Natesan, J.- These cases arise out of a charge-sheet laid before the Special Judge, Madras division, by the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption Madras on 5th October, 1964 against P. Sirajuddin, Retired Chief Engineer Highways and Rural Works, Madras, under section 165, Indian Penal Code and section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1)(b) and (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, (II of 1947) and taken on file as Calendar Case No. 10 of 1964 by the Special Judge. The petitioner is charged, to be brief, with having habitually obtained for himself and members of his family valuable things from his subordinate officers without consideration or for inadequate consideration or securing pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means or by abusing his position as public servant. Nineteen instances are enumerated in the charge-sheet between the period 3rd January, 1961, and 14th March, 1964. He is alleged, for instance, to have directed another officer working under him to get a suit length of imported variety of cloth and for its cost of Rs. 390 paid Rs. 200 only and asked the Subordinate Officer to make good the balance by adjustment in the departmental nominal muster rolls. Similarly he had a new Rolex Oyster date wrist watch from his subordinate without paying for it, the cost to be taken by manipulation of the nominal muster rolls. He got amenities like white-washing and F.O.L. done to his house by his subordinates. For our present purpose it is needless to detail the charges. Before the matter was taken up by the Special Judge for consideration, an application, Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 86 of 1964, was filed by the petitioner praying that he may be discharged under section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code. On this application, the learned Special Judge, while holding that there was no basis or material for charging the petitioner under section 165, Indian Penal Code or under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1)(b) of the Prevention of Corruption-Act held that a charge could be framed against the accused under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Against the said order dated 16th January, 1965, the Public Prosecutor has preferred Criminal Revisional Case No. 294 of 1965, under sections 435 and 439, Criminal Procedure Code The petitioner has preferred Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 934 of 1065 under section 561-A, Criminal Procedure Code for quashing the proceedings and discharge the petitioner, as the charge against him was groundless. Writ Petition No. 391 of 1965, is for the issue of a writ of certiorari or other appropriate writ or direction under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing the order inCriminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 86 of 1964, directing the framing of the charge under section 5 (2) read with section 5 (1)(d) of Act II of 1947. Writ Petition No. 390 of 1965, relating to the same proceedings is for the issue of a writ of mandamus or other appropriate direction or order directing the Director of Vigilance and AntiCorruption, to forbear from prosecuting Calender Case No. 10 of 1964. The writ petitions are sought to be maintained as providing the only effective remedy in the circumstances alleged. It is submitted that this is one of those cases where there has been such a violent departure from the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code in the matter of investigation and cognizance of offences as to amount to denial of justice and call for interference by the issue of prerogative writs. In the several affidavits filed averments are made that the investigation and prosecution are wholly mala fide and groundless and have been set afoot by the Officer immediately next in-rank to the petitioner, Sivasankara Mudaliar, Superintending Engineer, Madras. It is alleged that the petitioner was to retire on the 14th of March, 1964 and in the normal course he would have been retained till he completed the age of 58 years, that the circumstances ana sequence of events revealed that the aforesaid gentleman had used his influence with the Chief Minister of the State to get the petitioner retired, and that not content with it he is harassing him further. It is stated that the petitioner during the course of his official duties had to find fault with this gentlemen, and that he had nurtured grievance against the petitioner on account. It is stated that the petitioner during the course of his official duties had to find fault with this gentlemen, and that he had nurtured grievance against the petitioner on account. Several serious irregularities during the investigation are listed and it is contended that from the records it will be clear that the petitioner is being specifically singled out and discriminated against. The two writ petitions, criminal revision case and criminal miscellaneous petition were all heard together and no objection as to the maintainability of the writ petitions was taken before us by the learned Advocate General appearing for the prosecution. In the affidavit in support of his petition for the issue of a writ of mandamus, the petitioner avers that from the copy of the statements furnished under section 173 (4), Criminal Procedure Code, he found that 18 public servants have stated that they have given him valuables for no or inadequate consideration, and that at his instance for the purpose of reimbursing themselves they had deliberately committed offences of criminal conspiracy under section 120-B, Indian Penal Code, criminal breach of trust of Government money under section 409, Indian Penal Code, falsification of accounts under section 477-A, Indian penal Code, forgery of public records under section 466, Indian Penal Code, and also offences under section 5 (1) (c) and section 5 (1) (d) read with section 5 (2) of Act II of 1947. The petitioner states that the charges against him depend upon the statements of these subordinate officers in service and in their statements they admit their reimbursing themselves by manipulating departmental accounts. The petitioner charges the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption with obtaining signed statements, which are confessional and self-incriminating from the witnesses giving them assurance of immunity. The petitioner states that the charges against him depend upon the statements of these subordinate officers in service and in their statements they admit their reimbursing themselves by manipulating departmental accounts. The petitioner charges the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption with obtaining signed statements, which are confessional and self-incriminating from the witnesses giving them assurance of immunity. The assurances are in common form and the operative portion runs thus: "This is to affirm on behalf of the Government of Madras, and its officers, that in respect of any criminal or departmental offence disclosed in any true but inculpatory statement made by any official or non-official relating to enquiries into allegations of corruption against a certain public servant, no criminal prosecution will be launched by the police or by any other Government agencies and no other departmental action likely adversely to affect the deponent will be launched against any official or non-official making such true statements to facts, within his or her personal knowledge." In the principal affidavit in Writ Petition No. 390 of 1965, it was categorically stated that the petitioner had every reason to believe that assurances in this form have been given to the 18 public servants from whom statements have been recorded at the investigation. Charging that the procedure that has been adopted is in the circumstances a deliberate violation by devious means of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code relating to confessions and pardons to secure a definite end, it is submitted that the investigation is wholly illegal. Complaining that the procedure is a device for manufacturing a case against the petitioner at the instigation of higher authorities, it is stated that here is a clear case of discrimination by the State and the police leaving out other persons who are guilty on their own statements and prosecuting the petitioner only. The malice and mala fides, it is stated are apparent. More it is pointed out that by securing sanction to prosecute the petitioner when no sanction is necessary, the petitioner being a retired Government servant when the charge-sheet was filed, an air of reality and solemnity is designedly sought to be given to the proceeding. The malice and mala fides, it is stated are apparent. More it is pointed out that by securing sanction to prosecute the petitioner when no sanction is necessary, the petitioner being a retired Government servant when the charge-sheet was filed, an air of reality and solemnity is designedly sought to be given to the proceeding. A part from the question of mala fides and discrimination, the principal question that has arisen for consideration is whether there has been any violation of sections 162 and 163 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the effect of the violations if any. For the petitioner it is submitted that the signed statements for which assurances had been given to the witnesses are statements taken after investigation commenced and it is a fraud on procedure to rely on subsequent unsigned statements as statements under section 161 (3), Criminal Procedure Code for the purpose of section 173, Criminal Procedure Code. As the section 161 statements are the material on which the Special Judge has to consider whether the charge is groundless under section 251-A (2), Criminal Procedure Code, it is submitted that the illegality corroding the foundation vitiates the enquiry and necessitates discharge of the petitioner The history of the investigation as set out in the counter-affidavit in Writ Petition No. 390 of 1965, dated 12th December, 1965, by R. Thirumalai, the Secretary to the Government, Public Works Department, may be briefly set out. It is stated that prior to the date of the retirement of the petitioner, the Government had" definite information about the corrupt activities of the petitioner and in the beginning of March, 1964, the Government caused confidential enquiry to be made through the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras, the second respondent in the writ petitions. The decision to retire the petitioner on 14th March, 1964, without giving him re-employment was taken by the Government on the record of service of the petitioner It is not disputed that the decision to retire him was communicated to him only at 2 P.M. on 14th March, 1964 with direction to hand over charge to Sivasankara Mudaliar about whom reference has already been made. In the counter-affidavit for the State it is pointed out that 23 public servants have given statements and that only five of them stated that they had given valuable things to the petitioner for no or inadequate consideration. In the counter-affidavit for the State it is pointed out that 23 public servants have given statements and that only five of them stated that they had given valuable things to the petitioner for no or inadequate consideration. The counter-affidavit admits manipulations in the nominal muster rolls by S. Sivasubramaniam, an assistant engineer and S. Chidambaram, a junior engineer, for recouping themselves with assistance from other named subordinates. The stand is taken for the State that the manipulations at the instance of the petitioner and the acts of petitioner are distinct