JUDGMENT-This order will govern the disposal of all these petitions under Article 227 of the Constitution The petitioners are all landlords whose applications for possession have been dismissed ultimately by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal on a certain interpretation regarding the effect of section 46 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands (Vidarbha Region and Kutch Area) Act of 1958. Hereafter this Act shall be referred to as Vidarbha Tenancy Act. 2. The question that is posed for consideration is as to the effect of the provisions of section 46 of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act on the rights of landlords and tenants after 1st of April 1961. This section is one of the sections in Chapter III of the Act. That Chapter is itself divided into four parts. Sections 38, 39, 39A and 40 deal with termination of tenancies for personal cultivation. Sections 41, 42, 43, 44 and 45 deal with the right of tenant to purchase land. The following sections of the Chapter, namely, sections 46, 47, 48, 49, 49A and section 50 deal with compulsory transfer of ownership of land to tenants, and the last part comprising of sections 51, 52,53, 54, 55, 56 and 57 provide for other rights and liabilities of tenants. 3. The scheme of Chapter III shows that landlords were permitted to terminate tenancies of their tenants if they needed land bona fide for personal cultivation. Different categories of landlords have been given this right in sections 36, 39 and 39A. A date line was fixed for giving of a notice and also for making an application for possession. In the case of landlords of certain categories namely, (a) minor, (b) a widow, (c) a landlord who was a serving member of Armed Forces, and (d) a person subjected to any physical or mental disability, the period of giving of a notice or of making an application has been extended in each of these cases. This period is different for different categories of landlords under this classification. A ceiling has been fixed as to the area of land of which possession can be claimed and also the minimum of land which must be left with the tenant has been indicated. The right to get possession of the land for bona fide cultivation 1s again made subject to various conditions required to be fulfilled by a landholder as provided in sub-section (3) of section 38. 4. The right to get possession of the land for bona fide cultivation 1s again made subject to various conditions required to be fulfilled by a landholder as provided in sub-section (3) of section 38. 4. The tenants have been given a right to purchase land for which provision is made in the second part. Under sub-section (I) of section 41 general right is given to a tenant to purchase land of which such person is a tenant and the land is cultivated by him personally. But in the case of landlords who are themselves under some kind of disability namely, if the landlord was a minor or a widow, or a serving member of Armed Forces, or a person subjected to physical or mental disability, the right to purchase land of such a landlord would accrue to the tenant after expiry of two years from a date prescribed in the case of each of these landlords under disability. The extent to which land can be purchased by a tenant in exercise of the right under section 41 is indicated in section 42. That section originally stood at any rate till 1-4-1961 in the following form:- "42. Extent of land which tenant may purchase under section 41.-The right of B tenant under section 41 to purchase from his landlord the land held by him as a tenant shall be subject to the following conditions, namely:- (a) if the tenant does not hold and cultivate personally any land as a tenure-holder, the purchase of the land by him shall be limited to the extent of three family holdings; (b) if the tenant holds and cultivates personally any land as a tenure-holder the purchase of the land by him shall be limited to such area as will be sufficient to make up the area of the land held by him as a tenure-holder to the extent of three family holdings; (c) the extent of the land remaining with the landlord after the purchase of the land by the tenant whether to cultivate personally or otherwise shall not be less than one family holding." Clause (c) of section 42 has been deleted by Maharashtra Act 2 of 1962, which came into force on 1-3-1962. 5. 5. Section 43 prescribes the procedure to be followed by the tenant for making an offer of purchase, determination of purchase price, and certain liabilities of the tenant regarding rent till the tenant gets certificate of purchase. Section 44 provides that the amount of purchase price shall be applied for payment of debts and other sums and encumbrances on the property. Section 45 is an independent provision under which an occupancy tenant is given the right to purchase the right of a tenure-holder in the land and the procedure to be followed for exercise of this right. Then follows section 46 which was in the following form on 1-4-1961:- "46. Transfer of ownership of land to tenants from specified date.-(l) Notwithstanding anything in this Chapter or any law for the time being in force or any custom, usage, decree, contract or grant to the contrary, with effect on and from the first day of April 1961, the ownership of all lands held by tenants which they are entitled to purchase from their landlords under any of the provisions of this Chapter shall stand transferred to and vest in, such tenants and from such date such tenants shall be deemed to be the full owners of such lands: Provided that if on such date any such tenant is of the following category, namely:- (a) a minor, (b) a widow, (c) a serving member of the armed forces, or (d) a person subject to any physical or mental disability, the ownership of the land shall stand transferred- (i) to the tenant on the expiry of one year from the date on which the tenant of category (110) attains majority, the tenant of category (c) ceases to serve in such force, the tenant of category (d) ceases to be subject to such disability; and (ii) in the case of a widow to her successor-in-title on the expiry of one year from the date on which the widows interest in the land ceases to exist: Provided further that where in respect of any such land, any proceeding under section 19, 20, 21, 36 or 38 is pending on the date specifie4 in sub-section (1) the transfer or ownership of such land shall take effect on the date on which such proceeding is finally decided and the tenant retains possession of the land in accordance with the decision in such proceeding. (2) In respect of the land the ownership of which stands transferred to and vests in a tenant under sub-section (1), the tenant shall continue to be liable to pay to the landlord the rent of such land until the amount of the purchase price payable by the tenant to the landlord is determined under section 48." It may be mentioned that a new sub-section (I-A) has been added between sub-section (1) and sub-section (2) of section 46 by Maharashtra Act II of 1962. But in none of these petitions it is necessary to consider the effect of addition of this sub-section as that sub-section was added after 1-4-1961. 6. Section 47 provides for the determination of purchase price which comprises of an amount equal to ten times the rent of the land in the case of an occupancy tenant holding the land from a Bhumiswami, and an amount equal to seven times the rent of the land in the case of an occupancy tenant holding land from Bhumidhari, and not exceeding twelve times the rent of the land in the case of any other tenant. In these petitions the respondents are all other tenants. To this is to be added the amount of arrears of rent if any lawfully due on the date on which the ownership of the land stands transferred to the tenant, under section 46, depreciated value of structures, wells, embankments and other permanent fixtures and trees planted by the landlord, and the amount if any paid by or recovered from the landlord as land revenue, or canal revenues and cesses, liabilities of which is on the tenant under section 17 (1) of the Act~ There is a provision for addition of interest on the aggregate amount arrived at by addition of all the items mentioned above at 41 per cent for the period between the date on which ownership of the land stands transferred and the date on which purchase price is determined. 