Judgment :- 1. These two appeals are by the 1st defendant in a suit on a promissory note. Kunju Achan, who was a trustee of, the Viswanathaswami Temple, Kalpathy, describing himself as such trustee, executed the suit promissory-note, on May 9, 1957, in favour of the plaintiff for Rs. 1000/- for a stated purpose of the Temple. It contains an undertaking to pay on demand, but no undertaking to pay out of the funds of the temple. The 2nd defendant is the widow and legal representative of Kunju Achan. The 1st defendant, who is the trustee of the temple, contended that no decree on the promissory-note can be given against its assets. The Munsiff decreed the suit against the assets of Kunju Achan in the hands of the 2nd defendant, and dismissed it as concerns the temple. The plaintiff and the 2nd defendant filed separate appeals before the Subordinate Judge to make the temple also liable for the suit claim, and they have been allowed with costs. In S. A. No. 1494 of 1962 the 1st defendant challenges the order for costs of the 2nd defendant against the temple; and in S. A. No. 1440 of 1962 the 1st defendant challenges the decree against the temple on the suit claim. 2. The law appears well settled that in a suit on a promissory-note executed by the guardian of a minor the latter's estate cannot be made liable, and that the consecrated idol in a temple being, for legal purposes, a permanent minor (Vide 4 L A. 52) the same principle applies to a promissory-note executed by its trustee. In Swaminatha Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar (32 MLJ. 259) it is ruled: "The fact that the money was utilised and was intended to be utilised for the benfit of the temple cannot entitle the plaintiff to have a decree charging the amount due under the promissory note against the trust property." This is followed in Rama Variar v. Ananthanarayana Pattar (1950-11 MLJ. 636) where Viswanatha Sastri J. said: "In the present case, beyond the description of the executants as Uralars and the statement that the debt had been borrowed for purposes of the devaswom, there is no indication in the promissory note that the Uralars wanted to exclude their personal liability; nor is there any promise to pay the debt out of the funds of the temple. Sitting singly, I am bound by the decisions in Palaniappa Chettiar v Shanmugham Chettiar (ILR. 41 Mad. 815) and Swaminatha Aiyar v. Srinivasa Aiyar (32 MLJ. 259) which stand unreversed, to hold that no decree could be passed against the Devaswom properties." 3. Perhaps, the reason for the above rule is what the Federal Court expressed, as regards a promissory-note executed by the guardian of a Hindu minor, in Kondamudi Sriramulu v. Myneni Pundarikakshayya (AIR. 1949 F.C. 218). The opinions recorded by their Lordships are as follow: Kania C. J. "In my opinion, therefore, the law, as it stands permits a de facto manager to borrow money for the necessity or the benefit of the minor's estate, so as to make the minor's estate liable for the loan when he can do so without making out a contract between the minor and the creditor. In respect of borrowing money on the security of negotiable instruments, the same test should be applied but with greater strictness, because by giving a negotiable instrument in the name of a minor, a de facto manager is bringing into existence a contract between a minor and the creditor and which contract under the Negotiable Instruments Act creates rights and privileges in favour of third parties, e. g., presumption as to consideration, rights of holders in due course etc. I do not see therefore how the test laid down in Hunooman Persaud's case. 6 M1A. 393, can authorise a de facto manager to make a negotiable instrument in the name of a minor." Fazl Ali J. "It seems to me that no guardian ...can be allowed to involve the minor's estate in liabilities which may follow by a strict application of the somewhat stringent provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act. To give an undertaking on behalf of the minor that a certain sum will be paid on demand and that in default of such payment, compensation will be payable (as provided in S.117 of the Negotiable Instruments Act) is a somewhat onerous transaction, and in my opinion any contract which exposes the minor and his estate to the risks involved in such a transact ion cannot be countenanced in law." B. E. Mukherjea J. "When money is borrowed on a promissory note the provisions of the Negotiable Instruments Act would undoubtedly be attracted. A promissory note is payable unconditionally on demand and it has got some other special features, viz., there is a presumption that it was made for consideration and that the holder of it is a holder in due course.... If a promissory note purports to be executed by the minor it could not possibly be the basis of a suit at all. If it is passed by the guardian who does not exclude his personal liability the holder of the note can certainly have a decree against the guardian and if the minor is made a party to such a suit and the plaintiff or the guardian succeeds in proving that it was 'made for necessity, the creditor can avail himself of the guardian's right of reimbursement