JUDGMENT : Misra, J. - Plaintiff purchased the disputed - land by a registered sale deed (Ex. 6) on 13-5-60 from Defendant, No. 2, son of late Bodhi Naik. Plaintiff's Case is that the disputed land was the Mehenter Jagir land of Bodhi Naik and he was in enjoyment and possession of the same rent free in lieu of services being rendered to the ex-Ruler of Athgarh and his family members. He was in possession in his own right, title and interest till death. In the settlement records of the year 1922, the Jagir appears to have been resumed without the knowledge of Bodhi and Aparti (Defendant no, 2). Despite it, however, they continued in possession as tenants after rendering the usual services. In 1956, Defendant No. 2 obtained the Parcha (Ex. 1) in the current settlement. In 1960, Defendant No. 1 having no right, title and interest attempted to interfere with the possession of the Plaintiff resulting in a number of criminal cases on either side. Plaintiff accordingly asks for declaration of title, confirmation .of possession and in the alternative for recovery of possession, for permanent injunction and for recovery of Rs. 100/ - as being the value of the crop forcibly removed by Defendant No. 1. Defendant No. 2 fully supported the Plaintiff's case Defendant No. 1 contested the suit alleging that long prior to the 1922 settlement the suit land was lying fallow. Nobody was in possession of the same. Accordingly, it was resumed by the State. About fifteen years before the suit, Defendant No. 1 reclaimed the suit land if in possession since then by raising paddy crop thereon. He has made an application to the State for granting a lease of the land in his favour and the matter is under consideration. 2. The learned Munsif held that Defendant No. 2 and before him his father were holding the suit land as Mehenter Jagir and were in possession thereof and Defendant No. 1 did not acquire any title by adverse possession. On the finding that Ex. 6 was genuine and for consideration, be decreed the Plaintiff's suit. The learned lower appellate Court dismissed the suit on the finding that Plaintiff failed to prove title and possession within twelve years of the suit. It also examined the question whether Defendant No. 1 was a rank trespasser dispossessing the Plaintiff of his prior possession. 6 was genuine and for consideration, be decreed the Plaintiff's suit. The learned lower appellate Court dismissed the suit on the finding that Plaintiff failed to prove title and possession within twelve years of the suit. It also examined the question whether Defendant No. 1 was a rank trespasser dispossessing the Plaintiff of his prior possession. On the finding that evidence of possession on both the sides was unsatisfactory, it did not grant the relief of possession also. 3. Mr. Das contends that the learned lower appellate Court acted contrary to law in rejecting Plaintiff's title and possession within twelve years of the suit. He traced out the history of this case with reference to the documentary evidence. The Khatian (Ex. 4) of the year between 1890 and 1899 shows that Bodhi Naik, father of Defendant No. 2 was recorded in respect of the disputed land. The description of the land was Chakran Jagir. In the Yadadasta (Ex.5) dated 14-9-22, prior to the final publication of the Khatian, the land was stated to be Mehenter Jagir, but as nobody appeared at the time when the record of rights were being prepared, a suggestion was given to resume the land. In the finally published record of rights (Ex. B), the land was recorded as Rajsarkar in 1922. Thereafter in 1956, the Parch a (Ex. 1) was issued in favour of Defendant No. 2. The trial Court decree was passed on 3-2-62. The final record of rights (Ex. 10) was issued in favour of the Plaintiff in January, 1963. It was accepted as additional evidence in this Court under order XLI Rule 27, CPC Code. Defendant No. 2 was, therefore, not an utter stranger in respect of the disputed land. It was the Mehenter Jagir of his father. The reason for the resumption in 1922 as found from the Yadadasta (Ex. 5) is that nobody appeared before the Settlement Officer when enquiry was being made. It is, however, not necessary to go in to the question of title, as in this case on the materials on record Plaintiff's case of his and his vendor's possession has been satisfactorily established. 4. Both the Courts have concurrently found that Defendant No. 1 has failed to prove his possession. He is a rank trespasser. The only question for consideration is whether Plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest were in prior possession. 4. Both the Courts have concurrently found that Defendant No. 1 has failed to prove his possession. He is a rank trespasser. The only question for consideration is whether Plaintiff and his predecessor-in-interest were in prior possession. Plaintiff's case is that before his purchase, the disputed land was fallow only for a period of two years and before that Defendant No. 2 was in possession through bhag tenants. As the learned lower appellate Court has not placed reliance on the bhag pattas and kabuliyats (Exs. 7 to 9) in the absence of the persons in whose favour they were executed they are excluded from consideration. 5. The 'finding of the learned lower appellate Court on the question of possession is one of fact and is not ordinarily assailable in second appeal. Mr. Das attacks this finding u/s 100(1)(c), CPC contending that the learned Additional Subordinate Judge committed a substantial defect in the procedure by holding that the Parch a (Ex. 1) was inadmissible in evidence and by drawing adverse inference against the Plaintiff for non-production of the finally published record of rights (Ex. 10). He also attacks the appreciation of oral evidence made by the learned Additional Subordinate Judge. 