7. The law provides for establishment of a tribunal, called the Agricultural Lands Tribunal constituted under section 97 of the Act. 7. The law provides for establishment of a tribunal, called the Agricultural Lands Tribunal constituted under section 97 of the Act. It is the duty of the Tribunal under section 48 to cause a public notice to be published, calling upon the tenants to whom ownership of the land stands transferred, their land; lords and other persons interested therein to appear before it on the date specified in the notice in order to enable the Tribunal to hold an enquiry and to determine in respect of each tenant the land which stands transferred to and vests in him under section 46, and the purchase price thereof as provided in section47. Under section 49 certain provisions of sections 43 and 44 have been made applicable to the statutory trader of ownership under section 46. Under section 57 a person, to whom land stands transferred as a purchaser, under, section 41 or 46, is prohibited from transferring it by sale, exchange, mortgage, lien or assignment, without previous sanction of the collector, and any transfer or partition of such land in contravention of this provision is made invalid. 8. A careful perusal of the provisions of section 46 will show that a tenant is made the owner of land which he is entitled to purchase from his landlord under the provisions of this Chapter. The provisions of this Chapter, viz. Chapter III, create a right in a tenant to purchase land only under section 41. The provisions of section 41, however, are subject to the provisions of sections 42 to 44; in other words, the right to purchase is subject to the conditions given in sections 42, 43 and 44. In order to determine, therefore, whether a tenant has become a deemed owner of the land, of which he is a tenant, it is necessary to enquire and find whether the land of which he is to be deemed to have become owner is the land which the tenant was entitled to purchase under sections 41, 42, 43 and 4-4 .. If the tenant is in occupation of the land which he was not entitled to purchase, then such a tenant cannot claim in respect of such land that he should be deemed to have become the owner from 1-4,-1961 as a result of section 46 (1) of the Act. 9. If the tenant is in occupation of the land which he was not entitled to purchase, then such a tenant cannot claim in respect of such land that he should be deemed to have become the owner from 1-4,-1961 as a result of section 46 (1) of the Act. 9. The Legislature has granted a fictional right of ownership to the tenant in certain circumstances and within the limits prescribed by section 46 read with sections 41 to 44, so far as tenants other than occupancy tenants are concerned. 10. Under sub-section (2) of section 41 the right of the tenant to purchase land, of which the landlord is one of the specified categories, who may be described as landlord under some disability, namely, a minor, a widow, a serving member of the Armed Forces, or a person subjected to physical or mental disability, does not accrue in favour of a tenant of such land until after the expiry of two years from the date the disability of the particular landlord ceases. The date of cessation of disability in the case of landlord in each of these categories is different. It ceases, (1) in the case of a minor, when he attains majority; (2) in the case of a landlord who is a member of the Armed Forces, when he ceases to serve in the Armed Forces; (3) in the case of a landlord who is under physical or .mental disability, when the landlord ceases to be subject to such disability, (4) and in the case of a landlord who is a widow, when the interest of such widow ceases to exist. Until this date is reached and two years thereafter, a tenant of such landlord does not get the right to purchase the land. It is therefore clear that if on I-4cI96I the tenant holds land of a landlord who is of one of these disabled classes he does not become even a deemed owner of the land on 1-4-1961. 11. Under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 46, the date of transfer is postponed in the case of tenants who are themselves under some disability, namely, if such a tenant is minor or a widow, a serving member of the Armed Forces or a person subject to any physical or mental disability. 11. Under the first proviso to sub-section (1) of section 46, the date of transfer is postponed in the case of tenants who are themselves under some disability, namely, if such a tenant is minor or a widow, a serving member of the Armed Forces or a person subject to any physical or mental disability. In the case of tenants of any of these categories there are different dates prescribed for the statutory transfer of ownership to take effect. Thus, in the case of a minor such date is after expiry of one year from the date the minor attains majority; in the case of member of Armed Forces one year after the tenant Ceases to serve in the Armed Forces; in the case of tenant subject to any physical or mental disability, one year after he ceases to be subject of such disability; and where the tenant is a widow, on the expiry of one year from the date her interest in the land ceases to exist and her right accrued in favour of her successors-in-title. These tenants do not become statutory owners of the property i. e. lands of which they are tenants, at any rate on 1-4-1961. 12. Then follows the second proviso to sub-section (I) of section 46, which has given rise to different contentions raised by one side or the other. Under the second proviso, if any proceeding under any one of the sections mentioned in that proviso, namely sections 19, 20, 21, 36 and 38, is pending on t4e date specified in sub-section (1), then the transfer of ownership of such land is to take effect from the date on which such proceeding is finally decided. But there is another condition which the Legislature has also imposed on such statutory transfer taking place in the case of this category, and that condition is that the tenant must retain possession of the land in accordance with the decision of such proceeding. In other words, not only the proceeding must terminate in favour of the tenant but the tenant must also retain possession as a result of the proceedings. 13. Now, the second proviso speaks of proceedings under sections 19, 20, 21, 36 and 38 being pending on the prescribed date. In other words, not only the proceeding must terminate in favour of the tenant but the tenant must also retain possession as a result of the proceedings. 13. Now, the second proviso speaks of proceedings under sections 19, 20, 21, 36 and 38 being pending on the prescribed date. No proceeding as such could be said to be pending under section 19, which is an enabling section, investing the landlord with a right to terminate the tenancy of a tenant, if he has committed one or the other of the several defaults enumerated in clause (I) of sub-section. (1) of section 19, The scheme of section 19, which permits termination of tenancy by a landlord in respect of a tenant who has committed one or more of several defaults requires such landlord to give a notice in writing intimating to the tenant his decision to terminate the tenancy, the particulars or grounds for such termination, and calling upon the tenant for make good the default within the time given in the notice which should not be less than three months. Thus, it is the notice which according to this section under certain circumstances results in termination of the tenancy. Under section 36 of the Act a land-holder is not entitled to obtain possession of land from a tenant except under orders of a Revenue Officer. Thus, even if tenancy of a tenant is validly terminated by the landlord, the tenant is entitled to continue in occupation and possession of the land until the landlord obtains an order from the Revenue Officer against the tenant, entitling him to be restorer to possession. But the action to be taken by the landlord under section 19 is not in any manner an action by way of a proceeding in Court or before a Revenue Officer. 