Per Chaturvedi, Chairman : This reference arises out of the objections raised by Shri S. N. Parikh in the above mentioned cases when they came up for hearing before two different Single Benches of this Board. The learned counsel contended that the Board of Revenue as at present composed had not been properly constituted within the meaning of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act inasmuch as the State Govt. had not determined the strength of the Members of the Board of Revenue as required under sec. 4(2) of the aforesaid Act. It was, further, averred that the State Govt. had also failed to prescribe the qualifications of the persons eligible for appointment as the Chairman and the Members of the Board of Revenue as contemplated in sub-sec. (4). It was, therefore, argued that the composition of the Board as existing at present stood vitiated. He also questioned the validity of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act on the ground that the notification No. F. 12(13) Rev. II/64, dated 12.6.1956 was issued by the State Govt. on a date when the State Govt. had no authority to act under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. When this reference came up for consideration before a Larger Bench of this Board earlier, a preliminary objection was raised by the learned Advocate General. It was his contention that the Larger Bench of this Board was not competent to hear and adjudicate upon this reference. Arguments were heard on this preliminary objection and the same was overruled by the order of the Larger Bench dated 24.3.1966. The reference has now come up before this Larger Bench for consideration on merit. It is contended by Shri S. N. Parikh that originally the Board of Revenue was constituted under sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance, 1949 (XXII of 1949). It was stipulated under sub-sec. (1) of this Section that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and such number of other Members as the Raj-Pramukh may from time to time determine and appoint. It was, further, stipulated that all appointments made under sub-sec. (1) shall be notified in the Rajasthan Gazette. It was stipulated under sub-sec. (1) of this Section that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and such number of other Members as the Raj-Pramukh may from time to time determine and appoint. It was, further, stipulated that all appointments made under sub-sec. (1) shall be notified in the Rajasthan Gazette. In pursuance of the provision contained in Sub-sec.(1) referred to above, the State Government issued notification No. 906-VI II/49, dated 26.10.1949, whereby the Raj-Pramukh was, pleased to order that the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan shall consist of a Chairman and two other Members. It is his contention that under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act also, it is contemplated that Board shall consist of a Chairman and such other Members not less than 3 as the State Govt. may from time to time determine and appoint. But the State Govt. has failed to notify the number of Members who would serve on the Board from time to time, although the appointments made to the Board have been notified in the Gazette as and when they were made. He contends that the failure of the Govt. to notify in the Gazette the strength of the Members of the Board of Revenue from time to time as required under Sub-sec. (2) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act vitiates their appointment. The Advocate General appearing for the Govt. has sought to repel this contention by stating that all appointments to the Board are made by the Govt. after determining the number of Members required to cope with the volume of work pending in the Board. He contends that it is not necessary to notify in the Gazette the number of Members required to serve on the Board at a particular time. In this connection, he has invited our attention to sub-sec. (3) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act which requires that all appointments made under Sub-sec. (2) shall be notified in the Rajasthan Gazette. It is his contention that if the Legislature had intended the strength of the Members required to serve on the Board from time to time, also to be notified similarly, it would have so enacted. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act which requires that all appointments made under Sub-sec. (2) shall be notified in the Rajasthan Gazette. It is his contention that if the Legislature had intended the strength of the Members required to serve on the Board from time to time, also to be notified similarly, it would have so enacted. As the Legislature has specifically laid down that all appointments shall be notified, the obvious corollary would be that it did not require the Government to necessarily notify the strength of the Members required to serve on the Board from time to time. What is obligatory is that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and not less than three Members. The appointment of additional Members is discretionary with the Government depending upon the workload. The appointment of additional Members, which has taken place from time to time, has followed the determination of the strength by the State Govt , as it would be impossible to conceive of an appointment without there being a post duly sanctioned by the Govt. in the Finance Department. As soon as an appointment is made, which is, of course, followed by the process of determination of the strength, it is duly notified in the Rajasthan Gazette, thereby fulfilling the command of the Legislature. As such, there has been no violation of the requirements of the law as laid down in Sub-secs. (2) and (3) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. This contention must prevail. In support of his arguments, Shri S. N. Parikh has made a reference to the United Commercial Bank Ltd. vs. Their Workmen (AIR 38) 1951 Supreme Court 230). In this case, the learned Judges of the Supreme Court had an occasion to examine the import of Secs. 