JUDGMENT Gangeshwar Prasad, J. - The question involved in this appeal is one of limitation. 2. The facts which are no longer in dispute are that between 25-6-1951 and 16-4-1952 the plaintiff supplied to the defendant various consignments of bricks required by the latter for the construction of his house. The total price of the bricks supplied was Rs. 3,002/2/- and the payments made by the defendant from time to time amounted to Rs. 1,370/-. 3. These payments included a sum of Rs. 100/- paid by the defendant on 24-12-1953 by means of a cheque. The plaintiff filed the suit which has given rise to this appeal for the recovery of Rs. 1,793/2/. due to him as balance of price including interest thereon. The suit was filed on 22-12-1956 and it was claimed by the plaintiff that limitation was saved on account of the above payment of Rs. 100/-. The defendant contested the claim. The trial court dismissed the suit as barred by time but on appeal the lower appellate court held the suit to be within time and passed a decree in favour of the plaintiff for the amount sued for. The defendant has come up in appeal to this Court. The only point in controversy now is whether the payment of Rs. 100/- extended limitation for recovery of the price due in respect of the consignments. 4. In their arguments before me the learned counsel for the parties agreed that the suit is governed by Article 52 of the Limitation Act, but they differed about what should be regarded as the starting point of limitation in the circumstances of the case. On behalf of the plaintiff it was urged that the supplies made by him were parts of a single continuous transaction of sale which was completed when the last consignment was delivered to the defendant on 16-4-1952, and that date should be taken as the date of the delivery of the goods within the meaning of Article 52 of the Limitation Act. The contention for the defendant, on the other hand, was that the delivery of each consignment constituted a separate sale, and limitation for the recovery of the price of each consignment started as soon as that particular consignment was delivered. The contention for the defendant, on the other hand, was that the delivery of each consignment constituted a separate sale, and limitation for the recovery of the price of each consignment started as soon as that particular consignment was delivered. Since the suit was filed beyond three years from the delivery of even the last consignment, the question of the commencement of the period of limitation may at first sight seem to be of little significance because the case should turn only on the efficacy of the payment for the purpose of giving a fresh start of limitation. But, as will appear later, the question assumes importance also in deciding whether the payment could in fact give a fresh start of limitation. 5. It is not the case of the plaintiff that he placed with the defendant an order for a specific quantity of bricks and that it was agreed between him and the defendant that price would become payable after the entire quantity has been delivered. If that had been the nature of the transaction, no delivery could have made price payable or constituted delivery of the goods within the meaning of Article 52 of the Limitation Act unless, by itself or along with preceding deliveries, it had the effect of completing the execution of the order. It may be that the defendant intended to purchase from the plaintiff the entire quantity of bricks which he might need for the construction of his house and the plaintiff too intended to supply it; but that by itself could not make the various deliveries parts of one continuous whole. There may have been a continuity in the deliveries in the sense that there was a series of dealings between the parties covering a number of deliveries; but the deliveries could not merely on that account form parts of one whole, and each of them remained separate and distinct. The result was that the price of each consignment delivered to the defendant became payable at once. Under Sec. 32 of the Sale of Goods Act delivery of goods and payment of price are, unless otherwise agreed, concurrent conditions and no contrary agreement, either express or implied, existed in the present case. The result was that the price of each consignment delivered to the defendant became payable at once. Under Sec. 32 of the Sale of Goods Act delivery of goods and payment of price are, unless otherwise agreed, concurrent conditions and no contrary agreement, either express or implied, existed in the present case. In fact the plaintiff has clearly stated in the plaint that the cause of action for the suit arose on various dates between 25-6-1951 and 16-4-1952 when the plaintiff supplied bricks to the defendant, and he has admitted in his statement that it was agreed that payment would be made by the defendant as and when bricks would be delivered to him. It cannot, consequently, be doubted that limitation for recovery of the price of each delivery