14. The second proviso to section 46 (1) also makes a mention of section 20 of the Act. Now, under section 20 a tenant has a right to terminate a tenancy, at any time by surrendering his interest as a tenant in favour of the landlord provided such surrender is in writing and the surrender is further required to be verified before the Tahsildar in the prescribed manner. Now, under section 20 a tenant has a right to terminate a tenancy, at any time by surrendering his interest as a tenant in favour of the landlord provided such surrender is in writing and the surrender is further required to be verified before the Tahsildar in the prescribed manner. But even if land is surrendered by a tenant in exercise of the right under section 20, the landlord of such land cannot obtain possession until not only the surrender is verified and found to be voluntary, but also till the enquiry prescribed by section 21 is held and the landlord is found entitled to obtain possession of the land surrendered by the tenant, having regard to the total land in possession of such landlord. Even in cases covered by section 20, therefore, the tenant is not required to do anything in Court so far as the right to terminate the tenancy by 3urrendering his interest by a writing is concerned. Though it is true that the surrender is required to be verified by the Tahsildar, the effect of tile surrender is not dependent on such verification unless the surrender is found not to be voluntary. So far as proceedings under sections 21, 36 and 38 are concerned, proceedings under section 21 as well as proceedings under section 36 may be pending before a Revenue Officer under this Act either at the Instance of a landlord or at the instance of a tenant. Under section 36 both the landlord u well as the tenant is entitled to make an application if the tenant is dispossessed except in accordance with law or if a landlord is entitled to obtain possession from his tenant. Proceedings under section 38 are required to be commenced by landlord when he needs the land for bona fide cultivation for which he has to give notice and then make an application for possession. 15. Thus. it will be seen that out of the several proceedings which could be taken under the sections enumerated in the second proviso to section 46(1), action under section 19 or 20 is not required to be taken by a tenant before the Court in the first Instance though an application may become necessary when possession is required to be obtained at a later date. The question that falls for consideration, therefore, is what kind of proceedings or action is contemplated which can, be said to be pending on the dates specified in sub-section (1) of section 46 i.e. on the date on which the transfer of ownership takes effect. It has been suggested that the use of the word proceeding means an action, an "act", on the part of a tenant or landlord, and unless this meaning is given to the word proceeding, reference to sections 19 and 20 of the Act will become meaningless. It is therefore contended that if any action has been taken either in Court where necessary or by a voluntary act on the part of the landlord or the tenant according to the provisions of section 19 or section 20, and if such action has been taken before the date specified in sub-section (I) of section 46, it will have to be held that a proceeding under any of these sections is pending on such date. The learned counsel appearing for the tenants have not been able to suggest any other mode of construction regarding this part of the second proviso to sub-section (I) of section 46, and in my opinion, the construction 80ught to be put by the learned counsel for the petitioners is valid and must be upheld. Thus, in order that the second proviso should be effective, all that is necessary to be established is that action has been taken under section 19, 20, 21, 36 or 38 before 1-4-1961 which is the date we are required to consider in these petitions or before the date specified in sub-section (1) of section 46 and, that no final decision is taken in respect of such action by any authority. If this condition is satisfied, then it is obvious, according to the plain reading of the second proviso, the tenant of the land in respect of which such action is taken cannot be considered to have become statutory owner of such land on 1-4-1961. If this condition is satisfied, then it is obvious, according to the plain reading of the second proviso, the tenant of the land in respect of which such action is taken cannot be considered to have become statutory owner of such land on 1-4-1961. This is therefore yet another class of tenants who are outside the date line fixed by sub-section (1) of section 46 in its primary provision, The tenants of third class therefore are also those who cannot be said to have become owners on 1-4-1961 in respect of lands of which they are tenants but some kind of action has been taken prior to 1-4-1961 under sections 19, 20, 21, 36 or 38. The words used by the second proviso are "any proceeding under section 19, 20, 21, 36 or 38 is pending". The word "proceeding" is used in singular and so is the word "section" which must necessarily lead to the conclusion that if one or more than one action or proceeding is pending under any of these sections in respect of the land under tenancy, then the ownership of land will not be deemed to have been transferred until all those proceedings are finally disposed of and until the last of such orders has been passed. The second proviso contemplates that more than one proceeding may be pending in the sense in which the word must be understood in respect of the same land or the same tenant vis-a-vis the same landlord, and until all such actions are finally decided, the statutory transfer of ownership, which is fictionally created by sub-section (1) of section 46 does not take place. 16. It is, however, contended on behalf of the petitioner that the same meaning will have to be given to the provisions in the first proviso as well as the second proviso under each of which the statutory transfer of ownership is deferred. Under the first proviso, the Legislature has laid down that if on 1-4-1961 a tenant is a minor or a widow or a serving member of the Armed Forces or a person subject to any physical or mental disability, the ownership of such land held by such tenant shall be transferred not on 1-4-1961 but on different dates according as in the case of each category of such disabled tenant the disability ceases and one year thereafter. 17. 17. In the second proviso the phraseology is more or less identical, when it says that in respect of such land "the transfer of ownership of such land shall take effect on the date on which such proceeding is finally decided" The argument is if both under the first and the second provisos transfer of ownership itself does not take place until the contingency indicated in each of the provisos ;is reached, it cannot be said that the relationship of landlord and tenant ceases from 1-4-1961 only in the case of tenants governed by the second proviso but not by the first proviso. When this difficulty was pointed out, the learned counsel appearing for the tenants, Mr. Masodkar, suggested that even in the case of tenants governed by the first proviso what is deferred is only the fictional date of ownership but the relationship of landlord and tenant comes to an end on 1-4-1961 as indicated in the substantive sub-section (1) of section 46. It is not possible to accept this construction of the scheme of section 46. So far as the first proviso is concerned, the transfer of ownership takes place not immediately on the ceasation of the disability, where the tenant is a minor or a widow or serving member of the Armed Forces, or a person subject to physical or mental disability, statutory transfer of ownership takes place only after a lapse of a period of one year thereafter. The possible reason for providing this period may be that the tenant who was under a. disability may have enough time to make his own choice, and indicate that choice as required by sections 41 to 44 of the Act. It is difficult to hold, that when transfer of ownership itself is deferred and takes place only after a considerable interval between 1-4-1961 and the dates indicated in the first. proviso, the Legislature could have intended to create a vacuum. The relationship must be either that of landlord and tenant or that of owner and non-owner. It is difficult to hold what other mode of relationship could be said to exist between a tenant under disability and an owner in respect of land during the period indicated in the first proviso to sub. section (1) of section 46. The relationship must be either that of landlord and tenant or that of owner and non-owner. It is difficult to hold what other mode of relationship could be said to exist between a tenant under disability and an owner in respect of land during the period indicated in the first proviso to sub. section (1) of section 46. If it is not possible to hold with respect to the first proviso that relationship of landlord and tenant ceased after 1-4-1961, the conclusion is inescapable that the same result must follow because of the use of similar words by the Legislature, in interpreting the second proviso of sub-section (1) of section 46. Even after the second proviso so long as any proceedings in the sense in which have construed that word are pending and were pending on 1-4-1961, the transfer of ownership itself does not take effect till the date of final decision of that proceeding. If the transfer of ownership itself does not take place, the logical result that must follow is that the relationship as landlord and tenant can be brought to an end either by normal law when the tenant or the landlord is given the right to terminate the tenancy, or by provisions of the statute. If the statute makes provision for bringing to an end this, relationship by fixing a date line for cessation of that relationship and the transfer of ownership from one party to other in respect of that land, then until that date is reached it must be held that the relationship continues. 