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16 and 38 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, read with the Industrial Disputes Rules, 1949. Sec. 5 lays down that the appropriate Government may as occasion arises by notification in the official gazette constitute a Board of Conciliation. It also lays down that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and two or four other Members as the appropriate Govt. thinks fit. Under Sub-sec. (4) of sec. Sec. 5 lays down that the appropriate Government may as occasion arises by notification in the official gazette constitute a Board of Conciliation. It also lays down that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and two or four other Members as the appropriate Govt. thinks fit. Under Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 5 when a Member of a Board of Conciliation is absent or there is a vacancy the Board is permitted to act notwithstanding such absence, provided there is the prescribed quorum. Sec. 6 authorises the appropriate Govt. to similarly appoint a Court of Enquiry when an occasion arises, and sec. 7 authorises the appropriate Govt. to constitute one or more Industrial Tribunals for the adjudication of Industrial disputes. Rule 5 of the Industrial Disputes Rules provides that the appointment of a Board, Court or Tribunal together with the names of the persons constituting the Board, Court or Tribunal shall be notified in the official gazette. Examining the import of these provisions, it was laid down in this case that it was obligatory on the appropriate Govt. to notify the composition of the Tribunal and also the names of the persons constituting the same. It was observed that in respect of a Tribunal which is entrus-with the work of adjudicating upon disputes between employers and employees, which have not been settled otherwise, this provision is absolutely essential. It cannot be left in doubt to the employers or the employees as to who are the persons authorised to adjudicate upon their disputes. It was, further, observed that this is in accordance with the notifications of appointments of public servants discharging judicial or quasi-judicial functions and the important thing to note is that the member forming the Tribunal and the names of the Members have both to be noticed in the official gazette for the proper and valid constitution of the Tribunal. A perusal of this judgment, however, shows that the ratio decidendi in this case was whether under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 the award of an Industrial Tribunal would be valid or not if the services of one Member ceased to be available for some time and what would be the effect on the validity of the award if the Member rejoined subsequently and influenced the decision of other Members who had carried on the proceedings during his absence. As the responsibility of the Tribunal was joint and all its Members were to make and sign the award, it saw held that the rest of the Members had no right to act as the Tribunal when the services of a Member had ceased to be available and proceeding with the adjudication, in the absence of one Member undermined the basic principle of joint work and responsibility of the Tribunal and all their awards were without jurisdiction and void. This is not the question before us in the present case. Here, the Members of the Board of Revenue exercise their jurisdiction in terms of sec. 10 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act (a) by sitting singly or (b) by sitting in benches consisting of two or more Members. It is in this context that the effect of the failure of the Government to notify the number as well as the qualifications of the Members of the Board of Revenue has to be examined. As stated in the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court, the purpose of notifying the appointments of public servants discharging judicial or quasi-judicial func-tions is to leave the employers or employees in no doubt as to who are the persons authorised to adjudicate upon their disputes. If it had been the argument of the learned counsel that the litigating public had remained in doubt with regard to the persons constituting the Board of Revenue on account of lack of notification, it would have carried a lot of weight, but the failure of the State Government to notify the number of the persons, while at the same time, notifying the names of the persons cannot be deemed to be such a fatal flaw as to invalidate the decisions of such a Board. It would also have been a different matter if the Board of Revenue was required to adjudicate upon and decide matters jointly and if a quorum had been laid for such meetings. This is not so in the present case. We are, therefore, not persuaded that the observations made in the aforesaid ruling of the Supreme Court regarding the notification of the number of Members of the Industrial Tribunal hit equally fatally a lapse on the part of the State Govt. with regard to the notification of the number of Members required to serve on the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan from time to time. with regard to the notification of the number of Members required to serve on the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan from time to time. Another authority cited by the learned counsel is the State of Assam vs. Sristikar Dowerah (AIR 1957 S.C., 414). This relates to the constitution of the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948. The controversy in this case turned on sec. 296 of the Government of India Act, 1935. This provision debarred a Member of the federal or a provisional legislature from being appointed as a member of any tribunal in British India having jurisdiction to entertain appeals or revise decisions in revenue cases. It, further, stated that if in any province any such jurisdiction as aforesaid was, immediately before the commencement of part III of the above Act, vested in the local Government the Governor shall constitute a Tribunal consisting of such person or persons as he, exercising his individual