N. M. MIABHOY, N. K. VAKIL, J. ( 1 ) THESE are writ petitions directed against the orders of detention of the petitioners passed under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules by the District Magistrate Broach on 14-9-1965 praying for the issue of appropriate writs or for passing necessary orders quashing the impugned orders and to direct that they be set at liberty. Special Criminal Application No. 52 of 1965 is filed by Gulam Nabi Hussain Shaikh. Special Criminal Application No 53 of 1965 has been filed by his son Shaikh Mohammad Saeed Gulamnabi and Special Criminal Application No. 54 of 1965 has been filed by his daughter Kumari Munirabibi. Common questions of law and facts arise for consideration in all the three petitions and therefore all the three petitions are disposed of by this common judgment. ( 2 ) THE petitioner Gulam Nabi is a resident of Broach and was employed since 1926 with the Local Board Broach as a clerk. Thereafter since the coming into force of the Gujarat Panchayats Act he has been serving in the District Panchayat Broach as Internal Auditor from the 1st of December 1964. His son petitioner Shaikh Mohammad Saeed is a matriculate and has a shop at Chhota Bazaar Ankleshwar since a number of years. Daughter Munirabibi passed her S. S. G. Examination and thereafter is serving as a teacher in M. A. Makuwala High School Hansot since 1960 and is earning a salary of Rs. 158/per month. She was on leave from the 23rd of August 1965 to the 17th of October 1965 and in September 1965 she was at her fathers place. On September 13 1965 it is alleged that the petitioner Gulam Nabis house was searched by Police Inspector Dave and without making any panchnama some articles were attached from the petitioners house. After the search was over the police party had left the premises without arresting either of the petitioners. On the 14th of September 1965 he was put under detention under the order dated the 14th of September 1965 passed by respondent No. 1 as the District Magistrate of Broach under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules. His said son Mohammad Saeed and his said daughter Munirabibi were also put under detention by orders passed by the respondent on the same date. His said son Mohammad Saeed and his said daughter Munirabibi were also put under detention by orders passed by the respondent on the same date. ( 3 ) THE petitioners are challenging the impugned orders on the grounds that they are illegal void and ultra vires as they were passed mechanically without applying his mind by the District Magistrate and without having any basis for being satisfied as required by rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules. That the respondent No. 1 was not the District Magistrate. Even if he is held to be the District Magistrate the District Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass the said orders. That the notification on which reliance was placed by the District Magistrate for passing the impugned order was void illegal and ultra vires. In any case the impugned order was passed mala fide. That the petitioners house was searched by C. I. D. Inspector Dave because he had a grudge against the petitioner. The Local Board has a Guest House at Shukla Tirth and Dave had stayed at the said guest house and had paid only Re. 1/instead of Rs. 5/which was the actual charge for such stay at the guest house. The petitioner as Internal Auditor had found this out and had made a report about him and Rs. 4/were recovered from Dave and since that time Dave had been annoyed with him. The petitioners allege in their petitions that Dave had considerable influence with the first respondent and had managed to see that the petitioners were illegally detained. The impugned orders were there. fore passed mala fide with a view to ruin the petitioner Gulam Nabi and his family members. That the impugned orders were passed not on the personal satisfaction by respondent No. 1 but on information wrongly given to him by the police officers concerned who were bent upon ruining the petitioners. It is further contended that the delegation of the power by the State Government under notification Annexure B was not according to law. That in any case respondent No. 1 had dot complied with the requirements of that notification inasmuch as he had not sent a copy of the order passed by him to the State Government as early as possible. That in any case respondent No. 1 had dot complied with the requirements of that notification inasmuch as he had not sent a copy of the order passed by him to the State Government as early as possible. The petitioners have tried to explain in the petition that the articles that were seized from the place of petitioner Gulam Nabi were not such as could be the basis for the orders of detention made. We shall refer to these when we discuss the specific contentions pressed before us by the petitioners. The petitioners on the 8th of November 1965 amended the petition and added one more ground to challenge the detention order. It is contended that the proclamation of emergency purported to have been made by the President of India under Article 352 (1) of the Constitution of India was not in accordance with the requirements of Article 352 (1) and consequently the notification Annexure B and the orders passed by the respondent No. 1 were illegal and void. ( 4 ) IN response to the petition respondent No. 1 has filed his affidavit wherein he has stated that petitioner Gulam Nabi his son Mohammad Saeed and his daughter Munirabibi were reported to be pro-Pakistanis who were carrying on propaganda in favour of Pakistan and against India by holding secret meetings and spreading pro-Pakistani news. On the said information the police had raided the house of Gulam Nabi and Mohammad Saeed and had got hold of certain materials which have support to the information on which the police had acted. It was also alleged therein that his daughter Munirabibi who had obtained India Pakistan pass-port to go to Pakistan on the 1st of February 1965 with a visa which was valid for three months was also found to be in possession of materials which went to show that she was to go to Pakistan carrying certain vital information which was prejudicial to the safety of India. We shall refer to the further details regarding this and other matters referred to in the affidavit in reply at its proper place. But it may be stated at this stage that respondent No. 1 has said in the said affidavit that he was duly authorised to pass the impugned orders. He has denied that the materials at the time of the raid were attached without a panchnama. But it may be stated at this stage that respondent No. 1 has said in the said affidavit that he was duly authorised to pass the impugned orders. He has denied that the materials at the time of the raid were attached without a panchnama. He has stated that these and other materials were placed