ORDER S. B. Sen, J.-1. The facts are Kishanlal applicant No. 1 gave on rent the shop in dispute to the non-applicant Keshrichand on a monthly rent of Rs. 25/-. On 21-7-54 Keshrichand filed an application under section 7 of the Sthan Niyantran Vidhan. Samvat 2006, before the Rent Controlling Authority for fixation of fair rent. Mean while Kishanlal sold the snit shop to Babulal, applicant No. 2 in this case and he became the landlord of Keshrichand. 2. Babulal then filed a suit for eviction against Keshrichand. This suit was decreed and the decree was maintained up to the stage of second appeal. 3. The suit filed by Keshrichand for fixation of fair rent was dismissed by the Rent Controlling Authority. Keshrichand went up in appeal and the District Court fixed the rent at Rs. 850 per month. It is against this order that Kishanlal and Babulal have now come up in revision. 4. The reason for filing this revision is that while the application before the Rent Controlling Authority was pending, Babulal applicant No.2 filed a suit for eviction of his tenant and for arrears of rent. He was successful in obtaining a decree on 5-6-60 in civil suit No. 71 of 52. The decree was confirmed upto the stage of second appeal and possession was also obtained by him. It has been argued by the learned counsel for the landlords that after the ejectment decree was passed and confirmed by the High Court, the decree for fixation of fair rent could not operate. He therefore contends that the decree of the District Court be set aside. 5. In the ultimate paragraph of his order the learned District Judge has directed :- "Out of the rent deposited by the applicant in the Courts up to the time, the non-applicants will get the rent only at the rate of Rs. 8-8-0 per month, according to their proprietory possession over the suit shop. The remaining amount of the rent shall be given back to the applicant." 6. The applicant does not grumble there but his objection is to the following paragraph of the order of the District Judge:- "When the non-applicant No.2 has stepped into the shoes of non-applicant No. 1 by purchasing the suit shop he would also be bound by the order in this case. The applicant does not grumble there but his objection is to the following paragraph of the order of the District Judge:- "When the non-applicant No.2 has stepped into the shoes of non-applicant No. 1 by purchasing the suit shop he would also be bound by the order in this case. Even if the applicant is ejected from the suit shop before the passing of the order in appeal then also non-applicant No. 2 shall be bound by this order from 20-11-57 when he purchased the shop io the date of eviction if any". 7. The contention of the applicant is not that the District Judge was wrong in fixing the fair rent as Rs. 8-8-0 as he cannot challenge the same because the District Judge has jurisdiction to hold so and the order of the District Judge indicates that he has come to the conclusion from the evidence on record; But his objection is to the direction that this fair rent or reasonable rent, whatever term is given, will be applicable to the dated of eviction as mentioned in the above quoted order. 8. There is substance in this argument. The Accommodation Control Act applies only between landlord and tenant. It does not apply to persons who are not tenants. In Sthan Niyantran Vidhan Samvat 2006 which was in vogue when the application was filed, tenant has been defined as under :- ^^3¼c½ **HkkM+snkj** ls rkRi;Z ml O;fDr ls gS ftlds }kjk fdlh LFkku ds fy, HkkM+k ns; gks ;k fdlh Li”V ;k xfHkZr vuqca/k ds vHkko esa ns; gks] vkSj mlesa bl LFkku esa mi HkkM+snkj dh rjg vf/kokl djus okyk dksbZ Hkh O;fDr lfEefyr gSA^^ In Accommodation Control Act of 1955, the definition given is :- "G (f) "Tenant" means a person by whom rent is payable or but for a contract express or implied would be payable for any accommodation and includes any person occupying the accomodation as a sub-tenant." 9. The question therefore is whether, the applicant had been paying rent. After the decree for eviction there cannot be any question of paying rent. I am not talking of payment of rent after determination of notice. I am talking about the payment made after the decree has been passed. In Gangadin v. Addl. The question therefore is whether, the applicant had been paying rent. After the decree for eviction there cannot be any question of paying rent. I am not talking of payment of rent after determination of notice. I am talking about the payment made after the decree has been passed. In Gangadin v. Addl. Deputy Commissioner 1954 NLJ 122, their lordships have observed :- "Clause 4 C. P. and Berar Rent Control Order obviously contemplates existence of relationship of landlord and tenant when the application is made, and as under clause 8 (c) the tenant is entitled to refund of sums paid in excess of fair rent from date of application before the Rent Controller, the proceedings if once validly launched cannot be defeated merely because the applicant has ceased to be a tenant after their institution." The above Division Bench case speaks of the right of a tenant to proceed after he has ceased to be a tenant. The answer is obvious because he is entitled to refund after the period of tenancy. 10. Another decision relied on by the learned counsel for the respondent is Govind v. Jagneshwar 1956 NLJ Short Note 283 (Misc. Petition 323-35), decided by Bhutt, J. on (22-3-56). In that case Bhutt, J. held :- "The tenant as defined in clause 2 (5). Rent Control order includes a person continuing in possession after the term of his tenancy has expired." This decision also does not speak of continuation of payment after decree has been passed. 