Judgment :- 1. This second appeal is by the decree-holder and raises the question, whether his execution petition, dated the 4th February, 1961, is barred by limitation or not. The execution court held that it is not barred, but the Subordinate Judge in appeal held that it is. The second appeal coming before a learned Single judge of this court, has been referred to a Division Bench for decision. 2. The decree is dated the 11th November, 1965, and the previous execution petition which was within time was dismissed on the 20th February, 1957. The present execution petition was thus filed more than three years and six months after such dismissal. In the execution petition it was stated, that the decree debt and the judgment-debtors are governed by the provisions of Act 3 of 1956 and Act 31 of 1958, and that the amount of the first instalment of the debt as prescribed by the latter Act had been received from the respondent-judgment-debtor, but that he is in default for the next four instalments and it was prayed, that execution may be allowed, to recover the amount of the instalments in default. On the date of the execution petition, only five instalments as prescribed by Act 31 of 1958 were over. 3. Learned counsel for the appellant contended, that by virtue of the provisions of Act 31 of 1958, the decree which in terms was for the payment of money in lump forthwith, became converted into a decree for the payment of money in specified instalments, so as to attract the operation, as to the starting point of limitation, of Clause.7 in the third column of Art.182 of the Indian Limitation Act. Although several instalments are over by now, and the respondent does not claim to have made any deposit, the only question in this appeal is whether the execution of the decree for the realisation of the amounts of instalments 2 to 5 is barred by limitation or not. The contention of learned counsel stated above, was accepted by one of us sitting singly in Mammad v. Abdul Salam 1963 KLT. 283. The contention of learned counsel stated above, was accepted by one of us sitting singly in Mammad v. Abdul Salam 1963 KLT. 283. But the contention of learned counsel for the respondent was two-fold, first that the respondent is not an agriculturist, and second that in any event, unless an order had been passed specifying the several instalments and the amount payable for each instalment, the dates of such instalments cannot be the starting points for limitation for execution of the decree, even for the realization of the amounts of such instalments. The first contention has to be dismissed in limine on the short ground, that there was no such plea by the respondent in the objection to execution, and the case was dealt with by the two courts below as if the Act applied to him. The second contention does not appear to be based on any provision in the Act. S.4 enacts, as it were, a substantive provision as to the right of the debtor to discharge his debt in instalments. This section does not provide, either expressly or by necessary implication, for any application being made by the debtor for making payment, all that is necessary for him to do being, to make the payments as prescribed. Sub-section (5) of S.4 enacts, that "Where any instalment of any debt is not paid on the due date, the creditor shall be entitled to recover the same as provided in S.10 but the debtor shall not forfeit the benefits conferred by this section", and the proviso to it reads, that "if default is made in payment of six consecutive instalments the debtor shall not be entitled to the benefits of the provisions of sub-section (2) and sub-section (3) and the whole debt together with such interest as may have accrued thereon less any amount that have already been paid shall be forthwith payable". S.10 sub-section (1) relates to the execution of a decree passed before the commencement of the Act and provides that, where the debtor fails to make any one of the payments specified in sub-sections (2) and (3) or in the order on an application made under S.8, the decree-holder shall be entitled to execute the decree in respect of the instalment which is in arrear. Shortly stated, the effect of these provisions is, that where the debtor commits default in the payment of certain instalments, the creditor is entitled to recover the amounts of such defaulted instalments. So the original right of the decree-holder to execute the decree for the full amount is superseded by the right given to him by S.4(5) and S.10(1). An application under S.4 seems quite unnecessary. For the decree-holder there is nothing for him to do, except when the debtor commits default, to proceed to realise the defaulted amounts. In a case of default for six consecutive instalments falling within the scope of the proviso to S.4(5), a Division Bench of this court has held in Velayudhan v. Gokulan 1964 KLT. 600 that time for the execution of the decree runs, not from the date of the decree but from the date on which the debtor committed default in the payment of the last of such instalments. 4. But reliance was placed by learned counsel for the respondent on the observations of the learned Single Judge in Veeraraghava Iyer v. Suppan Chettiar (1963) 1 KLR. 275. After examining the provisions of the Act, the learned judge made these observations: "The effect is in cases where the judgment-debtor does not pay the instalments, the decree-holder has to file his execution application within the period of limitation or must at least get an order under S.7, so as to save limitation. If. on the other hand, the judgment-debtor pays the instalments or deposits the same, then the decree-holder can avail of S.21 and claim fresh periods of limitation." These observations seem to go against the view indicated, that the decree-holder has in the circumstances stated above, an undoubted right to execute the decree in respect of defaulted instalments as from the dates thereof. S.7 deals with the power of a court to amend a decree for the repayment of a debt, in conformity with the provisions of the Act whether at the instance of the decree-holder or of the judgment-debtor. The provisions of the Act are not to be limited to the right under S.4 to discharge the debt in instalments, and may relate also to such matters, as interest payable or realisable on the debt, the reopening of debts under S.5 and so on. The provisions of the Act are not to be limited to the right under S.4 to discharge the debt in instalments, and may relate also to such matters, as interest payable or realisable on the debt, the reopening of debts under S.5 and so on. But the point is that S.7 is an enabling provision and does not take away the right of the judgment-debtor to make payments under S.4 and the right of the decree-holder to execute the decree for defaulted instalments in terms of S.4 and 10, without any amendment of the decree. We may add, that S.8 of the Act applies only where the court is called upon to pass an order fixing the amount payable under S.4, in a case of doubt or dispute regarding the same. In the above sense, the scope and ambit of S.4 are wider than those of S.7 and S.8. 