N. G. SHELAT, J. ( 1 ) THIS appeal arises out of an order paged on 9-1-1965 by Mr. R. N. Desai Judicial Magistrate First Class Narol in Criminal Case No. 380 of 1904 whereby the respondents-original accused Nos. 1 and 3 and one Natverlal Ramshanker-original accused No. 2 came to be acquitted in respect of the charges levelled against them under secs. 3 4 and 5 of the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act 1956 hereinafter referred to as the Act. ( 2 ) SEVERAL residents of Saijpur Dhanushdhar Society situated in the village of Saijpur Bogha sent an application Ex. 7 to the Commissioner of Police City of Ahmedabad stating inter alia that one Bai Radha living in that Society brings girls from outside and runs a brothel and she has been maintaining herself on such income. When she was told not to invite people of immoral character to her house she got excited and abused them. It is that way that they requested the Commissioner of Police to look into the matter and do the needful. It appears that this application was forwarded by him to Mr. Mankad Ex. 8 who was then serving as a Superintendent of Police Crime Branch at Ahmedabad a few days before 1 Mr. Mankad verified the information which he had received as to Bai Radha carrying on a brothel at her house and maintaining herself from such immoral income and then arranged for 8 trap being laid in respect thereof. On the morning of 1-12-1963 he called the panchas and one decoy witness Kishan Ex. 4 and explained to them the purpose for which they were called. Kishan agreed to work as a punter and after ascertaining that he had no money with him he was given Rs. 8. 00in all. That amount included the currency note of Rs. 5. 00and three currency notes of Re. 1/-each the numbers whereof were noted down in the first part of the panchnama Ex. 3 made in that respect. The punter was told that the Police Head Constable Ratansing would point out one person who has been acting as a tout and who has been waiting near Taj Mahal Hotel at Kalupur in Ahmedabad. 1/-each the numbers whereof were noted down in the first part of the panchnama Ex. 3 made in that respect. The punter was told that the Police Head Constable Ratansing would point out one person who has been acting as a tout and who has been waiting near Taj Mahal Hotel at Kalupur in Ahmedabad. He was further instructed to hand over the amount for the charges that would have to be paid for having sexual intercourse with any girl or woman and at the same time he was asked not to have any sexual intercourse with any such woman and that he should keep himself talking with her. The first part of the panchnama was completed and the punter Kishan was asked to go along with one of the panchas Premsing Ex. 2 with that Head Constable Ratansing. Head Constable Ratansing was instructed to go by the same bus by which they were to go. Mr. Mankad and the other panch Bai Shanta and some other police officers had then gone to wait somewhere near Chamunda Char Rasta. The police Head Constable Ratansing was asked to make a sign when the bus taking the punter the other panch and the tout said to be accused No. 3 in the case going towards Saijpur Bogha passed by them. He was also instructed that after Kishan and Premsing entered the house of Bai Radha he should return and inform him about the same. ( 3 ) THUS the punter Kishan and the panch witness Premsing accompanied by the Police Head Constable Ratansing went to Kalupur by bus. On being shown a person waiting near Taj Mahal Hotel by the Head Constable Ratansing Kishan and Premsing went to that person. That person was accused No. 3 in the case. The evidence of both Premsing and Kishan further shows that they told accused No. 3 that they wanted to enjoy and to that accused No. 3 said that he would take there to Fadeli in Saijpur. The Head Constable was not to accompany them from that place. Then the accused No. 3 accompanied by Premsing and Kishan went by bus to Saijpur Bogha. They were then taken to Fadeli by the back road by accused No. 3 to one house. In the Osri of the house accused No. 1 Bai Radha was found sitting on a bench. Then the accused No. 3 accompanied by Premsing and Kishan went by bus to Saijpur Bogha. They were then taken to Fadeli by the back road by accused No. 3 to one house. In the Osri of the house accused No. 1 Bai Radha was found sitting on a bench. Accused No. 3 is then said to have told her that he had brought a customer. Thereupon Kishan asked Bai Radha if there was any good girl and she may be shown to him and that way Bai Radha showed to them two women. They were called by accused No. 1 from the adjoining room. Their names were Bai Kanta and Bai Sumitra. Their evidence further shows that Kishan was asked to select one of them. Kishan also inquired for the charges and he was told that while in respect of one charges were Rs. 5in respect of the other Rs. 8/were being charges. Kishan then selected the woman for whom the charges were Rs 8/ -. Bai Radha the accused No. 1 then asked the panch witness Premsing if be had any desire and to that Kishan said that he was his friend and had simply accompanied him. ( 4 ) BAI Radha then took Kishan and the woman selected by him namely Bai Kanta to the adjoining room and she then returned. Out of the amount of Rs. 8/received by her from Kishan she paid Re. 1/-to accused No. 3. Accused No. 3 had then left the place. In about 15 minutes time Mr. Mankad accompanied by the other panch and some other police officers came up there. Mr. Mankad then pushed the door and on being opened they found Kishan and one woman named Kanta on one bed. Bai Kanta had not put on any Saree and her blouse was open. On seeing Mr. Mankad both of them got up. The search was then taken of both Kishan and Kanta and nothing was found from them. In the room there was only one bed and in a corner were lying one bucket aluminum glass and an earthen pot full with water. From a room bearing No. 333 in that house two men and two women were found sitting there. The search was then taken of both Kishan and Kanta and nothing was found from them. In the room there was only one bed and in a corner were lying one bucket aluminum glass and an earthen pot full with water. From a room bearing No. 333 in that house two men and two women were found sitting there. They gave their names as (1) Bai Shanta wife of Vithalbhai Harjivandas of Naroda (2) Bai Sumitra wife of Phillip of Saijpur Fadeli (3) Himatlal Naranlal of Khadia Bala Hanuman Kavishwar Pole and (4) Chimanlal Bhogilal of the same locality. They were also searched and nothing was found from them. Then Bai Radha was searched and on being asked to produce the amount given by the bogus customer Kishan Teoomal she went inside her house and produced Rs. 7. 