before him along with the statements of witnesses and after being duly satisfied that it was necessary to detain the petitioners that he had passed the impugned orders. He denied that he passed orders mala fide mechanically and without applying his mind. He has denied that he was influenced by Dave the Police Circle Officer. He has also denied the several other allegations made in the petition. Over and above the affidavit of respondent No. 1 the affidavit of Dave has been filed wherein he denies the allegations made against him. In reply to the affidavit filed by the respondent No. 1 affidavits in rejoinder were filed by the petitioners and respondent No. 1 has further filed an affidavit in Sur-Rejoinder. ( 5 ) MR. V. J Desai the learned advocate for the petitioners firstly contended that respondent No. 1 was not the District Magistrate under section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code and he had no jurisdiction to pass any orders under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules. In support of this contention it was submitted that respondent No. 1 had in his affidavit in reply relied upon two notifications to claim that he had the authority to make the impugned orders. The copy of the notification produced as Annexure No. 2 with his sur-rejoinder dated the 1st of September 1959 on the face of it showed that it did not apply to the territory of Gujarat but it applied to Vidarbha Hyderabad Saurashtra and Kutch areas which were parts of the bilingual State of Bombay. The learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. B. R. Sompura conceded that this was a mistake and initially pointed out to us a notification dated the 21st of April 1950. Mr. The learned Assistant Government Pleader Mr. B. R. Sompura conceded that this was a mistake and initially pointed out to us a notification dated the 21st of April 1950. Mr. Desai submitted that it was a notification which did cover the District of Broach but contended that this was a notification issued prior to the coming into force of the Bombay Separation of Judicial and Executive Functions Act 1951 (Bombay Act No. XXIII of 1951) and he raised various contentions to urge that the said notification would not be valid after the coming into force of the said Act. The learned Assistant Government Pleader however later pointed out that the actual notification which had the application to the present case was the notification dated the 1st of July 1953 and this being a notification published after the above stated Act had come into force all the contentions raised on behalf of the petitioners on the basis that the notification prior to the coming into force of the said Act would not be valid had no force and Mr. Desai accordingly gave up those points. But it was urged that even the notification dated the 1st of July 1953 cannot help the respondent because it was also not a valid notification. It will be expedient to reproduce the text of this notification before we proceed to deal with these contentions:-NO. 3558/7-XII. In exercise of the powers conferred by sub-sec. (1) of see. 10 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (V of 1898) and in supersession of Government Notification Home Department No. 1456/6-I dated the 21st April 1950 the Government of Bombay is pleased to appoint all persons now or hereafter permanently or temporarily holding the office of Collector as defined in the Bombay Land Revenue Code 1879 in the State of Bombay to be District Magistrates of the Districts to which they may be posted for such time as they hold the aforesaid offices. The argument raised was that Government had no authority to issue such a notification under section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code making such blanket appointment. According to law the appointment has to be made individually as and when the occasion arises for such an appointment. Appointments could not be made in anticipation and that there can be no appointments made in future. In support of these submissions Mr. According to law the appointment has to be made individually as and when the occasion arises for such an appointment. Appointments could not be made in anticipation and that there can be no appointments made in future. In support of these submissions Mr. Desai relied upon section 14 of the Bombay General Clauses Act 1904 which is as under:14 Powers conferred on any Government to be exercisable from time to time. Where by any Bombay Act made after the commencement of this Act any power is conferred on any Government. then that power may be exercised from time to time as occasion requires. We find no force in this contention. Section 14 is an enabling section. It does not lay down that the Government shall not make any appointments of any officers in anticipation of any vacancy or any occasion requiring to exercise the powers vested in it. In our view this provision of law is intended only to authorise Government to exercise the right vested in it more than once and whenever the occasion arose to exercise such power. This provision is made to avoid any possibility of a difficulty arising on the ground that the power conferred on any Government in a given case when once exercised may be held to have been exhausted. We cannot read in this section any provision which would prohibit Government in making appointment of an officer or officers in anticipation of vacancies arising in future. It also does not prohibit Government from appointing any person or persons holding any particular office to also exercise the powers of another officer as has been done by the notification in question. On the contrary section 15 of the Bombay General Clauses Act gives power to the Government to make appointments either by name or by virtue of office. It provides that Where by any Bombay Act a power to appoint any person to fill any office or execute any function is conferred then unless it is otherwise expressly provided any such appointment if it is made after the commencement of this Act may be made either by name or by virtue of office. 9 We have not been shown any provision of law which would district the Government making an appointment in future. 