started running on the date on which it was made. 6. In Abdul Aziz v. Munna Lal, A.I.R. 1921 Alld. 325 it was observed by a Division Bench of this Court that in the case of a tradesman's action the liability to pay for each item of goods delivered, either day by day or week by week, is in the case of each item the date of the delivery of that particular item. This view was followed in two Division Bench cases of this Court, viz., Firm Puttu Lal Kunji Lal v. Firm B. Jagannath, A.I.R. 1935 Alld. 53 and Firm Gulabrai Narain Das v. Firm Ilahi Bux Mohammad Ayub, A.I.R. 1945 Alld. 185. A similar view was expressed in Atmaram Vinayat Kirtikar v. Lalji Lakhami, A.I.R. 1940 Bom. 158. The position, therefore, was that with each unpaid for delivery there came into existence a separate debt, and there were as many debts payable by the defendant to the plaintiff as the number of such deliveries made by the plaintiff to the defendant. 7. What has now to be considered is whether the payment of Rs. 100/- made by the defendant on 24-12-1953 had the effect of extending limitation for the claim of the plaintiff. This payment was by a cheque and it is not disputed that the cheque was signed by the defendant. The trial court was of the view that since there was nothing to indicate for which consignment the payment was made it was not possible to regard the claim in respect of any consignment as saved from limitation. This payment was by a cheque and it is not disputed that the cheque was signed by the defendant. The trial court was of the view that since there was nothing to indicate for which consignment the payment was made it was not possible to regard the claim in respect of any consignment as saved from limitation. The lower appellate court, however, came to the conclusion that the payment was towards the price due for all the unpaid for consignments and had, therefore, the effect of extending the period of limitation for the whole claim in suit. It was contended by the learned counsel for the defendant that the conclusion reached by the lower appellate court was not correct and in support of his contention the learned counsel relied on the Allahabad cases already referred to above. 8. Abdul Aziz v. Munna Lal, A.I.R. 1921 Alld. 325 was a case in which a tradesman brought a suit against a customer for goods sold and delivered. The Small Cause Court Judge who tried the case found that on each date that the customer made a purchase he also made a certain payment without giving any direction that the payment should be credited to the purchase of that day and observed that the plaintiff had, therefore, the option to credit the payment to the entire balance due up to that date. In revision against the judgment of the Small Cause Court Judge, this Court held that where the trial Judge had gone wrong was that he had treated such a payment as a payment which took every item out of the mischief of the statute of limitation, and the court remanded the case with the following observation: `Unless part payments have been made in respect of each of these items within the meaning of the statute of limitation so as to take the items out of the three years limit, each item in respect of which no such payment has been made ought to be struck out of the defendant's account. The principle emerging from the decision is that the amount due for each item of delivery needs a part payment towards it for extending limitation for its recovery and the mere fact that a payment has been made subsequent to a number of deliveries in a series of transactions does not make it ipso facto operate as part payment towards the amount due in respect of all preceding deliveries. In Firm Puttu Lal Kunji Lal v. Firm B. Jagannath, A.I.R. 1935 Alld. 53 the principle laid down in the above case was followed and it was said: `The plaintiff in a case like this is of course entitled to appropriate the payment to the earlier items in the accounts but not to credit them to the entire balance due up to that date in the sense of saving limitation for each and every item'. The principle was reaffirmed in Firm Gulabrai Narain Das v. Firm Ilahi Bux Mohammad Ayub, A.I.R. 1945 Alld. 185. There is, however, one feature of the last case which is worthy of note in judging its applicability to the instant case. The payment which was relied upon in that case for extending limitation was under an endorsement made presumably by or on behalf of the plaintiff and signed by one of the defendants and it was made during the continuance of the dealings between the parties. On these authorities it must be held that before a payment can have the effect of extending the period of limitation in respect of any item in a series of sales and deliveries of goods the payment should be towards that particular item. 9. Again it is obvious that the creditors power of appropriation in respect of a payment made by a debtor cannot, for the purpose of extending limitation, impart to it the character of a payment towards the debt to which it is