JUDGMENT S.D. Khare, J. - This is a writ petition filed by the Pradhan of Gram Sabha Malipur, tahsil and district Fatehpur and is directed against an order dated 16-12-1965 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer, fatehpur (Respondent No. 1) by which he (1) suspended the Pradhan pending enquiry against him of accusations involving moral turpitude, and (2) appointed the Block Development Officer, Bhitaura, Respondent No. 2, as enquiring officer and directed that he should frame charges, call the explanation of the Pradhan and submit his finding within one month. 2. The Petitioner sought the relief that the order dated 16-12-1965 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer be quashed and the Block Development Officer (Respondent No. 2) be restrained from making any enquiry against him. 3. After having heard learned Counsel for the Petitioner and examined the writ petition we dismissed it in limine on 24-2-1966, but mentioned in our order that we shall state the reasons later. We now proceed to give our reasons for dismissing the writ petition. 4. The averments made in the writ petition show that the Petitioner was elected Pradhan of Gram Sabha Malipur in the year 1957 and was re elected to the same office in the year 1961. During his term of the office from 1957 to 1961 an amount of Rs. 700/- was received from the Bithaura Development Block for the construction of a Panchayat Bhawan. The Petitioner was accused of having mi;-appropriated a part of that money while constructing the Panchayat Bhawan. According to the Petitioner the accusation was false. However, after perusing the report of the Block Development Officer, Bithaura, the Sub-Divisional Officer was prima facie satisfied that there was some substance in the accusations. He, therefore, passed the following order: Seen the report of B.D.O. Bithaura. The charges against the Pradhan are quite serious and amount to moral turpitude. In view of the seriousness of the charge, it appears prima facie that charge of embezzlement stands against the Pradhan Babu Ram Tripathi. As such I do not consider it necessary to call for his explanation before he is placed under suspension. The order dated 16-12-1965 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer has been challenged on the following grounds: (a) The accusations relate to acts by the Pradhan during his previous term of office 1957 to 1961. As such I do not consider it necessary to call for his explanation before he is placed under suspension. The order dated 16-12-1965 passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer has been challenged on the following grounds: (a) The accusations relate to acts by the Pradhan during his previous term of office 1957 to 1961. He could not be suspended during his present term for the alleged acts done during the last term. (b) The State Government could not delegate its powers to the Sub-Divisional Officer. (c) The Sub-Divisional Officer could not delegate his powers co his subordinate, the Block Development Officer, by entrusting the enquiry to him. (d) Even the State Government did not have the power to suspend the Pradhan pending enquiry. Sections 95, 95-A, 96 and 96-A of the Panchayat Raj Act are contained is Chapter VII which deals with external control which the State Government can exercise over the Panchayat. The relevant portion of Section 95 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act reads as follows: (i) The State Government may-- (g) suspend or remove a member of a Gaon Panchayat....an officer bearer of a Gaon Sabha....if he.... (ii) refuses to act or become incapable of acting for any reason whatsoever or if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude.... The term "offence" has not been defined in the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. It has, however, been defined in the U.P. General Clauses Act as follows: "Offence" shall mean an act or omission made punishable by any law for the time being in force. 5. Section 96-A provides that the State Government may delegate all or any of its powers under this Act to any officer or authority subordinate to it may deem fit to impose. The fact that the powers of the State Government u/s 95 have been delegated to all the Sub-Divisional Officers is not disputed and is mentioned in paragraph 12 of the writ petition. 6. There is absolutely no substance in the first three grounds of the writ petition. It is abundantly clear from the provisions of Section 96-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act that the State Government may delegate its powers u/s 95 of the said Act to any officer subordinate to it. 6. There is absolutely no substance in the first three grounds of the writ petition. It is abundantly clear from the provisions of Section 96-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act that the State Government may delegate its powers u/s 95 of the said Act to any officer subordinate to it. The State Government has already delegated its powers to suspend u/s 95(1)(g) to all Sub-Divisional Officer (vide Notification No. 4488-p. XXXIII-50-57, dated 9th May, 1958, published in the U.P. gazette of 17th May, 1958). Thus the Sub-Divisional Officer was fully authorised to pass the order of suspension by virtue of the delegation made in his favour. Section 95(1)(g) does not require that the accusation in respect of an offence involving moral turpitude should be in respect of the current terms of office. In order to exercise the power of suspension it is enough if the office-bearer of a Gaon Sabha is accused of an offence involving moral turpitude and the Sub-Divisional Officer is prima facie satisfied that there is some substance in the accusation. The fact that the alleged offence related to the previous term of the Pradhan is, therefore, wholly immaterial. The contention that the Sub-Divisional Officer has delegated his power to the Block Development Officer inasmuch as he had asked the latter to conduct an enquiry is without any substance. In fact no such delegation of power is involved in the order of the Sub-Divisional Officer. The Block Development Officer, who is subordinate to the Sub Divisional Officer, has been asked merely to conduct an enquiry. After the enquiry has been completed the report will have to be submitted to the Sub-Divisional Officer who will consider it and then himself pass final orders, after giving necessary opportunity to the parties concerned. No irregularity has so far been committed. Merely asking a subordinate officer to conduct enquiry cannot be interpreted to mean that the Sub-Divisional Officer has delegated his powers u/s 95(1)(g) to the Block Development Officer. 