00from an iron tin which was put in a cupboard. That amount consisted of one five rupee currency note bearing No. K/57/417129 and two one rupee notes bearing Nos. V/68/205148 and B/35/202868 D. These notes were found to bear the same numbers which were noted down in the earlier panchnama and which had come to be given to the punter Kishan for being paid to Bai Radha. Those notes were consequently attached. By about this time Natverlal Ramshanker-original accused No. 2 who was living with Bai Radha in the same house had come up there from outside. It further appears that one policeman was sent to bring accused No. 3 who had already gone away from that place. On his being brought there and on a search made of his person one rupee note was found from the pocket of his shirt. The number of that note also tallied with the number of one of those notes given to Kishan under the first part of the panchnama. That note was also attached. On a search made of the room a purse containing Rs. 25/and some change was found. Since that amount was claimed by Bai Kanta that was returned to her. That was however found from a glass jar in a cupboard. Thereafter they went inside the room and found two empty bottles one of which smelt of liquor and they were also attached. The mattress was also attached. About all this a panchnama was made. The complaint was then filed and after registering the offence further investigation was carried on. That was however found from a glass jar in a cupboard. Thereafter they went inside the room and found two empty bottles one of which smelt of liquor and they were also attached. The mattress was also attached. About all this a panchnama was made. The complaint was then filed and after registering the offence further investigation was carried on. The charge-sheet against Bai Radha as also accused No. 2 Natverlal who was said to be living in the same house and accused No. 3 was sent up to the Court of the learned Magistrate. ( 5 ) WHILE accused Nos. 1 and 2 were charged for running a brothel In Fedeli Saijpur Bogha and living on the income of prostitution of some other women so as to be liable for offences under secs. 3 and 4 of the Act the accused No. 3 was charged for an offence of procuring a woman for the purpose of prostitution as also for living on the earnings of prostitution of women so as to be liable under secs. 4 and 5 of the Act. Accused No. 2 Natverlal however was also charged for an offence under sec. 5 of the Act. ( 6 ) ALL of them pleaded not guilty to the charges levelled against them. By her statement Ex. 12 accused No. 1 denied to have committed any offence and according to her the house situated in Fadeli in Saijpur Bogha stands in the name of herself and her daughter Godavari. While some portion thereof has been let out bringing the income by way of rent of Rs. 80/the other part was occupied by them. She also said that she had another house in Patasa Pole Ahmedabad from where she used to get monthly income of Rs. 75/by way of rent. That house has been however sold away. She has then stated that no brothel was run in her house and that it is not true that she was maintaining out of the income of the brothel. As to Bai Kantas presence she stated that she had come to her house for inquiring for keening the house on rent and she denied to have made use of her for any immoral purpose as was alleged by the prosecution. As to Bai Kantas presence she stated that she had come to her house for inquiring for keening the house on rent and she denied to have made use of her for any immoral purpose as was alleged by the prosecution. She also denied to have taken any money from any one as also about her having produced the same before the panchas and the police. She denied to have paid any amount such as Re. 1/to accused No. 1 about his being her tout. She has then added that the police bad sent a bogus customer on 1-12-1963 under the pretext of seizing liquor and since no liquor was found they have made out a false case against them. Accused No. 2 has been acquitted by the Court and there has been no appeal preferred by the State against his acquittal. He was however not present at the time when the incident took place and had come up later on while the panchnama was being written. Accused No. 3 has also denied about any person such as Kishan and Premsing having approached him and about his having taken them to Bai Radhas house. He also denied to have been working as a broker or tout for Radha or his having received any amount from Radha. He denied about the currency note of Re. 1/having been found from his pocket on a search made of him. ( 7 ) AFTER considering the effect of the evidence adduced In the case the learned Magistrate found that the search made by Mr. Mankad was illegal on various grounds. He further found that since his name did not appear In the notification Ex. 10 whereby he was said to have been appointed as Special Officer under sec. 13 of the Act he had no authority to hold the search of the premises of accused No. 1. Nor was he authorised to search any premises In the area of Saijpur Bogha as no such area for the said purpose was notified. The learned Magistrate further found that Mr. Mankad must have prepared the order Ex. 8/a not at the time when it purports to have been made before the search was carried out but subsequently to make it appear that the search may not be said to be illegal. He also found that the panchas required to be taken under sec. The learned Magistrate further found that Mr. Mankad must have prepared the order Ex. 8/a not at the time when it purports