R. Ratanasabapathy Servai v. Sannasi Ambalagaran — 1966 DIGILAW 120 (MAD)

Judgment:-. This batch of appeals is filed by the plaintiffs in the suits against the order of the Subordinate Judge, Tanjore remanding the suits for fresh disposal after giving a finding on the question whether the suit lands are the private lands of the plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-title. A batch of suits was filed before the District Munsif, Pattukottai for possession, damages for use and occupation, and future mesne profits. According to their plaintiffs, the properties described in the plaints originally belonged to the Zamindar of Papanad and were his private lands. The Zamindar was in enjoyment of the lands by leasing out under terminable leases. After the abolition of the Zamindari and the taking over of the estate on 3rd January, 1951, the Zamindar applied for patta under section 12 of the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act (XXVI of 1948), and a ryotwari patta was granted by the first Additional Assistant Settlement Officer, Pattukottai, to the Zamindar. An appeal was preferred by some of the defendants to the Estates Abolition Tribunal, Vellore, but that appeal was dismissed. The plaintiffs purchased the suit lands and some other lands from the Zamindar under registered sale deeds, dated 19th September, 1959, and became the owners of the lands. According to the plaintiffs, the defendants were held to be not cultivating tenants in the Revenue Court, and therefore they are persons in possession without any legal rights and are trespassers in the eye of law. On these allegations the plaintiffs filed the suits for possession and for mesne profits. The defendants resisted the suits. They raised various contention, they contended, that the lands were ryoti and the defendants and their ancestors were in possession and enjoyment of these lands and were never let into possession by the Zamindar in pursuance of lease agreements. They also denied that the lands were private lands of the Zamindar. They also stated that patta was granted to the Zamindar without the knowledge of the defendants, and no proper notice was published in the village. The validity of the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was questioned as being made ex parte without going into the merits. They also submitted that the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer granting patta under section 15 of the Abolition Act is not final and binding on them. On these contention the trial Court framed the following issues: 1. The validity of the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer was questioned as being made ex parte without going into the merits. They also submitted that the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer granting patta under section 15 of the Abolition Act is not final and binding on them. On these contention the trial Court framed the following issues: 1. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the suit properties? 2. Whether the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff is sham and nominal? 3. Whether the patta granted to plaintiff’s vendor is final and conclusive and what is its efficacy? 4. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to any mesne profits, and if to so what amount? 5. Whether the description of suit property is correct? 6. To what relief, if any, is the plaintiff entitled? The trial Court found all the issues in favour of the plaintiffs and decreed the suits as prayed for. On appeal, the learned Subordinate Judge of Tanjore remanded the suits on the ground that the patta granted to the plaintiffs by the Assistant Settlement Officer under section* 15 of Act XXVI of 1948 is not final and conclusive, and liable to be questioned in a civil Court. He directed the trial Court to record a finding as to whether the suit lands are the private lands of the plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-title. It was contended on behalf of the appellants by Mr. Gopalaswami Ayyangar, learned Counsel, that the patta granted to the plaintiffs and their predecessor-in-title under section 15 of Act XXVI of 1948 is final and conclusive regarding the nature of lands, namely, that the lands are private lands of the Zamindar, and the Civil Court is not entitled to go into that question. Therefore according to the learned Counsel, the order of remand is unsustainable in law. Under section 3 of the Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act XXVI of 1948, with effect on and from the notified date the entire estate vested in the Government. The proviso to the section enjoined on the Government not to dispossess any person of any land in the estate in respect of which the Government considered that the person was prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta. Section 11 provides for the grant of a ryotwari patta to a ryot, and sections 12 and 14 for the grant of a ryotwari patta to a landholder. Section 11 provides for the grant of a ryotwari patta to a ryot, and sections 12 and 14 for the grant of a ryotwari patta to a landholder. Section 15 provides that a Settlement Officer shall examine the nature and history of all lands in respect of which the landholder claims a ryotwari patta under sections 12, 13 or 14 as the case may be and decide in respect of which lands the claim could be allowed. An appeal is