ORDER.- These revisions arise out of suits filed by the same plaintiff against four different tenants for arrears of rent and damages for use and occupation, in respect of portions of land in No. 57-L, Mount Road, Guindy, Madras. It is the case of the plaintiff that he terminated the tenancy of the respective defendants by notice dated 26th October, 1961, expiring with 30th November, 1961. He had called upon the defendants to surrender vacant possession of the premises on the expiry of the tenancy and the notice contained the provision that in default the tenant would be liable to pay damages for use and occupation. The plaintiff claimed damages for use and occupation at Rs. 15 per mensem. In the suits, arrears of rent of Rs. 17-25 and damages Rs. 135, from each tenant for his occupation from 1st December, 1961, were claimed. In defence, inter alia, the tenants set up rights under the Madras City Tenants Protection Act (III of 1922). It was pointed out that the landlord was in effect seeking to enhance the rent, and under the Act, the enhancement cannot exceed two annas in the rupee of the rent previously payable. When the case was taken up for trial it is stated, learned Counsel for the plaintiff was prepared to argue the matter on the assumption that the tenants may be entitled to claim protection under the Madras City Tenants’ Protection Act. He addressed arguments, assuming for the purpose of the case only that the City Tenants’ Protection Act applied to the occupation of the plots in question by the respective tenants. But the plaintiff did not desire any definite finding by the Court in the matter on evidence which may preclude him from agitating the question over again, or at least be a stumbling block in re-agitating the question in future. The first complaint by the petitioner before me, the landlord, is that, notwithstanding this reservation, the lower Court had gone into the question and given a finding that the tenants are entitled to protection under the City Tenants’ Protection Act. A ground objecting to the finding in that form has been taken on the appeals to the New Trial Bench in the Court of Small Causes. The New Trial Bench proceeds to consider the case in the view that it has been admitted that the Act applied to the tenancies in question. A ground objecting to the finding in that form has been taken on the appeals to the New Trial Bench in the Court of Small Causes. The New Trial Bench proceeds to consider the case in the view that it has been admitted that the Act applied to the tenancies in question. The limited nature of the admission it is contended has not been noticed. Evidently, the distinction which is made by the learned Counsel for the plaintiff has been lost sight of as the distinction does not affect the disposal of the cases before the Court. Learned Counsel for the plaintiff was willing to concede for the purposes of the suits, and for the determination of the claims made in the suits, that the City Tenants’ Protection Act applied to the tenancies in question. But only he did not want a finding as already indicated which will be binding in all cases. Assuming that the City Tenants’ Protection Act applied, the question posed and submitted by learned Counsel for the plaintiffs was that he would be entitled to claim damages for use and occupation, once he terminated the tenancy. Of course, the question can arise and may arise, whether it is open to him to terminate such a tenancy. That will be a question for determination. It is on this basis, that the learned Counsel it is stated, addressed arguments before the trial Court that section 11 has no application. It has no application, not in the sense that for the purposes of the suit the land need not be deemed to be one which is protected under the City Tenants’ Protection Act, but in law it does not apply when there is no suit for eviction. Having gone through the papers and the submission of learned Counsel who appeared in the Court of first instance and made the concession with reservation, I accept the statement of the Counsel and hold that the Court need not have given a finding in regard to that question on evidence. The Court need not have examined the evidence relating to the same. The Court need have only proceeded with the further hearing of the suits on the concession made by Counsel for purposes of the particular suits. The Court need not have examined the evidence relating to the same. The Court need have only proceeded with the further hearing of the suits on the concession made by Counsel for purposes of the particular suits. So far as the suits are concerned, it was immaterial whether the concession is made with a reservation, or not, as the concession would bind for all purposes in the suit. The finding that the tenancies are governed by Madras Act III of 1922 as a finding on evidence is therefore discharged without prejudice to the respective claims of the parties in other proceedings. But the concession stands and the matter is now considered on the basis of the concession limited to the present proceedings. The learned Trial Judge is of the view that the notice terminating the tenancy with 30th November, 1961, is incompetent and of no effect since it is not in conformity with section 11 of the City Tenants Protection Act. The learned Judge has failed to appreciate the provisions of section 11 of the Act. No doubt in its application