to have been made before the search was carried out but subsequently to make it appear that the search may not be said to be illegal. He also found that the panchas required to be taken under sec. 15 of the Act have been obtained from far off places and at any rate not from the same locality and in those circumstances the provisions contained in sec. 15 of the Act were contravened. Then on merits he found the evidence quite unreliable and the version put forward by the witnesses appeared to him to be a cock and bull story which cannot be believed by any man. In the result therefore he came to the conclusion that the offences were not established against any of the accused and they were consequently acquitted. Aggrieved by that decision the State of Gujarat has come in appeal and this appeal relates to the order of acquittal in respect of accused Nos. 1 and 3 in the case. ( 8 ) THE points that arise for consideration in so for as accused No. 1 is concerned having regard to the charges levelled against her are as to whether she kept or used her house as a brothel for the purpose of prostitution so as to be liable for an offence under sec. 3 of the Act and secondly as to whether she lived wholly or in part on the earnings of prostitution so as to be liable under sec. 4 (1) of the Act. So far as accused No. 3 is concerned the points that arise to be considered are as to whether he was acting as a tout on behalf of a prostitute and thereby he was wholly or in part living on the earnings of the prostitution so as to be liable under sec. 4 (1) of the Act and secondly as to whether he procured a woman or a girl for the purpose of prostitution so as to be liable under sec. 5 (1) (a) of the Act. Before we consider the effect of the evidence in this case it is desirable to consider certain points raised with regard to the powers of Mr. Mankad as a Special Police Officer contemplated under sec. 5 (1) (a) of the Act. Before we consider the effect of the evidence in this case it is desirable to consider certain points raised with regard to the powers of Mr. Mankad as a Special Police Officer contemplated under sec. 15 of the Act as also about the legality or otherwise of the search that came to be carried out on the morning of 1-12-1963. In the event of coming to the conclusion that the search was illegal in any manner we have to consider the question as to the effect of the evidence which has come to be led in the case obviously based and arising from the search carried out by Mr. Mankad in the presence of panchas and others that evening ( 9 ) MR. Mankad was appointed the Special Police Officer under sec. 13 of the Act as per the notification issued by the Government of Gujarat on 3-8-1961. His appointment had not been made by his name as such. He was however serving as the Superintendent of Police Crime Branch in the City of Ahmedabad and it was by virtue of his holding that post that he came to be appointed under the notification Ex. 10 as a Special Police Officer contemplated under sec. 13 of the Act. A point was raised in the Court of the learned Magistrate by the accused that since his name did not appear in the notification as a person appointed as a Special Police Officer under sec. 13 of the Act he cannot be said to be a person validly appointed under law. The learned Magistrate had found that the notification Ex. 10 did non empower him with the powers of a Special Police Officer under sec. 13 of the Act inasmuch as his name was not disclosed therein. Apart from Mr. Desai the learned advocate appearing for the respondents in this Court not pressing the point we have two decisions of this Court which have laid down that the notification need not refer to the name of any officer and it is enough if a Police Officer in charge of any division is appointed by the Government as a Special Police Officer for purposes of this Act. The first case in that respect is of Bachu Lakhman v. State 1 G. L. R. 128. The first case in that respect is of Bachu Lakhman v. State 1 G. L. R. 128. The other case is of Rasiklal Manilal v. State of Gujarat in Criminal Appeal No. 700 of 1965 decided on 5th November 1965 wherein it was held that reading sec. 13 (1) of the Act in conjunction with sec. 15 of the General Clauses Act 1897 it cannot be said that a special officer appointed means an officer appointed by name. The learned Magistrate was therefore wrong in saying that Mr. Mankad was not validly appointed as a Special Police Officer under sec. 15 of the Act. ( 10 ) IN the same notification Ex. 10 the area for which he is appointed the Special Police Officer for purposes of the said Act is mentioned. While no specific areas have been set out it refers to the areas specified in the Branch-schedule to the Government of Bombay Home Department Notification No. PRS. 5459/c-2098 (B) dated the 31st March 1960. A true copy of the notification is produced at Ex. 11 in the case. Clause (3) of the Schedule refers to villages of Ahmedabad City Taluka and at serial No. (9) is included the village of Sahijpur-Bogha. It was pointed out in this connection by Mr. Nanavati the learned Asst. Govt. Pleader that the areas incorporated in another notification can well be taken as incorporated in the subsequent notification by making a reference to the notification itself without specifying the particular areas. If therefore no specific areas were set out the notification would not become invalid or that it cannot be said that it did not empower the Special Police Officer to act within any such area. At page 223 of Craies on Statue Law the doctrine of incorporation of earlier enactment by reference has been explained as under :- the effect of bringing into a later Act by reference sections of an earlier Act is to introduce the incorporated sections of the earlier Act into the later Act as if they had been enacted in it for the first time. Consequently when an Act of 1855 incorporated sections of an earlier Act of 1840 those sections were read so as to take effect as if they had been passed in 1855 and Lord Esher M. R. said :-IF a subsequent Act bring into itself by reference some of the clauses of a former Act the legal effect of