( 1 ) THE plaintiff appellant installed three wooden almirahs in Block A Connaught Place, New Delhi, near Wangers Restaurant. It, appears that on 16th July, 1956 some member of the staff of New Delhi Municipal Committee inspected the site and made a report dated 18th July. 1966. Exhibit D/2, which inter alia recites "during my round on 10th July, 1966 I noticed that Sh. Hira Lal has got constructed three wooden almirahs, two in the corner and one on the wall in the verandah of Block a Con. Place, near "wangers", without the permission of the Committee. " In pursuance of this report, the respondent. New Delhi Municipal Committee, issued a notice to Hira Lal under section 195 of the Punjab Municipal Act, requiring the appellant to demo- lish the said Almirahs. THE notice recites the description of the almirahs as "two wooden almirahs measuring 6 x 5 each in the corners and one wooden Almirah measuring 6 x3 along with the pucca wall in the verandah of Block a . . . . . . " On 18th December, 1966, the appellant filed a suit for a declaration that the said notice under S. 196 of the Punjab Municipal Act was illegal, and void and for an injunction restraining the respondent from dismantling the said almirahs. It was alleged by the plaintiff that the said almirahs had been fixed in the year 1954 and no notice could be issued after the expiry of six months from the date of construction. It has not been disputed by the respondent that if the construction had been set up six months before the date of the notice, the respondents would not be competent to demolish the same. THE lower Appellate Court on proper appreciation of the evidence came to the conclusion that the almirahs were installed in July, 1956. This pure finding of fact being based on evidence, it is not open to me to review the same. I consequently hold that the notice under section 195 of the Punjab Municipal Act was within time. Two other contentions raised by the plaintiff before the lower Appellate Court were: (1) The almirahs did not fall within the definition of the word building in section 3 (2) of the Punjab Municipal Act. I consequently hold that the notice under section 195 of the Punjab Municipal Act was within time. Two other contentions raised by the plaintiff before the lower Appellate Court were: (1) The almirahs did not fall within the definition of the word building in section 3 (2) of the Punjab Municipal Act. (2) Fixing of the almirahs did not amount to erection or re-erection of a building within the meaning of section 3 (5) of the said Act, ( 2 ) BOTH these contentions were repelled by the lower Appellate Court, which came to the conclusion that the expression building includes "any shop" and since the almirahs were being used for selling goods, they constituted building within the meaning of the said provision. In my opinion the lower Appellate Court suffered itself to be led astray into treating the carrying on of trade as per se evidence of Its being building within the meaning of section 3 (2) of the said Act. No doubt, the expression building Includes "any shop , but carrying on of trade is not decisive of every place of business being a building. Whether a premises Is a building or not, the answer must depend on the nature of the structure and not the nature of the business carried on. IF the contention of the New Delhi Municipal Committee were to be upheld, it would mean that even fixing a book rack In a room of a house for keeping books would need the permission of New Delhi Municipal Committee. I am unable to subscribe to that view. The words shop, house, hut. out house, shed or stable are indicative of the nature of the structure and all these words lead me to only one conclusion, namely that a small wooden almirah would not amount to a building. Section 189 of the said Act forbids the erection or re-erection of the said building without the permission of the Committee. The expression "to erect or re-erect any building" is defined in S. 3 (6) of the said Act and that further indicates that almirahs are not within the prohibition of the statute. IN Emperor v. Hasanbhai Rehmatbhai Vinawala, AIR 1942 Bom 94, wire fence or a fence 6 feet in height and consisting of wooden plank attached to posts embedded in earth on the boundary of the property was held not to be a building. IN Emperor v. Hasanbhai Rehmatbhai Vinawala, AIR 1942 Bom 94, wire fence or a fence 6 feet in height and consisting of wooden plank attached to posts embedded in earth on the boundary of the property was held not to be a building. Similarly an enclosed space of canvas screen was held outside the definition of building in Kamta Nath v. Municipal Board of Allahabad, (1905) ILR 28 All 199. These cases may not be of any direct assistance in deciding the question but surely indicate the nature of structures that arc treated as building, it is obvious that no one would in common parlance style said almirahs as building and I do not think the definition of the word as given in the Act extends the meaning so far as to permit one to term such like almirahs as "building". IT is not disputed that the appellant had set up these almirahs with the permission of the owner of that place. Mr. Bishamber Dayal, the learned counsel for the respondent then drew my attention to paragraph 5 of the plaint and said that the plaintiff s main grievance was about the bar of limitation in issuing the notice under section 195 of the Punjab Municipal Act and the question whether the almirahs were "building" or not had not been raised in the plaint and should not have been permitted to be agitated by the courts below. It appears from the perusal of the judgments of both the Courts below that the point was raised and decided there on the basis of the description given in the report and the notice under section 195 of the Punjab Municipal Act. In these circumstances, I do not feel inclined to accept Mr Bishamber Dayal s. suggestion. MR. Bishamber Dayal then pointed out that the verandas in the Connaught Place have recently been declared public streets and it was, therefore, open to the New Delhi Municipal Committee to demolish the said unauthorised structures. That question does not arise before me and it may be open to them to demolish the structures on that ground. But I am really not called upon to answer that question at this stage. That question does not arise before me and it may be open to them to demolish the structures on that ground. But I am really not called upon to answer that question at this stage. In this view the appeal must be allowed and the judgments of the two Courts below set aside Tlie plaintiff, is therefore, granted a declaration that the notice under section 195 of the said Act was illegal and an injunction restraining the New Delhi Municipal Committee from demolishing the almirahs in pursuance of the said notice. It may. however, he open to New Delhi Municipal Committee to take such action in the matter of demolition as may now be open to them under any provision of law. In the circumstances of the case, however, the parties will bear their own costs throughout.