and separate things and the charge-sheet is concerned only with the misconduct of the petitioner It is stated that the irregularities of the subordinates are incidental and subsidiary and so they have been taken as witnesses. Their acts are only at the instance of the petitioner who was then the head of the department. As regards assurances of immunity, it is acknowledged in specific terms that the witnesses were given assurance certificates by the Deputy Superintendent of Police who conducted the preliminary enquiry. It is stated that the certificates were given after they had given their statements. Reliance is placed on section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947, which gives protection to a bribe giver from prosecution under section 165-A, Indian Penal Code. It is set out that the registration of the case against the petitioner with the Directorate of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption or the first information report was only on 27th June, 1964 and the charge-sheet was filed with the Special Judge on 5th October, 1964. In the reply affidavit filed by the petitioner to this counter it is pointed out that the only manner in which any person who is suspected to be an offender or abettor could be taken as witness to depose against another is to tender him pardon according to law. The purported exercise of discretion by the vigilance department citing all the other persons as witnesses, it is stated, is in flagrant violation of the provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and a clear case of hostile discrimination. It is submitted that the mode in which the investigation had gone on and sanction given show a predetermination by the Government. It is emphasised that at the time when the matter was before the Special Judge, the factum of immunity having been granted was not disclosed. It is submitted that the mode in which the investigation had gone on and sanction given show a predetermination by the Government. It is emphasised that at the time when the matter was before the Special Judge, the factum of immunity having been granted was not disclosed. The petitioner submitted that the evidence that has been procured at the investigation was clearly on threat, inducement and assurance of protection not usually granted, and that on the sole ground that the investigation and collection of evidence has proceeded in utter disregard of law, the entire proceedings have to be quashed. It has, in the circumstances, become necessary to examine in detail as to when the investigation under the Code can be said to have commenced in the present case and the nature and character of the several statements stated to have been taken during the investigation. By Civil Miscellaneous Petition No. 589 of 1966, in Writ Petition No. 390 of 1965, the petitioner sought production of a petition alleged to have been received by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, on 15th April, 1964, the statements recorded by him in pursuance of the said petition and copies of the assurance certificates given to the witnesses. Production was also sought from the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras of the note file relating to his retirement, G.O. Ms. No. 674, Public Works Department, dated 14th March. 1964. In the counter-affidavit to this by the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, dated 26th February, 1966, it is stated that there is no objection to the production of the statements recorded by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, in the preliminary enquiry conducted by him and the copies of the assurance certificates given by him to Sivasubramaniam, assistant engineer, and Chidambaram, junior engineer. It is averred that no petition was received before the commencement of the preliminary enquiry and the preliminary enquiry-was commenced on a note sent by the Director of Vigilance to the Deputy Superintendent of Police on 15th April, 1964. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, G. K. Ranganathan, has filed a supplemental counter-affidavit on 24th February, 1966. This states that he conducted the enquiry in. the matter pursuant to the orders, dated 15th April, 1964 of the Director of Vigilance registering the enquiry as 8/HD/64. The Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, G. K. Ranganathan, has filed a supplemental counter-affidavit on 24th February, 1966. This states that he conducted the enquiry in. the matter pursuant to the orders, dated 15th April, 1964 of the Director of Vigilance registering the enquiry as 8/HD/64. He affirms in his affidavit that he gave assurance certificates in the common form referred to by the petitioner only to Sivasubramaniam and Chidambaram and none else. It is denied that assurance certificates have been given to eighteen Public servants. He states that during his enquiry he took statements only from nine witnesses, two of them being Sivasubramaniam and Chidambaram above referred to. He states that he conducted the detailed enquiry only on the basis of the note on which enquiry No. 8/HD/64 was started on 15th April, 1964, and not or any petition. On the prayer for production of the note file relating to G.O.Ms. No. 674, Public Works Department, the Secretary to the Government, Public Works Department, as head of the department, claimed privilege stating that the file is an unpublished office record-relating to the affairs of the State and its disclosure will cause injury to the public interest. It was stated that disclosure of this document would impair the proper functioning of public service and efficient administrator, of public affairs. However, the relevant file Was produced in Court by the learned Advocate-General for our perusal and there was no objection to learned Counsel for the petitioner havings inspection of the papers in the file excepting as regards the notes and minutes made by the officers and opinions expressed. From the supplemental counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in-Writ Petition N0.390 of 1965 it is seen that a copy of a petition, dated 28th February, 1964, addressed to the Minister of Public Works purporting to emanate from one Rangaswamy Nattar, North East Street, Thillai Nagar, Trichy, was received by the Chief Minister on 1st March, 1964. From the supplemental counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the respondents in-Writ Petition N0.390 of 1965 it is seen that a copy of a petition, dated 28th February, 1964, addressed to the Minister of Public Works purporting to emanate from one Rangaswamy Nattar, North East Street, Thillai Nagar, Trichy, was received by the Chief Minister on 1st March, 1964. This was marked by the Chief Minister to the concerned department, as it contained allegations of corruption against the petitionen It is stated in the supplemental counter-affidavit that similar allegations had come to the notice of the Government, and that as the question of granting an extension of service to the petitioner who was due to retire or 15th March, 1964, was pending consideration, the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption was requested by the Chief Minister to make confidential enquiry and give opinion to the Government. It is now seen from the supplemental affidavit that the Director, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, sent a note on the matter on 10th March. 1964. There was a vagueness in the original counter-affidavit filed as to when the Government got definite information about the corrupt activities of the petitionen In fact it read as if they had definite information even before the Government directed the enquiry by the second respondent. In the present supplemental affidavit it is stated that the Government had definite information relating to the corrupt activities of the petitioner from the note, dated 10th March, 1964. It is unnecessary to discuss in detail this aspect of the matter, as the same has greater relevancy and bearing on the question whether the services of the petitioner were not continued beyond his fifty-fifth year mala fide. We are at the moment not on that matter In the affidavit of the Secretary to Government, Public Works Department, R. Thirumalai, it is now made out that further and detailed enquiry was directed by the Chief Secretary to the Government on the basis of the note, dated 10th March, 1964 and on this the Director of Vigilance registered the enquiry No. 8/HD/64. Copies of the petition, dated 28th February, 1964, and the note, dated 10th March, 1964, have now been given to the petitionen The Secretary to the Government,, Public Works Department, who had earlier not denied the averments in the affidavit of the petitioner of the grant of assurance certificates to eighteen persons, now states that on enquiry he understands that assurance certificates have been given only to two officers. He also stated that by inadvertence it was not specifically averred that assurance certificates were given only to the two officers and none else. We cannot pass by these averments without remarking that the explanation now submitted is puerile. Courts expect exactitude from officers of Government on such matters. The question raised by the petitioner is of vital importance to him. He has pleaded that the eighteen witnesses whose statements are relied upon for charging him with serious offences have been given assurance of total immunity. This procedure in the investigation has been attacked as undermining the very foundation of criminal justice as administered in this country. The petitioner would have it that the statements of these witnesses in whatever form they may be presented at the enquiry under section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code, would have to be wholly discarded and the argument is that if these statements are out of the record, there will not be a tittle of material for framing charges against the petitionen When the petitioner has come to this Court with that case, there is no repudiation in the earliest counter-affidavit filed in the matter denying that the assurance certificates have been granted to all these eighteen witnesses. The statements of these eighteen witnesses are ex facie valuable material for the prosecution. It is only after the writ petitions had been taken up for arguments, at a crucial stage of the hearing, that supplemental affidavits are forth-coming limiting the grant of assurance to two of the chief witnesses. The Secretary to Government, Public Works Department now states on oath that on enquiry from the concerned officer he understands that only two assurance certificates have been given and that he is not personally aware of these facts relating to the granting of assurance certificates. The petitioner who has expressed apprehensions of mala fides and ulterior motives in the prosecution may justifiably have the feeling that but for the supplemental affidavits he has a very good case. The petitioner who has expressed apprehensions of mala fides and ulterior motives in the prosecution may justifiably have the feeling that but for the supplemental affidavits he has a very good case. Naturally in his reply affidavit the petitioner states that the averment now that only two witnesses were given assurance certificates is an after thought and incorrect and the State should not be allowed to go back on its original counter-affidavit by a very responsible officer of the rank of the Secretary to the Government. From the records now before us it is seen that a detailed enquiry was started on 15th April, 1964. But according to the prosecution the investigation commenced only on 27th June, 1964, on a complaint given by