7. No irregularity has so far been committed. Merely asking a subordinate officer to conduct enquiry cannot be interpreted to mean that the Sub-Divisional Officer has delegated his powers u/s 95(1)(g) to the Block Development Officer. 7. The fourth ground raised in the writ petition that even the State Government could not have suspended the Pradhan during; the course of an enquiry against him is also without any force, but has to be considered in greater detail because the learned Counsel for the Petitioner has relied on certain observations made by a Division Bench of this Court in unreported case of Shambhoo Narain Singh v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Sadar, Faizabad Sp. A. No. 93 of 1963. However, before referring to the case-law on the subject we would like to examine the provision of Section 95(1)(g) in some detail. That section provides for suspension or removal of an office-bearer of a Gaon Sabha if he is accused of an offence involving moral turpitude. It is clear from the averments made to the writ petition itself that the Pradhan was accused of an offence involving moral turpitude. However the contention is that he could not be suspended by the Sub-Divisional Officer because-- (a) till the date the order of suspension was passed he was not accused of any offence involving moral turpitude in any court of law, and (b) the intention of the legislature in enacting Section 95(1)(g) appears to be that there should be no suspension pending enquiry; it is only after a complaint had been filed in a court of law or a charge that had been framed in a court of law that the Pradhan of a Gaon Sabha could be suspended u/s 95(1)(g) of the UP Panchayat Raj Act. 8. A plain reading of the relevant portions of Section 95(1)(g) does not support this contention raised by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner. It authorises the State Government (or the Sub-Divisional Officer to whom the powers have been delegated u/s 95A) to suspend the Pradhan, who is an office-bearer of a Gaon Sabha, "if he is accused of...an offence involving moral turpitude". There is nothing in Section 95(1)(g) to limit the scope of the powers of the Sub-Divisional Officer in that respect only to cases where accusation had been made or charge had been framed in a court of law. 9. There is nothing in Section 95(1)(g) to limit the scope of the powers of the Sub-Divisional Officer in that respect only to cases where accusation had been made or charge had been framed in a court of law. 9. The word 'offence' has not been defined in the UP Panchayat Raj Act. The definition of the term "offence" as given in the UP General Clauses Act will, therefore, apply to the provisions of UP Panchayat Raj Act. An act or omission can be made punishable before a domestic tribunal under the relevant provisions of any Act. A Sub-Divisional Officer may not, in certain cases, regard it proper to institute a criminal case against a Pradhan and may proceed against him only under the provisions of Section 95(1)(g). He can, therefore, pass an order of suspension after he is satisfied that the Pradhan is accused before him of an offence involving moral turpitude. However, after doing so, he is not debarred from instituting a further enquiry to satisfy himself whether the punishment of removal be inflicted under some other clause of Section 95(1) or a complaint be filed before a court of law. 10. Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 which provides for suspension or removal deals with six contingencies in which such an order may be passed. 10. Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 which provides for suspension or removal deals with six contingencies in which such an order may be passed. These are if the office bearer-- (1) absents himself without sufficient cause from more than three consecutive meetings or sittings; (2) refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reason whatsoever; (3) is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude; (4) has abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by the Act or rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest; (5) being a Sahayak Sarpanch or Sarpanch of the Nyaya Panchayat takes active part in politics; or (6) suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (a) to (m) of Section 5-A. Where an office-bearer of a Gaon Sabha refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reason whatsoever (vide Clause (ii)) or has abused his position as such or has persistently failed to perform the duties imposed by the Act or the rules made thereunder or his continuance as such is not desirable in public interest (vide Clause (iii)) of suffers from any of the disqualifications mentioned in Clauses (a) to (m) of Section 5-A of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act (vide Clause (v)), the only appropriate order that can be passed against him after enquiry will be that of removal. On the other hand, no case for the removal of a Pradhan can generally be made out if he is merely accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude. The accusation might turn out to be false and charge might remain wholly unsubstantiated. In such circumstances the intention of the Legislature could only be to suspend the office bearer and not to remove him at that stage. 11. Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 is a composite provision and deals with (a) cases in which the office bearer of a Gaon Sabha should appropriately be suspended and not removed and also with (b) cases where he may, on the establishment of the accusation made against him, be removed from the office. 11. Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 is a composite provision and deals with (a) cases in which the office bearer of a Gaon Sabha should appropriately be suspended and not removed and also with (b) cases where he may, on the establishment of the accusation made against him, be removed from the office. For example "where he refuses to act or becomes incapable of acting for any reason whatsoever" the power of removal may be exercised, but "if he is accused of or charged for an offence involving moral turpitude" he might more appropriately be suspended and not removed. Although both the powers--removal and suspension--have been mentioned in the beginning of the said clause the intention of the Legislature must be to exercise one or the other as the circumstances of the case justify. 