JUDGMENT S.S. Dhavan, J. - This is a tenants application under Sec. 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure against the decision of the Additional Civil Judge, Saharanpur, in appeal reversing the decree of the City Munsif, Saharanpur and decreeing the landlords suit for the recovery of Rs. 850/- as arrears of rent, with costs. The plaintiff respondent Jagdish Singh is the owner of a double-storeyed pucca house situate in the city of Saharanpur, and the applicant is his tenant. The respondent landlord filed an application under Sec. 7-B of the U.P. Control of Rent and Eviction Act (to be called "The Act") for the ejectment of the applicant on the ground that he was in arrears of rent from 1-6-1960 to 31-'3-1963. The respondent alleged in his application that the applicant was occupying the premises in pursuance of an order of allotment and the agreed rent was Rs, 25/- per month, and the total rent due was Rs. 850/- but the applicant had not paid it in spite of repeated demands. The applicant filed an objection denying that any rent was agreed upon between the parties. He admitted that an order of allotment had been passed in his favour on 11-5-1962 but alleged that he made an application before the Rent Control and Eviction Officer (to be called "R. C. & E. O.") under Sec. 3-A of the Act and that officer fixed the reasonable annual rent of the accommodation at Rs. 90/- per annum. He admitted that he received a notice of demand from the respondent on or about 23-2-1963 but alleged that, with the object of settling dispute amicably, he remitted the entire rent from 1-6-60 till 28-2-1962 at the rate of the reasonable annual rent fixed by the R. C. & E. O., but the respondent landlord refused to accept the amount of Rs. 240/- tendered by him. He pleaded that he was willing and ready to pay the rent at the rate fixed by the R. C. & E. O. 2. As the tenant had filed an objection the landlord converted his application for ejectment into a suit for recovery of arrears of rent after paying the necessary court fee. The parties led evidence, oral and documentary. The landlord contended that as the parties had fixed the rate of rent by agreement, and the rent payable was the agreed rent. As the tenant had filed an objection the landlord converted his application for ejectment into a suit for recovery of arrears of rent after paying the necessary court fee. The parties led evidence, oral and documentary. The landlord contended that as the parties had fixed the rate of rent by agreement, and the rent payable was the agreed rent. The applicant on the other hand contended that, the rent payable was the reasonable annual rent fixed by the R.C. & E.O. The applicant also contended that the suit under Sec. 7-B was not competent as the applicant had occupied the accommodation before obtaining an allotment order and not hi pursuance of it. There was also controversy over exact date of commencement of the tenancy. The landlord alleged that it commenced on 1st June 1960 and the applicant that it began in the beginning of January 1962. 3. The learned Munsif held that there was no agreement between the parties with regard to the rent, that the landlord was entitled to the reasonable annual rent as fixed by the R. C. & E. O. which was Rs. 7.50 per month; that under Sec. 7-B he could claim rent only for the period when the tenant was in occupation in pursuance of the allotment order - that is, from 11-5-62 to 10-7-63. Accordingly he passed a decree for rent for Rs. 105/- in favour of the respondent landlord. On appeal the Additional Civil Judge disagreed with almost every finding of the trial court. He held that there was an agreement between the parties fixing the rent at Rs. 25/- per month; that the landlord was entitled to claim the agreed rent and not the reasonable annual rent fixed by the R. C. & E. O., that he was entitled to claim rent for the entire period from 1st June, 1960. He allowed the appeal and decreed the suit against the applicant for Rs. 850/'-. The applicant has come here in revision. 4. Mr. S.D. Agarwala for the applicant contended that the decision of the lower appellate court is illegal as he assumed jurisdiction to pass a decree for rent for a period , not contemplated under Sec. 7-B and at a rate not permitted under the Act. 850/'-. The applicant has come here in revision. 