against the minor's estate. As between the creditor and the guardian, the undertaking is certainly unconditional but that would not preclude the guardian for showing as against the minor that it was for necessity or benefit of the latter." Mahajan J. "The first and essential requisite of a promissory note is certainty, i. e., certainty as to the person making the payment, the person to receive it, the time and place of payment, the conditions of liability and also the amount to be paid. The note must be payable at all events. When no time of payment is specified, it is payable on demand. The maker of a promissory note is bound to pay the amount at maturity according to the apparent tenor of the note and every party to a negotiable instrument is liable thereon, to the holder in due course until the instrument is duly satisfied. Even if the instrument is executed without consideration, the holder for consideration and every subsequent holder deriving title from him, may recover from him, from the transferor for consideration or any prior party thereto. Even if the instrument is executed without consideration, the holder for consideration and every subsequent holder deriving title from him, may recover from him, from the transferor for consideration or any prior party thereto. It is obvious, therefore, that a promissory note by itself is an onerous kind of document and making a minor liable on such document would fall outside the purview of the rule of necessity laid down in Hunooman Persaud Panday's case, 6 M. I. A. 393, and the minor on such a note may have to pay without having the opportunity of raising the defences allowed to him under Hunooman Persaud Panday's case, 6 M. I. A. 393 or asking the lender to satisfy the conscience of the Court on those matters. ....A promissory note is a peculiar kind of document and by its very nature it imposes an onerous liability on the minor. On the note itself, therefore, a minor cannot be sued or a claim decreed against his estate. It is also clear that if the guardian has given a promissory note, making himself personally liable, then, he can be sued on the note and he can then seek reimbursement from the minor's estate and that otherwise the note can he used as evidence of the debt. There is no liability on the promissory note: the liability, if any, is aliunde of the note i. e., on the loan itself, if it is for the benefit of the estate or is given for a pre-existing liability that has been discharged by a fresh borrowing taken for the purpose and evidenced by the note. Unless there is a cause of action independently of the promissory note which can sustain the action, the minor cannot be made liable." Thus, in circumstances like the present, a distinction appears to be maintained between debts and negotiable instruments. While the minor's estate may be liable for a debt contracted by the guardian for necessity or benefit of the minor it is not liable for a negotiable instrument executed by the guardian for the minor's necessity. The distinction seems quite subtle, but the law seems to have been strict throughout. So long as the law is as laid in the above precedents I am not given any precedent doubting the correctness of AIR. The distinction seems quite subtle, but the law seems to have been strict throughout. So long as the law is as laid in the above precedents I am not given any precedent doubting the correctness of AIR. 1949 F. C. 218 or 1950, II M. L. J. 636 the decree given in the instant case against the assets of the temple cannot be sustained. 4. Counsel for appellant contended that the present suit is not on a promissory note alone, but on the debt evidenced by the promissory note as well and that, as the debt is found to have been intended and utilised for purposes of the temple, the plaintiff is entitled to a decree against the temple on the principle of subrogation to the trustee's right of reimbursement. If the suit is on the debt, counsel would have been right in that contention. But, I am afraid, the plaint does not appear to be based on the debt apart from the promissory note. Both the Courts below have characterised the suit as on the promissory note. The prayer in the plaint is for a decree for the amount as shown in the accounts appended to it and the account is only of "the principal sum of the promissory note" and "the interest accrued thereon". Counsel for plaintiff made an (oral) prayer for an opportunity to amend the plaint to make it expressly on the debt covered by the suit promissory-note. As a fresh suit on the debt would now be hopelessly barred by limitation, I am not allowing that prayer here. 5. In the result, both the second appeals are allowed and the decrees against the assets of the temple nude by the Court below in the appeals by the plaintiff and the 2nd defendant are reversed. The appellant will have costs in S. A. No. 1440 of 1962, but not in S. A. No. 1494 of 1962 as one second appeal would have been sufficient in one suit even though there were different appeals in the lower appellate Court. The right, if any, for reimbursement of the 2nd defendant out of funds of the temple is not relevant here and is therefore left open. Allowed.