A. N. Grover ( 1 ) THIS is an appeal under clause 10 of the Letters Patent against a judgment of a learned Single Jadge dismissing apetition filed under Articles 226 of the Constitution challenging an order made on 2nd February, 1965, by which ho was reverted from the post of Vigilance Inspector to his parent department In the Northern Railway with immediate effect. ( 2 ) THE appellant was appointed in the East Punjab Railway as ft Clerk in the grade of Rs. 55-130 on 1st October, 1951. The Government of India, Railway Department, invited recommendations from all heads of departments to fill up vacancies of Vigilance Inspectors, in the grade of Rs. 300-400 as also in the grade of Rs. 260-350. According to the appointment order dated 16th August, 1960, which has been reproduced in the judgment of the learned Judge, the appellant was appointed as a Vigilance Inspector in the prade of Rs. 260-350. Shri S. C. Misra, Section Controller, grade : Rs. 200-300 who was described as at present officialiting as Vigilance Inspector, grade: Rs. 300-400 (an ex-cadre post)" was reverted to his parent department with immediate effect. Shri B. K. Dasi Malhotra Vigilance Inspector, grade.-Rs 260-350, was to be promoted as Vigilance Inspector, grade; Rs. 300-400, in place of Shris. C. Misra. The appellant, who was a Clerk holding the grade of Rs. 60-130, was promoted as Vigilance Inspector in the grade of Rs. 260-360 in place of Shri B. K. Dass Malhotra. He continued to work in that post till the, impugned order was made on 2nd February, 1965. ( 3 ) BEFORE the learned Single Judge two matters appear to have been seriously pressed. The first was that the appellant, having been appointed to the post of a Vigilance Inspector in a substantive capacity, could not have been reverted to the post which he was entitled to hold in his parent department, in the way in which it was done. In other words, the case of the appellant was, and is, that since he was a permanent incumbent, he could not be reduced in rank without complying with the provisions of article 311 (2) of the Constitution. In other words, the case of the appellant was, and is, that since he was a permanent incumbent, he could not be reduced in rank without complying with the provisions of article 311 (2) of the Constitution. The learned Judge, after considering the material, to which his attention was invited, formed the opinion that if was not posible to determine that issue in a writ petition, as it would have to be elaborately considered on the basis of evidence, and the materials placed before him were not adequate enough to enable him to determine whether the appellant had been appointed in a permanent capacity, as was being claimed by him, or whether he had been appointed only temporarily, as was the case of the respondent. ( 4 ) MR. I. M. Lal, learned counsel for the appellant, has sought to call attention to the order of appointment as also the other relevant material and has pressed us to give a finding on the aforesaid question in particular. It is pointed out by him that the appointment order, while deicribing Shri S. C. Misra as Officiating Vigilance Inspector, did not say that the appellant was being promoted as officiating Vigilance Inspector. He has also referred to the various portions of the return filed on behalf of the respondents, in which the position, that has been firmly taken, is that since the posts of Vigilance Inspectors were only of a temporary duration, the appellant could not have been appointed in a permanent capacity. Mr. Lal is probably right in maintaining that there can be appointment In a substantive capacity even to a post of a temporary duration, vide Parshotam Lal Dhingra v. Union of lndia at page 48. But determination of the question whether the appellant was appointed temporarily or in a permanent capacity cannot be made on the order of appointment alone. Indeed, there are indications in that very order, which militate against the contention advanced by Mr. Lal. But determination of the question whether the appellant was appointed temporarily or in a permanent capacity cannot be made on the order of appointment alone. Indeed, there are indications in that very order, which militate against the contention advanced by Mr. Lal. As has been slated before, Shri S. C. Misra was officiating as Vigilance Inspector in the grade of Rs 300-400, and when he was reverted to his parent department Shri B. K. Dass, Malhotra, who was officiating in a lower grade, was promoted to his grade, which would apparently mean, in an efficiating capacity, and similarly the appellant was promoted in place of Shri B K. Dass Malhotra as Vigilance Inspector, which again would be in an officiating capacity, but the learned Single Judge was fully justified in declining to decide this question finally as it can be more appropriately decided in a regular action. It is unnecessary cover the same ground whkh has been dealt with by the learned Judge and we consider that the present case falls within the rule laid down in Union of India v. T. R. Varma that in a case in which there is a serious dispute on a question, which cannot be satisfactorily decided without taking evidence, it is not the practice of courts to decide it in a writ petition. Mr. Lal has relied a great deal on the observations in K. K. Kochunni v. State of Madras , in which the scope of an enquiry into disputed questions of fact under Article 32 came up for consideration. In that case the petitioners had alleged, inter alia, that the impugned Act bad deprived them of their fundamental right to the equal protection of the law and equality before the law guaranteed by Article 14 of the constitution. Their case was founded on discrimination. In that case the petitioners had alleged, inter alia, that the impugned Act bad deprived them of their fundamental right to the equal protection of the law and equality before the law guaranteed by Article 14 of the constitution. Their case was founded on discrimination. It was made quite clear by their Lordships ihat they were not expressing any opinion as to the jurildiction and power of the High Courts to entertain and deal with applications under Article 226 of the Constitution, where disputed question of fact have to be decided, but as regards the limits of the jurisdiction and power of the Supreme Coutt when acting under Article 32 it was stated: "the court may in some appropriate cases, be inclined to give in opprotunity to the parties to establish their respective cases by filling further affidavits or by issuing a commission or even by setting the application down for trial on evidence, as has often been done on the original