G. K. Ranganathan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras, to the Additional Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption. It is seen from the record that it is on 27th June, 1964, the first information report was submitted to the Principal Sessions Judge. Madras, the Special Judge. Sanction to prosecute was obtained on the 29th of September, 1964, in G.O. No. 3107 and the charge-sheet was filed before the Special Judge on the 5th of October, 1964. It is submitted for the State that from 27th June, 1964, 47 witnesses have been examined in the investigation that followed and that only nine of these witnesses had been previously examined at what is termed a preliminary or detailed enquiry. It is the case now that from these nine witnesses only signed statements have been taken. A statement purported to have been recorded from Sivasubramaniam on 27th June, 1964 is relied upon as his section 161, Criminal Procedure Code statement. But on 9th June, 1964 a signed statement has been taken from him and on 22nd July, 1964, a statement has been taken from him under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. Similarly from Chidambaram a signed statement was taken on 3rd June, 1964. A statement purported to have been recorded from him on 27th June, 1964, is relied upon as his section 161, Criminal Procedure Code statement. A statement under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code has been recorded from him on 23rd July, 1964. Assurance certificates are admitted to have been given to these two witnesses when the first signed statements were recorded from them. A statement under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code has been recorded from him on 23rd July, 1964. Assurance certificates are admitted to have been given to these two witnesses when the first signed statements were recorded from them. We do not think it necessary to go into greater details of the facts or the actual merits of the accusation. It is always embarrassing to a superior Court to deal with a matter still at the stage of enquiry and determination in the Court of first instance and particularly in a criminal matter where on the one hand the liberty and reputation of the petitioner are at stake and on the other the interest of the public at large that crime and unsocial acts which are offences under the law should be put down with firm hand. We may, however, state that we are not impressed with the contention that the proceeding should be quashed for the reason that it is the result of mala fides, or that a direction should now be given by the Court for the prosecution of the subordinate officers also. As stated earlier we are not concerned in this case with the question whether the petitioner might have been continued in service. The inference which the petitioner draws as he states from the subsequent events of the use of influence by his deputy, Sivasankara Mudaliar, with the Chief Minister, finds specific repudiation in the affidavit of the Chief Minister The Chief Minister in an affidavit filed very early in the proceedings has denied that Sivasankara Mudaliar is related to him and that Sivasankara Mudaliar used any influence with him for promotion as Chief Engineer We have no reason whatever not to accept the Chief Minister’s statement. Charge of communal or sub-communal bias is sought to be made out in the affidavits of the petitionen In our view, this charge is equally groundless. Such a charge is easily made and can come in handy when there is nothing else to hang upon. Besides, these considerations are totally irrelevant if in fact the petitioner is guilty of the offence with which he is charged and could be so found on relevant, legal and material evidence. Motive or malice in prosecution cannot absolve a criminal; may be if established it may have its effect in appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution. Besides, these considerations are totally irrelevant if in fact the petitioner is guilty of the offence with which he is charged and could be so found on relevant, legal and material evidence. Motive or malice in prosecution cannot absolve a criminal; may be if established it may have its effect in appreciation of the evidence for the prosecution. The charge of hostile discrimination coming under Article 14 of the Constitution is equally groundless. May be that several of the witnesses who have been examined and from some of whom signed statements have been taken by the police are equally blameworthy and are accomplices. It is felt by the prosecution that if they arraign the subordinate officers also along with the petitioner, the whole case may fail for lack of evidence. What weight would be given by the Court to the evidence of the accomplices is quite a different matten It is well understood that evidence of accomplices is tolerated as a necessity as it may be impossible to get sufficient evidence of many crimes unless some of the participants or at least one of them is disposed to disclose the circumstances within his knowledge. Usually pardon is tendered and an accomplice is taken as approver As noticed in Sarkar’s Evidence, eleventh edition, at page 1200: "The State may enter nolle prosequi against an accused and call him as a prosecution witness, or the police may refrain from prosecuting a person with a view to call him as a witness against his confederates in the offence." Under section 494, Criminal Procedure Code any Public Prosecutor may with the consent of Court withdraw from the prosecution of any person. Where interests of justice may require that every offender should be booked, equally interests of justice may require that where it is not possible, some at least are arraigned and the rest retained for giving evidence at the trial. The policy of not securing judicial pardon to accomplices and bringing them as approvers but retaining them at the sole discretion of the prosecution may be open to question, but that cannot be itself invalidate the arraignment of the persons actually put up for trial. If it is laid down that all participants in a crime should be put up for trial, grave consequences may ensue. If it is laid down that all participants in a crime should be put up for trial, grave consequences may ensue. Abbott, L.C.J, observed in his charge to the Grand Jury in March, 1820 in Trial of Arthur Thistlewood for High Treason1that "............it must not only happen that many heinous crimes and offences will pass unpunished, but great encouragement will be given to bad men, by withdrawing from their minds the fear of detection and punishment through the instrumentality of their partners in guilt, and thereby universal confidence will be substituted for that distrust of each other, which naturally possesses men engaged in wicked purposes, and which operate as one of the most effectual restraints against the commission of those crimes, to which the concurrence of several persons is required.“ The demoralising effect of a general absolution by the prosecution authorities to practically all accomplices on the administration is one thing, whether there is hostile discrimination against the person actually prosecuted is quite a different thing. It cannot be said that the superior officer and the subordinates are similarly situated. The subordinate may feel that he should oblige his superior or otherwise incur his displeasure, and he could hardly run that risk. For the present we are not concerned with the merits of the case. That is a question which will fall for consideration if and when it becomes necessary for the accused to be tried for the offence. The accused may be perfectly blameless. But the question is if in fact the investigation reveals that there is a prima facie case against him, it could be said that the prosecution of the chief alone is the result of an evil eye and unequal hand It is alleged for the petitioner that his immediate deputy, Sivasankara Mudaliar, having achieved his object and got the petitioner retired and showing his spite, further by getting all the staff in the Highways department under his control and setting up the subordinates against him. Assuming that Sivasankara Mudaliar bears ill will and malice against the petitioner, we are not pronouncing upon it. Assuming that Sivasankara Mudaliar bears ill will and malice against the petitioner, we are not pronouncing upon it. that cannot in the least affect the validity of the investigation and prosecution if it is otherwise regular It may affect the credibility of the witnesses who happen to be subordinates of Sivasankara Mudaliar That is a matter for consideration in the appreciation of evidence by the trial Judge, and much Will depend upon the confidence in their testimony which the witnesses inspire. But certainly it cannot be said that there is any objectionable discrimination in proceeding with the prosecution of the principal offender leaving out the subordinates. In this particular case they continue to be in service and subject to the disciplinary jurisdiction in the service. Really the important question that is posed for consideration is the effect of the alleged contravention in the proceedings of sections 162 and 163, Criminal Procedure Code. The argument of the learned Counsel for the petitioner, Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari, on this part of the case may be briefly summed up thus: Under section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code which is the procedure to be adopted by the Special Judge in this case, whether or not a charge has to be framed against the petitioner has to be decided by the Special Judge upon a consideration of all the documents referred to in section 173 and or such examination of the petitioner as the Special Judge may think it necessary and on hearing Counsel for the prosecution and the petitionen The documents referred to in section 173 are those specified in section 173 sub-clause 4 and include the statements, if any, recorded under section. 164, Criminal Procedure Code, and the statements recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. Learned Counsel submits that if there is any violation of sections 162 and 163, the documents cease to be those whose consideration is provided under section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code. If these documents are excluded, learned Counsel submits, there will be no material on which a charge could be framed against the petitioner in this case. The learned Special Judge would have to conclude that the charge against the petitioner is groundless and discharge him. If these documents are excluded, learned Counsel submits, there will be no material on which a charge could be framed against the petitioner in this case. The learned Special Judge would have to conclude that the charge against the petitioner is groundless and discharge him. For the prosecution it is submitted that the signed statements and assurances were all prior to the commencement of the investigation and they were not statements recorded under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code. The prosecution would have it that the investigation commenced on the filing of the first information report on 27th June, 1964 and not before. It will be convenient to set out sections 161 to 163, Criminal Procedure Code.” 161. (1) Any Police Officer making an investigation under this chapter or any Police Officer not below such rank as the State Government may by general or special order, prescribe in this behalf acting on the requisition of such officer may examine orally any person supposed to be acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the case. (2) Such person shall be bound to answer all questions relating to such case put to him by such officer other than questions the answers to which would have a tendency to expose him to a criminal charge or to a penalty or forfeiture. (3) The Police Officer may reduce into writing any statement made to him in the course of an examination under this section, and if he does so he shall make a separate record of the statement of each such person whose statement he records. 