judgment, may think fit, to exercise the same jurisdiction until other provision in that behalf was made by an Act of the Provincial Legislature. On 5.4.1948, a High Court was established for the Province of Assam. On 6.4.1948. the Assam Revenue Tribunal (Transfer of Powers) Act, 1948 received the assent of the Governor of Assam. It was published in the official gazette on 8.4.1948 and was brought into force on the same day by a notification issued by the Provincial Government. In exercise of the powers conferred on it by sec. 3(3) of the 1948 Act, the Provincial Govern ment from time to time issued notifications appointing persons to exercise the powers of the Appellate Authority. At first, the Revenue Secretary was appointed as the Appellate Authority. Subsequently, the Minister of Excise to the Govt. of Assam was appointed as the Appellate Authority. This was challenged as a flagrant violation of the provisions of sec. 296(1) of the Government of India Act, 1935 and was declared to be invalid by the Assam High Court. Thereafter, fresh notifications were issued and a new post called the Commissioner of Hill Divisions and Appeals was created and he was appointed as the Appellate Authority. In the litigation that followed the challenging of the orders of the authority by the aggrieved parties, the High Court of Assam issued writs, quashing the said orders and held that sec. Thereafter, fresh notifications were issued and a new post called the Commissioner of Hill Divisions and Appeals was created and he was appointed as the Appellate Authority. In the litigation that followed the challenging of the orders of the authority by the aggrieved parties, the High Court of Assam issued writs, quashing the said orders and held that sec. 3(3) of the 1948 Act, by virtue of which the authority appointed by the order of the Government was empowered to exercise such jurisdiction to entertain appeals and revise decisions in matters arising under the provisions of enactments specified in Schedule B as was being exercised then by the Revenue Tribunal and was vested in the Provincial Government before 1.4.1937, was void on the ground that sec. 3(3) of the 1948 Act was (a) repugnant to sec. 296(2) and (b) it conferred essential legislative power on the Provincial Government and amounted to excessive delegation of legislative power. It was also held that the notification of 5.7.1955 whereby the Commissioner of Hill Divisions and Appeals was appointed as the Appellate Authority was invalid. In the result, all its decisions were declared to be nullities. In appeal, however, the Supreme Court set aside the judgments of the High Court and restored those of the Appellate Authority holding that the purpose of sec. 296(2) was to authorise the Governors of certain Provinces to constitute a Tribunal and to prescribe a time limit upto which the Tribunal so constituted by him was to exercise the appellate jurisdiction. This section did not indicate any qualification for the eligibility of the persons to be appointed as Members of the Tribunal. It was, however, clear that the Tribunal was to sit in appeal over the decision of the Excise Commissioner and that by itself gave some indication that the person or persons to be appointed to the Tribunal should have the requisite capacity and competency to deal with appeals from such officials. It could not, therefore, be considered that there had been an excessive delegation of legislative power. As a result, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that sec. 3(3) of the 1948 Act could not be held to be bad. Similarly, it held that the view of the High Court regarding the invalidity of the notification of 5.7.1955 was also not justified. As a result, the Supreme Court came to the conclusion that sec. 3(3) of the 1948 Act could not be held to be bad. Similarly, it held that the view of the High Court regarding the invalidity of the notification of 5.7.1955 was also not justified. We have not been able to appreciate how this authority can be of any help to the learned counsel for the petitioners. The ratio decidendi in this case has no relevance to the issues under consideration before us. The authority next cited by the learned counsel is Harla vs. the State of Rajasthan (AIR 38 of 1951, Supreme Court 467). It relates to the necessity of the proper promulgation and publication of laws whereby the subject of a State is liable to punishment or penalty in case of violation thereof. It lays down that natural justice requires that before a law can become operative, it must be promul-gated or published, in some recognisable way so that all men may know what it is. It was observed that a law cannot come into being by merely passing a resolution without promulgation or publication in the gazette or by other means. Distinguishing between an order and an Act, it was stated by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the Acts of the Parliament are publicly enacted. The debates are open to the public and the Acts are passed by the accredited representatives of the people who can be trusted to see that their constituents know what has been done. They also receive wide publicity in papers and over the wireless. Not so the proclamations and the orders of appropriate authorities. There must, therefore, be promulgation and publication in their cases. To our mind, this authority, also, is not relevant to the present issue. They also receive wide publicity in papers and over the wireless. Not so the proclamations and the orders of appropriate authorities. There must, therefore, be promulgation and publication in their cases. To our mind, this authority, also, is not relevant to the present issue. In the first place, it lays down the rule in respect of substantive laws, for the breach of which a citizen may render himself liable to punishment or penalty, while the present controversy relates to the constitution of a Tribunal, and as has been laid down in the Industrial Disputes Act case, what is incumbent upon the State in such a case is to notify the persons who will be called upon to decide