that as has often been said is to write those sections into the new Act just as if they had been actually written in it with the pen or printed in it and the moment you have those clauses in the later Act you have no occasion to refer to the former Act at all. For all practical purposes therefore those sections of the Act of 1840 are to be dealt with as if they were actually in the Act of 1855the same thing can well be said in respect of such notifications and by reason of this doctrine of incorporation by reference it can be easily said that the notification Ex. 11 clause (3) of the Schedule can be taken as subsequent to the notification under which Mr. Mankad came to be conferred with the powers under sec. 15 of the Act. Even the learned advocate Mr. Desai did not press this point as well and it is therefore clear that the learned Magistrate was wrong when he held that Mr. Mankad was not duly authorised to act under the provisions of this Act to search the premises in the area of Saijpur Bogha. ( 11 ) THEN two points were made out with regard to the search carried out by Mr. Mankad at the house of Bai Radha on the morning of 1 The first was that when a Special Police Officer is appointed under the provisions of any special enactment and when his powers and duties are defined vis--vis the action that he has to take under the provisions of the Act he has to act in consonance with the provisions contained therein and any breach or any contravention of any of such provisions should render not only the search carried out by him as illegal but even the evidence led in relation thereto should be struck down as having been obtained by illegal procedure. Now sec. Now sec. 15 (1) of the Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the time being in force whenever the Special Police Officer has reasonable grounds for believing that an offence punishable under this Act has been or is being committed in respect of a woman or girl living in any premises and that search of the premises with warrant cannot be made without undue delay such officer may after recording the grounds of his belief enter and search such premises without a warrant. Then sub sec. (2) says that before making a search under sub-sec. (1) the Special Police Officer shall call upon two or more respectable inhabitants (at least one of whom shall be a woman) of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate to attend and witness the search and may issue an order in writing to them or any of them so to do. Then there are some other sub-sections which give special powers to the Special Police Officer which ordinarily any other Police Officers not appointed under the provisions of this Act do not have. In this connection it was pointed out by Mr. Desai that no attempt was made to obtain any warrant for searching the premises of Bai Radha and that Mr. Mankad has of his own chosen to search the same. For searching the premises no doubt he was required to fulfill two conditions viz. that search of premises with warrant cannot be made without undue delay and that if that is so he may after recording the grounds of his belief enter and search such premises without a warrant. The other objection with regard to the search is about Mr. Mankad having selected two panchas none of whom was the inhabitant of the locality in which the place to be searched was situate. That way Mr. Mankad is said to have contravened sub-sec. (2) of sec. 15 of the Act. Now in this connection an attempt is made to show from the evidence of Mr. Mankad that as no woman panch was easily and without any delay available warrant was not obtained from the Magistrate and as soon as he was able to have a woman as panch since there was no time left he made an order Ex. 8a on the same day before making a search of premises of Bai Radha. Mankad that as no woman panch was easily and without any delay available warrant was not obtained from the Magistrate and as soon as he was able to have a woman as panch since there was no time left he made an order Ex. 8a on the same day before making a search of premises of Bai Radha. On a plain perusal of Ex. 8a what we find is his having practically set out sub-sec. (1) of sec. 15 and nothing more. All that he has stated is that he has reliably learnt that offences punishable under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act have been or are being committed in respect of women or girls living in the premises owned by Bai Radha W/o Natverlal Ramshanker situated in Saijpur Fadeli and secondly as the search of the said premises with warrant cannot be made without undue delay that he resolves that the search of the said premises shall be conducted by him without a warrant. He has thus made use of the very words which have been used in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 15 of the Act. Apart from the contention raised by Mr. Desai about any such order having not been passed at all even if we were to take this order having been passed by him before he actually entered the house for carrying on a search it is difficult to say that it records the grounds of his belief both in respect of the first part and more particularly in respect of the other viz. about his not being able to obtain the warrant without undue delay. There is no ground whatever such as the one sought to be set out in his evidence set out in the order made by him as per Ex. 8a in the case. It was urged by Mr. Nanavati that it was a matter of subjective satisfaction of the Special Police Officer who makes an order to that effect. It should be taken that though no such specific grounds were set out which led him to that belief they were present in his mind and the final order in that respect would be quite conclusive to clothe him with the authority of the action that he intended to carry out. It should be taken that though no such specific grounds were set out which led him to that belief they were present in his mind and the final order in that respect would be quite conclusive to clothe him with the authority of the action that he intended to carry out. In the first place there is hardly any question of subjective satisfaction in the