6. It is well settled that even if appreciation of evidence made by the lower appellate Court is patently erroneous and the finding of fact recorded in consequence thereof is grossly erroneous, no substantial error or defect in the procedure is introduced thereby and the High Court cannot interfere in Second appeal in the matter of appreciation of evidence. On the other band, if the lower appellate Court discards evidence on the ground that it is inadmissible and the High Court is satisfied that the evidence was admissible, an error or defect in the procedure is introduced R. Ramachandran Ayyar Vs. Ramalingam Chettiar, . 7. It is thus necessary to examine if Ex. 1 is admissible and was wrongly discarded ann if adverse inference should have been drawn against the Plaintiff for non-production of Ex. 10. For a proper appreciation of the question, it would be profitable to notice as to how attestation and draft publication is made. Chapter XX of the B and 0 Survey and Settlement Manual, 1927 deals with attestation and draft publication. Rule 352 is to the effect 352. 10. For a proper appreciation of the question, it would be profitable to notice as to how attestation and draft publication is made. Chapter XX of the B and 0 Survey and Settlement Manual, 1927 deals with attestation and draft publication. Rule 352 is to the effect 352. As far as practicable, the attestation should take place within the village to which the records belong; but, if this is not possible, central places should be selected, convenient for the attestation of several villages. Such centres are in no case to be distant more than three miles from the farthest lands in the village or villages of which records are being framed. Under Rule 353, when the date and place for attestation have been fixed, the notice in form 35 prescribed by the statutory rules will be issued. An interval of not less than a week must be allowed between the service of the notice and the date of attestation, but, ordinarily, unless the progress of the work should be hampered by delay, an interval of one month should be allowed. Rule 355 prescribes the attestation should be done in the presence of all the parties interested. If any person whose presence is necessary fails to attend the attestation officer should take action, to compel him to attend. It is not necessary to compel the attendance of a person when the accuracy of the entries affecting him can be sufficiently attested by his relatives or neighbours present. Under Rule 356, attestation is divided into three stages. The first stage is the distribution to landlords and tenants of slips showing the areas of all plots. These slips are the Parcha slips. The Parcha slip (Ex. 1) was issued by a public servant in due discharge of his official duty and in performance of duty specially enjoined by the B and O Survey and Settlement Manual and the Orissa Survey and Settlement Act (Orissa Act 3 of 1959) which consolidated and amended the laws relating to surveys, record of rights and settlement operations in the State of Orissa. 8. The learned lower appellate Court relied on Ram Bhagwan v. Emperor AIR 1918 Pat. 201, in holding that Ex. 1 was inadmissible. Their Lordships observed Now the Parch a slip was clearly inadmissible in evidence in proof of the title and possession of Jahar Ali. 8. The learned lower appellate Court relied on Ram Bhagwan v. Emperor AIR 1918 Pat. 201, in holding that Ex. 1 was inadmissible. Their Lordships observed Now the Parch a slip was clearly inadmissible in evidence in proof of the title and possession of Jahar Ali. It is not a public document and it is not in any way recognised by law. The same view was taken in Saroop Rai v. Srikant Prasad AIR 1920 Pat. 726. The aforesaid view came in for consideration before a Division Bench in Chand Ray Vs. Bhagwati Charan Goswami. Their Lordships observed In support of his contention the learned Vakil for the Appellants has relied upon certain cases ... in which it would appear to have been held that the draft record of rights referred to in Section 103-13 of the Bengal Tenancy Act is not admissible in evidence at all.... The proposition thus broadly stated, I think, goes further than is warranted. It is quite true that no presumption arises in favour of the correctness of the draft record of rights. Such a presumption only arises in favour of the finally published record, and where it is necessary to prove fact such as, the rent payable for a particular holding or any other fact recorded in the record of rights, it is not sufficient to put in and rely upon the draft record as it is only the finally published record that carries any presumption with it, and 80 it has been held that in order to prove facts of that nature, the draft record of rights is not admissible for that purpose. This, however, seems to me to go very far short of holding that the draft record of rights prepared under the Bengal tenancy Act or under the corresponding section of the Chhota Nagpur Tenancy Act is totally inadmissible in evidence for any purpose. The presumption arising from the record of rights as finally published is a presumption which may be rebutted and, to my mind, it is perfectly legitimate to put in evidence the proceedings which led up to the finally published record. This dictum, if I may say with respect, enunciates the correct law. The same view was taken in Hardeo Narayan Singh and Others Vs. Kapil Singh and Others, and Haridas Ghosh and Another Vs. Kishan Chand Mehera, . 