the Transfer of Property Act shall to the extent necessary to give effect to the provisions of the Act be deemed to have been repealed or modified. The question is whether the provisions of section 11 are inconsistent with the determination of a lease under the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Section 11 runs thus: “ No suits in ejectment or applications under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act 1882, shall be instituted or presented against a tenant until the expiration of three months next after notice in writing has been given to him requiring him to surrender possession of the land and building, and offering to pay compensation for the building and trees, if any, and stating the amount thereof.” If the present suits were suits for eviction, certainly the notices will be wholly invalid and the suits will get dismissed in limine. The prohibition is against institution of suits in ejectment without notice in accordance with the provisions of section 11. The notice as provided therein is required and insisted upon only when the landlord seeks to evict the tenant and instituted a suit or makes an application under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act for the said purpose. The prohibition is against institution of suits in ejectment without notice in accordance with the provisions of section 11. The notice as provided therein is required and insisted upon only when the landlord seeks to evict the tenant and instituted a suit or makes an application under section 41 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act for the said purpose. The question which we have to consider is whether when a landlord, is not seeking to evict the tenant by suit he cannot terminate the lease by a notice in accordance with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act. Of what use it may be to him is quite a different matter. The effect of it in one sense will be to compel him to file a suit for possession within 12 years of the termination of the lease by the notice. If any such suit is filed, it must be preceded by a notice in accordance with section 11. By not giving notice in accordance with section 11 and terminating the lease, the landlord only places himself in a dilemma that he cannot keep quite without filing a suit for eviction within 12 years and such a suit must be preceded by a notice in accordance with section 11. If he fails to file such a suit on the lapse of 12 years the landlord may be met by the plea of limitation. It must be seen that under the Act a tenant in relation to land includes a tenant who continues in possession of the land after the determination of the tenancy agreement. This therefore contemplates the applicability of the Act to cases of persons in possession of the land after determination of tenancy. In the present case, if the tenants are tenants under the Act, they will be continuing in possession after the determination of the tenancy agreements and they can claim benefits under sections 7-A, 9 and 11 amongst other rights recognised under the Act. The next question for consideration is if they are not tenants under the Transfer of Property Act, is not the plaintiff, as owner, entitled to claim from them damages for use and occupation. I see no provision of law barring him from claiming damages for use and occupation of the land from the erstwhile tenants, continuing in possession after the determination of tenancy. I see no provision of law barring him from claiming damages for use and occupation of the land from the erstwhile tenants, continuing in possession after the determination of tenancy. No doubt, as pleaded by the tenants, the question may arise as to the quantum of damages for use and occupation whether he can get round the limitation in section 7 of the Act. It may be that the landlord cannot claim more than what he could recover if the tenants had chosen to apply for fixation of fair rent under section 7-A of the Act, or the landlord had applied under section 7 of the Act for a tenant under the Act includes a person whose tenancy agreement has been determined. This aspect of the matter has not received any consideration from the trial Court. Then there is section 8 to be considered. The lower Court has in the view that the tenancies have not been validly terminated, given the finding that the plaintiff is not entitled to recover damages for use and occupation for any period. As I have held that even if the Act applied to the tenancies in question, the leases as such could be validly terminated, though the landlord may not be able to seek eviction without a notice under section 11, the trial Court will have to entertain the cases over again and determine the damages for use and occu-pation which the landlord may be entitled to. No doubt the Act makes no distinction between rent proper that is what is payable by a tenant under subsisting lease for occupation and the amount payable by the protected tenant under the Act whose lease might have been determined usually termed damages for use and occupation outside the Act - see sections 6 to 8 of the Act. The decrees of the Courts below are therefore set aside and the cases remitted to the Court of first instance for fresh disposal in the light of the observations made above. The respondents are unrepresented and there will be no order as to costs. R.M. ------------- Revision set aside.