162. (3) The Police Officer may reduce into writing any statement made to him in the course of an examination under this section, and if he does so he shall make a separate record of the statement of each such person whose statement he records. 162. (1) No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this chapter shall, if reduced into writing, be signed by the person making it; nor shall any such statement or any record thereof, whether in a police diary or otherwise, or any part of such statement or record, be used for any purpose (same as hereinafter provided) of any inquiry or trial in respect of any offence under investigation at the time When such statement was made: Provided that when any witness is called for the prosecution in such enquiry or trial whose statement has been reduced into writing as aforesaid, any part of his statement, if duly proved, may be used by the accused, and with the permission of the Court, by the prosecution to contradict such witless in the manner prescribed by section 145 of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872) and when any part of such statement is so used, any part thereof may also be used in the re-examination of such witness, but for the purpose only of explaining any matter referred to in his cross-examination. (2) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to apply to any statement falling within the provisions of section 32, clause (1) of the Indian Evidence Act (I of 1872), or to affect the provisions of section 27 of that Act. 163. (1) No police officer or other person in authority shall offer or make or cause to be offered or made, any such inducement, threat or promise as is mentioned in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, section 24. (2) But no police officer or other persons shall prevent, by any caution or otherwise, any person from making in the course of any investigation under this chapter any statement which he may be disposed to make of his own free will. One thing is clear that it is to statements recorded during investigation under Chapter XIV that sections 162 and 163 apply. One thing is clear that it is to statements recorded during investigation under Chapter XIV that sections 162 and 163 apply. Learned Counsel have taken us through these relevant provisions in Chapter XIV, Part V of the Code, headed, information to the police and their powers to investigate. The first question for consideration is when the investigation commenced in this case. Ultimately, this is a question of fact and often defies easy determination. In cases like habitual bribery and corruption it may often be necessary to make preliminary and informal enquiries as to whether at all there is anything in the news floating about corruption and bribery as to necessitate a formal investigation. There may be groundless charges inspired by pure malice, anonymous and pseudonymous letters by disgruntled persons, may be, chagrined by the integrity of the officer and a formal investigation may damage the reputation of persons holding responsible posts. The other aspect is that in certain types of cases it may help delinquents to cover their tracks and vanish drying all sources of information. But it could be said that while an enquiry may start with shadowy beginnings and vague rumours, once a police officer forms a definite opinion that there are grounds for investigating a crime, an investigation under the Code has started. Anything said or done subsequently must be held to have been done or said during the investigation. As pointed out in H. N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi1: "Investigation usually starts on information relating to the commission of an offence given to an officer-in-charge of a police station and recorded under section 154 of the Code. If from information so received or otherwise, the officer-in-charge of the police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence. he or some other subordinate officer deputed by him, has to proceed to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and if necessary to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender Thus investigation primarily consists in the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case. he or some other subordinate officer deputed by him, has to proceed to the spot to investigate the facts and circumstances of the case and if necessary to take measures for the discovery and arrest of the offender Thus investigation primarily consists in the ascertainment of the facts and circumstances of the case. By definition it includes " all the proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer" For the above purposes, the investigating officer is given the power to require before himself the attendance of any person appearing to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case. He has also the authority to examine such person orally either by himself or by a duly authorised deputy" Section 154 of the Code provides for the recording of every information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence if given to an officer-in-charge of a police station. Under section 156 any officer-in-charge of a police station may without the order of a Magistrate investigate any cognizable case which a Court having jurisdiction over the local area would have power to enquire into or try under the provisions of Chapter XV relating to the place of enquiry or trial. Under section 157 of the Code a police officer-in-charge of a police station has, if from information received or otherwise reason to suspect the commission of an offence to forthwith send a report of the information to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of such offence and commence investigation of the facts and circumstances of the case. Reference may be made in this connection to section 551 of the Code which provides that police officers superior in rank than officer-in-charge of a police station may exercise the same powers throughout the local area to which they are appointed as may be exercised by such officer within the limits of his station. It is not questioned in this case for the petitioner or the prosecution that the police officer who conducted enquiries prior to the formal first information report lodged on 27th June, 1964, was not a person competent to enter upon investigation. To recapitulate the progress of the enquiry, even admittedly there has been an earlier probe by the vigilance department prior to 10th March, 1964. To recapitulate the progress of the enquiry, even admittedly there has been an earlier probe by the vigilance department prior to 10th March, 1964. They had submitted a report on 10th March, 1964 on which the Government had acted and retired the petitioner without giving him re-employment. It is admitted that this report, dated 10th March, 1964 was the definite information to the Government relating to certain corrupt activities of the petitionen It is found in the counter-affidavit now filed for the prosecution that on the orders of the then Chief Secretary to Government to conduct further and more detailed enquiry into the allegations revealed by the note, dated 10th March, 1964, the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption registered enquiry 8/HD/64 on 15th April, 1964. G. K. Ranganathan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras City, admittedly conducted an enquiry in the matter pursuant to the registration of the enquiry on 15th April, 1964. He would state in his present affidavit that he had taken statements from nine witnesses during the enquiry conducted by him till the filing of what is relied on by the prosecution as the first information report on 27th June, 1964. He would have it that assurance certificates were given to two out of these nine witnesses all of whom have signed their statements. On behalf of the petitioner the present version as to the number of the witnesses examined before 27th June, 1964, and the number of persons to whom assurance certificates have been granted is questioned. It is needless for us to decide at this stage which of the proposed witnesses for the prosecution were examined prior to 27th June, 1964, also which of them have given signed statements and which among them were given assurance of immunity purporting to be on behalf of the State. While it can be stated as a genera! principle that not every piece of information, however vague, intangible and indefinite need be recorded as first information report under section 154, Criminal Procedure Code, to start an investigation, it is equally clear that to permit a preliminary enquiry before recording the first information even after definite information as to the commission of an offence is received would be to destroy the value of the first information report and equally to provide room for fabrication of cases. If the first information could be recorded after a detailed enquiry into the offence is conducted, there is the danger and temptation to incorporate in the first information report details and circumstances advantageous to the prosecution. Section 154 only provides for the receipt of information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence ; that is, the information should be such that it enables the police to come to the conclusion that a cognizable offence has been committed. On receipt of such information the section provides for its being reduced to writing and authenticated by the person giving it. The substance of it has to be entered in a book to be kept by the officer-in-charge of the police station in such form as the State Government may prescribe in this behalf. Section 157 provides for the sending of the report of information to the Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of an offence, if from information received or otherwise an officer-in-charge of a police station has reason to suspect the commission of an offence which he is empowered under section 156 to investigate. It is unnecessary to refer to several other features of the provisions of sections 154 to 157, Criminal Procedure Code. Under section 158 every report sent to a Magistrate under section 157 shall, if the State Government so directs, be submitted through such superior officer of police as the State Government, by general or special order, appoints in that behalf and such superior officer may give such instructions to the officer-in-charge of the police station as he thinks fit, and shall after recording such instructions on such report transmit the same without delay to the Magistrate. Section 157, it is seen casts an imperative duty on a police officer who has reason to suspect, be it from information received or otherwise, that a cognizable offence has been committed, to report forthwith the matter to the Magistrate and initiate investigation. The aforesaid provisions of the Code relating to registration and investigation of an offence do govern also an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. The aforesaid provisions of the Code relating to registration and investigation of an offence do govern also an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Can a police officer by merely delaying sending a report to the Magistrate after the receipt of definite information of the commission of an offence proceed upon what he would regard