9. The correct legal position may be summed up. This dictum, if I may say with respect, enunciates the correct law. The same view was taken in Hardeo Narayan Singh and Others Vs. Kapil Singh and Others, and Haridas Ghosh and Another Vs. Kishan Chand Mehera, . 9. The correct legal position may be summed up. The Parcha slips mean draft record of rights. They are issued by public officers in due discharge of duties in accordance with the injuction prescribed under the Survey and Settlement Manual and are admissible u/s 35 of the Evidence Act. Doubtless, they have not the presumptive value of correctness of the finally published record of rights as referred to in Section 117(3) of the Orissa Tenancy Act, but they are admissible in proof of the fact that at the time when the draft record of rights were prepared, the tenant to whom the Parcha slip was issued was found to be in possession by public servants in due discharge of their duties. It is also admissible as evidence to rebut the presumption arising out of the finally published record of rights if both are not in accord. The probative of these Parcha slips may vary according to the facts and circumstances of each case, but they cannot be said to be inadmissible for any purpose. 10. In this case, the record of rights were finally published in January, 1903, while the suit was disposed of in 1962. Plaintiff could not have produced the finally published record of rights in the trial Court, and the learned Additional Subordinate Judge acted contrary to law in drawing adverse inference against him for non-production or the same. In fact, Defendant No. 1 (D.W.3) admitted in cross-examination that he had also objected in current settlement, but it was recorded in the name of Defendant No. 2 and his objection was rejected. Doubtless, the finally published record of rights (Ex. 10) was issued in favour of the Plaintiff after the disposal of the suit. It would, however, be presumptive evidence of the fact that in January, 1963 Plaintiff was in possession of the disputed land. Added to it, is the further fact that Ex. 10 is in consonance with Ex. 1. Ex. 1 is a piece of evidence in support of the case of Defendant no 2 that he was in possession in 1956. Ex. 10 show that Plaintiff was in possession in 1963. Added to it, is the further fact that Ex. 10 is in consonance with Ex. 1. Ex. 1 is a piece of evidence in support of the case of Defendant no 2 that he was in possession in 1956. Ex. 10 show that Plaintiff was in possession in 1963. Both the documents cumulatively support the Plaintiff's version that before the sale Defendant No. 2 was in possession and after the sale Plaintiff was in possession. Mr. Das is right in his contention that the learned lower appellate Court was wrong in excluding Ex. 1 as inadmissible and in drawing adverse inference against the Plaintiff for nonproduction of the finally published record of rights. 11. Both the Courts have concurrently rejected the defence case of his being in possession for the last 14 to 15 years before the suit. They accept him as a rank trespasser who interfered with the possession of the disputed land as alleged in the plaint. The question for consideration now is whether the story of Plaintiff's possession is true. The learned lower appellate Court has not accepted the evidence of p. ws. 1 to 4 regarding possession. As his criticisms of these witnesses relate to appreciation of evidence, their evidence is excluded from consideration. The residue of the evidence consists in the sworn statement of the Plaintiff' (p.w.5), of Defendant No. 2 (D.W.1). Parcha (Ex. 1) and the finally published record of rights (Ex. 10). Exs. 1 and 10 support the version of the Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2. On the aforesaid evidence, I hold that Plaintiff was in possession of the disputed -land from the date of the sale and Defendant No. 2 was in possession prior to the sale. 12. u/s 103, CPC in any second appeal the High Court may if, the evidence on record is sufficient, determine any issue of fact necessary for the disposal of the appeal which has not been determined by the lower appellate Court or which has not been wrongly determined by such Court by reason of any illegality., omission, error or defect, such as is referred to in Sub-Section 0) of Section 100. I have already indicated how the judgment of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge is vitiated by Section 100(1)(c). I have already indicated how the judgment of the learned Additional Subordinate Judge is vitiated by Section 100(1)(c). In exercise of my powers u/s 103, I record a finding for reasons, already discussed that Plaintiff and Defendant No. 2 were in possession of the disputed land and the Defendant No. 1 as a rank trespasser dispossessed the Plaintiff. 13. In Gadadhar v. Karsanbasta ILR 1963 Cutt. 482, this Court observed: The position of law is now well settled that a person in possession of land without title has an interest in the property which is heritable and good against all the world excepting the true owner. This interest, unless the true owner interferes, is transferable On this view, Plaintiff is entitled to recovery of possession of the disputed land and to damages. Plaintiff's title to the property need not be gone into in this suit. There would be no declaration of title in favour of the Plaintiff in the decree to be prepared. All that would be said in the decree is that Plaintiff is lawfully entitled to possession. 14. In the result, the judgment of the lower appellate Court is set aside and the Plaintiff suit is decreed as indicated above. The second appeal is allowed. Parties to bear their own costs throughout. Final Result : Allowed