this view. We are only concerned with the question whether a statement was made by Mayan in Ex. B-4 that item 5 was a joint family property. There is no such statement. The effect of Ex. B-4 can only be that even in respect of admitted joint family properties Mayan stated therein that they were the joint properties of the second defendant and himself. In this view, the finding of the learned judge that item 5 is not a joint family property available for partition has to be upheld. The appeal is therefore without substance and it is hereby dismissed. 2. We shall now take up the cross-objection filed on behalf of the second defendant. The main ground raised by the second defendant in the cross-objection is that Ex. The appeal is therefore without substance and it is hereby dismissed. 2. We shall now take up the cross-objection filed on behalf of the second defendant. The main ground raised by the second defendant in the cross-objection is that Ex. B-4 is a deed of assignment executed by the plaintiff's father in favour of the second defendant conveying his interest in items 1 to 4 and 6 to 7 in the plaint B schedule and therefore the plaintiff is entitled only to 1/6th share in those items and not for 4/18th share decreed to him. Ex. B 4 is styled a deed of relinquishment executed by the plaintiff's father in favour of the second defendant. Both the lower courts found that Ex. B-4 is a deed of surrender by the plaintiff's father in favour of the second defendant and the legal effect of such a surrender though in the name of the second defendant eo nomine is a renunciation of the share of the plaintiff's father in the joint family properties in favour of all the three co-parceners including the second defendant. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Mammo v. Ramunni 1965 KLT.1196 at 1199 expressed the view that a registered instrument styled a release deed releasing the right, title and interest of the executant in any property in favour of the releasee for valuable consideration may operate as a conveyance if the document clearly discloses an intention to effect a transfer. Their Lordships observed: "Ex. B clearly discloses an intention to transfer all the rights of Baithan to defendants 1 to 5, and though the word "surrender' is used and though the deed is styled a release deed, it operates as an assignment." Both the courts below took the view that though the consideration recited in the document was Rs. 500/- the actual consideration was only Rs. 8 a. 1 ps. 9 which according to the courts below is inadequate. This view taken by the courts below is incorrect. Ex. B-4 was executed in consideration of the undertaking by the second defendant to discharge the debts of the plaintiff's father to the extent of Rs. 500/-. No doubt in Ex. B-4 the right of the plaintiff's father to collect the debts to the extent of Rs. 414-3 was also included. On a reading of Ex. Ex. B-4 was executed in consideration of the undertaking by the second defendant to discharge the debts of the plaintiff's father to the extent of Rs. 500/-. No doubt in Ex. B-4 the right of the plaintiff's father to collect the debts to the extent of Rs. 414-3 was also included. On a reading of Ex. B-4 it is clear that the liability of the second defendant to discharge the debts or Rs. 500/- is not conditional on his realising the sum of Rs. 414-0. The second defendant also undertook to indemnify the plaintiff's father against any loss that may be occasioned to him on account of default of the second defendant to discharge the debts recited in the document. In these circumstances, it is clear beyond any doubt that Ex. B-4 was executed for consideration. Ex. B-4 clearly discloses intention on the part of the plaintiff's rather to convey his interest in the properties comprised in Ex. B-4 in favour of the second defendant. It therefore follows that though Ex. B-4 is termed a deed of relinquishment, it is in effect a deed of transfer conveying the I/ 16th interest of the plaintiff's father in items 1 to 4 and 6 and 7 in favour of the second defendant. If so the plaintiff and the first defendant can claim only 1 /3rd share each in the plaint schedule items 1 to 4, 6 and 7 and not 4/18th share as found by the two courts below. 3. But it was contended on behalf of the appellant that Ex. B-4 was stamped only as a release and no advalorem stamp duty was paid which is necessary for a conveyance and therefore no interest could validly pass to the second defendant under Ex. B-4. This contention of the learned advocate for the appellant cannot be accepted for two reasons. The claim of the appellant for 4/18th share was based on Ex. B-4 on the ground it was a release. We have held that it is not a release but a conveyance. So the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief on the basis that Ex. B-4 is a release. Secondly Ex. B-4 was admitted in evidence by the trial court without any objection. 4. The learned advocate for the respondent relying on S.36 of the Indian Stamp Act contended that the appellant at this stage cannot question the admissibility of Ex. So the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief on the basis that Ex. B-4 is a release. Secondly Ex. B-4 was admitted in evidence by the trial court without any objection. 4. The learned advocate for the respondent relying on S.36 of the Indian Stamp Act contended that the appellant at this stage cannot question the admissibility of Ex. B-4 in evidence on the ground of insufficiency of stamp and he cannot therefore contend that it should not be acted upon. S.36 of the Indian Stamp Act is to the following effect: "Admission of instrument where not to be questioned. Where an instrument has been admitted in evidence such admission shall not, except as provided in S.61, be called in question at any stage of the same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped." We are of the view that this contention of the learned advocate for the respondent has to be accepted. It was observed in Alagappa v. Narayanan AIR. 1932 Madras 765 that once a document is admitted in evidence by the lower court under S.35 of the Stamp Act such admission cannot be questioned at any later stage of th2 same suit or proceeding on the ground that the instrument has not been duly stamped and the natural consequences of that admission which has become final must also follow that the appellate court cannot say that though it has been marked as an exhibit in the case it would not look into it and would not make use of it in the appreciation of the evidence or would not allow a decree to be passed in such a case. Even if S.6 of the Stamp Act should be held to govern this case the provisions of S.36 of the Act preclude this Court from refusing to act upon this document. 5. This decision was followed in Mangala Lakshmappa v. PathalaMusud Sahib AIR. 1934 Madras 700 wherein it was observed that S.36 enacting that the admission of the instrument shall not be called in question thereafter necessarily implies that it must also be acted upon. In view of these decisions, the objection of the learned advocate for the appellant has to be over-ruled. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the decrees of the courts below in respect of plaint B schedule item 5. In view of these decisions, the objection of the learned advocate for the appellant has to be over-ruled. 6. In the result, the appeal is dismissed confirming the decrees of the courts below in respect of plaint B schedule item 5. The memorandum of cross-objection filed on behalf of the second defendant is allowed and the decrees and judgments of the courts below are modified by giving the plaintiff 1/6th share in the plaint schedule items 1 to 4, 6 and 7. There will be no order as to costs in the appeal but the second defendant will be entitled to his costs on the memorandum of objections from the plaintiff in this Court. Dismissed.