appropriated. Appropriation by the creditor is the exercise of an option by him, whereas payment which can extend limitation has to be the exercise of an option by the debtor. Unless the debtor intends to make part payment towards a particular debt, limitation for the recovery of that debt is not extended by the fact that the creditor has the option to appropriate the payment to that debt and has actually exercised that option. Secs. Unless the debtor intends to make part payment towards a particular debt, limitation for the recovery of that debt is not extended by the fact that the creditor has the option to appropriate the payment to that debt and has actually exercised that option. Secs. 59 and 60 of the Contract Act lay it down in clear terms that the creditors option comes into play only when the debtors option does not appear to have been exercised. Appropriation made by the creditor in exercise of the power given to him has, therefore, the effect of only extinguishing or reducing a debt which he chooses to regard as extinguished or reduced by applying to it a payment made by the debtor, but it cannot give a new start of limitation to a debt. In short, it is payment made towards a debt and not mere appropriation to it by the creditor that extends limitation. 10. But the fact that a payment was made towards a particular debt does not necessarily require for its proof an express declaration by the debtor, and like any other fact it may be established from circumstances. Under Sec. 20 of the Limitation Act a payment, in order that it may give a fresh start of limitation, has only to be made and not to be also expressed to be made on account of a debt. If, therefore, the circumstances lead to the inference that a payment made by a debtor was really made towards all the debts which had become payable on account of sales and deliveries of goods made to him from time to time the limitation for each one of the debts will be extended by such a payment. In such a case while the original starting point of limitation for the recovery of the price of each item of goods sold and delivered would certainly be the date of delivery of that particular item, the limitation in respect of each of them would receive a fresh start on account of a payment towards each. And whether or not a particular payment was a payment of this kind is a question of fact. Reference may here be made to the case of Sukhdeo Prasad Baldeo Prasad v. Michael, Christian, A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 266 the case on which the lower appellate court has relied. And whether or not a particular payment was a payment of this kind is a question of fact. Reference may here be made to the case of Sukhdeo Prasad Baldeo Prasad v. Michael, Christian, A.I.R. 1938 Nag. 266 the case on which the lower appellate court has relied. In that case Niyogi, J. held : "If more debts than one are due and a payment is made which is not specifically appropriated (by the debtor) it is a question of fact in respect of which debt the payment was made: see Halsbury's Laws for England, Vol. 20, p. 637, S. 807, Edn. II." (Words in brackets mine). 11. In the above case, after referring to the decisions of this Court in Abdul Aziz v. Munna Lal, A.I.R. 1921 Alld. 325 and Firm Puttu Lal Kunji Lal v. Firm B. Jagannath, A.I.R. 1935 Alld. 53 Niyogi, J. observed that in those decisions the principle that the creditor is not entitled to credit the payment made by the debtor towards the entire balance found due on the date of payment so as to save limitation for each item was too broadly stated without qualification. But I may, with respect, say that what was laid down in the aforesaid Allahabad decisions was that the creditors appropriation of a payment to the balance due from the debtor would not, by itself, make it a payment towards all the debts which have gone to make the balance, and it was nowhere suggested that even if a payment is found to have been made towards all the items it would not extend limitation for all of them. The principle laid down in the Nagpur case is, therefore, not at all in conflict with what was held in the Allahabad cases. The question really is whether a payment was made towards all the items which were due at the time of the payment, and the finding on this question may be a matter of inference from circumstances also. The principle laid down in the Nagpur case is, therefore, not at all in conflict with what was held in the Allahabad cases. The question really is whether a payment was made towards all the items which were due at the time of the payment, and the finding on this question may be a matter of inference from circumstances also. I may here reproduce a passage from U. N. Mitra's Law of Limitation Volume I quoted in the Nagpur case (the passage being an extract from Darby and Bosanquet Edition II p. 710) : "This appropriation need not be proved by any express declaration of the debtor at the time of the payment but any expression used by him, either before or after that time, or any other circumstances from which it may be inferred that the payment was intended to be appropriated to any particular debt or debts, or was made on account of all the debts collectively will be sufficient or the purpose. It must be observed that if the evidence shows that the payment was made on account of all, it will prevent any of the debts being barred by statute." 