9 We have not been shown any provision of law which would district the Government making an appointment in future. As a matter of facts there is bound to be in many case some time-lag between the making of the order and the taking of office be a particular individual. In our view there can be no prohibition on the power of the Government to make an appointment to take effect in future either by name or by office; as for example an order can be made that a particular individual is appointed as the Collector at a particular place from a particular date in future. By the notification dated the 1st of July 1953 the Government of Bombay appointed all persons now or hereafter permanently or temporarily holding the office of Collector to be the District Magistrates of the Districts to which they may be posted for such time as they hold the aforesaid offices. By this notification all individuals holding the office of Collector on the date of the notification as well as those who may hold that office after that date were also appointed District Magistrates. ( 6 ) MR. Desai however tried to rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Ajaia Singh v. Gurbabhan Singh and others A I. R. 1 65 S. C. 1619 in support of his contention. In that case one of the questions considered by the Supreme Court was whether the officer passing the impugned order was the District Magistrate. In the said case Shri Lall Singh who had made the order was alleged to be only the Additional District Magistrate and the other question that had arisen for the decision of the Supreme Court was whether if he was not the District Magistrate could he as Additional District Magistrate exercise the power of detention that is to say whether the Additional District Magistrate is of the same rank as the District Magistrate or below him in rank. While deciding these questions their Lordships considered section 10 of the Criminal Procedure Code and came to the conclusion that even if an Additional Magistrate had been appointed with all the powers under the Code and also under any other law for the time being in force he could not be considered to be the District Magistrate unless the Government had appointed him as such under section 10 (1) of the Code. Their Lordships also observed that section 11 of the Code envisaged the contingency of the office of the District Magistrate becoming vacant. It provided that where this contingency arises any officer succeeding temporarily to the chief executive administration of the District would pending the orders of the State Government exercise all the powers and perform all the duties respectively conferred and imposed by the Code on the District Magistrate. But even if an officer was exercising the powers of the District Magistrate on there being a vacancy in the office of the District Magistrates he would not still be the District Magistrate unless and until he was appointed as such under sec. 10 (1) of the Code. Relying upon this decision Mr. Desai urged that though respondent No. 1 who was a Deputy Collector and was appointed under the notification Annexure 1 dated the 14th of April 1965 to officiate as Collector Broach vice Shri H. R. Patankar as no order was also made under sec. 10 (1) appointing him as the District Magistrate he could not be held to be a District Magistrate authorised to pass detention orders under rule 30. It is true that though there was no specific appointment made of respondent No. 1 as the District Magistrate either by the said notification or by a separate order still by virtue of the notification dated the 1st of July 1953 mentioned here in above he would be the District Magistrate of Broach appointed under sec. 10 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. We are of the view that the observations made in the aforesaid Supreme Court decision could not be of any help to support the contention raised on behalf of the petitioner. In the said case the officer concerned was only appointed as Additional District Magistrate under sec. 10 (2) of the Code and as such had all or any of the powers of the District Magistrate under the Code but he was never appointed as District Magistrate under sec. 10 (1 ). In the light of these facts the learned Judges had observed that though the said officer could exercise the powers of the District Magistrate he had no authority to make orders of detention under the Defence of India Rules. These observations were made in the context of the said facts of the case. 10 (1 ). In the light of these facts the learned Judges had observed that though the said officer could exercise the powers of the District Magistrate he had no authority to make orders of detention under the Defence of India Rules. These observations were made in the context of the said facts of the case. So far as the present petitions are concerned reading notification Annexure 1 dated the 14th of April 1965 and notification dated the 1st of July 1953 together respondent No. 1 was appointed the District Magistrate under sec. 10 (1) of the Criminal Procedure Code. We therefore do not accept the contention that respondent No. 1 was not the District Magistrate of Broach on the date on which he passed the impugned orders. ( 7 ) IT was then contended on behalf of the petitioners that even if it is held that respondent No. 1 was the District Magistrate the detention orders are illegal because no District Magistrate has the power to issue orders under rule 30 (b) under notification Annexure B dated the 20th of August 1964 which was published in the Gazette on the 4th of September 1964. The said notification is as follows: No. GG-180/sb-II/cag-1664/3660in exercise of the powers conferred by subsec. (2) of sec. 40 of the Defence of India Act 1962 (No. 51 of 1962) and in supersession of the Government order Home and Civil Supplies Department (Special) no. SB-II/cag-1662 (1) dated the 5th December 1962 the Government of Gujarat hereby directs that the powers conferred on it by rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules 1962 shall be exercisable also by the Commissioner of Police Ahmedabad City and all District Magistrates within the limits of their respective jurisdictions subject to the following conditions:-namely (I) That the power under clause (a) of sub-rule (1) of Rule 30 shall not be exercisable without the prior approval of the State Government. (II) That a copy of any order made under any provisions of that rule shall be forwarded to the State Government as early as possible and (III) That the State Government shall have power to modify rescind or supersede any order passed by the Commissioner of Police or District Magistrate under the said Rulesthe State Government of Gujarat in exercise of the powers conferred by sec. 40 (2) of the Defence of India Act by the said Notification purports to direct that the powers conferred on it by rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules shall be exercisable by all the District Magistrates within the limits of their respective jurisdictions. The argument urged in support of the contention was that in pursuance of sec. 3 clause (2) sub-clause (15) rule 30 was framed by the Central Government and rule 30 provided that the order of detention could only be passed by the Central Government or the State Government and not by a District Magistrate. That sec. 3 (2) clearly provides that while enacting the rules the authority who will be authorised to exercise the powers has to be prescribed and that the District Magistrate was not mentioned as such authority in rule 30 and therefore the District Magistrate had no powers to pass any orders of detention under rule 30. We find no substance