11. In Shamlal v. Umacharan 1961 JLJ 892= 1960 MPLJ 1002 . Full Bench of this Court bas held :- "A person whose tenancy has been determined but who continues to remain in possession of the tenanted premises without the assent of the landlord after the determination of the tenancy is a tenant for the purposes of the Act and is entitled to the benefit of sections 4 and 17 of the Act." This Full Bench decision does not decide the question about the liability of the erstwhile tenant against whom there is a decree for ejectment. 12. The order of the District Judge was passed on 1-9-65 when the New Accomodation Control Act of 1961 came into force. But in view of section 51 of 1961 Act, it is clear that the proceedings in this case would be governed by the earlier Act. 12. The order of the District Judge was passed on 1-9-65 when the New Accomodation Control Act of 1961 came into force. But in view of section 51 of 1961 Act, it is clear that the proceedings in this case would be governed by the earlier Act. Therefore the provisions of 1961 Act will not apply. The definition of tenant in 1961 Act is as follows :- "2(1) "tenant" means a person by whom or on whose account or behalf the rent of any accommodation is, or, but for a contract express or implied, would be payable for any accomodation and includes any person occupying the accomodation as a sub• tenant and also any person continuing in possession after the• termination of his tenancy whether before or after the commencement of this Act, but shall not include any person against whom any order or decree for eviction has been made." 13. In this definition it has been specifically mentioned that it does not include a person against whom an order or decree for eviction has been made. This Act, as I have already said is not applicable to the present revision. But the definitions in the earlier Acts do not say that the tenant includes also a person against whom decree for eviction has been made. 14. Tenant in short is one who pays rent. The Acts referred do not define rent. They speak of 'standard' or 'fair' rent. A man does not pay rent after he has got a decree against him. His status as a tenant goes away after the decree is passed. 15. It is also one of the principles of interpretation of Statutes to interpret earlier Act on the basis of a later Act under certain circumstances. In this connection reference may be made to the following passage of Maxwell, Eleventh Edition page 34 under the heading "Earlier Act explained by Later": - "Not on1y may the later Act be construed by the light of the earlier, but it sometimes furnishes a legislative interpretation of the earlier, if it is in pari materia and if the provisions of the earlier Act are ambiguous. Thus chapter 23 of Magna Carta (9 Hen. 3) which provides that "all weirs shall be put down through Thames and Medway, and through all England, except the sea-coast, was held to apply only to navigable rivers, because, 25 Ed. 3 St. 3. Thus chapter 23 of Magna Carta (9 Hen. 3) which provides that "all weirs shall be put down through Thames and Medway, and through all England, except the sea-coast, was held to apply only to navigable rivers, because, 25 Ed. 3 St. 3. c. 4 and other subsequent statutes, spoke of it as having been passed to prevent obstruction to navigation." 16. The following passage from 1951 Appeal Cases 161, (In re Macmanaway and In re The House of Commons) at pages 176-177 also explains the matter fully :- "Arguments were also addressed to their lordships which sought to establish the interpretation of the 1801 Act by deductions drawn from the language of later statutes or from the presence in them, or absence from them of some particular provision. The law does not in all cases reject such aids to interpretation. In Ormond Investment Co. Ltd. v. Betts, Lord Buckmaster, after quoting a passage from the judgment of lord Sterndale in Cape Brandy Syndicate v. Inland Revenue Commissioners which ran: "I think it is clearly established in Attorney General v. Clarkson that subsequent legislation in the same subject may be looked to in order to see the proper construction to be put upon an earlier Act where that earlier Act is ambiguous. I quite agree that subsequent legislation if it proceed upon an erroneous construction of previous legislation, cannot alter that previous legislation; but if there be any ambiguity in the earlier legislation then the subsequent legislation may fix the proper interpretation which is to be put upon the earlier" proceeded as follows: "This is in my opinion an accurate expression of the law, if by 'any ambiguity' is meant a phrase fairly and equally open to divers meanings......" The earlier Act has left the position of a judgment-debtor in an ejectment decree absolutely unexplained. The definition in the Act of 1961 will therefore help in the interpretation of the matter. 17. It does not stand to reason when the Court has given a decree against a person, he is entitled to continue in the premises in spite of the decree. One who does not obey the decree of the Court is not entitled to any benefit. On this ground also the tenant as the occupant is not entitled to a deduction at the rate of Rs. 8-8-0 after the decree has been passed. One who does not obey the decree of the Court is not entitled to any benefit. On this ground also the tenant as the occupant is not entitled to a deduction at the rate of Rs. 8-8-0 after the decree has been passed. So from whatever angle we look, we find that the tenant cannot continue in the premises by paying the rent that has been fixed by the District Judge, whether we call it rent, damages or mesne profits. 18. The result is the revision petition is allowed with costs, and the order under revision is modified to the extent that the non-applicant Keshrichand will be liable to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 8-8-0 up to the date of decree for ejectment. After that it is for the executing Court or the Court granting restitution to fix mesne profits or damages for use and occupation as it thinks fit. Counsel fee according to scale, if certified.