and adjudicate upon the disputes arising between the litigants regarding matters falling within its jurisdiction, and if this object has been substantially achieved, it should fulfil the requirements of natural justice, and would not invalidate the decisions of such a Tribunal. The learned counsel next referred to Ajaib Singh Lehna Singh vs. The State of Punjab and another (AIR 1952 Punjab 309) whereby the constitution of a Tribunal under the Abducted Persons (Recovery and Restoration) Act, 1949 was held to be invalid as there was no notification regarding the appointment of the Pakistan Member to the Tribunal. This rule was eventually upheld by the Supreme Court also in AIR 1953 Supreme Court 10. It may be observed that the aforesaid Punjab Authority was referred to the Larger Bench hearing the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate General earlier in this case by Shri S. N. Parikh. On the strength of this and other authorities, the Larger Bench came to the conclusion that it must proceed to decide the question of the validity of the constitution of the Board of Revenue, itself. We, therefore, find this citation only to be repetitive and not of any help in the determination of the question whether the failure of the State Govt. to notify the number of Members who were appointed to the Board of Revenue from time to time must be held to be fatal to the functioning of the Boards rendering their decisions and judgments void and inoperative. Shri S.N. Parikh next cited Rajalakshmi Motor Service, Kozhikode vs. Govt. of Kerala and others (AIR 1960 Kerala 229). In this case, the State Govt. Shri S.N. Parikh next cited Rajalakshmi Motor Service, Kozhikode vs. Govt. of Kerala and others (AIR 1960 Kerala 229). In this case, the State Govt. had issued a notification on 7.5.1957 with regard to the constitution of a State Transport Authority for the whole State and a Regional Transport Authority for each of the Revenue Distts. of the State in exercise of the powers conferred by Sec. 44(1) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939. It also issued a separate notification on the same date under sub-sec. (2) of Sec. 44. This notification was subsequently replaced by a notification dated 23.8.1957, whereby the term of the Members of the Regional Transport Authorities was prescribed as one year. The State Govt., however, forgot about the time limit embodied in this notification and nothing was done till 23.12.1958, on which date the State Govt. issued a notification sanctioning the continuance of the State Transport Authority as well as the Regional Transport Authorities (except R.T.A. Eranakulam) as on 1.8.58 from dates of expiry of their term till the successors were appointed. The High Court of Kerala held that the appointment of the Members of the Transport Authority constituted under sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 44 was in pursuance of a power conferred by the Legislature and was not in pursuance of the executive power of the State under the Constitution. It was observed that the power to constitute the Transport Authority was derived from sub-sec.(1); this was in the realms of a delegated statutory power and in such cases there was no right to retroactive action unless the legislature by express words or necessary intendment had authorised the same. It was, therefore,, held that the retroactive operation of the notification dated 23.12.1958 of the Kerala Govt. under Sub-Sections (1) and (2) sec. 44 sanctioning "the continuance of the State Transport Authorities and the Regional Transport Authorities as on 1.8.1958 from the dates of expiry of their term till their successors are appointed," was of no effect and as a result there was no Regional Transport Authority in existence on 13.11.1958 and if the authority was non-existent, there could have been no de facto Members of that Authority. The ratio decidendi in this case, too, has no relevance to the matter in issue before us and we fail to see how the same falls within the compass of this authority. The ratio decidendi in this case, too, has no relevance to the matter in issue before us and we fail to see how the same falls within the compass of this authority. As stated above, we are called upon to examine the effect of the failure of the State Govt. to notify the determination of the number of Members constituting the Board of Revenue from time to time in the official gazette, as was done in pursuance of the Board of Revenue Ordinance of 1949. The question is whether this failure vitiates the appointments made to the Board from time to time. We find sufficient force in the argument of the learned Advocate General that no appointment could be made to the Board without the prior determination of the strength required to cope with the work-load thereof. In fact, it is imperative before an Officer is called upon to serve not only on the Board of Revenue but for the matter of that on any Government assignment that his post should be properly created and sanctioned by the State Government. Unless this is done, he will not be able to draw his salary. It is not. the case of the learned counsel for the petitioners that this was not done. Thus it can safely be inferred that so far as the Govt. is concerned it duly undertook the process of determining from time to time the number of Members required to serve on the Board in addition to the Chairman and the three Members as laid down in sub-sec.