18. Reliance is placed on a Full Bench decision of this Court interpreting ,the effect of section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy and Agricultural Lands Ace, 1948, for the proposition that after the date indicated in sub-section (1) of section 46, the right of a landlord to terminate the tenancy comes to an end if such termination is sought to be effected by any action after that date. That decision is reported in Ramchandra v. Janardan (1). The provision of law which came for interpretation in that case was section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. Subsection (1) of section 32 of that Act was as follows:- "32. That decision is reported in Ramchandra v. Janardan (1). The provision of law which came for interpretation in that case was section 32 of the Bombay Tenancy Act. Subsection (1) of section 32 of that Act was as follows:- "32. (1) On the first day of April 1957 (hereinafter referred to as "the tillers day") every tenant shall, subject to the other provisions of this section and the provisions of the next succeeding sections, be deemed to have purchased from his landlord, free of an encumbrances subsisting thereon on the said day, the land held by him as tenant, if- (a) such tenant is a permanent tenant thereof and cultivates land personally; (b) such tenant is not a permanent tenant but cultivates the land leased personally; and (i) the landlord has not given notice of termination of his tenancy under section 31; or (ii) notice has been given under section 31, but the landlord has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land; or (iii) the landlord has not terminated this tenancy on any of the grounds specified in section 14, or has so terminated the tenancy but has not applied to the Mamlatdar on or before the 31st day of March 1957 under section 29 for obtaining possession of the lands: Provided that if an application made by the landlord under section 29 for obtaining possession of the land has been, rejected by the Mamlatdar or by the Collector in appeal or in revision by the Maharashtra Revenue Tribunal under the provisions of this Act, the tenant shall be deemed to have purchased the land On the date on which the final order of rejection is passed. The date on which the final order of rejection is passed is hereinafter referred to as the postponed date: Provided further that the tenant of a landlord who is entitled to the benefit of the proviso to sub-section (3) of section 31 shall be deemed to have purchased the land on the 1st day of April 1958, if no separation of his share has been effected before the date mentioned in that proviso.’ The other provision of the Bombay Tenancy Act, which bas a material bearing in understanding the scheme of the Bombay Legislation is section 32F, which is in the following terms:- "32F. (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the preceding sections,- (a) where the landlord is a minor or a widow, or a person subject to any mental or physical disability, ..the tenant shall have the right to purchase such land under section 32 within one year from the Expiry of the period during which such landlord is entitled to terminate the tenancy under section 31: Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family, the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned in this sub-section unless before the 31st day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar on inquiry" is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated, having regard to the area, assessment, classification and value of the land, is the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property and not in a larger proportion; (b) where the tenant is a minor, or a widow, or a person subject to any mental or physical disability or a serving member of the armed forces, then subject to the provisions of clause (a), the right to purchase land under section 32 may be exercised- (i) by the minor within one year from the date on which he attains majority; (ii) by the successor-in-title of the widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist; , , I (iii) within one year from the date on which the mental or physical disability of the tenant ceases to exist; (iv) within one year from the date on which the tenant ceases to be a serving member of the armed forces: Provided that where a person of such category is a member of a joint family; the provisions of this sub-section shall not apply if at least one member of the joint family is outside the categories mentioned in this sub-section unless before the 31st day of March 1958 the share of such person in the joint family has been separated by metes and bounds and the Mamlatdar on inquiry is satisfied that the share of such person in the land is separated, having regard to the area, assessement, classification and value of the land, in the same proportion as the share of that person in the entire joint family property, and, not in a larger proportion, (1A) A tenant desirous of exercising the right conferred on him under sub-section (1) shall give an intimation in that behalf to the landlord and the Tribunal in the prescribed manner within the period specified in that sub-section. (2) The provisions of sectious32 to 32E (both inclusive) and sections 32G to 328 (both inclusive) shall, so far as may be applicable apply to such purchase. A perusal of section 32 and section 32F of the Bombay Tenancy Act and their comparison with section 46 (1) of the Vidarbha Tenancy Act will show that the two provisions cannot be said to be in pari materia. Under, the Bombay Act, under clause (b) of sub-section (I) of section 32F, where a tenant is a minor or a widow or a person subject to any physical or mental disability or a serving member of the Armed Forces, the rights to purchase land under section 32 may be exercised by the minor within one year from the date on which he attains majority, by the successors-in-title of a widow within one year from the date on which her interest in the land ceases to exist, and in the other two cases within one year from the date on which the disability, ceases to exist. It will thus be seen that so far as this class of tenants i.e. tenants under disability is concerned, there is no, compulsory transfer of ownership under the Bombay scheme; whereas under the first proviso to section 46 (1) of the Vidarbha Act transfer of ownership is compulsory even in the case of tenants of this category who may be caned disabled tenants. Thus, under the Bombay Act a disabled tenant i.e. a tenant who was disabled on the Tillers' Day which was 1-4-1957, the relationship between such disabled tenant and the landlord did not cease because the right to purchase itself was deferred till year after cessation of disability of such tenant. Could it be said that it was intended by the same Legislature when providing for compulsory, transfer of ownership to disable tenants one year after cessation of their disability that the transfer of ownership was deferred but the relationship of landlord and tenant, to cease with effect from 1-4-1961? There is no indication of any such intention of the Legislature in any other provisions of the Act. On the other hand, the use of the phrase, that the ownership shall stand transferred on and after a particular date must imply that till that date is reached ownership is not transferred from the landlord. There is no indication of any such intention of the Legislature in any other provisions of the Act. On the other hand, the use of the phrase, that the ownership shall stand transferred on and after a particular date must imply that till that date is reached ownership is not transferred from the landlord. If the ownership is not transferred from the landlord till one year after the cessation of the disability of the tenant, then it must follow that till that date is reached the relationship between the landlord and the tenant is governed by the first proviso and the landlord continued as such. Once it is held that the relationship continues as landlord and tenant in respect of tenants governed by the first proviso and their landlords,-it must follow that the mutual obligations as such must also continue to govern their relations. In this context it is significant to note that the non-obstante clause in sub-section (1) of section 46 excludes only the provisions of this chapter, namely, Chapter III, and not other part of the Act. It was urged on behalf of the tenants, by their learned counsel Mr. Masodkar that the non-obstante clause also embraces any law for the time being in force and should include other provisions of this .very Act in that context. I do not think this construction is well founded. If the Legislature intended to embrace within the non-obstante clause all the provisions of the Act, it would not have restricted it to the provisions of "this Chapter". It must therefore be held that the other provisions of the Act, and specially the provisions governing the relations between the landlord and tenant under the Act must continue to govern as obligatory between the parties so far as the first proviso is concerned. 