A. R. BAKSHI, M. U. SHAH, J. ( 1 ) ON account of the acquisition of certain lands for the purpose of remodelling the railway yard at Asarwa and for the purpose of construction of a road six cases arose for award of compensation out of which we are concerned with Compensation Cases Nos. 157/58 165 and 163/58. These cases were by consent of parties consolidated and heard together and the evidence was recorded in Case No. 165 of 1958 which was treated as the main case. All these cases were disposed of by a common judgment by the learned Joint Judge at Ahmedabad on 30 November 1959 Appeal No. 745 of 1960 is in respect of Compensation Case No. 157. Appeal No. 785 of 1960 is against the decree passed in Compensation Case No. 165 of 1955 and Appeal No. 1031 of 1960 is in respect of Compensation Case No. 163 of 1958. As these three cases were disposed of by a common judgment these three appeals will also be disposed of by one judgment. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ( 2 ) IT would be seen from the above discussion that the lease-deeds which have been produced show a market rate far in excess of the rate which is claimed by the appellants. Most of the leases show a rate exceeding Rs. 100. 00 per square yard ant as the evidence of the tenants has not been adduced it is not possible to know the circumstances under which the tenants agreed to pay the rent. The evidence in the shape of rental value no doubt can be taken Into consideration for fixing the market value of lands but on the face of the transactions it appears that the rate which the annual rent Indicates when capitalized is abnormally high and moreover there is other evidence on the record which would indicate the market value of the lands in the area where the acquired lands are situated. The evidence referred to above consists of swards Exs. 87 89 and 90 given by the Land Acquisition Officer in respect of lands situated on the Naroda Road. Ex. 87 is an award in respect of acquisition of 7912 square yards of land out of S. No. 525 which were acquired in February 1951. Ex. The evidence referred to above consists of swards Exs. 87 89 and 90 given by the Land Acquisition Officer in respect of lands situated on the Naroda Road. Ex. 87 is an award in respect of acquisition of 7912 square yards of land out of S. No. 525 which were acquired in February 1951. Ex. 89 is an award by the Land Acquisition Officer in respect of 378 square yards of land which were acquired out of S. No. 525 in June 1956 and Ex. 90 is an award in respect of 605 square yards of land which were acquired out of S. No. 424 in August 1955 The rate that was allowed in respect of S. No. 87 was Rs. 7. 00 per square yard Rs. 9. 50 in respect of lands which were the subject matter of the award Ex. 89 and Rs. 8. 00 per square yard in respect of lands the compensation of which was fixed by the award Ex. 90. S. Nos. 525 and 424 in respect of which these awards have been given are situated on the same Naroda Road on which S. No. 520b is situated. It is true that these two survey numbers are at a greater distance from the city side than S. No. 520b. but it does not appear that S. Nos. 525 and 424 are situated in a locality which is totally undeveloped. These awards thus indicate a price from Rs. 7 to 9 50 from 1951 to 1956 and can be utilised for the purpose of assessing the market value of the acquired lands after taking into consideration any particular advantage or disadvantage which would attach to these two survey numbers In comparison with the acquired lands. S. No. 525 which is the subject matter of award Exs. 87 and 89 is as stated above at some distance from the city but is situated on the main high way on which S. No 520/b Is situated also. The level of the acquired lands which are situated on the Naroda Road as it appears from the evidence is lower by about a foot and the level of the portion of S. No. 525 which is the subject matter of award Ex. 87 is also lower than the road by about 2 to 3 feet. The level of the acquired lands which are situated on the Naroda Road as it appears from the evidence is lower by about a foot and the level of the portion of S. No. 525 which is the subject matter of award Ex. 87 is also lower than the road by about 2 to 3 feet. The level of the portion of lands in S. No. 525 which are the subject matter of the award Ex. 89 does not appear to be lower than the Naroda Road whereas the level of the lands in S. No. 424 which is the subject matter of the award Ex. 90 is lower than the road by about 1 to 2 feet. Out of the acquired lands S. No. 520b is situated on the main Naroda Road which is a high way and therefore would be comparable with S. Nos. 525 and 424 which are also situated on the same road. Therefore we do not think that the rate of Rs. 10. 00 which has been fixed by the learned Civil Judge for the purpose of assessing the market value of the acquired lands in S. No. 520b is unreasonable and would therefore require to be enhanced. S. No. 520a is a little here up but is nearer to the Naroda Road than S. Nos. 519 and 570 and the rate in respect of S. No. 520a must therefore be slightly higher than the other survey numbers In the rear. On a consideration of the rates indicated by awards Exs. 87 89 and 90 and taking into consideration all the factors relevant for the lands which are the subject matter of the awards and the acquired lands we are of the view that since S. No. 520a is slightly in the rear a rate of Rs. 5 25 would be a reasonable rate at which the market value of the 1 acquired out of that survey number should be assessed. As stated above S. Nos. 519 570 and 650 are in the rear and therefore it would be reasonable to award compensation in respect of these lands at the rate of Rs 4/- per square yard. As regards S. Nos. As stated above S. Nos. 519 570 and 650 are in the rear and therefore it would be reasonable to award compensation in respect of these lands at the rate of Rs 4/- per square yard. As regards S. Nos. 557 and 646 which relate to Compensation Case No. 165 of 1958 and Compensation Case No. 163 of 1958 respectively (Appeals No 785 and 1031 of 1960) these lands are not situated on the Naroda Road which is a wider road and is a national high way but are situated on a narrower road starting from near the Asarwa tank going towards Omnagar Society. The importance of these pieces of land from the point of view of market value would not be as much as that of S. No. 520b which is situated on a high-way. These lands are also situated in the interior of the main Naroda Road and therefore we consider that it would be reasonable to assess the market value of S. Nos. 557 and 646 at the rate of Rs. 5. 