matter of this kind for after all the words used in sub-sec. (1) of sec. 15 viz. that such officer may after recording the grounds of his belief clearly show that it is he who has to set out the reasons or the grounds which made him think or believe that the search of the premises with warrant cannot be made without undue delay and that in itself would show that the grounds are intended to be judged to the satisfaction of the Court in case such question arises to be considered. It may be that what satisfied him may not appear to be so satisfactory in the eyes of another person but at any rate that does not exonerate him from setting out the grounds which led him to a particular belief and not having done so only justifies one to say that he had failed to carry out the pre-emptory provisions which led him to carry out the search of the premises without obtaining a warrant in that connection. In this connection we may usefully refer to the observations in a case of State of Rajasthan v. Rehman A. I. R. 1960 Supreme Court 210. In that case such a point arose to be considered and Their Lordships of the Supreme Court observed as under :-THE recording of reasons does not confer on the officer jurisdiction to make a search though it is a necessary condition for making a search. The jurisdiction or the power to make a search is conferred by the statute and not derived from the record of reasons. That a part sec. 18 of the Act in express terms states that searches shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec 165 of the Code lays down various steps to be allowed In making a search. That a part sec. 18 of the Act in express terms states that searches shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Sec 165 of the Code lays down various steps to be allowed In making a search. The recording of reasons is an important step in the matter of search and to ignore it is to ignore the material pars of the provisions governing searches. If that can be ignored it cannot be said that the search is carried out In accordance with the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure:- It would be a search made in contravention of the provisions of the Code. From these observations two facts emerge. One is that to ignore recording of reasons would be to ignore the material part of the provisions governing the search and that would amount to a search made in contravention of the provisions of the Code and the second is that the jurisdiction or the power to make the search is not thereby affected because that power is derived from the statute and not from the recording of reasons. Therefore Mr. Mankad cannot be said to have acted beyond his powers though no doubt he having not recorded his reasons for not being able to obtain the warrant from the Magistrate would render his search as contravening the provisions contained in sec. 15 (1) of the Act. As to what the effect thereof would be we shall consider it hereafter. ( 12 ) NOW in this connection it has been observed by the learned Magistrate that Ex. 8a has been subsequently got up and for which some reasons have been given by him. That was also urged by Mr. Desai and we may consider the same from the evidence on record. This Ex. 8a was for the first time produced in the evidence of Mr. Mankad when he came to be examined as a prosecution witness on 24-1-64. It cannot be denied that this was an important document for after all Mr. Mankad had to justify his having made a search of the premises without his having obtained a warrant from the Magistrate and that he could do so only on his recording reasons for making a search as required under sec. 15 of the Act. It cannot be denied that this was an important document for after all Mr. Mankad had to justify his having made a search of the premises without his having obtained a warrant from the Magistrate and that he could do so only on his recording reasons for making a search as required under sec. 15 of the Act. Such a document can therefore be said to be one which would fall within the documents and papers which are required to be supplied to the accused either under sec. 173 or under sec. 251a of the Criminal Procedure Code. Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 173 requires the Police Officer to furnish to the accused free of cost a copy of the report forwarded under sub-sec. (1) of and of the first information report recorded under sec. 154 and of all other documents or relevant extracts thereof on which the prosecution proposes to rely Including the statements and confessions if any recorded under sec. 164 and the statements recorded under sub-sec. (3) of sec. 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. Sec. 251a provides further that when the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate at the commencement of the trial such Magistrate shall satisfy himself that the documents referred to in sec. 173 have been furnished to the accused and if he finds that the accused has not been furnished with such documents or any of them he shall cause them to be so furnished. In other words apart from the statements etc. any documents which the prosecution is expected to rely upon in the case have got to be supplied to the accused before the trial commences. No such document as per Ex 8a was supplied to the accused before the trial began and it came to be produced for the first time on 24-10-64 in the evidence of Mr. Mankad and that too after the evidence of the panch witness and the evidence of punter had come to be recorded. There is therefore some force in the contention when it is said that realising the defect in the search carried out without obtaining a warrant it is at some later stage that such a document which could be easily prepared by the Special Police Officer may have been brought in while he came to give evidence in the case. There is therefore some force in the contention when it is said that realising the defect in the search carried out without obtaining a warrant it is at some later stage that such a document which could be easily prepared by the Special Police Officer may have been brought in while he came to give evidence in the case. At