4. Mr. S.D. Agarwala for the applicant contended that the decision of the lower appellate court is illegal as he assumed jurisdiction to pass a decree for rent for a period , not contemplated under Sec. 7-B and at a rate not permitted under the Act. Counsels first argument is that Sec. 7-B applies only when the tenant occupies the accommodation in pursuance of an allotment order, but in the present case the applicant had occupied the accommodation long before he obtained an order of allotment in his favour. This argument is based on a misreading of the opening words of Sec. 7-B (1) which are as follows: "When any tenant, who is in occupation of an accommodation in pursuance of an order made under the provisions of sub-Sec. (2) of Sec. 7 is in arrears of rent . . . .". The material words are "who is in occupation of an accommodation in pursuance of an order" and not "who occupied the accommodation in pursuance of an order". Therefore, Sec. 7-B applies irrespective of whether the tenant occupied the accommodation before obtaining an allotment order or afterwards. If he first occupies the accommodation and then obtains an allotment order, the result is that his occupation,which would otherwise have been illegal and rendered him liable to ejectment under Sec. 7-A, is "regularised" and made legal, and after the passing of the order he is in occupation in pursuance of it. 5. Learned counsel the contended that the lower court was not competent to pass a decree for rent at the agreed rate when the R. C. and E. O. had fixed the reasonable annual rent at a lower rate. Counsel argued that the agreed rate, if any, is excluded when the District Magistrate (or the R. C. and E. O.) fixes the reasonable annual rent under Sec. 3-A. I cannot agree. The powder under Sec. 3-A to declare the reasonable annual rent can be exercised even where there is an agreed rent. Counsel argued that the agreed rate, if any, is excluded when the District Magistrate (or the R. C. and E. O.) fixes the reasonable annual rent under Sec. 3-A. I cannot agree. The powder under Sec. 3-A to declare the reasonable annual rent can be exercised even where there is an agreed rent. This is made clear in Sec. 5 (4) of the Act which entitles the tenant to institute a suit for a declaration that "the agreed rent is higher than the reasonable annual rent", and for fixation of rent by the Court, Such a suit can be filed only if there is an agreed rent as well as a reasonable annual rent declared under Sec. 3-A, and the tenant wants the agreed rent to be reduced. 6. Moreover, the power of the District Magistrate under Sec. 3-A declare the reasonable annual rent of an accommodation does not include any power to impose the reasonable annual rent in place of the agreed rent. This is made clear by Sub-Sec. (3) of Sec. 3-A which provides that "subject to the result of any suit filed under sub-Sec. (4) of Sec. 5, the rent declared or determined by the District Magistrate under this section shall be the annual reasonable rent of the accommodation." This sub-section does not say that the rent declared or determined under Sec. 3-A shall be the rent of the accommodation but only that it shall be the annual reasonable rent. It does not overrule Sec. 5 which governs the position when the parties have fixed the rent by agreement. Sub-Sec. (1) of Sec. 5 provides, "Except, as hereinafter provided in this section, the rent payable for any accommodation, to which this Act applies, shall be such as may be agreed upon between the landlord and thy tenant". This section applies to every accommodation governed by the Act and no exception is made in favour of accommodation of which the reasonable annual rent has been declared under Sec. 3-A. Sec. 5(1) is the later provision and deals with a specific case - namely, of accommodation with an agreed rent. This section applies to every accommodation governed by the Act and no exception is made in favour of accommodation of which the reasonable annual rent has been declared under Sec. 3-A. Sec. 5(1) is the later provision and deals with a specific case - namely, of accommodation with an agreed rent. It has been made subject to the other provisions of the same section but not of Sec. 3-A. Therefore, in every case where the parties have fixed the rent by agreement, Sec. 5(1) will apply and the rent payable shall be the agreed rent irrespective of whether the reasonable annual rent of this accommodation has been fixed or not. 7. It appears to me that the purpose of fixing the reasonable annual rent under Sec. 3-A is to provide a standard of which both parties can take advantage in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Act. If the agreed rent is lower than the reasonable annual rent the landlord may enhance it up to the limit of the reasonable annual rent - Sec. 5(2). On the other hand, if the agreed rent is higher than the reasonable annual rent, the tenant may apply to the Court and have it reduced provided he satisfies the court that the agreement fixing the rent was unfair. Thus the reasonable annual rent does not automatically displace the agreed rent. 8. Learned counsel then contended that in any case the landlord, in an application under Sec. 7-B, cannot claim any rent for a period prior to the date of the allotment order. 