in this submission. Subsec. (1) of sec. 3 of the Act given the general authority to the Central Government to make rules for securing the various objects of the statute. Sub-sec. (2) of the said section without affecting the generality of the powers given by sub-sec. (1) authorises the Central Government to make rules which may provide for and may empower any authority to make orders providing for all or any of the matters mentioned in the said section. Clause (15) of sub-sec. (2) provides as follows: (15) notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force (I) the apprehension and detention in custody of any person whom the authority empowered by the rules to apprehend or detain (the authority empowered to detain not being lower in rank than that of a District Magistrate) on grounds appearing that authority to be reasonable of being of hostile origin or of having acted. acting being about to act or being likely to act in a manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence the security of the State the public safety or interest the maintenance of public order Indias relations with foreign States the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part or area of India or the efficient conduct of military operations or with respect to whom that authority is satisfied that his apprehension and detention are necessary for the purpose of preventing him from acting in any such prejudicial manner; (II ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (iii ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . (iv ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . sub-sec. 11) of sec. 40 of the Act authorizes the Central Government to delegate any of the powers given to it under the Act or Rules made thereunder to any authority mentioned therein. Sub-sec. (2) empowers the State Government to delegate any of the powers given to it either under the Act the Rules or under power given to the Central Government to delegate under sub-sec. (1) to any officer or authority not being an officer or authority subordinate to the Central Government. Under the powers given to the Central Government to make Rules under clause (15) of sub-sec. (2) of sec. 3 the Central Government made the Rules. Under rule 30 it provided for restricting the movements of suspected persons and passing of detention orders etc. and authorised itself and the State Government to pass such orders. So the combined effect of all these provisions is that the State Government got its authority from the Central Government under rule 30 and under sub-sec. (2) of sec. 40 the State Government has the authority to delegate these powers vested in it to any other authority In the present case the State Government authorised all District Magistrates to exercise the powers conferred on it under rule 30 by its aforesaid order dated the 20th of August 1964 a copy whereof is annexure B to the petition. Therefore there is no manner of doubt that the District Magistrates so authorised had the power to pass orders under rule 30. Therefore there is no manner of doubt that the District Magistrates so authorised had the power to pass orders under rule 30. ( 8 ) THE third ground on which the petitioners tried to challenge the impugned orders is that the Proclamation of Emergency made by the President of India is not in accordance with the provisions of Article 352 (1) of the Constitution of India as the said Proclamation does not recite that the President was personally satisfied that the emergency exists. It was submitted that such a declaration of satisfaction in the body of the proclamation is absolutely mandatory and in absence of such a reference in the body of the proclamation the declaration of emergency is not valid. Such a declaration must comply not only with the substantial requirements of law but also with those of form which alone can indicate that the requirements had been complied with. As a consequence it would follow that Articles 353 358 and 359 cannot have any operation and the petitioners fundamental rights guaranteed in Part III of the Constitution of India are not affected and the Central Government had no jurisdiction or authority to enact the Defence of India Act or to make the Defence of India Rules and the detention of the petitioners under the orders passed is illegal. Article 352 of the Constitution reads as follows : 352 (1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance he may by Proclamation make a declaration to that effect. Article 352 of the Constitution reads as follows : 352 (1) If the President is satisfied that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened whether by war or external aggression or internal disturbance he may by Proclamation make a declaration to that effect. (2) A Proclamation issued under clause (1) (a) may be revoked by a subsequent Proclamation; (b) shall be laid before each House of Parliament; (c) shall cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament: provided that if any such Proclamation is issued at a time when the House of the People has been dissolved or the dissolution of the House of the People takes place during the period of two months referred to in sub-clause (c) and if a resolution approving the Proclamation has been passed by the Council of States but no resolution with respect to such Proclamation has been passed by the House of the People before the expiration of that period the Proclamation shall cease to operate at the expiration of 30 days from the date on which the House of the People first sits after its reconstitution unless before the expiration of the said period of thirty days a resolution approving the Proclamation has been also passed by the House of the People. (3) A Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security of India or of any part of the) territory thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression or by internal disturbance may be made before the actual occurrence of war or of any such aggression or disturbance if the President is satisfied that there is imminent danger thereof. It was argued that the words make a declaration to that effect have a reference to two facts viz. (i) the satisfaction of the President that a grave emergency exists and (ii) the fact of such grave emergency existing whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened and therefore the Proclamation must necessarily make a reference to the fact of the satisfaction of the President. (i) the satisfaction of the President that a grave emergency exists and (ii) the fact of such grave emergency existing whereby the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened and therefore the Proclamation must necessarily make a reference to the fact of the satisfaction of the President. If no such reference is made in the declaration by Proclamation to the fact of the President being satisfied such a declaration would not be in conformity with the necessary