any rate the fact remains that there are no grounds recorded which justify him to search the premises without obtaining the warrant in question. On that account the provisions contained in sec. 15 (1) of the Act have been contravened by Mr. Mankad. ( 13 ) AS to the other ground relating to contravention of the provisions of sec. 15 (2) we find from the evidence of the panch witness Premsing that by about that time he was returning from the house of one Balvantsingh and that he came to be called at Chamunda Char Rasta by Mr. Mankad and other Police Officers. He was therefore taken as a panch. It was said that since that was a locality nearby the locality where the premises were to be searched no contravention of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 15 can be said to have been committed in respect of him. Much though we do not feel satisfied as to this part of his testimony we may for the purpose of determining this part of the case accept his word that he was found somewhere in that area by about the time the search was taken of the premises of Bai Radha the accused No. 1. But if we turn to subsec. (2) of sec. 15 of the Act what is required is that the Special Police Officer shall call upon two or more respectable inhabitants one of whom shall be a woman of the locality in which the place to be searched is situate In other words. the persons who are called upon to act as panchas in respect of any such search have to be the inhabitants of that locality apart from their being respectable. The inhabitants of the locality amply suggest to mean the residents of that locality. At any rate the term inhabitant does not convey the sense of a person found all of a sudden at some place where the Police Officers were standing. The inhabitants of the locality amply suggest to mean the residents of that locality. At any rate the term inhabitant does not convey the sense of a person found all of a sudden at some place where the Police Officers were standing. The panch witness Premsing is a resident of Nani Hamam in the City of Ahmedabad. His place of residence is at a distance of 7 miles from Saijpur Bogha where the premises which came to be searched are situate. Saijpur Bogha is an independent village having its own Panchayat and at any rate it is not a part of the City of Ahmedabad. Thus he was obviously a resident of altogether a different locality for he cannot be said to be an inhabitant or resident of Saijpur Bogha so as to say that he was from the same locality. We find no attempt made out to find out respectable persons from that village of Saijpur Bogha. There is considerable force in saying that such a panch could not be had from such a purpose all of a sudden but that some attempt must have been made before actually they started for doing out for search. He must have been taken from the City of Ahmedabad and he cannot therefore be said to be an inhabitant of the same locality where the premises are situate. With regard to the other panch admittedly she has been living near Victoria Garden in the City of Ahmedabad and that way far off at a distance of about 7 miles from where the premises to be searched were situate. Thus both the panchas were in my opinion not the inhabitants of the locality in which the place to be searched was situate and that they were taken from the City of Ahmedabad. So far as the woman panch is concerned it may become difficult for the Police Officer to obtain any woman to come forward as a panch in a case of this character. But at any rate we find no material on record to show that any such attempt was at all made and having failed he was required to obtain the services of the woman panch from the City of Ahmedabad. The fact remains that this sub-sec (2) of sec. 15 has also been contravened by Mr. But at any rate we find no material on record to show that any such attempt was at all made and having failed he was required to obtain the services of the woman panch from the City of Ahmedabad. The fact remains that this sub-sec (2) of sec. 15 has also been contravened by Mr. Mankad while carrying out the search with the aid of panchas on the morning of 1-12-1963. ( 14 ) THAT leads us to the consideration of the question as to the effect of any such search carried out by the Special Police Officer under sec. 15 (1) of the Act. Mr. Desai referred to a decision in the case of Delhi Administration v. Ram Singh A. I. R. 1962 Supreme Court 63. The point that arose for consideration before Their Lordships was as to whether a Police Officer who is neither a Special Police Officer under the Suppression of Immoral Traffic in Women and Girls Act 1956 nor a Police Officer subordinate to a Special Police Officer can validly investigate the offences under the Act. In the case one Ram Singh was suspected of having committed an offence under sec. 8 of the Act. Jet Ram Sub Inspector who had not been appointed a Special Police Officer by the State Government investigated the case and submitted the charge-sheet to the Magistrate. The Magistrate quashed the charge-sheet holding that the Special Police Officer alone was competent to investigate the case and that Jet Ram could not have investigated it. On revision by the State the High Court agreed with the view of the Magistrate and dismissed the revision. The High Court however granted a certificated under Art. 133 (1) (c) of the Constitution and that way the appeal came up before the Supreme Court. After having referred to various provisions of the Act it has been observed that it is clear from the various provisions of the Act that it is a complete Code with respect to what is to be done under it. The entire police duties in connection with the purposes of the Act within a certain area have been put in the charge of a Special Police Officer. The expression police duties in sec. The entire police duties in connection with the purposes of the Act within a certain area have been put in the charge of a Special Police Officer. The expression police duties in sec. 2 includes all the functions of the police in connection with the purpose of the Act and in the special context of the Act they will include the detection prevention