provided against the decision of the Settlement Officer to the Tribunal. Section 15(b) provides that the decision of the Tribunal on any such appeal shall be final and not be liable to be questioned in any Court of law. Section 64-C enacted that an order passed by the Government or other authority under this Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act shall subject only to any appeal or revision provided by or under this Act be final. The Act provides the machinery under section 15 for examining the nature and history of all the lands and granting a ryotwari patta to a landholder. The section also makes the decision of the Tribunal on appeal from the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer final and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law. It has been held by the Supreme Court in Desikacharyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh1that when a hierarchy of judicial Tribunals is provided for determination of a question under the Act, it is sufficient to infer that the jurisdiction of the civil Court to try the matter is barred. As already observed the Act provides the machinery for determining the nature and history of the lands and specifically bars the jurisdiction of the civil Court. In the circumstances it cannot be said that the finding of the Settlement Officer regarding the nature of the lands, namely, that they are private lands, is not final and conclusive and liable to be questioned in a civil Court. It was contended by Mr. V. V. Raghavan, learned Counsel for the respondents that under section 15(1) it is only the decision of the Tribunal on appeal from the decision of the Settlement Officer that is made final and not the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer. It was contended by Mr. V. V. Raghavan, learned Counsel for the respondents that under section 15(1) it is only the decision of the Tribunal on appeal from the decision of the Settlement Officer that is made final and not the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer. In this case there was an appeal against the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer, but as the appeal was filed beyond time, the petition to excuse the delay was not ordered and the appeal itself was dismissed. It was contended that though it is a decision of the Tribunal, it was not on merits, and therefore, the decision is not final. This contention cannot be upheld. An appeal is provided against an order of the Settlement Officer. If an appeal is not filed, the decision of the Settlement Officer becomes final. If an appeal is filed, decision of the Tribunal is final. The plea that the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer, if not appealed against, is not final under section 15(b) of the Act, and therefore, liable to be questioned in a Court of law cannot be countenanced. The Supreme Court has in Desikacharyulu v. State of Andhra Pradesh1repelled a like argument in the case of section 9(4)(c) of the Act. The Supreme Court held that a precisely similar effect was predicated as regards to decision of the Settlement Officer where no appeal had been filed from his decision and the Act never meant to draw any distinction between orders of Settlement Officers which were affirmed by Tribunals and other orders which by reason of their not being appealed against within the time prescribed, attained finality. Further, section 64-C specifically provides that any order passed by any authority under the Act in respect of matters to be determined for the purposes of this Act shall be final subject to any appeal or revision provided under the Act. There cannot be any dispute that the Assistant Settlement Officer is entitled to decide the nature of the land, whether it is private or ryoti, and his order is final subject to the right of revision, or appeal. Section 64-C(2) provides that no such order shall be liable to be questioned in any Court of law. There cannot be any dispute that the Assistant Settlement Officer is entitled to decide the nature of the land, whether it is private or ryoti, and his order is final subject to the right of revision, or appeal. Section 64-C(2) provides that no such order shall be liable to be questioned in any Court of law. Thus it is clear that the order of the Assistant Settlement Officer under section 15 determining the nature of the lands as private lands is final and conclusive and not liable to be questioned in a civil Court. Reference was made to section 11 of the Act and it was contended that the civil Court has jurisdiction to decide disputes between the ryots themselves as to possession. No machinery has been provided for under section 11 for deciding disputes by the Tribunal, and therefore, the jurisdiction of the civil Court is not excluded. The decision under section 11 of the Act cannot be of any assistance in deciding the question before me. In the result I uphold the contention of the learned Counsel for the appellants and hold that the decision of the Assistant Settlement Officer that the disputed lands are the private lands of the Zamindar is final and not liable to be questioned. The lower appellate Court will take the appeals on its file and dispose of them afresh according to law and in the light of the observations made in this judgment. The appeals are allowed with costs in C.M.A. No. 32 of 1962. R. M. ----- Appeals allowed; matter remitted.