ingredients of article 352. We are unable to agree with Mr. Desai. In our judgment the words make a declaration to that effect are not contemplated to have a reference to the satisfaction of the President. The satisfaction of the President is only the condition precedent to the exercise of powers of declaring the emergency by a Proclamation under the said article. If we turn to the other clauses of the article the picture becomes more clear and in our view they give a clear indication of what the declaration is to contain. They indicate that it is the Proclamation of emergency which is the important and the central idea. What is to be proclaimed is the state of grave emergency and the danger to the security of the Country and not the satisfaction of the President. Clause (3) provides for issuing of a Proclamation even before the actual occurrence and it states that a Proclamation of Emergency declaring that the security of India or of any part of the territory thereof is threatened by war or by external aggression may be made if the President is satisfied that there was imminent danger thereof. This clearly shows that what the Proclamation is intended to contain is the declaration of the existence of the grave emergency and the threat to the country and not the satisfaction of the President though of course this Proclamation could be made only if the President was satisfied that such imminent danger existed. Therefore the satisfaction of the President is only a condition to be fulfilled before the declaration by way of Proclamation could he made by him. Reading this clause it cannot be said that the Legislature intends that the body of the Proclamation must contain the declaration of his satisfaction also. Therefore the satisfaction of the President is only a condition to be fulfilled before the declaration by way of Proclamation could he made by him. Reading this clause it cannot be said that the Legislature intends that the body of the Proclamation must contain the declaration of his satisfaction also. Then again sub-clause (c) of clause (2) of article 352 provides that a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of article 352 shall cease to operate at the expiration of two months unless before the expiration of that period it has been approved by resolutions of both Houses of Parliament. This would indicate that it is only the operation of the Proclamation declaring the emergency that ceases. It could not mean that the satisfaction of the President would also cease. Inspite of the fact that the satisfaction of the President may continue the Proclamation would still cease to operate if before the expiration of the prescribed period the approval of both the Houses of Parliament was not received. This would also indicate that it is the concept of the Proclamation which is the central ingredient of clause (1 ). The Proclamation of Emergency that is issued clearly states that in the exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of article 352 of the Constitution the President of India by the said Proclamation declared that the grave emergency exists whereby the security of India was threatened by external aggression and this proclamation had been issued under his own signature. For greater accuracy the text of the Proclamation itself may be reproduced Proclamation of Emergency in the exercise of the powers conferred by clause (1) of Article 352 of the Constitution I Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan President of India by this proclamation declare that a grave emergency exists whereby the security of India is threatened by external aggression. S. Radhakrishnan President. The Proclamation therefore leaves no manner of doubt that the President himself made that declaration contained in the said Proclamation under his own signature in exercise of the powers conferred on him by clause (1) of article 352. This would necessarily imply that he had been satisfied as was required by clause (1) of article 352 as regards existence of the emergency and the danger to the security of India which was threatened by external aggression. This would necessarily imply that he had been satisfied as was required by clause (1) of article 352 as regards existence of the emergency and the danger to the security of India which was threatened by external aggression. It has to be kept in mind that by virtue of this Proclamation no individual is deprived of his liberty as is the case when an order is passed under the provisions of any statute passed as emergency or preventive measure as in the case of orders made under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules or sec. 3 of the Preventive Detention Act. Mr. Sompura relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Gullapalli Nageswara Rao and others v. Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and another A. I. R. 1959 S. C. 308 which also lends some support to the above stated construction that we have placed on the said article. In the said cases sec. 68c of the Motor Vehicles Act (1939) came in for interpretation. Sec. 68c stated that where any State Transport Undertaking is of opinion that for specified reason it is necessary in the public interest that road transport service should be run or operated by the State Transport Undertaking it may prepare a scheme giving particulars of the scheme and publish it in the Official Gazette. In the scheme which was being examined by the Supreme Court an express recital of the formation of the opinion by the Undertaking was not made. The Supreme Court held that the express recital of the formation of the opinion that the scheme was necessary in the interest of public by the Undertaking in the scheme is not made a condition of the validity of the scheme. The said authority could frame a scheme only if it was of opinion that it was necessary in public interest that the road transport service should be run or operated by the Road Transport Undertaking. When it proposed for the reasons mentioned in sec. 68c a scheme providing for such a transport undertaking it was a manifest expression of its opinion in that regard. We are therefore unable to accept the submission that because the Proclamation does not contain the words that the President is satisfied the Proclamation is not in compliance with the requirements of article 352 (1 ). 