19. Now, when we come to the second proviso the phraseology used by the Legislature to indicate deferment of the transfer of ownership is more or less identical with that used in the first proviso. In one case, the date chosen under the first proviso is one year after cessation of disability, and in the ot4er case, the date chosen is the date of final decision of the proceedings under one or the other of the enumerated sections in the second proviso. In one case, the date chosen under the first proviso is one year after cessation of disability, and in the ot4er case, the date chosen is the date of final decision of the proceedings under one or the other of the enumerated sections in the second proviso. If the transfer of ownership itself does not take place till the proceedings pending on 1-4-1961 come to an end, it is difficult to hold that the mutual obligations between the parties nonetheless cease to be operative. 20. Considerable aid is sought from the observations of the Full Bench decision that there cannot be a second postponement of the Tillers' Day. If it was possible to hold that the scheme of section 32 (1) of the Bombay Tenancy Act is in pari materia with section 46 of the Vidarbha Act, I would be bound by the ratio of that decision to hold that pendency of proceedings On 1-4-1961 preserves only limited right of the landlord and tenant, and would not give right to action under a fresh cause of action or a cause of action which has already accrued but in respect of which proceedings were not taken bef6re 1-4-1961. But it is not possible to hold in view of the scheme of section 46, and in particular, the inclusion of provision like the first proviso in the same section, that it was intended by the Legislature that the relationship of landlord and tenant shall cease to exist between tenants and landlords between whom a proceeding is pending on 1-4-1961. Such a conclusion will not be warranted having regard to the phraseology used in the second proviso regarding the date of transfer of ownership which is different from the one used in first part of subsection (1) of section 46. Under the substantive clause of sub-section (1) the date is 1st April 1961. Under the first proviso the date differs according as the disability of the tenant ceases and one year thereafter, and under the second proviso the date of transfer of ownership is made dependent on the final decision of any of the proceedings which were pending on 1st April 1961. 21. Under the first proviso the date differs according as the disability of the tenant ceases and one year thereafter, and under the second proviso the date of transfer of ownership is made dependent on the final decision of any of the proceedings which were pending on 1st April 1961. 21. The contention urged on behalf of the tenants is that the Legislature intended to confer ownership of land on all the tenants of whatever category from 1st April 1961, and what is deferred according to the two provisos is the effectiveness of that transfer of ownership which is to take place on the dates indicated in the two provisos. I do not think this construction can be accepted without straining the language and ignoring the meaning implicit in the words used in the two provisos. 22. There is yet another aspect which must be considered to find out the correct interpretation to be put on the scheme of section 46 vis-a-vis other provisions of the Act, and the object of the legislation. It is contended on behalf of the petitioners that the provisions of Chapter II regarding the tenancies lay down in sufficient detail mutual obligations of landlords and tenants. A landlord is not entitled to realise from tenant by way of rent anything in excess of four times the land revenue or such amount as may be fixed as fair rent. The tenant is immune from eviction except as indicated in section 38 and section 19. Section 19 gives a qualified right to a landlord to terminate a tenancy if the tenant is proved to be guilty of one or the other of the defaults enumerated in sub-section (l). Thus, (a) if there is a default in payment of rent, or (b) if the tenant is guilty of any act destructive to the land, (c) if the leasehold is sub-divided in contravention of section 33, or (d) if the land is sub-let or assigned by the tenant or (e) if the tenant fails to cultivate the land personally, or (f) if the land is used for purposes other than agriculture, the tenancy may be terminated. Injunction against the tenant to indulge in any of these acts is provided with a view to secure good agriculture from the tenant. But even if the tenant indulges in any of these defaults, there is no automatic termination of the tenancy. Injunction against the tenant to indulge in any of these acts is provided with a view to secure good agriculture from the tenant. But even if the tenant indulges in any of these defaults, there is no automatic termination of the tenancy. The landlord has to give a notice and give an opportunity to the tenant to make good the default. The further period of locus penitentiae is compulsorily provided within which the violation of the injunction can be remedied by the tenant himself. It is only on the failure of the tenant to make good the default within time that the tenancy may be terminated. There is a further protection given to the tenant against forfeiture of tenancy for non-payment of rent, and that is provided by section 30 (1) of the Act. It is only in the case of contumacious default in payment of arrears in spite of notice by the landlord and in spite of grant of time by the Revenue Officer that the tenant suffers forfeiture of tenancy for nonpayment of rent. It is difficult to hold that these obligations, which are mutual and necessary for a healthy relationship of landlord and tenant to continue, altogether cease and are intended to cease after 1-4-1961. It is one thing to say that there is no obligation as a tenant if ownership is transferred in favour of the tenant and the tenant has become owner of the land, and quite another to gay that even though the transfer of ownership is deferred and is to take place at an uncertain time in future, the obligation of the tenant ceases altogether, with the consequence that the landlord is precluded from taking any steps under section 19 Or section 30 or section 36 after 1-4-1961. The intention of the Legislature in granting the right of ownership to the tenant is not inconsistent with the scheme of the law in other parts of the Act, under which the tenant continues to be responsible for observance of his obligation regarding payment of rent, cultivation of land personally, user of land for the purpose for which it was meant, i.e. agriculture, and preservation of the leasehold property in good state. 23. 