and investigation of offences and the other duties which have been specially imposed on them under the Act. Then after considering the expression dealing with offences in sec. 13 (1) of the Act it has been further said that the Special Police Officer is competent to investigate and that he and his assistant Police Officers are the only persons competent to Investigate offences under the Act and that Police Officers not specially appointed as Special Police Officers cannot investigate the offences under the Act even though they are cognizable offences. It was that way that the appeal by the Delhi Administration came to be dismissed. In other words any investigation made by any other Police Officer was illegal and consequently the Magistrate was justified in rejecting the charge sheet that came to be sent by any other Police Officer who had no authority to investigate under the provisions of the Act. So this much is clear that the Special Police Officer appointed under the Act is the only officer who had jurisdiction and competence to inquire into such offences falling within the ambit of the said Act and that no other Police Officer can have any jurisdiction or competence to inquire into the said offences. In those circumstances the question competence of Mr. Mankad however for the investigation of this case does not arise as already observed here above but not having recorded reasons for not obtaining the warrant from the Magistrate as required under sec. 15 (1) of the Act would not render his competence to search the premises invalid. All that he can be said to have done is in contravention of certain requirements under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 15 of the Act. Now in this connection we have the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 822. All that he can be said to have done is in contravention of certain requirements under sub-secs. (1) and (2) of sec. 15 of the Act. Now in this connection we have the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 822. In this case the house in which the appellant lived along with his father Diwan Singh a retired police Head Constable. was searched by the C. I. D. Inspector S. N. Singh along with Masood Murtaza Sub-Inspector of Police Bulandshahr on May 12 1956 in connection with a ease against Messrs. Greenwood Publicity and they accidentally discovered a large number of letters and postcards and also the five registered letters in question. At the time of the search the appellant who happened to be a trade union official was not in Bulandshahr but was away on leave at Delhi in connection with a postal conference. These articles were found in an almirah the key of which was produced by the appellants father. The articles were not listed at the spot but were taken to the Kotwali in a sealed packet and later on listed there. A member of other articles were also seized at that time but Their Lordships were not concerned with them as they had no connection with the charges against the appellant. The question arose as to whether the search was illegal inasmuch as it was in contravention of the provisions of secs. 103 and 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code and if so what would be the effect thereof. While dealing with that contention. Their Lordships have said as under :-SO far as the alleged illegality of the search is concerned it is sufficient to say that even assuming that the search was illegal the seizure of the articles Is not vitiated. It may be that where the provisions of secs. 103 and 165 Code of Criminal Procedure are contravened the search could be resisted by the person whose premises are sought to be searched. It may also be that because of the illegality of the search the Court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure But beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensues. In that case even the High Court had chosen to accept the evidence of the prosecution regarding the fact of seizure. It may also be that because of the illegality of the search the Court may be inclined to examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure But beyond these two consequences no further consequence ensues. In that case even the High Court had chosen to accept the evidence of the prosecution regarding the fact of seizure. It was however pointed out in this connection that the search under the special Act as we have in the present case would be quite different from the one carried out under secs. 103 and 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code. As to the requirements contemplated both under sec. 165 of the Criminal Procedure Code and under sec. 15 of the Act there is hardly any difference and while In one case an ordinary Police Officer is required to make a search in the other a Special Police Officer appointed under the Act is required to make a search. they can therefore well stand at par. Apart from that In the first place whenever there are such procedural defects and when they do not affect the authority power or competence of any officer to search any premises non-observance thereof cannot vitiate the search carried out and all that the Court is required to look Into is to scrutinise the same with care and caution. At the same time we find no provision of law which renders any such evidence if led in respect of any such search carried out by a competent officer as inadmissible in evidence. In those circumstances one can easily understand if any person were to resist or not allow the search being carried out if the person was not authorised to do so and escape the consequences arising therefrom. But once the officer is found to be a competent officer entitled to effect a search at the premises such as the one in the present case the defects arising from any procedural aspect of the matter would not vitiate the effect of any such search and there is hardly any justification to say that the evidence led in that respect can be ignored or shut out. ( 15 ) MR. Desai then referred to a case of Public Prosecutor Andhra Pradesh v. Uttaravalli Nageswararao A. I. R. 1965 Andhra Pradesh 176. In that case the allegations against the respondent