68c a scheme providing for such a transport undertaking it was a manifest expression of its opinion in that regard. We are therefore unable to accept the submission that because the Proclamation does not contain the words that the President is satisfied the Proclamation is not in compliance with the requirements of article 352 (1 ). ( 9 ) THE next contention on behalf of the petitioners was that the respondent No. 1 should be held not to have applied his mind and must be held to have passed the impugned orders mechanically because in the order he has mentioned that he was satisfied with respect to each of the respective petitioners that with a view to preventing him or her from acting in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India it was necessary to make an order to detain them. According to the petitioners under rule 30 various grounds have been mentioned for which the detention order can be passed one of them being an act which is in any manner prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence. It was submitted that any act prejudicial to the defence of India by itself was not made the ground but any act which is prejudicial to the defence of India and civil defence is made the ground. The impugned orders as pointed out above only mentioned the defence of India and therefore respondent No. 1 could not have applied his mind as to the necessary ingredient of rule 30 which would enable him to pass the impugned detention orders. This argument presupposes that the Central Government intended to make any act that would prejudicially affect the combination of the concepts of the two activities the defence of India and civil defence a ground and that if the act was prejudicial only to the defence of India or against civil defence it was not made a ground for the exercise of such right. In the first place we find it difficult to agree with the learned advocate that the use in the order of the words defence of India only would indicate non-application of mind or the making of the orders mechanically. In the first place we find it difficult to agree with the learned advocate that the use in the order of the words defence of India only would indicate non-application of mind or the making of the orders mechanically. If it had been a mechanical order or an order made without any application of mind on the contrary we would have found the repetition of the words from rule 30 which would necessarily have included the phrase defence of India and civil defence. But Mr. Desai then contended that the said orders must then be held to be illegal orders as not complying with the requirements rule 30. Mr. Desai urged that looking to the wordings of rule 30 as well as the various provisions of the Defence of India Act it becomes clear that the intention of the Legislature and the Central Government is to make the combination of both the concepts to be the ground. He submitted that the use of the conjunction and clearly indicates this intention. He pointed out that commas have been used after each of the other grounds such as the public safety the maintenance of public order Indias relations with foreign powers the maintenance of peaceful conditions in any part of India etc. He also pointed out that if we turn to the Defence of India Act we find that in the preamble in sec. 3 (1) in sec. 3 sub-secs. 2 (10) (j) 2 2 2 2 2 2 and 2 as well as in sec. 3 (3) (viii) and in sec 44 the conjunction and has been used while in respect of other grounds commas have been placed in between. In our judgment the construction which Mr. Desai would like us to place would lead to absurdity. The argument when taken to its logical end would mean that an individual who were to act in any manner prejudicial only to the defence of India but not also the civil defence would not be liable to be detained at all under rule 30 and also vice versa that is to say an individual whose act was in any manner prejudicial only to the civil defence and was not prejudicial to the defence of India also he could not be dealt with under rule 30. The reading of the various provisions of the Defence of India Act itself clearly indicates that the concepts of defence of India and civil defence are not treated as one and the same. It could not be so. The two concepts are entirely different and connote different situations; that becomes obvious from the definition given of civil defence in sec. 2 (a) of the Act which is as under: (A) `civil defence includes any measures not amounting to actual combat for affording defence against any form of hostile attack by a foreign power or for depriving any form of hostile attack by a foreign power of its effect either wholly or in part whether such measures are taken before during or after the time of the attack. Though it is an inclusive definition it definitely shows that civil defence includes measures which is something different from any measures that amount to actual combat The other provisions which also support the fact that the two concepts are differently treated by the Legislature are to be found in sec. 3 (23) and 3 (48) where civil defence only is referred to and the defence of India is not mentioned. Then in secs. 3 (41) 3 only defence of India is referred to. There is no manner of doubt that these two activities are separately treated and are meant to be different from each other. To emphasize the fact that the construction which we are called upon to place would lead to absurdity an illustration may be given. If an individual acts in a manner near the front-line where the armies are defending the borders of India which would put the defending army in a grave situation and if such a person is found out on the construction placed by Mr. Desai nothing can be done to him under rule 30 because his action is prejudicial only to the defence of India. Similarly if a person acts in a manner which would endanger the civil defence as defined by sec. 2 (a) he can also not be dealt with under rule 30 because his act is only prejudicial to the civil defence. We are in no doubt therefore that the construction we are called upon to place can only lead to an absurdity. 2 (a) he can also not be dealt with under rule 30 because his act is only prejudicial to the civil defence. We are in no doubt therefore that the construction we are called upon to place can only lead to an absurdity. It is true that ordinarily the use of conjunction and would lead to a construction as is suggested on behalf of the petitioners but in the present case such construction would not only lead to absurdity but would also lead to the negation of the very object for which these emergency measures have been enacted. In Maxwell on The Interpretation of Statutes 11 Edition at page 221 it has been observed as follows:-WHERE the language of a statute in its ordinary meaning and grammatical construction leads to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of the enactment or to some inconvenience or absurdity hardship or injustice presumably not intended a construction may be put upon it which modifies the meaning of the words and even the structure of the sentence. This may be done by departing from the rules of grammar by giving an unusual meaning to particular words by altering their collocation or by rejecting them altogether under the influence no doubt of an irresistible conviction that the legislature could not possibly have intended what its words signify and that the modifications thus made are mere corrections of careless language and really give