12. In the present case we are concerned only with the interpretation of sub-Clause (ii) of Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 of the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act. A mere perusal of that clause leaves no doubt that the order of suspension can be passed by the Sub-Divisional Officer as soon as he is prima facie satisfied that the office bearer of a Gaon Sabha is accused of an offence involving moral turpitude. 13. This was the view taken by a Bench of this Court in the unreported case of Mohammad Yasin v. Sub-Divisional Officer, Chandauli West, Varanasi Sp. A. No. 3603 (?) of 1963. It was observed in that case that "the second prayer for quashing the order of suspension was urged before us by learned Counsel for the Appellant on the ground that u/s 95 of the UP Panchayat Raj Act the order of suspension can only be made after the enquiry is completed and the authority concerned has arrived at a final finding of fact which would justify an order of suspension being made against him and that no such order of suspension can be made pending enquiry. We are unable to accept this submission. We are unable to accept this submission. Section 95 of the UP Panchayat Raj Act specifically permits an order of suspension as well as removal to be made in the circumstances indicated by the charges and if there can be an order of suspension and removal, we see no reason why a suspension pending final orders could not be directed after the appropriate authority had prima facie satisfied itself that the action was justified." 14. The reasoning given by the Division Bench of this Court in the case of Mohammad Yasin (supra) is fully applicable to the facts of the present case. The Sub-Divisional Officer has in his order clearly indicated that he was prima facie satisfied that the accusation had some substance and a charge shall have to be framed. 15. The learned Counsel for the Petitioner has invited our attention to certain observations made in the unreported case of Shambhoo Narain Singh v. Sub-Divisional Officer Sadar Faizabad (supra). The Appellant in that case was the Pradhan of Gaon Samaj and officio Chairman of the Land Management Committee of the village. The Sub-Divisional Officer on 19-9-1963 passed an order to the effect that the Pradhan be placed under suspension with immediate effect and mentioned in it that a charge sheet would follow. It was not stated in the order on what grounds that order had been passed. There was also no mention in the order that the Pradhan was accused of an offence involving moral turpitude and the accusation appeared to be prima facie correct. Nearly one month after that order had been passed a charge was framed against the Pradhan and it was served upon his father on 28-10-1963. The writ petition was filed on 7-10- 1963. On 6-11-1963 the counsel for the Petitioner made a statement that no charge had been served on the Petitioner. The learned Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition was of the opinion that the statement made by the Petitioner's counsel on 6-11-1963 was not absolutely correct and that it was not a fit case in which he should use his discretionary powers to grant relief. The learned Single Judge, who dismissed the writ petition was of the opinion that the statement made by the Petitioner's counsel on 6-11-1963 was not absolutely correct and that it was not a fit case in which he should use his discretionary powers to grant relief. While hearing the special appeal the Division Bench of this Court came to the conclusion that it-could be that on 6-11-1963 when the Petitioner's counsel made the statement that no service of any charge had been made on the Petitioner till that date he was not aware of the service that had been effected on the father of the Petitioner. In that connection it was observed that: Moreover, whether a charge sheet was served upon the Appellant or not was absolutely irrelevant because u/s 95(1)(g) a Pradhan cannot be suspended during an inquiry into a charge against him. So even he could not be suspended. While discussing the merits of the petition it was again observed that the Sub-Divisional Officer had an authority to suspend the Appellant during the pendency of an enquiry into the charge against him and that he could suspend him only by way of punishment as provided in Section 95(1)(g), as the Act contained no provision authorising suspension pending enquiry into a charge. 16. In the case before the Division Bench there was nothing on the record to show that on the date the order of suspension was passed the Pradhan was either accused of ah offence involving moral turpitude or was charged with such an offence. There is no mention of any such accusation anywhere and the charge against him was framed nearly one month after the order of suspension was passed. Therefore the requisite conditions under which the order of suspension could have been passed were missing in that case. The order of suspension on the day it was passed was, therefore, wholly unjustified and had to be quashed. For the purposes of that Special Appeal it was not at all essential to consider whether or not an order of suspension pending enquiry into a charge could be passed by a Sub-Divisional Officer. The observations made in the Special Appeal and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, therefore, (a) are in the nature of obiter dictum and (b) must be read in the context of the peculiar facts of the case. The observations made in the Special Appeal and relied upon by the learned Counsel for the Petitioner, therefore, (a) are in the nature of obiter dictum and (b) must be read in the context of the peculiar facts of the case. The observations could only mean that no suspension order could be passed while an enquiry was being made prior to the making of an accusation or proving of a charge. 17. It is true that the U.P. Panchayat Raj Act does not provide for an order of suspension pending enquiry. However, it does not provide for an order of suspension once an accusation is made against an office bearer of a Gaon Sabha in respect of an offence involving moral turpitude. Sub-clause (ii) of Clause (g) of Sub-section (1) of Section 95 no where says that the accusation must be made in a criminal court are found to be correct, before an office bearer of a Gaon Sabha can be suspended. It, therefore, follows that the only requisite conditions for passing an order of suspension u/s 95(1)(g) are that (1) there should be an accusation of or charge for an offence involving moarl turpitude and (2) the Sub-Divisional Officer should be of the opinion that in view of that accusation or charge it is necessary to suspend the office bearer of a Gaon Sabha. 18. There is no merit in this writ petition.