5. The case before the learned judge was of a suit to enforce repayment of a debt on a promissory note and was not of a proceeding to execute a decree. In the case of a suit, as observed by the Bench in Adhrumankutty v. Chovvara 1963 KLT. 306, S.3 of Act 31 of 1958, expressly contemplates the institution of suits by creditors in time to save limitation, even though a period of six months from the date of its commencement has been allowed to agriculturist-debtors to pay the first instalment in discharge of the debt. There is a distinction in the case of suits. In Kuruvilla v. Joseph (1960) 2 KLR. 583 at P. 592 the argument advanced on behalf of a judgment-debtor, that he: "should take some step either by way of payment of an instalment or by way of an application under S.7 or 8 to entitle him to the benefits of the Act." was dismissed by the learned judge relying on S.6 (2) of the Act, as it was before the amendment. That section then read as follows: "The provisions of S.4 shall, for purpose of execution be deemed to be a subsequent order of court within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908". That section then read as follows: "The provisions of S.4 shall, for purpose of execution be deemed to be a subsequent order of court within the meaning of clause (b) of sub-section (1) of S.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908". Upon this, the conclusion reached was stated thus: "the starting points of limitation for the purposes of execution of the different instalments contemplated by S.4 are automatically fixed by the deeming provision in S.6 (2) without any step or application being taken by either the judgment-debtor or the decree-holder. S.4 by virtue of S.6 (2) becomes, as it were, or shall be deemed to be, a subsequent order of court under S.48 (1) (6) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Therefore this contention also has no merit and has to be rejected." In the later case of Veeraraghava Iyer v. Suppan Chettiar (1963) 1 KLR. 275, S.6 (2) as it was amended was relied on. It reads: "An order passed under the provisions of S.4 shall be deemed to be a subsequent order of court within the meaning of clause (6) of sub-section (1) of S.48 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908." The learned judge observed: "This amendment, according to me, throws considerable light on the intention of the Legislature and furnishes the key to the unravelling of the scheme of the Act. When this Court interpreted the original sub-section as having the effect of fixing the instalments automatically the legislature intervened and amended the sub-section making it now clear that an order passed under S.4 alone shall have that effect." It is on these observations and those referred to earlier, that learned counsel has relied in support of his contention. 6. When this Court interpreted the original sub-section as having the effect of fixing the instalments automatically the legislature intervened and amended the sub-section making it now clear that an order passed under S.4 alone shall have that effect." It is on these observations and those referred to earlier, that learned counsel has relied in support of his contention. 6. Speaking with respect, it seems to us, that S.6 (2) has application-only in the context of S.48 (1) (b), C. P. C. It is useful to recall that provision; it reads: 'Where an application to execute a decree not being a decree granting an injunction has been made, no order for the execution of the same decree shall be made upon any fresh application presented after the expiration of twelve years from (b) where the decree or any subsequent order directs any payment of money or the delivery of any property to be made at a certain date or at recurring periods, the date of the default in making the payment or delivery in respect of which the applicant seeks to execute the decree." It is sufficient for us to hold, that the observations of the learned judge do not cover a case like the one before us, to which S.48 (1) (b) is not attracted and which is governed by Art.182 of the Indian Limitation Act. It may well be, that in a case falling within the purview of S.7 or S.8 of the Act, if an order is passed granting relief under S.4, such order is "an order passed under the provisions of S.4" within the meaning of S.6 (2). For the purpose of Art.182, the rule stated earlier, that the decree for payment of money as originally passed must be deemed to be converted into a decree for payment in instalments must be held to govern. If so, the execution petition dated the 4th February, 1961, was well within time with respect to instalments 2 to 5 and was not barred by limitation. 7. The argument does not appeal to us, that to hold against every agriculturist-judgment-debtor, whether be avails himself of the benefit of instalment payment under S.4 or not the decree-holder will have a right to execute the decree for the defaulted instalments in terms of S.4 (5), would amount to imposing a benefit the debtor may not want, and even against his will. To us, the result indicated above seems to flow from the scheme of the Act and from a plain reading of its provisions. No decree-holder could make an application for execution of a decree in respect of a debt against any agriculturist for the first six months from the commencement of the Act, regardless of anything that the judgment-debtor may do or may not do; this is absolute, to the extent provided by S.3. If the judgment-debtor does not deposit the amount of the first instalment within six months of the commencement of the Act, the consequence is not, that he is deprived of his right ever to discharge the debt in instalments under the Act and that the decree-holder is entitled to recover the whole debt forthwith. Even after the date of the first instalment, the decree-holder could not execute the decree except for the amount of that instalment, and after the date of the second instalment without deposit, for the amount of that instalment also, and so on, until the date of the sixth instalment. After that date, if no deposit had so far been made, the decree. holder could execute the decree for the entire debt payable. In such cases, the question is not whether the judgment-debtor has availed himself of the benefits of the Act, but is whether he is an agriculturist or not. That issue is there from the beginning, and becomes a live-issue once the judgment-debtor disputes his status as an agriculturist and contends that time for execution should not be allowed to be reckoned in the above manner, from the dates of the several instalments. We see no illogicality or impropriety in so reading the provision of the Act. This view, we venture to think, accords also with the ruling of the Bench in Velayudhan v. Gokulan f 1964 KLT. 600). We may add, as observed in Mammad v. Abdul Salam (1963 KLT. 283) that the primary object of S.21 is to provide for the period of limitation being computed against the non-agriculturist¬debtor also on the same basis, in the events contemplated by the section and not to limit such computation to cases in which the judgment-debtor has made the payment or deposit for any of the instalments. The result is, that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge is set aside and that of the execution court is restored. The result is, that the judgment of the Subordinate Judge is set aside and that of the execution court is restored. The second appeal is allowed with costs throughout.