12. I may also point out that under Secs. 59 and 60 of the Contract Act too an express intimation of an appropriation by a debtor is not necessary and here may be circumstances indicating to which debt a payment is to be applied. 13. The net result for this discussion is that the question involved in the appeal resolves itself into a question of fact, namely, whether the payment of Rs. 100/- made by the defendant was towards what he owed in respect of each item of goods delivered to him. The judgment of the lower appellate court shows that the lower appellate court correctly appreciated the legal position in regard to the question of limitation and it was alive to what was required to be proved for saving the plaintiff's claim from the bar of limitation. As such, the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court must be regarded as binding in second appeal. Even if the finding is only in the nature of an inference Tom facts it would still be a finding if fact : vide Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. I. T. Commissioner, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 49. As such, the finding of fact recorded by the lower appellate court must be regarded as binding in second appeal. Even if the finding is only in the nature of an inference Tom facts it would still be a finding if fact : vide Shree Meenakshi Mills Ltd. v. I. T. Commissioner, A.I.R. 1957 S.C. 49. The basis of the finding of the lower appellate court on the nature of the payment made by the defendant may be quoted in full from its judgment: "The plaintiff filed the original reply of the defendant per list 26C and the defendant filed a copy per list 17C to plaintiff earlier notice. The reply is dated 24-9-53. The said three payments were made long thereafter on 24-12-53, 17-8-55 and 24-12-55. This reply, though admitted, was not exhibited and appears to have escaped the notice of the learned Munsif. The defendant therein complained that in the notice the plaintiff had not mentioned either the figure of bricks or the payments made by cheque or in cash and it was the duty of the plaintiff to give a detail of the number, quality, value and rate of the bricks, to have adjusted the amounts received and to have made the demand from the defendant of the balance, if any. In these terms the defendant implicitly admitted that he was receiving bricks from the plaintiff from time to time, was making payment from time to time, desired that the plaintiff should consolidate his claim in respect of all the bricks, adjust the payments made by him, and thereafter make a claim of the entire balance due on such consolidated claim. The defendant in the notice further said that the plaintiff had approached him on 15th September 1953 and had agreed that the plaintiff would submit a proper account of the bricks, settle the rates and settle the accounts in accordance with the vouchers signed by the defendant. If after these assertions in has notice the defendant made payments, they could not but be deemed to be the payments made in respect of all the earlier items, as found in the Nagpur case. The plaintiff stated on oath that the payment of Rs. 100/- was made towards the account of bricks. There is no evidence to the contrary and the defendant did not enter the witness-box. The plaintiff stated on oath that the payment of Rs. 100/- was made towards the account of bricks. There is no evidence to the contrary and the defendant did not enter the witness-box. On the totality of the evidence, therefore, it appears that the defendant intended to make the aforesaid 3 payments towards the consolidated amount due from him and that the plaintiff did not appropriate the amounts towards the earlier items of the bricks supplied." 14. I may mention that there were two other payments relied upon by the plaintiff, but those payments do not appear to have been acknowledged in any writing signed by the defendant and they could not, therefore, extend limitation. So far, however, as the payment of Rs. 100/- made by cheque on 24-12-1953 was concerned there is no doubt that on the finding of the lower appellate court it extended limitation in respect of all the items in suit. The basis of the finding recorded by the lower appellate court cannot be said to be faulty and, at any rate, there is nothing in it to warrant interference in second appeal. The payment of Rs. 100/- on 24-12-1953 having been made towards all the unpaid for items the entire claim of the plaintiff is in time and the suit has been rightly decreed. 15. The appeal fails and it is accordingly dismissed with costs. Appeal dismissed.