the true meaning. Where the main object and intention of a statute are clear it must not be reduced to a nullity by the draftsman unskilfulness or ignorance of the law except in a case of necessity or the absolute intractability of the language used. In our view the word and should be read as or to avoid being led to a manifest contradiction of the apparent purpose of enactment and also to absurdity. Occasions have arisen when Courts have been compelled to read conjunction or for and in our view this is one of such cases. Again referring to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes in his 11th edition the following observations are found at page 229:to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions or and one for the other. There is one very significant illustration to be found in those given by the said author. Again referring to Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes in his 11th edition the following observations are found at page 229:to carry out the intention of the legislature it is occasionally found necessary to read the conjunctions or and one for the other. There is one very significant illustration to be found in those given by the said author. The Disabled Soldiers Act 1601 for instance in speaking of property to be employed for the maintenance of sick and maimed soldiers referred to soldiers who were either the one or the other and not only to those who were both. It is true that the substitution of the conjunctions has to be made for sufficient and compelling reasons only and in our judgment such a course is eminently indicated while construing the phrase defence of India and civil defence. ( 10 ) MR. Desai drew our attention to the decision of the Supreme Court in Rameshwar Shaw v. District Magistrate Burdwan and another A. I. R. 1964 S. C. 334 where it has been observed that when liberty of a person is concerned the provisions are to be strictly construed and safeguards are to be liberally interpreted. Keeping in mind the principle laid down also we are unable to accept the interpretation that Mr. Desai would have us put on the phrase aforesaid. He also drew our attention to Magor and St. Mellons Rural District Council v. Newport Corporation. 1951 All E. R. p. 839 wherein at page 841 Lord Simonds has while differing from the proposition laid down by Denning L. J. has observed that The duty of the court is to interpret the words that the legislature has used. Those words may be ambiguous but even if they are the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery are strictly limited. The proposition of Denning L. J. from which Lord Simonds expressed difference was that We sit here to find out the intention of Parliament and of Ministers and carry it out and we do this better by filling in the gaps and making sense of the enactment than by opening it up to destructive analysis. We are not called upon as a matter of fact to accept one or the other proposition referred to hereinabove. We are not called upon as a matter of fact to accept one or the other proposition referred to hereinabove. Confronted with the problem of a different nature as has been referred to by us here in above the accepted principles of interpretation of statutes make us come to the conclusion that the construction which the petitioners would like us to place cannot be placed. ( 11 ) THE next ground on which the impugned orders were challenged is that respondent No. 1 had not exercised his powers in accordance with the terms laid down in the notification Annexure B to the petition which was the source of his authority. It was submitted that condition No. 2 laid down in the said order was not complied with. As we have seen the said order authorises the District Magistrates to exercise powers under rule 30 of the Defence of India Rules but this authority has been given subject to three conditions and one of them was that a copy of any order made under any provisions of that rule shall be forwarded to the State Government as early as possible. The contention is than copy of the orders passed by respondent No. 1 ordering detention of the petitioners was sent as early as possible as required and therefore he had failed to carry out of the conditions laid down. His authority being a conditional one non-compliance with the condition must result in illegality of the order. It was urged that they have raised the ground specifically in their petitions and in the affidavits filed in reply to the respective petitions there was only a vague statement that the copy of the detention order was immediately forwarded to the State Government as required. As against this in the affidavit filed in rejoinder by the petitioners it was not admitted that the detention order was immediately forwarded to the State Government as required. That the first respondent had not given any particulars as regards the date on which the order was forwarded to the State Government. Though thereafter respondent No. 1 filed an affidavit in sur-rejoinder he has not cared to give the date or any other particulars to carry conviction that he had complied with the said condition by sending copies of the respective orders to the State Government as possible. Though thereafter respondent No. 1 filed an affidavit in sur-rejoinder he has not cared to give the date or any other particulars to carry conviction that he had complied with the said condition by sending copies of the respective orders to the State Government as possible. It is true that in neither of the affidavits filed by respondent No. 1 the particulars as regards the date on which it was sent has been stated or indicated. But the learned Assistant Government Pleader submitted that respondent No. 1 had definitely stated in his affidavit in reply that the copies of the detention orders were immediately forwarded to the State Government as required. He further submitted that he was prepared for the satisfaction of the Court to produce original letter itself which was sent by respondent No. 1 wherewith copies of respective orders detaining the petitioners were sent as soon as possible and as a matter of fact it was forwarded on the very day the orders were passed and they were received at the other end on the next day i. e. the 15th of September 1965. Mr. Desai on behalf of the petitioners strongly objected to any production or filing of an affidavit in support of the statement made by the learned Assistant Government Pleader. Ordinarily we would not have permitted the production of a new document or an affidavit at the stage of hearing on behalf of the respondent but in this particular case we do not find any hesitation to accept it on the record. In order to avoid any delay in the disposal of the petition this course is imminent and it also cannot prejudice in any manner whatever the cause of the petitioners. In this case when the petitioners raised the contention that the copies were not sent as early