00 per square yard. ( 3 ) BEFORE we work out the result of the aforesaid conclusion we may mention here that we have taken into consideration the three awards Exs. 87 89 sad 90 which were passed by the Land Acquisition Officer. Our attention was drawn to a decision of the Bombay High Court reported in 61 B. L. R. 1033 (The special Land Acquisition Officer Bombay v. Lakhamsi Ghelabhai) in which it was held that a judgment in another Land Acquisition Reference not inter parties and in respect of another property situate in the vicinity of the land in question was not admissible as an instance from which market value of the land in question could be deduced. That judgment considers cases of awards which are by judgments from a Court and awards which are by a Land Acquisition Officer. That judgment considers cases of awards which are by judgments from a Court and awards which are by a Land Acquisition Officer. Reference was made in the judgment referred to above to the case decided by the Privy Council of Secretary of State for India v. India General Steam Navigation and Railway Company I. L. R. 36 Calcutta 967 and it was observed at page 1039 that:i do not see either in this passage which deals with the contentions raised on behalf of the Secretary of State or anywhere else in the judgment Lord Collins either assuming or laying down the principle that a pervious judgment in another acquisition case is admissible. That question was not raised before the Board and the Board did not answer it as it was not called upon to do so. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided the cases reported in Madan Mohan v. Secy. of State and Secy. of State v. Amulya Charan it is difficult to see how the decision in the Secretary of State for India v. India General Steam Navigation and Railway Company can be regarded as an authority for the proposition they laid down. ( 4 ) ON the above reasoning it was held that awards by judgment by the Court could not be taken into consideration for the purpose of determining the market value of the acquired lands As regards awards by the Collector it was observed at page 1037 that-NOW the question as to admissibility of awards stands on a different footing than the one relating to judgments and therefore I will first deal with the question of awards. It is well-settled that an award made by a Land Acquisition Officer is not an admission binding on Government for the purposes of a reference under sec. 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. The Land Acquisition Officer occupies no better position than that of an agent of Government for the purpose of making an offer. That offer may be accepted or rejected by a claimant who if dissatisfied with it may ask for a Reference. When the matter comes before the Court on such a Reference it is the Court who has to determine the question of valuation on evidence and evidence alone. That offer may be accepted or rejected by a claimant who if dissatisfied with it may ask for a Reference. When the matter comes before the Court on such a Reference it is the Court who has to determine the question of valuation on evidence and evidence alone. The award thus being a mere offer it is difficult to see how it can become evidence in another case in which different parties and different properties are concerned. Besides an offer is at best opinion evidence which cannot become admissible unless the person making the offer gives evidence about it. The decision reported in Pribhu Diyal v. Secy. of State gives no reason why such an award amounts to evidence binding on a person who is not a party to that award nor does it mention any of the provisions of the Evidence Act under which it becomes relevant evidence. Allowing an award as evidence besides is inconsistent with its very nature for it is nothing which is final. It is at best an offer which is not binding either on the claimant or Government and is subject to its being set aside by a Court. The fact that it was accepted by a claimant without asking for a Reference is also immaterial for a claimant might not seek a Reference for fear that it would involve him into litigation involving costs and time. With great respect to the learned Judges who decided that case it is not possible for me therefore to agree with the principle they are said to have laid down that an award is admissible evidence. ( 5 ) WE have also been referred to a judgment of this High Court in First Appeal No. 434 of 1960 where reference: has been made to a judgment of the Supreme Court in Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1962. In the judgment of this High Court it has been observed that-BEFORE we undertake a comparison of the lands under acquisition with the lands in regard to which we have held that 800d evidence has been adduced by claimants we will discuss the evidence relating to the awards. Now there is no dispute that these awards are admissible in evidence. In the judgment of this High Court it has been observed that-BEFORE we undertake a comparison of the lands under acquisition with the lands in regard to which we have held that 800d evidence has been adduced by claimants we will discuss the evidence relating to the awards. Now there is no dispute that these awards are admissible in evidence. This is what has been decided now on 10tb April 1963 by Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the judgment delivered in the