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1966 DIGILAW 136 (ALL)

Chetu Singh v. Jai Narain Singh

1966-03-18

LASHMI PRASAD, V.BHARGAVA

body1966
JUDGMENT V. Bhargava, C.J. - We have heard learned counsel on this special appeal which is directed against a judgment of a learned Single Judge of this Court dismissing a writ petition filed by the appellant. In the petition the prayer was for the quashing of two orders of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 8th July, 1963 and 26th September, 1963. 2. Having heard the learned counsel we consider that the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation dated 26th September, 1963 -was perfectly correct and could not be quashed. The order dated 26th September, 1963 was passed on an application for revision which was presented by the appellant against the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation in first appeal under Sec. 21 of the Consolidation of Holdings Act. At the time when the order in the first appeal was made by the Settlement Officer, Consolidation, a second appeal against his order lay and it was in fact filed entertained and decided by a Deputy Director. The result of the decision of that second appeal was that the first appellate order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation merged in the order made by the Deputy Director of Consolidation in second appeal. No revision could, therefore, be entertained against the order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation made in first appeal after its confirmation in second appeal. The revision filed against that order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation was, therefore, rightly dismissed by the order dated 26th September, 1963. 3. However, we find that so far as the order dated 8th July, 1963 is concerned, it, was clearly wrong. That order was made dismissing the revision which was directed against the order of the Deputy Director of Consolidation passed in second appeal on 16th March, 1963. Since the second appeal was decided 15th March, 1963 the proviso to Sec. 47 (1) of the U.P. Consolidation of Holdings (Amendment) Act (Act VIII of 1963) was not applicable. Under the main provision of sub-Sec. 1 of Sec. 47 of that amending act the provisions of the unamended Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood before this Amending Act was passed were applicable to the order made in second appeal and consequently a revision against that order lay under the unamended Act to the Deputy Director. Under the main provision of sub-Sec. 1 of Sec. 47 of that amending act the provisions of the unamended Consolidation of Holdings Act as it stood before this Amending Act was passed were applicable to the order made in second appeal and consequently a revision against that order lay under the unamended Act to the Deputy Director. This view of ours is in line with the Full Bench decision of this Court in Sardar Singh v. Major Haran Singh, 1966 ALJ 670 Writ No. 388 of 1963 in which the Full Bench recorded it a opinion on 22nd December, 1965 and in which the final judgment of the Division Bench has also been delivered. It is, therefore, clear that the Deputy Director of Consolidation when he dismissed the revision on 8th July, 1963 on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to entertain the revision committed a clear error and refused to exercise jurisdiction which was vested in him. 4. The learned Single Judge refused the prayer for the quashing of this order of 8th July, 1963 on two grounds. One ground was that according to the learned Single Judge the appellant should have requested the Deputy Director to transfer back the revision to the Director or he should have approached the Director and asked him to hear the revision himself. This view seems to have been expressed on the basis that the Deputy Director was not at all competent to hear the revision against the second appellate order of another Deputy Director. Actually the view of this Court is well established that a Deputy Director exercising the powers of a Director can competently hear a revision transferred to him even though the revision may be directed against a second appellate order of a Deputy Director. In hearing the revision the Deputy Director exercises the powers of a Director and consequently he can interfere with the orders of another Deputy Director. This reason given by the learned Single Judge was, therefore, not at all applicable. 5. The second ground given by the learned Single Judge was that there had been laches and delay on the part of the appellant in approaching this Court against the order of 8th July, 1963. This reason given by the learned Single Judge was, therefore, not at all applicable. 5. The second ground given by the learned Single Judge was that there had been laches and delay on the part of the appellant in approaching this Court against the order of 8th July, 1963. It is true that the appellant did not move this Court in writ petition within the usual period of 90 days of the passing of this order of 8th July, 1963. But he gave an adequate explanation for it. It seems that he was advised that since no revision lay against the second appellate order he should file a revision against the first appellate order of the Settlement Officer, Consolidation and that is why removed the second revision application which was dismissed by the order dated 26th September, 1963 which we have already upheld above. Time having been spent in taking that remedy should in the circumstances of this case not have been considered as part of laches and delay on the part of the appellant and after that time is ignored, there is no such great laches or delay as would disentitle the appellant from seeking relief from this Court.As we have said above the Deputy Director of Consolidation by his order dated 8th July, 1963 had refused to exercise jurisdiction clearly vested in him and this is a fit case where this Court should direct him to exercise that jurisdiction in accordance with law and decide the revision on merits. 6. In the result, we allow this special appeal, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge and grant the prayer in the petition to the extent that the order of the Deputy Director dated 8th July, 1963 is set aside. The effect of the setting aside of the order is that die revision by which that order was dismissed is again to be deemed to be pending and shall be decided on merits by the Deputy Director. In the circumstances of this case we direct the parties to bear their own costs of this special appeal as well as the writ petition.