as more detailed enquiry and deprive the petitioner of the safeguards provided under section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, in respect of the statements recorded during that enquiry? In our view, it would be a travesty of justice if the provisions intended with the definite object of safeguarding the accused could be evaded in that manner The delay on the part of the investigating officer in registering the first information report may be an irregularity; but certainly the statement recorded subsequent to the receipt of definite information of the commission of an offence in gathering evidence of the offence would nonetheless be a statement recorded during investigation and hit by section 162, Criminal Procedure Code. Investigation is defined by section 4(1) of the Code as to include all the proceedings under the Code for the collection of evidence conducted by a police officer or by any person other than a Magistrate who is authorised by a Magistrate in this behalf. In the so-called complaint, dated 27th June, 1964 filed by G. K. Ranganathan, Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, it is stated that on the orders of the Government a full-fledged enquiry was conducted into the allegations of corruption, misconduct and malpractices against the accused, and that as a result of the enquiry conducted by him the instances of obtaining valuable things by corrupt or illegal or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant set out in the complaint have come to light. After setting out the instances, it is stated that from the same it would be seen that from 2nd January, 1961 to 14th March, 1964, the petitioner habitually obtained from his own subordinates valuable things without consideration or for consideration which he knew to be inadequate and by corrupt and illegal means, abusing his position as a public servant, obtained for himself many valuable things, thereby committing offences punishable under sections 161 and 165, Indian Penal Code and section 5 (1) (a) and (d) read with section 5 (2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. Registration of a criminal case against the petitioner under the aforesaid sections is prayed for, as a regular investigation alone would facilitate the collection of additional evidence by way of recovering the various valuable things which he obtained from his subordinates, etc., by illegal means. It is stated that in addition more incriminating evidence is likely to be forthcoming during a regular investigation. It is after this no doubt there was search of the premises of the petitioner on 29th June, 1964 for the gathering of additional evidence by way of recovery of valuable things alleged to have been obtained by the petitionen This complaint admits that some evidence had already been gathered. What is wanted is further evidence, particularly search of the premises of the petitionen There is a clear admission of a prior full-fledged enquiry. This was after the registration of the offence by the Director of Vigilance and Anti-Corruption on. 15th April, 1964. In this first information report, dated 27th June, 1964, no doubt the Additional Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption, Madras, R.N. Krishnaswami, would state that he is personally investigating the case. Since this has been sent to the Special Judge, as first information report the prosecution has taken this as the starting point for investigation. As already stated, it would be a travesty of justice to treat the investigation as commencing from 27th June, 1964. We are unable to appreciate any emphasis on the lodging of the complaint by the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Vigilance and Anti-Corruption to the Additional Superintendent of Police, Vigilance Anti-Corruption — between tweedledum and tweedledee. Substantial information and evidence it is found, has been gathered before the so-called first information report was registered. The fact of registration of the first information report long after steps were taken to gather evidence, cannot affect the question as to when the investigation started. Collection of evidence relating to the commission of an offence is one of the definite steps in the investigation of a case, and here the statements have been recorded from a material witnesses. The violation of rules in the taking of statements during the course of investigation cannot be got round by ignoring the investigation which preceded the formal lodging of the first information, report as in this case. The violation of rules in the taking of statements during the course of investigation cannot be got round by ignoring the investigation which preceded the formal lodging of the first information, report as in this case. In K.M. Nanavati v. State of Maharashtra1, Subba Rao, J., speaking for the Court observes: “But it is said that, as the information given by Puran Singh was not recorded by the police officer, Phansalkar as he should do under section 154 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, no investigation in law could have commenced within the meaning of section 156 of the Code. The question whether investigation had commenced or not is a question of fact and it does not depend upon any irregularity committed in. the matter of recording the first information report by the concerned police officer If so, section 162 of the Code is immediately attracted.” In our view the investigation in this case under Chapter XIV of the Code should be held to have commenced when G. K. Ranganathan, the Deputy Superintendent of Police started enquiry on 15th April, 1964. Now we shall consider the effect of disregarding the provisions of sections 162 and 163 while gathering evidence during the course of investigation. The policy underlying the prohibition in section 162 against taking the signature of a maker of statement appears to be that the witness at the trial should be free to make any statement in favour of the petitioner which he may wish to make unhampered by anything which he might have said or might have been made to say to the police. The result of taking signature of the maker of statement to his statement would be to tie him down to the statement so recorded or at least to give him the impression that he is so tied down and would not be free to make a different statement.. The maker of a statement may feel at the trial that he is not a free agent to give evidence. No doubt the evidence of the witness who has signed the statement, given in open Court at the trial does not on that account only become inadmissible. There are no words for such prohibition in the Code or the Evidence Act; nor can it be said that the entire proceedings and investigation get vitiated by taking signed statements. No doubt the evidence of the witness who has signed the statement, given in open Court at the trial does not on that account only become inadmissible. There are no words for such prohibition in the Code or the Evidence Act; nor can it be said that the entire proceedings and investigation get vitiated by taking signed statements. The effect of signature on a statement may be in most cases to seriously impair to the evidence of the witness. Witnesses of standing and culture and with trained minds who might have given signed statements may hardly be expected to depart from what they have stated if subsequently statements are recorded from them under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code, or evidence taken. in Court. They may feel that they have pinned themselves down by the former signed statements, however, it might have been obtained. No doubt the question in each case would be whether the witness appeared to have been influenced by the impression that since he has given a signed statement to the police he is bound to repeat the same at the trial. The answer to this question would depend on the circumstances of each case, the nature and character of the evidence and the witnesses involved. In Tahsildar Singh and another v. The State of Uttar Pradesh1, while discussing the objects sought to be achieved by section 162, Criminal Procedure Code, reference is made to the observations of Braund, J., in Emperor v. Aflab Mohammed Khan2: “As it seems to us it is to protect accused persons from being prejudiced by statements made to police officers who by reason of the fact that an investigation is known to be on foot at the time the statement is made may be in a position to influence the maker of it and, on the other hand, to protect accused persons from the prejudice at the hands of persons who in the knowledge that an investigator) has already started, are prepared to tell untruths.” The following observation of a Division Bench of the Nagpur High Court in Baliram Tikaram v. Emperor3, is also referred: “The object of the section is to protect the accused both against over-zealous police officers and untruthful witnesses” . The Supreme Court also cites the following passsage from the judgment of the Judicial Committee in Pakala Narayanswami v. The King Emperor:4 “If one had to guess at the intention of the Legislature in framing a section in the words used, one would suppose that they had in mind to encourage the free disclosure of information or to protect the person making the statement from a supposed unreliability of police testimony as to alleged statements or both.” In Kotayya v. King Emperor5, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee noted (hat “Courts in India have always regarded any breach of the proviso to section 162 as matter of gravity.” True it has been observed by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee in Zahiruddin v. Emperor6, that where in contravention of section 162, sub-section (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure a witness has signed a statement made to a police officer which has been reduced into writing, the evidence given by the witness who signed it does not become inadmissible and still less can it be said that the contravention has the effect of vitiating the whole proceeding. Their Lordships observed that the value of his evidence, however, may be seriously impaired as a consequence of the contravention of the statutory safeguard. It is noted that when the Magistrate or presiding Judge discovers that a witness has, while giving evidence, made material use of a statement made by him to the police, it is the duty under section 162 sub-section (1) of the Code to disregard the evidence of that witness as inadmissible. That of course can happen only when the matter goes to trial. We have to consider the case under the amended provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code with reference to section 251-A. We will be adverting to this aspect of the matter presently. An equally serious infraction of procedural safeguard during investigation alleged, is the giving of assurance of immunity from all prosecution to the Subordinate officers who have given the statement. Admittedly two such assurances have been given It is the petitioner’s case that eighteen of the proposed witnesses had been given such assurances and the statements recorded from them. An equally serious infraction of procedural safeguard during investigation alleged, is the giving of assurance of immunity from all prosecution to the Subordinate officers who have given the statement. Admittedly two such assurances have been given It is the petitioner’s case that eighteen of the proposed witnesses had been given such assurances and the statements recorded from them. Section 163, of the Code in emphatic terms prohibits a police officer or other person in authority from offering or making or causing to be offered or made any inducement, threat or promise which would appear to a person from whom a statement is obtained grounds for supposing that by making the statement he would gain any advantage or avoid any evil of temporal nature. A police officer or a person in authority should, of course, not prevent by any caution or otherwise any person from making in the course of any investigation under the Code any statement which the person may be disposed to make of his own free will. Sections 160 to 164 of the Code must in this connection be read together The reason behind the rules are obvious Where a statement is not make voluntarily but is the result of inducement or threat, there is a danger of the statement being false or at least biased. Referring to confessions obtained by inducement or threat, Williams, J., in Reg. v. Mansfield1, said: “It is not because the law is afraid of having truth elicited that these confessions are excluded, but it is because the law is jealous of not having the truth.” The same could be said of the statements obtained by inducement of threat. The ground for prohibition in section 163 is that it would not be safe to receive a statement made under any influence or fear Such statements may hamper the due course of administration of justice. They may divert investigation from proper channels. Equally such injunctions are necessary for keeping under check the wide powers of investigation and search which are likely to jeopardise the cherished freedom of personal liberty and reputation. Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari stressed on the demoralising and debasing effect of an investigation vitiated by grant of full absolution at the discretion of police officers and securing statements from colleagues or subordinates in a public office or for that matter in any administrative department. Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari stressed on the demoralising and debasing effect of an investigation vitiated by grant of full absolution at the discretion of police officers and securing statements from colleagues or subordinates in a public office or for that matter in any administrative department. If such procedure is condoned, it is submitted that any person who is approached for a statement may hesitate to refuse, as on his refusal others could be found in his place and the person refusing himself made a victim in his turn. The thesis is, no one is secure unless everyone is secure from the over-zealous investigating officer The amnesty granted in this case purports to emanate from the Government and is of the widest character We are not on the validity of these assurances whether in law it is worth the paper on which it is engrossed. Neither the Criminal Procedure Code nor the Prevention of Corruption Act recognises the immunity from prosecution guaranteed under these assurances. It must be noted that the witnesses to whom assurances are given are themselves guilty of offences. They are not just bribe givers to come under section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The grant of pardon is not in the discretion of the police authorities; it is a judicial function. Section 337 of the Code provides for tender of pardon to accomplices in certain cases. At any stage of the investigation or enquiry into or trial of the specified offences with a view to obtaining evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to the offences, conditional pardon could be tendered. Section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act provides that notwithstanding anything contained in any law for the time being in force, a statement made by a person in any proceeding against a public servant for an offence under section 161 or section 165 of the Indian Penal Code or under sub-section (2) of section 5 of the prevention of Corruption. Act that he offered or agreed to offer any gratification (Other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing to the public servant, shall not subject such person to a prosecution under section 165-A of the Penal Code This is the only statutory immunity outside judicial pardon to which our attention has been drawn. Act that he offered or agreed to offer any gratification (Other than legal remuneration) or any valuable thing to the public servant, shall not subject such person to a prosecution under section 165-A of the Penal Code This is the only statutory immunity outside judicial pardon to which our attention has been drawn. Reference may be made to section 343 of the Code which runs thus: “Except as provided in sections 337 and 338, no influence by means of any promise or threat or otherwise, shall be used to an accused person to induce him to disclose or withhold any matter within his knowledge.” It cannot be gainsaid that assurances outside the law which cannot grant immunity under the law are likely to interfere in the proper discharge of duties by public servants. The self-inculpatory statements they might have made would be hanging like a Damocles sword over them, and unless they are men of strong character and have made statements really voluntarily with a sense of responsibility to purify the administration and get rid of an incubus compelling them by his position to infamous acts, they may become handy stooges for unprincipled officers ready to take advantage of their plight. The danger of such statements is that the man getting fixed and pinned to a statement may readily seek further immunity by voluntarily accusing others if cornered. A statement so obtained can also vitiate any subsequent statement recorded under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. In Zahiruddin v. Emperor1, the Judicial Committee remarked that while the value of giving evidence may be seriously impaired as a consequence of the contravention of the statutory safeguard under section 162 Criminal Procedure Code, the use by a witness while he Was giving evidence of a statement made by him to the police give rise to different considerations. Their Lordships observed at page 188: “The categorical prohibition of such use would be merely disregarded if reliance were to be placed on the evidence of a witness who had made material use of the statement when he was giving evidence at the trial. When, therefore, the Magistrate or presiding Judge discovers that a witness has made material use of such a statement it is his duty under the section to disregard the evidence of that witness as in admissible.” Now we are dealing with literate witnesses holding positions of responsibility in Government office. When, therefore, the Magistrate or presiding Judge discovers that a witness has made material use of such a statement it is his duty under the section to disregard the evidence of that witness as in admissible.” Now we are dealing with literate witnesses holding positions of responsibility in Government office. If they have been called upon to go through the formality of signing their statements, obviously it must be with a view to make them stick to it; then it is hardly likely that these persons would vary or depart from the signed statements they had made, when later making statements on oath before a Magistrate under section 164, Criminal Procedure Code. May be they will not be actually having on hand the statements previously made by them to gag them. But one may reasonably expect this class of persons, when called upon to state again what they have already stated, to at least previously refresh their memory as to what they had stated before and carry the same in their memory. Having pinned himself to a particular narration of facts in a signed statement, the maker would feel that when he is called upon to make a statement on oath before a Magistrate, he is not free to depart from his earlier statement. Thus the violation of the provision of sections 162 and 163 may impair a statement judicially recorded on oath under section 164. Of course irregularities and illegalities during an investigation do rot necessarily vitiate the entire proceedings. The guilt of an accused will be pronounced by Court on the evidence given at the trial and irregularities and illegalities during investigation will only affect the value of the evidence. When the case should go up for trial it will be for the trial Court to consider to what extent the testimony placed before Court is vitiated and to be discarded. If without any judicially recognised amnesty a person comes forward and gives evidence no doubt it is his look out. He is an accomplice and his evidence will be looked with suspicion as tainted. But the law does not make him an incompetent witness at the trial of another person in respect of an offence in the commission of which he is an accomplice. Section 133 of the Evidence Act provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person. But the law does not make him an incompetent witness at the trial of another person in respect of an offence in the commission of which he is an accomplice. Section 133 of the Evidence Act provides that an accomplice shall be a competent witness against an accused person. We are not here concerned at the present stage with the quality of such evidence at the trial and what confidence it can inspire in Court. The learned Advocate-General referred to us in this connection to the decision of the Allahabad High Court in Emperor v. Har Prasad Bhargava1. In that case in proceedings against a Subordinate Judge for receiving bribes, the Government issued a notification to the effect that no prosecution would be instituted by the Government against any person who came forward with evidence that he had paid or offered bribe to the particular officer whose case was under consideration. In consequence of this notification, two persons came forward and gave evidence against the Subordinate Judge, being undoubtedly accomplices as regards the offence with which the accused was charged. Of course this was long before we had on the statute book section 8 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The relevant passage is at page 231 and runs thus: “From a legal point of view the only difference in the case now before us is that neither Bhagirath nor Mangal Chand was ever an "accused person" at the trial in which his evidence was tendered, within the meaning of the said section. The real effect of the argument addressed to us on behalf of the accused on this point is that there is a method by which the prosecution, keeping strictly within the four corners of the Code of Criminal Procedure, might, with the consent of the Court, have put Bhagirath and Mangal Chand into the witness-box against Har Prasad Bhargava, each of them fortified by a judicial order of acquittal which would have barred their subsequent prosecution. They actually gave evidence without any such shield, though relying upon an extra judicial undertaking that the Local Government would not direct their prosecution. Whether their testimony is entitled to greater or less credit on this account is a question to be considered, but it has nothing to do with the admissibility of the testimony. There is abundant case-law in support of the propositions which we have laid down. Whether their testimony is entitled to greater or less credit on this account is a question to be considered, but it has nothing to do with the admissibility of the testimony. There is abundant case-law in support of the propositions which we have laid down. Reference was also made for the State to the decision in Anant v. Emperor2where it is observed at page 319: "As to the assurance given to four persons, it is notorious that it is very difficult to get evidence in such cases of bribery, and I see nothing sinister in the fact that it was considered necessary in the present case to assure four people that they would not suffer by telling the truth.