Judgment Anant Singh, J. 1. The petitioner has been convicted by the two Courts below under Sec.279 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for a period of three months. 2. The facts of the case are as follows: At about 10-30 a.m. on the 3rd March, 1963, the petitioner was driving a truck No. BRN 5851 on Patna Ranchi Road. He was going from south to north near village Kharant when a bus bearing No. BRA 1759 was com ing from the opposite direction on the north. There was a collision between the truck and the bus as a result of which both the vehicles got damaged in their front parts. At the rele vant time, there were three bullock-carts also coming from south to north and one of the bullock carts as a result of the collision between the bus and the truck got thrown into a ditch nearby The allegation is that peti tioner was driving his truck rashly and negli gently at a high speed whereas the but was coming in slow speed. 3. Learned Counsel, Mr. Saptami Jha,appearing for the petitioner, has raised a point that for exactly the same facts, the petitioner was tried by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate of Nawadah under Sec.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act and was acquitted by the judgment, dated the 13th April, 1964. The contention is that the ingredients of Sec.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act are substantially similar to the ingredients of Sec.279 of the Penal Code and. therefore, it is urged that for the same offence arising out of exactly the same facts, the petitioner could not be tried twice. This contention was raised also before the learned Court of Appeal below and that Court, relying on a Bench decision of this Court in State of Bihar V/s. Mangal Singh, AIR 1953 Pat 56 , has observed that the trial of the petitioner under Sec.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act was no bar to his subsequent trial under Sec.279 of the Penal Code, since, in its obvious view, the ingredients of the two offences are different though the learned Court has not said so in so many words. 4. 4. In Mangal Singhs case, AIR 1968 Pat 56, the accused had been convicted under Sec.121 of the Motor Vehicles Act and thereafter he was tried and convicted under Sections 279, 338 and 304A of the Penal Code, Sec.121 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages the driving or causing to be driven in any public place a motor vehicle or trailer with mechanical or other defects in them, and it does not envisage any other offence, like causing simple or grievous injuries or death by rash and negligent driving of a vehicle. It was, therefore, obviously held that the conviction of the accused in Mangal Singhs case under Sec.121 of the Motor Vehicles Act could be no bar to his subsequent trial and convictions under Sections 279, 338 and 304A of the Penal Code. 5. In order to appreciate the contention of learned Counsel for the petitioner, I may quote below the relevant ingredients of Sec.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act and those of Sec.279 of the Penal Code Sec.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act envisages the driving of a motor vehicle "at a speed or in a manner which is dangerous to the public having regard to all the circumstances of the case." Sec.279 of the Penal Code envisages driving of any vehicle or riding it on any public way "in a manner so rash or negligent as to endanger human life, or to be likely to cause hurt or injury to any other person." 6. Reading the ingredients of the two sections, it would appear that the difference is only in the language but the substance of the offence is the same namely, driving or riding of a vehicle in a manner so "as to endanger human life", which is the same as being "dangerous to the public" The offence, defined in Sec.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act, and the one, defined in Sec.279 of the Penal Code, is essentially the same. True it is that Sec.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act will not be attracted, when any mischief or injury is caused to any one else, as a result of rash or negligent driving, whereas, in the Penal Code, such results are cognizable by other sections of the Penal Code, like Sections 337, 338 and 304A. 7. True it is that Sec.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act will not be attracted, when any mischief or injury is caused to any one else, as a result of rash or negligent driving, whereas, in the Penal Code, such results are cognizable by other sections of the Penal Code, like Sections 337, 338 and 304A. 7. In the instant case, the petitioner was not tried or convicted for any other offence than for driving his vehicle on a public way in rash and negligent manner, which was of course likely to endanger human life. But this offence was obviously covered by Sec.116 of the Motor Vehicles Act, as well, for which the petitioner was tried and acquitted. Now for the same set of facts constituting no other offence, than the only one of rash and negligent driving, he could not be placed twice in jeopardy. Ray, J., as he then was in Gouri Shankar Rai V/s. Emperor, AIR 1947 Pat 290, after discussing the provisions of Section 408 of the Criminal Procedure Code observed that "no accused shall be vexed with more than one trial for offences arising out of the same set of facts." The position, however, may be different, if, on the same set of facts, different offences can be made out and for such different offences an accused can be tried separately" But, if the same set of facts constitute only one offence, for which an accused has been tried previously he cannot be tried once again. 8. The principle prohibiting a second prosecution on the same facts, as embodied in Sec. 403 of the Criminal Procedure Code, as also in Sec.26 of the General Clauses Act, and Article 20(2) of the Constitution of India, has been laid down by the Supreme Court after discussion of the various case laws bearing on the point in Manipur Administration V/s. Thockchom Bira Singh, AIR 1966 SC 87. In paragraph 11 at page 91 their Lord ships held:- - "As we have pointed out earlier, issue estoppel does not prevent the trial of any offence as does autrefois acquit but only precludes evidence being led to prove a fact in issue as regards which evidence has already been led and a specific finding recorded at an earlier criminal trial before a Court of competent jurisdiction Their Lordships have also quoted a passage from the judgment of the Privy Council in Sambasivam V/s. Public Prosecutor, Federation of Malaya 1950 AC 458, to the following effect:- - "The effect of a verdict of acquittal pronounced by a competent Court on a lawful charge and after a lawful trial is not completely stated by saying that the person acquitted cannot be tried again for the same offence To that it must be added that the verdict is binding and conclusive in all subsequent proceedings between the parties to the adjudication." 9. It appears that the conviction of the petitioner under Sec.279 of the Penal Code in the present case is based exactly on the same facts, for which he was once tried before by a Court of competent jurisdiction and was acquitted. Thus, the second trial of the petitioner and his conviction thereunder were without jurisdiction. 10. The application is, accordingly, allowed and the conviction and the sentence imposed on the petitioner are set aside.