case of Khaja Faizuddin (dead) by his legal representatives v. State of Hyderabad (New Andhra Pradesh) in Civil Appeal No. 176 of 1962. Therefore the relevancy of these awards is not in dispute. The learned Advocate General however drew our attention to the fact that the awards which have been brought on record represent merely bold decisions of the Arbitrator and do not contain the judgment in which the valuations were recorded. It appears that these awards ware given in a number of cases all of which were tried together and in respect of which the judgment was delivered by the Arbitrator in Compensation Case No. 116 of 1953. The judgment delivered in the latter proceeding has not been brought on record. The argument of the learned Advocate General is that just as in the case of sale instances the circumstances under which the sales took place are as much important as the prices which passed under the sales similarly the process of reasoning and the materials on the basis of which the final valuations were arrived at in making the awards are as much important to be known in the case of awards. There is considerable force in this argument. It is relevant to notice that an award constitutes a piece of evidence only. In order to evaluate that piece of evidence everything in connection with that particular piece would be as much relevant as the final result which embodies the price determined in the proceeding. As the judgment of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case shows in order that an award may be a useful piece of evidence. it is necessary for the claimant to show that the lands in respect of which the award was given bore a comparison with the lands under acquisition. As the judgment of Their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case shows in order that an award may be a useful piece of evidence. it is necessary for the claimant to show that the lands in respect of which the award was given bore a comparison with the lands under acquisition. Therefor at least in order to know the situations of the lands and the other relevant factors the judgment as a result of which the award came to be made would be as much a relevant document as the final award itself. Moreover it is quite clear that that award will have to be evaluated in the context of the evidence on record of the case in which the award is produced as a piece of evidence. Therefore the context of evidence in which the award was made and the view which was taken regarding the same or a similar piece of evidence adduced in the case in which it is produced as evidence would also be circumstances which it would be relevant to know in order to determine the evidentiary value of the award. ( 6 ) IT would thus appear that so far as the question of admissibility of the award of compensation by a judgment of the Court the matter is finally decided and to that extent the decision in 61 B. L. R. 1033 could no longer be taken as good law. As regards an award made by the Land Acquisition Officer we see no good reason why that award should be totally rejected as inadmissible evidence. Sec. 23 of the Land Acquisition Act provides that in determining the amount of compensation to be awarded for land acquired under the Act the Court shall take into consideration the market value of the land at the date of publication of the notification under sec. 4 and therefore any fact which would indicate or show the market value of the land at the relevant time would be a relevant fact which could be considered by the Court in coming to the conclusion as regards the market value prevailing on the date when the acquisition was made. 4 and therefore any fact which would indicate or show the market value of the land at the relevant time would be a relevant fact which could be considered by the Court in coming to the conclusion as regards the market value prevailing on the date when the acquisition was made. The fact that the Land Acquisition Officer assessed the market value of the land in the vicinity would indeed not be a conclusive fact but that fact would have the value of an offer from the Land Acquisition Officer and if that offer has been accepted and if the amount of compensation as fixed by the Land Acquisition Officer has not been disputed it would indicate though not conclusively the rate of the market value of the land in the vicinity and would therefore be a relevant fact which could be considered by the Court for the purpose of fixing the market value of the acquired lands. What probative value should be attached to such a piece of evidence is another matter but it cannot be said that such evidence must be totally ruled out as inadmissible and should not be considered at all. We may here refer to the relevant observations in some of the decided eases of other High Courts which were cited before us. In the ease of Madan Mohan and another v. Secretary of State A. I. R. 1925 Calcutta 481 the observations though made in the context of awards by judgment are as under-THE claimant has appealed and the point of law pressed before us is that certain evidence was wrongly excluded. The learned President whose decision on points of law at the trial is binding on the assessors refused to allow the claimant to adduce evidence about the amount of compensation awarded to him in respect of the set back and the compensation awarded in respect of the acquisition of premises Nos. 161 162 ant 163 Machuabazar Street No 1 Upper Chitapur Road. The reason he gave was that in those cases the awards were made as the result of decisions given by the Civil Court in judicial proceedings and he held that the judgments were inadmissible under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act relating to judgments and orders. 