sides of the High Courts of Bombay and Calcutta, or by adopting some other appropriate procedure. Such occassions will be rare indeed and such rare cases should not, in our opinion, be regarded as a cogent reason for refusing to entertain the petition under Article 32 on the ground that it involves disputed questions of fact " As the course adopted by the learned Single Judge has the imprimatur of the Supreme Court in the previous decision in Union of India v. T. R. Verma, and as the later decision in K. K. Kochunni s case was distinguishable, as different considerations prevailed there, we are not inclined to take a view different from the one expressed by the learned Single Judg on the facts of the present case. ( 5 ) THE second point, which has been canvassed by Mr. Lal is that the order of reversion was made by way of pumishment, and therefore, even if it be assumed that the appellant was holding only a temporary post or was appointed to it in a temporary capacity, the provisions of Art. 311 (2) would be attracted. In this connection a great deal of emphasis has been laid on the background in which, it is said, the impugned order came to be made. It appears that an Additional Member (Vigilance), Railway Board, recorded some note adverse to the appellant in December, 1964, that note being as follows. In this connection a great deal of emphasis has been laid on the background in which, it is said, the impugned order came to be made. It appears that an Additional Member (Vigilance), Railway Board, recorded some note adverse to the appellant in December, 1964, that note being as follows. "in this case, Shri Rabat Maulavy, M. L. A. of U. P. Vidhan Sabha, had sent a complaint to "the Railway Minister, alleging that one Vigilance Inspector of Northern Railway, Shri J. S. Bedi, had used abusive language towards the late Prime Minister Shri Jawaharlal Nehru while talking to one ticket Collector, Shri Z. A. Khan of Moradabad. The M. L. A. had also stated that the above mentioned officer and staff at Moradabad were playing havoc with the Railway staff and were indulging in malpractice of accepting illegal gratification in kind. The Board (C. R. B.) had ordered enquries to be conducted by the C. 1. A. into the first allegation only and it was gathered that the reputation of Shri Bedi is not good. I discussed this case with Shri S. P. Lal, S. D. O. M. (V) and Shri Kapur Singh, Vigilance Officier, Northern Railway, on 2nd December, 1964. In this case, the allegations could not be substantiated but the reputation of the Vigilance Inspector, Shri Bedi did not appear to be good. It may be better in this case, therefore, to take an administrative decision rather than go through the rigmarole of a prolonged enquiry. Administratively speaking, Shri Bedi s performance during the last nine months has been only one case initiated by him as against 17 surprise checks conducted by him which are all stated to be minor. His performance is, therefore, not very impressive. On administrative grounds, therefore it is time that he is sent to his normal duties, especially as he. was appointed Vigilance Inspector on 29th August, 1960, which is more "than four years ago. S. D. G. M. (V) told me that he would be taking action accordingly to revert Shri Bedi. "according to Mr. On administrative grounds, therefore it is time that he is sent to his normal duties, especially as he. was appointed Vigilance Inspector on 29th August, 1960, which is more "than four years ago. S. D. G. M. (V) told me that he would be taking action accordingly to revert Shri Bedi. "according to Mr. Lal, the order of reversion was prompted by the considerations mentioned in the note and the authorities concerned were anxious to avoid any enquiry, and thus they purported to older the reversion without giving any reasons, so as to convey an impression that the appellant, who was stated to be holding the post of Vigilance Inspector in an officiating capacity, was being reverted to his parent department in the ordinary course. Our attention has been drawn to the well known rule laid down in Parshotam Lal Dhinga v. Union of Iridia which has become locus classicus on the subject, that where it is sought to revert even a temporary servant or reduce him inrank by way of punishment, the provisions of Article 311 (2) must be complied with. ( 6 ) MR. Lal has then invited our attention to Shambhoo Ji Srivastava v. state of Uttar Pradesh and another, where a clerk in the Collecterate holdding a permanent post was appointed to a hiher post as a result of selection and he was reverted from the higher post to his permanent post. It was held that his reversion from the higher post amounted to a reduction in rank. That case was decided on its own facts. In each case it has to be determined on its facts whether reversion from a higher post was by way of punishment. Even if it be assumed that it was the note of the Additional Member (Vigilance), Railway Board, which led to the reversion of the appellant, it is not possible to see that his reversion was by way of punishment. The view expressed in the aforesaid note was that the appellant s performance had not been very impressive and on administrative grounds it was time that he be sent back to his normal duties, especially when he had held the post ill question for nearly four years. In the order, which was made, no reason was given which shows that it was not intended to say anything which might attach as a stigma to him in his future career. In the order, which was made, no reason was given which shows that it was not intended to say anything which might attach as a stigma to him in his future career. In Sukhbans Singh v. State of Punjab, it was found that the action of the Government in reverting the appellant to his original post of Tahsildar was malafide and the reversion was by way of punishment for misconduct, and as the provisions of Article 311 (2) had not been complied with, his reversion was illegal. That cannot be said in the present case, and there is no such material on the record which would justify the conclusion that the reversion of the appellant was ordered either on account of any malafides on the part of the authori- ties concerned, or by way of punishment. This was the view of the learned Single Judge, before whom reliance was placed on rule 1707 of the Indian Railway Establishment Code, volume I, as well. For the reasons given by the learned Single Judge, the contention raised on the basis of that rule has hardly any merit. ( 7 ) FOR the reasons given above, this appeal is dismissed, but, in view of the entire circumstances, we leave the parties to bear their own costs. ( 8 ) I agree.