9. According to him, if the tenant occupies the accommodation for any length of time and then obtains an order of allotment, the landlord can invoke the help of Sec. 7-B only in respect of rent which falls due after the date of the order. I cannot agree. The relevant words of Sec. 7-B are "when any tenant ..... is in arrears of rent for more than three months. If the intention had been to confine Sec. 7-B to arrears of rent becoming due after the date of the allotment order the words would have been "when any tenant is in arrears of rent for any period after the passing of the allotment order." There is no such limitation. The words "arrears of rent" must be given their ordinary meaning and include arrears of rent for any period of the tenancy. The words "arrears of rent" must be given their ordinary meaning and include arrears of rent for any period of the tenancy. 10. Learned counsel then contended that the decree of the trial court under Sec. 7-B is not subject to an appeal and the appellate decision is without jurisdiction. Learned counsel contended that the Munsif when hearing an application converted into a suit does not act as an ordinary civil court but as a special tribunal whose decisions are not subject to appeal under the Code of Civil Procedure. I cannot agree. Sec. 7-B contemplates two stages. The first is from the filing of the application for ejectment to the conversion of the application into a plaint. It is not necessary for me to consider whether the Munsif acts as a civil court or not during this stage. The second stage is when the landlord elects to treat his application as a plaint and pays court fee. As soon as this is done, the proceedings are automatically converted into a suit. Sub-Sec. (8) provides: "if the applicant pays the necessary court fee within the time allowed, the application shall be treated as a plaint and the proceedings as a suit." The word "suit" indicates that the Munsif functions as a civil court. Consequently, the proceedings are governed by the Code of Civil Procedure including the provisions conferring the right of appeal. 11. Learned counsel contended that this interpretation will result in hardship on the tenant. He pointed out that if the landlord had filed an ordinary civil suit for the recovery of rent in the first instance, it would have been filed in the Court of Small Causes and there would have been no appeal from the decree dismissing the suit; but by treating the Munsif as a Civil Court under Sec. 7-B this Court will be conferring upon the landlord a right of appeal which he did not otherwise have. I am not much impressed by this argument. In the first place, the right of appeal is conferred on both parties. If the present applicant had lost the suit he would have invoked this right. Secondly, if the statute itself describes the proceedings as a suit initiated by a plaint there is no reason why all the incidents of a suit should not be attached, including the right of appeal. 12. If the present applicant had lost the suit he would have invoked this right. Secondly, if the statute itself describes the proceedings as a suit initiated by a plaint there is no reason why all the incidents of a suit should not be attached, including the right of appeal. 12. It must be presumed, in the absence of express words to the contrary, that a statute requiring the payment of full court fee as a condition for converting the proceedings into a suit was intended to confer on the plaintiff all the ordinary rights available to a plaintiff, including the right of appeal, if any. 13. Lastly, learned counsel tried to argue that the finding of the lower appellate court that the tenancy commenced from 1st June 1960 is manifestly erroneous. But this objection cannot be raised in revision. The factual findings of the appellate court are binding on this Court. Moreover, after examining the evidence and the record, I am inclined to agree with the finding of the appellate Judge. It is the applicants own case that he occupied the accommodation before obtaining an order of allotment. This is not unusual, but in such cases the tenant usually occupies the accommodation with the permission of the landlord - in other words, by an agreement with him. Secondly, the applicant tendered rent for the entire period from 1-6-1960 till 28-2-1962. It is inconceivable that he would have tendered the rent for the period when he was not in occupation. He disputed the rate of rent, but not the date of occupation. He never contradicted the statement in the notice of demand dated 4-1-1962 that rent was due from 1-6-1960. His subsequent allegation that he occupied the house in the beginning of January 1962 is difficult to believe. If true, it means that the landlord served on him with a notice of demand for arrears of rent almost on the very day when he occupied the accommodation as a new tenant, which is hardly credible. 14. The application is dismissed with costs.