JUDGMENT 1. THIS appeal is by the tenant defendant and it arises out of a suit for ejectment. 2. THE suit was instituted sometime in the early part of 1958. Admittedly, it wag governed by the west Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, and, in the plaint, two grounds were taken under that Act (Section 13 (1)) for depriving the tenant defendant of any benefit under the said act. Those grounds were unlawful subletting, or, subletting; by the defendant without the consent of the plaintiff's landlords, and reasonable requirement of the suit premises by the plaintiffs for their own occupation. The learned trial Judge, in his original judgment, delivered on June 24, 1958, rejected the plaintiffs' contentions on both the above grounds and dismissed the present suit. 3. ON appeal to this Court, the plaintiffs succeeded in getting an order of remand under the judgment of this court, delivered on June 12, 1961. That judgment is reported in (1) 65 C. W. N. 1119. By that judgment, this Court expressly affirmed the validity and sufficiency of the notice of ejectment, upon which the instant suit was brought, affirmed also the finding of the learned trial Judge against the plaintiffs on the question of their reasonable requirement of the disputed premises for their own occupation, but set aside the finding on the other question, namely, of unlawful subletting as, in the view of this Court, that point was not properly presented to the Court or dealt with by it in all its aspects and sent it down for further consideration with leave for additional evidence on the point. It was thus a limited order of remand, under which the matter went back to the trial court for a fresh decision on the above question of subletting in accordance with law on evidence, already on record, and additional or further evidence, and for a final disposal of the suit on the basis of its finding thereon. No other question was left open by this Court for further investigation at the remand hearing and the issue on the question of validity and sufficiency of the notice of ejectment was, as we have said above, expressly decided in favour of the plaintiffs. 4. No other question was left open by this Court for further investigation at the remand hearing and the issue on the question of validity and sufficiency of the notice of ejectment was, as we have said above, expressly decided in favour of the plaintiffs. 4. WHEN the matter went back to the learned trial Judge as aforesaid, the plaintiffs applied for an order under section 17 (3) of the above Act for striking out the defence against ejectment on account of defaults in payment of rent. The defaults, complained against for the purpose, were defaults after the previous decree and the learned trial Judge, upon the view that those defaults would not be relevant for purposes of Sec. 17 (3), refused the plaintiffs' above prayer. The matter was then taken to this Court in revision and Eachawat, J., as he then was, and R. N. Dutt, J., reversed the above decision of the learned trial Judge and passed an order, striking out the defendant's defence against ejectment. The hearing on remand under the above circumstances took place ex parte and, on the ex parte evidence, adduced by the plaintiffs, in the light of the earlier evidence on record, the learned trial Judge decreed the plaintiffs' suit by his judgment, dated september 5, 1963. Against this judgment, the present appeal has been preferred by the defendant. 5. IT may be mentioned at this stage that the notice of ejectment in the instant case, which was held to be valid and sufficient by this Court in its judgment (1) 65 C. W. N. 1119 (supra), between the parties would not, on the test laid down by the Special Bench of this Court in the later decision, reported in (2) 67 C. W. N. 977, be valid and sufficient for purpose of Section 13 (6)of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy act, 1956, and, upon this fact, Mr. Chatterjee, arguing for the defendant appellant, raises a special contention. He contends that the above defect in the notice, which must be found in view of the above Special Bench decision, goes to the root of the Court's jurisdiction as the aforesaid Section 13 (6)expressly provides that unless the notice of ejectment be without such a defect, no suit for ejectment can be entertained on the basis of the same. 6. MR. 6. MR. Chatterjee argues that as it really raises a question of jurisdiction, he is entitled to raise it in this appeal notwithstanding the previous decision of this Court, affirming the validity and sufficiency of the above notice, and once this plea is entertained, his contention, based thereon, would have no answer and the plaintiffs' suit must be dismissed. Mr. Chatterjee also contends that, on the evidence, as it stands, the issue of unlawful subletting ought to have been decided against the plaintiffs and the learned trial Judge ought to have held that, on that evidence, the plaintiffs have not succeeded in proving that there was any subletting by the defendant. These are the two questions, which arise for our consideration in this appeal. 7. ON the first question, we are inclined to hold that the point of notice is not open to the appellant after the previous decision of this Court between the parties (Vide (1) 65 C. W. N. 1119), affirming its validity and sufficiency. The order of remand, under which the re-hearing took place and to which the defendant was entitled under the judgment of this Court, reported in (1) 65 C. W. N. 1119, was a limited order of remand, - a remand only on the point of unlawful subletting and no other question was eligible or open for consideration. In view of that order, the point of notice could not be said to have been open to the defendant for further agitation at the hearing on remand and, accordingly, she cannot be allowed to urge it in this; appeal. This view of ours will be fully supported by the Bench decision of this Court (Banerjee, J. and myself) in (3) M. Levi v. Dinendra Nath Das and others, (unreported), decided on august 11, 1964. The limited order of remand entitled the trial court to re-hear the matter only on the point, on which the remand order was made, and no other point could be re-opened. 