23. A close scrutiny of sub-section (1) of section 32 of the Bombay Act win show that in respect of the tenants governed by that sub-section the fictional purchase was complete and was also free from all encumbrances provided the conditions in sub-clause (a) or (b) were satisfied. The distinguishing feature of the Vidarbha Act is that the land in respect of which compulsory transfer is operative is not every variety of land in occupation of the tenant but is restricted to land which the tenant is entitled to purchase from his landlord. In order to determine, therefore, whether even in cases falling under sub-section (1) of section 46 a tenant has become a fictional owner by compulsory transfer from 1-4-1961, an enquiry is to be made to find out which is the land and what is its extent which he is entitled to purchase and only with respect to such land a fictional ownership is created in favour of such tenant by the legislative grant. In other words, merely by the coming into force of section 46 it cannot be predicated that every person who is on land as a tenant has become its owner. It is a matter of enquiry and a finding to be given whenever the question is raised, and in any case by the Agricultural Lands Tribunal as provided in section 48 of the Act. 24. In this context the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 46 may also be examined. Under sub-section (2) in respect of land the ownership of which stands transferred to and vests in the tenant under sub-section (1), the tenant continues to be liable to pay to the landlord the rent of such land until the amount of purchase price payable by the tenant to the landlord is determined under section 48. What the tenant is made liable is described as "rent" and that liability continues till the determination of purchase price by the tenant. One of the arguments advanced on behalf of the landlord is that this is a result even in the case of those persons to whom the land stands compulsorily transferred under sub-section (1) of section 46. It will be difficult, to conclude that a tenant in whose case the date of transfer of ownership is deferred ceases to be liable to pay rent or to suffer penalties for non-payment of rent in spite of notice. It will be difficult, to conclude that a tenant in whose case the date of transfer of ownership is deferred ceases to be liable to pay rent or to suffer penalties for non-payment of rent in spite of notice. Once it is held that on account of deference of the date of transfer of ownership under the first proviso as well as the second proviso, the relationship continues as landlord and tenant, it must follow that the obligation of the landlord to charge nothing more than the fair rent or rent not in excess .of four times the land revenue, and the corresponding duty of the tenant to pay that rent within the time prescribed by section 19 (1) (I) still continue to govern the mutual relations ,between the parties. The consequence of non-payment of rent is provided in section 19, and if action is taken in pursuance of the provisions of section 19, in some cases it must result in the tenant facing eviction for breach of provisions of section 19. It is urged that such a .result could not have been contemplated by the Legislature if between 1-4-1961 and the date of transfer of ownership indicated in the first or the second proviso of sub-section (1) of section 46 in, a given case, the tenant loses possession of the land. I do not see why such a result is inconsistent and could not have been contemplated or intended by the Legislature when other provisions of the Act i.e. provisions other than the provisions of Chapter III, continue to govern the relationship between the parties as between landlord and tenant. It could, not be said that after 1-4-1961 a person who was on land as tenant was given, as it were, a charter to commit a breach of other provisions of the Act without suffering the consequences of that breach. If the relationship continues, the obligations must continue and must be enforceable under the provisions of the law. It is in this context that, the careful limitation of the operation of the non-obstante clause of section 46, which is limited to the provisions of Chapter III only, is relevant. If the relationship continues, the obligations must continue and must be enforceable under the provisions of the law. It is in this context that, the careful limitation of the operation of the non-obstante clause of section 46, which is limited to the provisions of Chapter III only, is relevant. The relations between the parties, therefore, must be held to continue to be governed by other provisions of the Act till the ownership is transferred, and therefore the rights of the landlord if available-in the other provisions of the Act must continue to be enforceable., 25. Thus, I have come to the conclusion that under the scheme oft he Vidarbha Act, on the coming into force of the provisions of section 46 of the, Act, in each case, an enquiry is to be made to find out whether a particular land in possession of the tenant under the law stands transferred in ownership to the tenant. It cannot be said merely because an application is made after 1-4-1961 that the application will have to be thrown out because the tenant has ceased to be a tenant and had become an owner. In order to determine whether a tenant has become owner of a particular land, other provisions of the Act are required to be taken into account, evidence has to be led and a finding is required to be recorded, indicating clearly in respect of which land the particular claimant can claim to be owner. If it is found that ownership of a particular land does not stand transferred on 1-4-1961, the relationship between the parties continues to be governed by other provisions of the Act under whi6h the date indicated in the first or the second proviso to sub-section (l) of section 46 is reached. In the instant cases that date has not reached in any of these petitions. 26, In an enquiry that is required to be made to find out whether a particular land has come to vest in the tenant under section 46 of the Act, the Revenue Officer has to find out whether the tenant or the landlord is not one or the other of the following classes:- (1) If the landlord on 1-4-1961 held land equal to or less than one family, holding. In other words, if the landlord came in the class, indicated in clause (f) of section 42, the tenant of such landlord in respect of that land would not become owner on 1-4-1961. (2) If the land is owned by a landlord who is a minor, a widow, a serving member of the Armed Forces, or a person subject to any physical or mental disability on 1-4-1961, the tenant of such land would not be entitled to purchase that land on 1-4-1961, his right being deferred till expiry of two years from the cessation of disability of such landlord. (3) If the tenant himself is a person under disability, namely, a minor, or a widow, or a serving member of the Armed Forces, or a person subject to any physical or mental disability on 1-4-1961, then such a tenant could not be said to be entitled to purchase land of which he is tenant on 1-4-1961 and his right shall stand deferred till one year after the cessation of the disability. (4) If the land is one in respect of which any proceedings are pending under section 21, 36 or 38 or any action is taken under section 19 or section 20 by the landlord or tenant on 1-4-1961, the tenant of such land does not become an owner on 1-4-1961. The right of such tenant to claim ownership under the statute is deferred till the final decision of the proceedings which are pending. (5) In other two c1asies,ofcases in which the tenant holds land in excess of three family holdings, the right to claim ownership of the land will be limited to land to be determined 1lIl:derthe provisions of section 42 (a) and 42 (b) on 1-4-1961, other conditions being satisfied in, that respect. 27. It will now be necessary to examine each of the cases which are governed by this order, to find out what appropriate orders should be passed in each case. 28. In Special Civil Application No. 41 of 1965 the petitioner is one Kamlabai. There is nothing on record to show what is the total holding of the petitioner. If the total holding of the petitioner is less than one family holding, the respondent will not be able to claim ownership of any land of the petitioner as vesting in him from 1-471961. There is nothing on record to show what is the total holding of the petitioner. If the total holding of the petitioner is less than one family holding, the respondent will not be able to claim ownership of any land of the petitioner as vesting in him from 1-471961. It is alleged that the proceedings under section 38 are pending between the parties on 1-4-1961. If such proceedings were pending, the relationship between the parties did not come to an end in view of the second proviso to section 46 (1) as interpreted, and the parties will be bound by other provisions of the Act. The Tribunal has rejected the application merely on the ground that it was made after 1-4-1961. That order and the other orders of the subordinate authorities are set aside and the matter is remanded for fresh trial to the Naib-Tahsildar in accordance with law. In the circumstances the petition is allowed, but there will be no order as to costs. 