“ But the principles laid down in these cases do not in the least detract from the validity of the objection taken to the statements recorded at the investigation and the consideration of those statements at the stage of framing charge under section 251-A There has been deliberate violation of the provisions of the Code and a departure from the recognised and lawful procedure for investigation. When the law provides tor a particular procedure and certain prohibitions are specifically indicated these are there to be obeyed and not deliberately flouted. In Nazir Ahmad v. The King Emperor 3 , the Judicial Committee while considering non-compliance with observed at page 641: "The rule which applies is............not less well recognised rule, namely, that where a power is given to do a certain thing in a certain way the thing must be done in that way or not at all. Other methods of Performance are necessarily for bidden. This doctrine has often been applied to Courts-Taylor v. Taylor, Taylor v. Keily, Ex parte Taylor4.“ In State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh5, Sarkar, J., as he then was, referred to this rule thus: ”The rule adopted in Taylor v. Thylor, Taylor v. Keily, Ex parte Taylor4, is well recognised and founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. Its result is that if a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which that power has to be exercised it necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory provision might as well not have been enacted." A point made on behalf of the accused is that as statements under section 161 (3) obtained on assurance of immunity from prosecution will have to be discarded on of the weapons in the armoury of the accused, the right to contradict the witnesses for the prosecution by reference to the statements recorded under section 162 is denied to the accused. It is, therefore, contended that the investigation should be struck down as illegal. Like all procedural laws the provisions of the Code are designed to subserve the ends of justice and not to frustrate them. One has to see the effect if any of the breach of the provisions of the Code in the advancement of justice whether the illegality or irregularity is one that can be cured or is cured and whether the accused would be prejudiced by its presence. The Code itself does not define what is irregularity and what is illegality and as pointed out by the Supreme Court in Willie (William) Slaney v. The State of Madhya Pradesh1, illegality can only mean an incurable irregularity, incurable because of the prejudice leading to failure of justice, and the question of prejudice being a question of fact has to be decided by Court in each particular case. Imam, J. concludes his judgment in that case with the following observations: "In conclusion I would point out that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are meant to be obeyed. Imam, J. concludes his judgment in that case with the following observations: "In conclusion I would point out that the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure are meant to be obeyed. Contravention of its provisions are unnecessary and neither the prosecution nor the Courts of trial should ignore the provisions in the hope that they might find shelter under sections 535 and 537 of the Code Where the contravention is substantial and a retrial becomes necessary public time is wasted and the accused is put to unnecessary harassment and expense " In view of the amended procedure to be adopted in warrant cases instituted on police report under section 251-A, Criminal Procedure Code, statements recorded under section 162 have become more important. While prior to the amendment of the Code in 1955 the use of the statement under section 161, Criminal Procedure Code, was limited, after the amendment of the Code in 1055 the statement has vital role to play at a crucial stage of the procedure in the enquiry of cases triable by Court of Sessions and in the trial of warrant cases under sections 207-A and 251-A of the Code. It is necessary to set out the following portions in section 1-70 Criminal Procedure Code: "173- (1) Every investigation under this Chapter shall be completed without unnecessary delay, and, as soon as it is completed, the officer-in-charge of the police station shall- (a) forward to a Magistrate empowered to take cognizance of the offence on a police report, a report in the form prescribed by the State Government setting forth the names of the parties, the nature of the information and the names of the persons: who appear to be acquainted with the circumstances of the case and stating whether the accused if arrested has been forwarded in custody, or has been released on his bond, and, if so, whether with or without sureties...... (4) After forwarding a report under this section the officer-in-charge of the police station shall before the commencement of the inquiry or trial furnish or cause to be furnished to the accused, free of cost, a copy of the report forwarded under sub-section (1) and of the first information report recorded under section 154 and of all other documents or relevant extracts thereof, on which the prosecution proposes to rely, including the statements and confessions, if any, recorded under section 164 and the statements recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses." The relevant provisions of section 251-A under which the present enquiry is being proceeded with are: "251-A (1) When, in any case instituted on a police report the accused appears or is brought before a Magistrate at the commencement of the trial, such Magistrate shall satisfy himself that the documents referred to in section 173 have been furnished to the accused, and if he finds that the accused has not been furnished with such documents or any of them, he shall cause them to be so furnished. (2) If, upon consideration of all the documents referred to in section 173 and making such examination, if any, of the accused as the Magistrate thinks necessary and after giving the prosecution and the accused an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate considers the charge against the accused to be groundless, he shall discharge him. (3) If, upon such documents being considered, and examination, if any, being made and the prosecution and the accused being given an opportunity of being heard, the Magistrate is of opinion that there is ground for presuming that the accused has committed an offence triable under this Chapter, which such Magistrate is competent to try, and which, in his opinion, could be adequately punished by him, he shall frame in writing a charge against the accused. (4) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused and he shall be asked whether he is guilty or claims to be tried...................." It will be seen that under section 251-A no provision is made for examination of a Witness before making an order under sub-section (2) discharging the accused or under sub-section (3) framing a charge. (4) The charge shall then be read and explained to the accused and he shall be asked whether he is guilty or claims to be tried...................." It will be seen that under section 251-A no provision is made for examination of a Witness before making an order under sub-section (2) discharging the accused or under sub-section (3) framing a charge. It will be interesting 10 compare these provisions with the provisions of sections 252 to 255, Criminal Procedure Code, in respect of warrant cases instituted otherwise than on police report. In such cases there is provision for taking evidence by the Court before framing of charge. The procedure has been simplified in cases taken cognizance on police report by reason of the provision for previous enquiry and investigation by a competent police officer A trained person has collected the evidence that would be available at the trial. As noticed in Ramnarayan Mor and another V. State of Maharashtra1. "In a warrant case therefore there will be no evidence of witnesses and the examination of the accused if found necessary by the Magistrate must of necessity be restricted to the circumstances appearing from the documents under section 173 (4). The Legislature has therefore in enquiries in warrant cases contemplated examination of the accused solely upon circumstances appearing from the documentary evidence referred to in section 173 (4) and it cannot be assumed that the examination of the accused in respect of circumstances appearing from those documents which are not proved but of which copies have been furnished to the accused, is so inconsistent with principles of criminal jurisprudence that it must be discountenanced." While referring to the change in the procedure that had been brought about at the same time in committal proceedings by section 207-A of the Code which their Lordships had to consider in the above case, it is observed at page 1076: "Normally in a criminal trial, the Court can proceed on documents which are duly proved, or by the rules of evidence made admissible without formal proof, but under the amended Code the Legislature has in section 207-A prescribed a special procedure in proceedings for commitment of the accused. The record consists of the oral evidence recorded under sub-section (4) of section 173, and it would be difficult to regard only those documents which are duly proved, or which are admissible without proof as "evidence" within the meaning of clause (6) (of section 207-A) and not the rest. There is no substance in the contention that the Legislature could not have intended that the accused should be examined in respect of documents which are not duly proved before the Court, because to do so might in some cases operate as “ a trap for the accused.” The object of the examination it may be remembered is to afford an opportunity to the accused to explain any circumstances appearing against him.“ Under the amended procedure relating to warrant cases instituted on police report also the documents referred to in section 173 of the Code are the material on which the accused has to be discharged or charges framed and the accused made to stand on his trial. The examination of the accused by the Magistrate at that stage can only be with reference to the documents. The documents referred to under section 173 which thus now have positive role in the framing of charges, include the statements and confessions, if any, recorded under section 164 and the statements recorded under sub-section (3) of section 161 of all the persons whom the prosecution proposes to examine as its witnesses. While prior to the amendment of the Code in 1955 statements recorded at the investigation stage had a limited use, though important from the point of the accused, now they provide the basis for the framing of charge. Prior to the amendment statements made by prosecution witnesses of the investigation, being the earlier statements made by them with reference to the facts of the case, were valuable material for testing the veracity of the witnesses examined in Court with particular reference to their recorded statements when they happened to be at variance. Such statements were considered only with a view to weigh the evidence actually adduced in Court. Now as pointed out above, they are in a sense evidence, though, only at the stage of enquiry before framing charge and for framing charge. The Evidence Act defines evidence to mean and include also all documents produced for inspection of Courts. Such statements were considered only with a view to weigh the evidence actually adduced in Court. Now as pointed out above, they are in a sense evidence, though, only at the stage of enquiry before framing charge and for framing charge. The Evidence Act defines evidence to mean and include also all documents produced for inspection of Courts. In Ramanarayan Mor and another v. State of Maharashtra1, the documents referred to in section 173 (4) are considered as part of the evidence mentioned in section 207-A. As these documents are the matter which a Magistrate has to consider under sections 251-A (2) and (3), it would be open, to the prosecution and the accused to rely upon or refer to them in support of their respective contentions, when they exercise the right of being heard under sub-clauses (2) and (3) of section 251-A. Section 162 (1) while prohibiting the signing of statements recorded under section 161 (3) by the person making the statements places an embargo on its user for any purpose subject to the latter provision in the Code. ”nor shall any such statement..............be used for any purpose save as hereinafter provided.