8. REFERENCE was made by Mr. Chatterjee to the decision of this Court, reported in (4) Alimunnissa chowdhurani v. Shama Char an Roy. I. L. R. 32 cal. The limited order of remand entitled the trial court to re-hear the matter only on the point, on which the remand order was made, and no other point could be re-opened. 8. REFERENCE was made by Mr. Chatterjee to the decision of this Court, reported in (4) Alimunnissa chowdhurani v. Shama Char an Roy. I. L. R. 32 cal. 749, in support of his contention that, in spite of the previous decision of this Court, reported in (1) 65 C. W. N. 1119, the defendant was entitled to reagitate this point of notice, but the said decision (I. L. R. 32 Cal. 749) appears to have been overrruled by the Full bench decisior of this Court, reported in (5)Tarini Charan Bhattacharya v. Kedar nath Haldar, I. L. R. 56 Cal. 723. It is, therefore, no longer good law. Apart from that, the said decision proceeded upon the view that, in such circumstances, there can be no bar of constructive res judicata and the way, in which their Lordships proceeded, would really raise a question of constructive res judicata. la the present case, however, the matter is one of actual res judicata as, on the previous occasion, there was an express issue on the point, whether the notice of ejecment was valid and sufficient and the issue was decided in the affirmative, - may be on reasonings, which were rot complete and without adverting to the aspect, which was later presented before the Special Bench of this Court in (2) 67 C. W. N. 977 in which a contrary view was taken. The decision, however, - it must be remembered - and not the reasonings, constitutes res judicata. It is, no doubt, true that the law, as laid down by the Special bench, would be the law but it will not have the effect of over-riding or nullifying previous decisions to the contrary between the parties. That, indeed, is clear from the observation of rankin, C. J., in the Full Bench case, reported in (5) I. L. R. 56 Cal. 723, at pp. 733-734. 9. IN the above view, we hold that the appellant is not entitled to raise, in this appeal, the question of validity or sufficiency of the notice of ejectment, which must be held to be concluded between the parties and against the appellant by the previous decision of the Court, reported in (1)65 C. W. N. 1119. 733-734. 9. IN the above view, we hold that the appellant is not entitled to raise, in this appeal, the question of validity or sufficiency of the notice of ejectment, which must be held to be concluded between the parties and against the appellant by the previous decision of the Court, reported in (1)65 C. W. N. 1119. 10. IN the above context, the appellant is left only with the point of unlawful subletting. Upon that point, as we have said above, the material evidence was ex parte and, upon that evidence, the learned trial Judge has recorded his conclusion in favour of the plaintiffs. Some criticism may, no doubt, be made on the learned trial Judge's acceptance, on this point, of the evidence of P. W. 3 and it may be argued that that evidence is not relevant or sufficient as the entries in question (Exts. 6 and 6a) in the Corporation inspection Book may be said to have not been properly proved in the absence of any statement by the witness that he was acquainted with the handwriting of the writer or writers, who wrote those entries, but, even then, the evidence of P. W. 4 seems, in our opinion, to be sufficient for saying that there was subletting after the West bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956, had come into operation, where he says "I saw only some of the old bharatias in the premises in 1958, who came in 1956 or 1957. Their number changed as some females came and went away. Those female bharatias who I saw here in 1958 and 1959, were not to be found there now. In their place new bharatias had come. I may say that these bharatias are floating - coming and then going away". This sufficiently indicates that there were new bharatias after 1956. This evidence remains unchallenged, as, in the circumstances, stated above, there could be no cross-examination of this new witness after remand and, on that evidence, the learned trial Judge's finding in favour of the plaintiffs on the question of unlawful sub-letting must be affirmed. 11. This sufficiently indicates that there were new bharatias after 1956. This evidence remains unchallenged, as, in the circumstances, stated above, there could be no cross-examination of this new witness after remand and, on that evidence, the learned trial Judge's finding in favour of the plaintiffs on the question of unlawful sub-letting must be affirmed. 11. IN the above view, we would dismiss this appeal but, having regard to the situation in this city in the matter of accommodation, we would give the defendant appellant time till the end of April next for vacating the disputed premises and, during this period, the present decree for ejectment will remain inexecutable provided that she goes on depositing, in the trial court, to the credit of the decree-holders respondents, a sum of Rs. 200/- per month, month by month, regularly, according to the Bengali calendar within the 15th of the next succeeding month according to the same calendar, and, in default of any two of such deposits the above provision for time or grace period will automatically lapse and this decree for ejectment will become executable at once. 12. SUBJECT as above, this appeal fails and it is dismissed. There will be no order for costs in this Court.