29. Special Civil Application No. 42 of 1965 is by a landholder .who is obviously a minor. In the case of a minor landlord the tenant is not entitled to purchase the land under section 41 (2) until two years after the cessation of minority. The right to purchase itself is not available till then under section 41 (2). That right arises only two years after the cessation of minority of the landlord. Under the circumstances the relationship continues and the application could not have been dismissed. The order of the Tribunal is set aside and that of the Sub-Divisional Officer is restored. Under that order the matter has been remanded to the Naib-Tahsildar to find out what defaults, if any, are committed, and the result thereof. The contention of the petitioner before the Tribunal was that there was no evidence or plea that there was suspension of land revenue in any of the relevant years. As the Tribunal has rejected the revision on the ground that the application was not tenable, the order of the Tribunal is set aside and the case is remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision according to law. The petition is allowed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. 30. As the Tribunal has rejected the revision on the ground that the application was not tenable, the order of the Tribunal is set aside and the case is remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision according to law. The petition is allowed but in the circumstances there will be no order as to costs. 30. In Special Civil Application No. 44 of 1965, the petitioner is one Godawaribai and the dispute is in respect of S. No. 67/1, having an area of 5 acres and 25 gunthas. It will have to be found out what is the total land held by the petitioner to ascertain whether the tenant Deoman could claim acquisition of ownership under section 46 (1) of the new Tenancy Act. It is alleged that an application under section 38 was pending on 1-4-1951. There is no dear averment in the return of the respondent about this position. The respondent does not admit this position as the matter was not in issue in any of the Courts below. The application was rejected because of the interpretation of section 46 by the Tribunal. The matter will have to go back to the Naib-Tahsildar firstly to determine whether the landholder is' one against whom the tenant can claim to have acquired the right of statutory ownership. It will have to be determined if any proceeding was pending between the parties under section 36 on 1-4"1961 and if such proceeding was pending then there would be no bar to the entertainment of the application filed by the petitioner which will have to be disposed of on merits. 31. The orders of all the three revenue authorities are set, aside and the case is remanded to the Naib-Tahsildar for a fresh decision according to law. 32. The petition is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. 33. Special Civil Application Nos. 45 and 46 of 1965. In both these cases, the petitioner is the same as in Special Civil Application No" 4'1 of 1965. Here again, the issue regarding the total holding of the petitioner and whether proceeding under section 38 was pending on 1-4-1961 is required to be enquired into and decided. In the circumstances, the orders of all the three revenue authorities are set aside and the cases are remanded to the Naib-Tahsildar for a fresh decision according to law with advertence to the above remarks. In the circumstances, the orders of all the three revenue authorities are set aside and the cases are remanded to the Naib-Tahsildar for a fresh decision according to law with advertence to the above remarks. 34. The result is that both the petitions are allowed but there will be no order as to costs. 35. In Special Civil Application No. 119 of 1965 the petitioner is a minor. As such opponents Shriram Sadashio and others cannot claim any such to have become statutory owners under section 46 (1) of the new Tenancy, Act. The application of the petitioner has been dismissed by the Tribunal holding that the respondents had become owners on and from 1-4-1961 under section 46. Obviously, the respondents cannot claim any such status as their right to purchase the land was not available to them on 1-4-1961 but would arise two years after the petitioner had attained majority., The order of the Tribunal is therefore set aside and the case is remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision of the revision according to law. 36. The petition is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. 37. In Special Civil, Application No. 112 of 1965 the five petitioners commenced these proceedings to get possession of S. N. 127 having an area of 31 acres and 5 gunthas. There is no material on record to find, out what is the total holding of these five petitioners or whether they are joint holders of land only in respect of this survey number or any other property. But it is admitted between the parties that a notice for termination of tenancy for the tenant being in arrears for the years 1958-59, 1959-60 as well as 1960-61 was served before 1-4-1961. The petitioners served another notice for the default in payment of the rent for the year 1960-61 but after 1-4-196r. Even so, the petitioners had a right to have the tenancy terminated for the default in the payment of rent for the years 1958-59 and 1959-60. As such proceeding was pending between the, parties within the meaning of the' second proviso to section 46 (1) on 1-4-1961. It has been held that pendency of such proceeding postpones statutory ownership of land under section 46 (1) till the final decision of the proceeding. As such proceeding was pending between the, parties within the meaning of the' second proviso to section 46 (1) on 1-4-1961. It has been held that pendency of such proceeding postpones statutory ownership of land under section 46 (1) till the final decision of the proceeding. The Tribunal took the view that the' application will not be tenable unless it was established that the petitioners did not hold land in excess of one family holding. The Tribunal, therefore, remanded the matter for a finding on this issue whether the condition under section 42 (c) of the Act is satisfied. 38. I have held above that issuing of a notice under section 19 terminating the tenancy prior to 1-4-1961 will postpone transfer of ownership and therefore the application which was filed after 1-4-1961 would be tenable. The order of the Tribunal is therefore set aside and the matter is remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision according to law. 39. The petition is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. 40. In Special Civil Application No. 115 of 1965, the petitioner is a tenure-holder of S. No. 632 out of which he owns 11 acres, 1 guntha. There is no material on record to find out what is the total holding of the petitioner. There is no allegation either that any proceeding under any of the sections including the second proviso to section 46 (1) was pending on 1-4-1961. Proceeding has been commenced by a notice after 1-4-1961 and an application thereafter. The Tribunal originally rejected the revision filed by the tenant but on an application for review at the instance of the tenant it held that the landholder's application was itself untenable under section 46. It could not have determined whether the tenant has become the owner of the land under section 46 (1) unless enquiry was made and a finding arrived at that the total land held by the landlord was in excess of one family holding. The Tribunal could not come to the conclusion that section 46 (1) was attracted unless it was established that the petitioner held land in excess of one family holding in the absence of any other consideration which would take the case out of section 46 (1). The order of the Tribunal passed on review therefore cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. 41. The order of the Tribunal passed on review therefore cannot be sustained. It is accordingly set aside. 41. It is urged on behalf of the petitioner that review was not tenable as there was no material on record before the Tribunal or before any of the subordinate authorities indicating that the landlord held land in excess of one family holding. Whether a tenant of a particular land gets a right as a statutory owner depends on the finding as to whether such tenant was entitled to purchase that land. The tenant will not be entitled to purchase land if after the exercise of such right the land remaining with the landlord of such land is less, than one family holding. As there is no material on record to give, a finding either way in these proceedings the matter is required to the remanded before the Tribunal. All the contentions which the petitioner can raise to the tenability of the review application are open to be canvassed by the petitioner before the Tribunal. 