“ Sections 207-A and 251-A provide for the user of these statements at the stage of committal or framing charge as the case may be. In Ukha Kolhe v. State of Maharashtra2, it is stated: "Exclusion from evidence of any part of a statement made to a police officer or a record from being used for any purpose at any enquiry or trial in respect of an offence under investigat:“on at the time when such statement was made in” save as hereinafter provided “. The word” hereinafter “ is in our judgment not restricted in its operation to section 162 alone, but applies to the body of the Code; to hold otherwise would be to introduce a patent inconsistency between section 207-A and section 162 of the Code, for by the former section in committal proceeding, statements recorded under section 162 are to be regarded as evidence”. Such being the scope of section 251-A, infraction of the provisions of the Code in the matter of investigation brought to the notice of the Court before the framing of charge cannot be passed over leaving the accused to stand trial for charges framed on material gathered in violation of the provisions of the Code. Such being the scope of section 251-A, infraction of the provisions of the Code in the matter of investigation brought to the notice of the Court before the framing of charge cannot be passed over leaving the accused to stand trial for charges framed on material gathered in violation of the provisions of the Code. No doubt illegality committed in the course of investigation does not affect the competence or jurisdiction of the Court for trial. Where cognizance of case had in fact been taken and the case had proceeded to termination, the invalidity of the preceding investigation, it has been held repeatedly, does not vitiate the result, unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby. But the position would be different, if the illegality is discovered at the early stage of the proceeding. In State of M.P. v. Mubarak Alt1, an objection was taken before the trial began before the Special Judge that the investigation had been carried on in violation of section 5-A of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Order of the High Court in the matter providing for rectification of the defect and curing of the illegality in the investigation directing the Special Judge to order the Deputy Superintendent of Police to carry on investigation while the case remained pending on the file of the Special Judge was upheld by the Supreme Court. In H.N. Rishbud and Inder Singh v. The State of Delhi2, after observing that where cognizance of the case has in fact been taken and the case has proceeded to termination the investigation will not vitiate the result unless miscarriage of justice has been caused thereby, it is stated by Jagannadha Das, J.: “It does not follow, however, that the invalidity of the investigation is to be completely ignored by the Court during trial. When the breach of such mandatory provision (section 5 (4) and proviso to section 3 of the Prevention of Corruption Act and section 5-A of the Act) is brought to the knowledge of the Court at a sufficiently early stage, the Court, while not declining cognizance, will have to take the necessary steps to get the illegality cured and the defect rectified, by ordering such reinvestigation as the circumstances of an individual case may call for.............. When the attention of the Court is called to such an illegality at a very early stage it would not be fair to the accused not to obviate the prejudice that may have been caused thereby, by appropriate orders, at that stage but to leave him to the ultimate remedy of waiting till the conclusion of the trial and of discharging the somewhat difficult burden under section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of making out that such an error has in fact occasioned a failure of justice. It is relevant in this context to observe that even if the trial had proceeded to conclusion and the accused had to make out that there was in fact a failure of justice as the result of such an error, explanation to section 537 of the Code of Criminal Procedure indicates that the fact of the objection having been raised at an early state of the proceeding is a pertinent factor To ignore the breach in such a situation when brought to the notice of the Court would be virtually to make a dead letter of the peremptory provision which has been enacted on grounds of public policy for the benefit of such an accused.” Learned Counsel for the petitioner attacked the propriety of taking self-incriminatory statements even in cases where there has been no assurance of immunity from the prosecution. Some of these persons have admitted making manipulations in the nominal muster rolls to reimburse themselves the cost of valuable things provided for the petitionen It is unnecessary for us to examine at length the question whether these admissions in the statements which are confessions of guilt should be discarded by the Special Judge, as the learned Advocate-General, to a specific question from Court, stated that the record of such manipulations has to be discarded as not proper material for consideration. The learned Special Judge has not considered these vitiating features in regard to the documents that have been placed before him while ordering the framing of charges against the petitionen In the light of the above discussion, it is clear that the present order of the Special Judge directing the framing of charge on consideration of the statements before him under section 173 (4), Criminal Procedure Code, without reference to the illegalities in the investigation has to be quashed. The Special Judge will have to take up the matter once again and consider the case excluding from consideration all statements recorded under sections 161 (3) and 164 which are found vitiated in the light of the observations made herein. The Special Judge will also exclude while considering the statements which are not otherwise violative of sections 162 and 163 of the Code, portions of the statements which are self-incriminatory and confessional in character of the maker The State has preferred Criminal Revision Case No. 294 of 1965 questioning the view of the Special Judge that no charge could be framed in the case under section 5 (1) (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act read with section 5 (2) of the Act. The Special Judge agreed with the contention on behalf of the accused that section 5 (1) (b) of the Prevention of Corruption Act like section 165, Indian Penal Code, was designed to cover only cases of receipt of valuable things by public servant from third parties who have any business before him and not from officers subordinate to him. It is not the case for the prosecution that the documents warrant a charge for receipt of valuable things from third parties who are not subordinate of the petitionen Their contention is that the sub-section would include acceptance of valuable things from subordinates. The Special Judge has taken the view that the offence would come under section 5 (1) (d) of the Act, that is, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, he has obtained for himself or for any other person any Valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. In our view the interpretation placed by the Special Judge on section 5 (1) (b) is correct. The language used in section 5(1) (b) is identical with the language of section 165, Indian Penal Code. Though the illustrations to the section cannot govern its interpretation, the illustrations under section 165, Indian Penal Code, are at any rate where there is ambiguity, indicative of the scope of the section. The illustrations refer to receipt of valuable things from third parties. The material portion of section 5 may be set out: 5. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty,- ................ The illustrations refer to receipt of valuable things from third parties. The material portion of section 5 may be set out: 5. (1) A public servant is said to commit the offence of criminal misconduct in the discharge of his duty,- ................ (b) if he habitually accepts or obtains or agrees to accept or attempts to obtain for himself or for any other person, any Valuable thing without consideration or for a consideration which he knows to be inadequate, from any person whom he knows to have been or to be, or to be likely to be concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him, or having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servant to whom he is subordinate, or from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the person so concerned ; ........ (d) if he, by corrupt or illegal means or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant, obtains for himself or for any other person any Valuable thing or pecuniary advantage. In our reading of the section the acceptance of valuable things which constitutes an offence of criminal misconduct is acceptance, (i) from any person (whom he knows to have been or to be likely to be) (a) concerned in any proceeding or business transacted or about to be transacted by him or (b) concerned in any proceeding or business having any connection with the official functions of himself or of any public servants to whom he is subordinate, and (ii) from any person whom he knows to be interested in or related to the persons so concerned as in (i) (a)or (b)It is not contended for the prosecution that the words having any connection with the official functions of himself axe to be red as qualifying any person. It is difficult to include the subordinates of an officer as persons concerned in any business transacted or to be transacted by him. It is not contended that on the facts of this particular case the subordinate officers were in anyway concerned in any proceedings before the accused. In the result Writ Petition No. 391 of 1965 and Criminal Miscellaenous Petition No. 934 of 1965 are allowed. The order, dated 16th January, 1965 of the Special Judge in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 86 of 1964, is quashed. In the result Writ Petition No. 391 of 1965 and Criminal Miscellaenous Petition No. 934 of 1965 are allowed. The order, dated 16th January, 1965 of the Special Judge in Criminal Miscellaneous Petition No. 86 of 1964, is quashed. The Special Judge is directed to take up the matter for fresh consideration in the light or the observations made above. Writ Petition No. 390 of 1965 and Criminal Revision Case No. 294 of 1965 fail and are dismissed. No costs in the Writ Petitions. R.M. ----- W. P. No. 391 and Crl. M. P. No. 934 of 1965 allowed. W. P. No. 390 and Crl. R.C. No. 294 of 1965 dismissed. Matter remitted.