JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is by the defendant and it arises out of a suit for eviction. The suit is, admittedly, governed by the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and the ground, taken under that act, was the ground of requisite defaults in payment of rent. 2. ACCORDING to the plaintiff landlord, the defendant was a defaulter since April, 1961, the present suit being instituted on February 17, 1962, after service of the requisite notice of ejectment, dated July 25, 1961, terminating the defendant's tenancy on the expiry of the last date of August, 1961. The suit was contested by the defendant who denied the plaintiff's allegation of default and his (defendant's) case was that the rents for April, May and June, 1961, were not accepted by the plaintiff in spite of valid tender and, thereafter, they were deposited in court in time under sec. 17 (1)of the above Act; that he had been duly depositing rents since July, 1961, with the Rent Controller, as required by law; that, further, he was entitled to an adjustment; of the sus, spent by him on account of repairs of the building and on account of payment of the municipal taxes and that, if these adjustments were allowed, the defaults, alleged by the plaintiff, would vanish. 3. THE plea of adjustment, although originally put into issue, does not appear to have been pressed at the time when the issues were finally recast by the court and, in these circumstances, the said plea must be deemed to have been adandoned, 4. THE defendant's denial of default, as alleged, by the plaintiff, was rejected by the learned trial Judge and, he having found that the defendant was a defaulter for more than four months and that his contractual tenancy had been duly terminated by a valid notice of ejectment, the plaintiff was given a decree by him in the instant suit. In this appeal, Mr. Bagchi, appearing for the defendant-appellant, has contended first that the learned trial Judge ought to have held that there was valid tender in respect of, at least, the rents of April. In this appeal, Mr. Bagchi, appearing for the defendant-appellant, has contended first that the learned trial Judge ought to have held that there was valid tender in respect of, at least, the rents of April. May and June, 1961, and, accordingly, the subsequent deposits of rent from July, 1961, with the Rent Controller would be valid on the basis of the said tender and refusal, and the defendant having deposited the dues for April, May and June, 1961, in court, within time under sec. 17 (1) of the above Act, he will be protected from ejectment on the ground of default under sec. 17 (4) of the said Act and will not be hit by its proviso. He has further contended that, in any event, the defendant should be given an opportunity of proving his plea of adjustment and an issue on the point should be raised and decided by the court. 5. WE are unable to accept any of the above submissions of Mr. Bagchi. In the first place, on the evidence before the Court, the defence plea of tender of rents for April, May and June, 1961, cannot be accepted. The plaintiff is his examination-in-chief denied any such tender and he was not cross-examined on the point. It is true that the defendant, coming later on the witness box, gave evidence about such tender and the plaintiff's refusal of the same in his examination-in-chief but, in view of the non-cross-examination of the plaintiff on the point and the plaintiff's specific denial of the same in his examination-in-chief, we are unable to hold that the defence story of tender should bo accepted. This will knock out the basis of Mr. Bagchi's submission on this point. 6. EVEN apart from that, it is clear from the records that, even assuming that there was tender and refusal of rents for the months of April, May, and June, 1961, such tender were not followed by any corresponding or relative deposits with the Kent Controller, in the circumstances, such tender cannot be relevant for deposit of rent for July, 1961, with the Rent Controller, the decisions, referred to by Mr. Bagchi, in the cases of (1) Rekhabachand doogar v. J. R. D'cruz, 26 C. W. N. 499, and (2) Satya Charone Roquittee v. Suresh Chandra Pal, 65 C. W. N. 1239, explaining the earlier decision in the case of (3) Ballabhdas Agarwal Private ltd. v. Dalhousie Properties Limited, 65 C. W. N. 1021, are distinguishable from this point of view in that, in those cases, the particular tender and refusal was followed by the corresponding or relative deposit with the Rent controller. In the above view, we reject Mr. Bagchi's submission on the point and hold that the defendant appellant was a defaulter in the payment of rent for more than four months and, accordingly, he would not be entitled to the protection of section 17 (4) of the above Act. 7. THE plea of adjustment also, as we have already indicated, must be held Lu have been abandoned by the defendant, and, accordingly, would be of no avail to him. 8. IN the premises, this appeal will fail and it will be dismissed, but, having regard to the circumstances of this case, we are inclined to grant the defendant time till the end of September next, in the first instance, for vacating the disputed premises and making over vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff decree-holder, such time to be enlarged till the end of June, 1967, provided the defendant gives an undertaking to this Court, within one month from date, to vacate the disputed premises and make over vacant and peaceful possession thereof to the plaintiff respondent by the end of June, 1567, and provided, further, that, in eithur case, the defendant goes on depositing, in the trial court, to the credit of the decree-holder respondent, a sum of Rs. 41. 62 paise, month by month, regularly, according to the English calender, within the 15th of the next succeeding month according to the same calender; and, in default of any of such deposits, this decree for eviction will become executable at once and the above provision for time, be it the shorter or the longer one, will automatically lapse. Subject as above, this appeal fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order as to costs in this Court. The plaintiff, however, will be entitled to his costs of trial court.