42. The result is that the petition is allowed but, there will be no order as to costs. 43. In Special Civil Application No. 190 of 1965 the petitioner argued his own case. He is a practising lawyer. His contention is that even though he holds a little over 300 acres of land not an inch of it is under his personal cultivation. So far as the, opponent-tenant in this case is concerned, the land in possession of the opponent as tenant is only 11 acres, 6 gunthas. According to the contention of the petitioner in this case the provisions of section 42 (c) should be so construed to hold that the laud required to be left with the landlord should not be less than one family holding on independent calculation with respect to the land held by each tenant. It is not possible to accept this construction of section 42 (c) of the new Tenancy Act. It is an admitted position that there was no proceeding for termination of the tenancy and the finding of the Tribunal that the opponent had become a statutory owner seems to be the only finding that could be reached on the facts proved on record. 44. The petition therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. 45. It is an admitted position that there was no proceeding for termination of the tenancy and the finding of the Tribunal that the opponent had become a statutory owner seems to be the only finding that could be reached on the facts proved on record. 44. The petition therefore fails and is dismissed with costs. 45. In Special Civil Application No. 615 of 1965 the petitioner is one Tarabai who commenced proceedings in respect of S. No. 76/44 having an area of only 17 gunthas. She alleged that she had become an owner of this property as a result of re-partition among the members of the family in 1959. The opponent was said to be in arrears of rent for the years 1959-60, 1960-61 and 1961-62 for which notices were served demanding payment. Thereafter, the petitioner commenced proceedings for possession. The Naib-Tahsildar rejected the application on the ground that the partition of 1959 was not legal and did not give any right to the petitioner. Tarabai filed an appeal against this order before the Sub-Divisional Officer who upheld the order of the, Naib-Tahsildar. Against these orders the petitioner went up in revision before the Tribunal, The Tribunal declined to interfere in revision on the view that the application was made by Tarabai after 1-4-1961 when it was assumed that the opponent had become the owner of land. Whether the opponent had become the owner of the land could not be decided until it was established that the tenant could claim this land from the landholder under section 41. There was no material before the Tribunal to come to such a finding. It is admitted that a notice terminating the tenancy in respect of the year 1959-60 was given before 1-4-1961. It could therefore be said that on that date proceedings were pending under section 19 and that the relationship could not have come to an end on 1-4-1961. The order of the Tribunal therefore cannot be sustained and it, is hereby set aside and the case is remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision according to law with advertence to other contentions between the parties. 46. The petition is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. 47. Special Civil Application No. 634 of 1965 is by the same petitioner Tarabai but against another tenant who had committed the same defaults. 46. The petition is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. 47. Special Civil Application No. 634 of 1965 is by the same petitioner Tarabai but against another tenant who had committed the same defaults. A similar decision, was given by the Tribunal rejecting her application. In the circumstances, the order in this case passed by the Tribunal is also set aside and the case is remanded to the Tribunal for a fresh decision with respect to other contentions between the parties. 48. The petition is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. 49. ln Special Civil Application No. 891 of 1965, it is true that the tribunal also took the view that the landlord's application was not tenable, because the opponent had become the owner of the land. No enquiry was made as required by several provisions of the Act to come to such a finding and that finding cannot be sustained as a valid finding in law. That finding is set aside. However the petitioner cannot succeed in obtaining possession of the land as he has failed to prove that the opponent had contravened the provisions of section 19 (I) (i) (c) of the new tenancy Act. Under clause (c) a tenant i8 prohibited from sub-dividing the land in contravention of section 33. Under section 33 of the Act there is a prohibition to the sub-division or sub-letting of the land held by a tenant or assignment of any interest in the land of such tenant. What is urged in support of this petition is that the opponents had together taken on lease as joint lessees four pieces of land, viz. S. Nos. 37/1, 107/3, 40 and 110 and the crop statement showed that each of these survey numbers was separately cultivated by one or other of the joint lessees. This according to the petitioner is a sub-division of the land within the meaning of section 33 read with section 19 (1) (i) (c). The finding of the Sub-Divisional Officer as an appellate authority and that of the Tribunal is against the petitioner. Even assuming that the petitioner has made out any prima facie case by showing separate cultivation by each of the lessees unless there was proof of exclusion of one lessee by another it could not be said that the lan4 was sub-divided. Even assuming that the petitioner has made out any prima facie case by showing separate cultivation by each of the lessees unless there was proof of exclusion of one lessee by another it could not be said that the lan4 was sub-divided. It is quite permissible and possible for each of the joint lessees by an arrangement among themselves to be in charge of cultivation of separate pieces of property. But so long as they are jointly liable and there is no exclusion of one against the other infer Be, a fact which is difficult of proof by a third person like the landlord, it cannot be said that there has been any sub-division of the land. A sub-division does not mean a mere demarcation which is not the case of the petitioner at all. In this case, each of the survey number is intact so far as the cultivation is concerned. What is urged is that the totality of land comprised in the four survey numbers having been cultivated by different persons all of whom are joint lessees such cultivation amounts to a sub-division of the land. I do not think the section is susceptible of this construction. Thus on merits the petitioner has no case. The petition accordingly fails and is dismissed with costs. 50. Special Civil Application No. 1009 of 1965 is in respect of S. No. 112/1, area 20 acres, 6 gunthas. The petitioner had given notices of default in payment of rent in 1958-59 and 1959-60 and the last notice was on 9-5-1961. As these notices were given, it is contended, it could be said that proceedings were not pending against the opponent-tenant within the meaning of the second proviso to section 46 (1) and therefore the tenant could not claim that he had been an owner of the property. While such proceedings were pending, an application under section 30 (2) was given but it had been rejected by the Tribunal on the ground that the opponent-tenant had become the owner of the property. Before such a finding could be reached by the Tribunal it had to find out whether the tenant could claim the right to purchase the land in question and then it had to be found whether any proceeding3 were properly pending under the second proviso to section 46. Before such a finding could be reached by the Tribunal it had to find out whether the tenant could claim the right to purchase the land in question and then it had to be found whether any proceeding3 were properly pending under the second proviso to section 46. If the landlord did not own more than one family holding then the tenant could not claim ownership of the property at all as a result of coming into operation of section 46 (1) of the new Tenancy Act. As there is no enquiry on these matters, the orders of all the revenue authorities are set aside and the case is remanded to the Naib-Tahsildar for a fresh decision according to law. 51. The petition is allowed but there will be no order as to costs. Petition allowed.