161 162 ant 163 Machuabazar Street No 1 Upper Chitapur Road. The reason he gave was that in those cases the awards were made as the result of decisions given by the Civil Court in judicial proceedings and he held that the judgments were inadmissible under the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act relating to judgments and orders. We are unable to agree with him on this point In assessing the market value of a piece of land the price paid in other transactions relating to land in the neighbourhood must be of some value What its value is it is for the Court of fact to determine; but we hold that it cannot be rejected as inadmissible on the ground given in the judgment of the learned President. For the view we take we have the authority of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Secretary of State v. Indian General Steam Navigation and Railway Co. In that case certain judgments of High Court in other proceedings were relied on by the claimant. It was argued on behalf of the appellant to the Judicial Committee that these judgments were not evidence of the value of the land in dispute. Their Lordships after stating in their judgment that the High Court in a very careful judgment had revised the earlier awards dismissed the appeal holding that no question of principle was involved in it. There cannot be a clearer authority that previous decisions in land acquisition cases are relevant in a subsequent case where the market value of lands in the same neighbourhood is in issue. ( 7 ) IT would be relevant to note that in the above judgment the ease of Secretary of State v. Indian General Steam Navigation and Railway Co. I. L. R. 36 Calcutta 967 was relied upon. The observations in the Privy Council Judgment in I. L. R. 36 Calcutta 967 clearly approve of the consideration of the earlier awards by the High Court against whose judgment the appeal was taken to the Privy Council. The relevant observations at page 974 are as under-AGAINST this decision the claimants appealed to the High Court. The observations in the Privy Council Judgment in I. L. R. 36 Calcutta 967 clearly approve of the consideration of the earlier awards by the High Court against whose judgment the appeal was taken to the Privy Council. The relevant observations at page 974 are as under-AGAINST this decision the claimants appealed to the High Court. That Court in a very careful judgment reviewing the earlier awards and comparing the prices realized on sales of land in the neighbourhood having regard to the special advantages of or drawbacks to their respective situations and having regard the evidence of experts on both sides came to the conclusion that the total compensation due to the claimants ought to be increased to the sum of Rs. 10 13 591 ( 8 ) IT appears that the High Court had in that case taken into consideration certain awards of the Collector for similarly situated lands. It therefore does appear that the Privy Council approved of the procedure adopted by the High Court in taking into consideration awards in respect of similarly situated lands. ( 9 ) ANOTHER case which was cited before us was of Collector of Nagpur v. Atmaram Bhagwant A. I. R. 1925 Nagpur 292 in which the award of the Collector was taken into consideration The relevant observations are at page 293-THE area of 223. 97 surrounding what is practically the whole of the plot under consideration was acquired from twenty four different owners. Every one of them has accepted the award of the Collector in which the rates were exactly the same as those given by him to the claimant roughly Rs. 30. 00 an acre and not one of them even demanded a reference to the Civil Court. Ten of them accepted the Collectors rates without any demur at all. One asked for Rs. 60. 00 an acre one for Rs. 100. 00 five for Rs. 200. 00 two for Rs. 250. 00 one each for Rs. 303. 00 Rs. 400. 00 Rs. 500. 00 and Rs. 1030 and one like the present Claimant for Rs 2090/- but not one of them went beyond making a formal sort of demand. It is hard to imagine better evidence of the sufficiency of the rates on which the Collector-s calculation of the compensation is based. 303. 00 Rs. 400. 00 Rs. 500. 00 and Rs. 1030 and one like the present Claimant for Rs 2090/- but not one of them went beyond making a formal sort of demand. It is hard to imagine better evidence of the sufficiency of the rates on which the Collector-s calculation of the compensation is based. ( 10 ) IN the ease of Secretary of State v. Amulya Charan Bannerjee and others A. I. R. 1927 Calcutta 874 it was held that prices which were given by Collector to people whose land were acquired and who accepted them were valuable evidence in ascertaining the market value of the acquired lands. Reliance was placed on the Privy Council case reported in I. L. R. 36 Calcutta 967 and it was observed at page 977 that-FOR the Secretary of State reliance is placed on the awards made when the Kalighat lane was widened. They average from Rs. 5 Q00 to Rs. 8000 per catta. The learned Judge rejected then He was in error in thinking that the Collector cannot rely on his own admission iq these awards. They are prices which were given to people whose lands were acquired and who accepted them and therefore they are valuable evidence in ascertaining the market value of the property in suit. This was so held by this Court and the judgment of this Court was approved by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Secy. of State v. India General Steam Navigation and Rly. Co. ( 11 ) THEREFORE for the reasons stated above we are unable to agree with the reasoning of the learned Judge who decided the case reported in 61 B. L R. 1033 and we are of the view that it would be open to the Court to take into consideration previous awards made by the Land Acquisition Officer in respect of lands situated in the vicinity of the acquired lands. As already stated there is material on the record to show the situation of the lands which were the subject matter of the awards and the situation of the acquired lands and there is also material on the record which would enable us to consider whether the rate given by the awards could afford a standard for comparison for the purpose of fixing the market value of the acquired lands. [ The rest of the judgment is not material for the reports. ] orders modified .