were that he was running a brothel in a particular house. ( 15 ) MR. Desai then referred to a case of Public Prosecutor Andhra Pradesh v. Uttaravalli Nageswararao A. I. R. 1965 Andhra Pradesh 176. In that case the allegations against the respondent were that he was running a brothel in a particular house. Then on 19-11-1962 at about 11 in the night the Special Police Officer along with the mediators made a surprise raid on the said house and found two customers in the house in the company of prostitutes. The respondent was also said to be present in the house. When the doors were got opened two persons P. Ws. 1 and 2 were found inside while in the other room were found P. Ws. 6 and 7 in a disheveled state. On enquiry it was revealed by P. Ws. 1 and 6 that they had come to the said house for the purpose of intercourse with the two girls and that they had paid one rupee for that purpose. Thereupon a mahazar was drafted. The money was seized from the custody of the respondent and a charge-sheet was sent up against the accused under sec. 3 (i) of the Act. The learned Magistrate found that the offence was not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that he acquitted the respondent in respect of that charge. In appeal filed by the State the contention raised by the learned Public Prosecutor was that the order of the Magistrate was unsustainable as it was merely based on the ground that the officer conducting search had not strictly complied with the pro. visions of sec. 15 of the Act. He referred to the decision in the case of Radha Kishan v. State of U. P. A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 822 and urged that though the provisions of search as contemplated under sec. 15 of the Act have not been complied with only two consequences could follow therefrom (i) that the accused could resist the search being illegal and (ii) the Court would examine carefully the evidence regarding the seizure. It was that way contended that the evidence on record could not be brushed aside and it was sufficient to warrant conviction of the respondent under sec. 3 (i) of the Act. It was that way contended that the evidence on record could not be brushed aside and it was sufficient to warrant conviction of the respondent under sec. 3 (i) of the Act. On the other hand reliance was placed on the decision in State of Rajasthan v. Rehman A. I. R. 1969 Supreme Court 210 and it was contended that as the provisions relating to search under sec. 15 of the Act have not been complied with investigation is defective and as such the order of acquittal should not be interfered with. Now in that case it was beyond controversy that the provisions of sec. 15 of the Act were not complied with. The non-compliance with the provisions of sec. 15 was on two grounds. One was that the Special Police officer who conducted the search had conceded in the cross-examination that he did not record the reasons as laid down in the section and he did non assign any reasons for not doing so. He also admitted that he tried to secure a woman mediator but could not do so and he admitted that he had made no note in the diary about it and that he had non served notices on any person in his attempt to secure the services of a woman mediator as provided in that Act. As provided in sub-sec. (2) thereof one of the panchas is required do be a woman and in that case there was no woman panch at the time when the search was made. So far as the necessity of there being a woman panch in such a case the direction was found to be mandatory. The question then arose as to whether the search of the premises conducted by the Special Police Officer was vitiated on account of any such contravention of the provisions of sec. 15 of the Act. The High Court held that the offence if any was brought to light by improperly conducted search and the evidence of the offence should therefore be struck down as unacceptable more so when the Magistrate has found that the evidence in the case is also shaky and unreliable. 15 of the Act. The High Court held that the offence if any was brought to light by improperly conducted search and the evidence of the offence should therefore be struck down as unacceptable more so when the Magistrate has found that the evidence in the case is also shaky and unreliable. It was in those circumstances that the High Court found it difficult to interfere with the order of acquittal made by the lower Court on the ground that apart from the illegality of search the data on record was not sufficient to find the respondent guilty. To hold that the evidence relating to the offence found as a result of the search carried out should be struck down as unacceptable would be going far beyond what we find it said in the case of Radha Kishan v. State of U. P. A. I. R. 1963 Supreme Court 822. I have already referred to that decision of the Supreme Court and the effect that emerges out of any such improperly carried out search is not said to brush aside any such evidence led in respect thereof. As I said above I have not been shown any provision of law which renders any such evidence in relation to any search much though it may be illegally or improperly carried out as inadmissible in law. It cannot vitiate the effect of the evidence arising out of any seizure of articles from the place searched or other type of evidence as to what took place at that particular time. Besides we do not find any provision in the Act which raised any particular presumption on the finding of such articles or materials form gay such premises searched. If that were the case it is possible to urge that no such presumption may be allowed to be raised against the accused. But to say that the evidence of the offence arising out of any search conducted could be brushed aside or be struck down would hardly be proper With respect I am unable to agree with the decision of the Andhra Pradesh High Court relied upon by Mr. Desai in support of his contention that the entire evidence arising out of the search made on the morning of 1-12-1963 should be eliminated. All that we have to keep in mind is to scrutinise the evidence in relation thereto with care and caution.