as possible it was categorically stated in reply that the copies were sent as early as possible. Therefore there is word against word. Here there is no question of production of any affidavit to prove any oral fact but here because of some vagueness in the statement and in order to satisfy our conscience that the copies were sent we called upon the Assistant Government Pleader to satisfy us of that fact. Therefore there is word against word. Here there is no question of production of any affidavit to prove any oral fact but here because of some vagueness in the statement and in order to satisfy our conscience that the copies were sent we called upon the Assistant Government Pleader to satisfy us of that fact. The original letter has been produced with the affidavit which prima facie showed that the copies were sent on the very day on which the orders were passed and it bears the original endorsement of receipt in the Secretariat on the 15th. It also shows that the letter was addressed with which the copies were sent to the Chief Secretary General Administration Department and a copy of the letter together with the copies of the orders was also sent to the Secretary of the Home and Civil Supplies Department. This leaves no manner of doubt that the condition was duly complied with. ( 12 ) MR. Desai then made an effort to raise one more contention that under rule 30a it was necessary for the respondent No. 1 forthwith to report the fact of the detention order to the reviewing authority. This important contention however was not at all raised by the petitioners in any of their petitions. Mr. Desai however drew our attention to the fact that the contention was raised at least in the affidavits in rejoinder filed by the petitioners and inspite of that no explanation was tendered by respondent No. 1 in his sur-rejoinder. This is true but this is an extremely important point which was tried to be raised for the first time in the affidavit in rejoinder by the petitioners and it would not be fair to permit that ground to be pressed before us. If it were the intention of the petitioners to raise a contention of that importance the petition ought to have been amended with our permission so that the respondent may have sufficient opportunity to meet it by production of necessary affidavits of officers concerned. It is obvious that if the respondents were to meet the point they would have to produce affidavits not only of the respondent No 1 but also of the officers who were the members of the reviewing authority or of persons in the know of what happened with the reviewing authority. It is obvious that if the respondents were to meet the point they would have to produce affidavits not only of the respondent No 1 but also of the officers who were the members of the reviewing authority or of persons in the know of what happened with the reviewing authority. It may be that in a proper case a contention raised in the affidavit in rejoinder by the petitioners may be allowed to be agitated and pressed if it can be shown that such a contention is not entirely alien to the contentions already raised in the petition. When these circumstances were pointed out to the learned advocate of the petitioners he fairly did not press the point any further. ( 13 ) THAT brings us to the last contention raised by the petitioners that the orders passed are based on extraneous matters and that they suffer from the stigma of mala fide. The Defence of India Act and the Rules framed thereunder have been enacted as emergency measures. Provisions are made thereunder to authorise the appropriate authorities with a view to prevent a person from acting to the detriment of public order and safety or defence of India to detain him without trial. The idea of a person being detained may appear to be reprehensible on the very face of it but in the larger interest of the security of the State such as the maintenance of peaceful conditions in the country. public order public safety defence of India etc. the Parliament has thought it necessary when a grave emergency arose to invest the competent authorities with such a power. It is now well established that satisfaction of the authority which would justify the use of the extra-ordinary power under rule 30 and the confirmation of the order of detention are not open to judicial review for such an order of detention is pre-eminently an executive act. Law only requires subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority as a condition precedent to the making of the order and if such condition is shown to exist the Courts have no power to inquire into the sufficiency of materials which is the basis of such order or the propriety of making such order. The result is that the satisfaction of the competent authority itself is determinative of the validity. The result is that the satisfaction of the competent authority itself is determinative of the validity. But even then Courts powers to look into questions which affect the procedural safeguards imposed by the statutes or to decide whether the power was exercised in compliance with the conditions precedent or to examine the allegation that the order was passed in a colourable exercise of the powers vested in him or on extraneous matters are not taken away. Within this narrow ambit the Court can come to the help of the subject. While this is so it is also well established that when it is alleged that the order was passed mala fide the onus is on the persons so alleging and unless a reasonable and specific foundation is laid which would prima facie indicate that the order has been so passed mala fide it would not be permissible to him to pray for setting aside such an order even under the jurisdiction of the High Court vested under article 226 or article 227 of the Constitution. The onus so laid on the party alleging mala fides is naturally heavy looking to the purpose and the circumstances under which the authority is vested with such extra-ordinary powers. But once such foundation is laid it certainly opens out a wide vista for the Court to investigate the manner and the circumstances in which the order is passed and to find out whether the order was passed mala fide for preventing the danger contemplated by rule 30. In the background of this position of law we shall have to examine the allegations made by the petitioners in this case of mala fides. ( 14 ) [ His Lordship after discussing the facts on record held that the petitioners had not been able to discharge the burden which lay on them to establish a foundation even on which they would be justified to rely for supporting their allegations of mala fides. ] ( 15 ) NO other contentions were raised before us by Mr. Desai in support of the petitions and having given our anxious consideration to all the points that he has raised we find that all the petitions must fail. The petitions a re dismissed. Rules discharged. Petitions dismissed. .