(2) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. As has been rightly pointed out by the learned Advocate General, sub-sec. (3) requires all appointments to be made under sub-sec. (2) to be notified in the Rajasthan Gazette. It is not the case of the learned counsel for the applicants that the State Government has defaulted in this respect. Reading the two sub sections together, we are inclined to hold that what was incumbent upon the State Government was to notify the appointments in the Rajasthan Gazette so that the litigants would know who were the persons appointed to decide and adjudicate upon their disputes. Reading the two sub sections together, we are inclined to hold that what was incumbent upon the State Government was to notify the appointments in the Rajasthan Gazette so that the litigants would know who were the persons appointed to decide and adjudicate upon their disputes. If it had been the intention of the Legislature to require the State Government to notify additional number of Members deputed to serve on the Board of Revenue, from time to time, in excess of the number prescribed in the Act, there was nothing to prevent the Legislature from saying so in sub-section (3). The irresistible conclusion, therefore is that the failure of the State Government to notify the number of such Members cannot be held to be fatal to the functioning of the Board. We have, therefore, no hesitation in rejecting this objection of the learned counsel for the petitioners. Now, we come to the effect of the State Government to prescribe the qualifications of the persons who may be eligible for appointment as Chairman and Members of the Board as required in sub-sec. (4). The learned Government Advocate concedes that no such qualifications have been prescribed. The question arises whether the provisions of sub-sec. (4) are mandatory and should the failure to prescribe qualifications invalidate the appointments. Shri S.N. Parikh has referred to sec. 3(ii) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, according to which prescribed means prescribed by this Act or by rules made thereunder. He has also referred to sec, 261 (2)(i) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, which lays down that the State Government may make rules consistent with the provisions of this Act, prescribing the qualifications of persons eligible for appointment as Chairman and Members of the Board under sec. 4 and has argued that this is an obligatory duty cast on the State and the failure of the State to carry out this mandatory provision of law vitiates the constitution of the Board of Revenue. He has quoted from Caries on Statute Law to the effect that the act permitted by an absolute enactment is lawful only if done in accordance with the conditions annexed to the statutory permission. He has quoted from Caries on Statute Law to the effect that the act permitted by an absolute enactment is lawful only if done in accordance with the conditions annexed to the statutory permission. If an absolute enactment is neglected or contravened, a Court of law will treat the thing which is being done as invalid and altogether void, but if an enactment is directory it is immaterial so far as it relates to the validity of the thing which is being done, whether it is complied with or not. So far as this statement is concerned, there can be no quarrel about it. As stated above, the question before us is whether the provisions contained in sub sec. (4) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act are mandatory or not. Shri S. N. Parikh, further quoting from Caries, has argued that as a general rule, statutes which enable persons to take legal proceedings under certain specified circumstances must be accurately obeyed notwithstanding the fact that their provisions may be expressed in merely affirmative language. It is inferred by Shri S. N. Parikh from this that the command of the Legislature contained in sub-sec. (4) is mandatory. Caries, however, goes on to explain this statement by referring to sec. 2 of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 under which after the hearing by a Justice of the Peace of any summary information, either party could, if dissatisfied, apply in writing within three days to the said Justice to state and sign a case setting forth the facts. In Edwards vs. Roberts, the appellant neglected to get the case stated within the three days prescribed, and it was held, in consequence, that the Court had no jurisdiction to hear the appeal. Caries proceeds to state that according to this rule when a statute confers jurisdiction upon a tribunal of limited authority and statutory origin, the conditions and qualifications annexed to the grant must be strictly complied with. Evidently, the provision of law under consi-deration by us does not in any manner annex any conditions to the authority vested in the Board of Revenue nor does it relate to the conferment of any legal rights or imposition of any limitations on the citizen subject to the existence of any such qualification. Evidently, the provision of law under consi-deration by us does not in any manner annex any conditions to the authority vested in the Board of Revenue nor does it relate to the conferment of any legal rights or imposition of any limitations on the citizen subject to the existence of any such qualification. On the other hand, it relates to a duty cast on the State by the Legislature, and therefore, this citation from Caries cannot be of much help to the learned counsel for the petitioners in this case. A reference has also been made to Maxwell in this connection. Maxwell poses the question of the intention of the Legislature thus ; when a statute requires that something shall be done, or done in a particular manner or form without expressly declaring what shall be the consequences of non-compliance the question often arises, what intention is to be attributed by inference to the Legislature. According to him, where, the whole aim and object of the Legislature would be plainly defeated if the command to do the thing in a particular manner and not imply a prohibition to do it in any other, no doubt could be entertained as to the intention. He goes on to say that the reports are full of cases dealing with statutory provisions which are devoid of indication of intention regarding the effect of noncompliance with them. In some of them, the conditions, forms or other attendant circumstances, prescribed by the statute have been regarded as essential to the Act or thing regulated by it and their omission has been held fatal to its validity. In others, such prescriptions have been considered as merely directory, the neglect of which did not affect its validity. It has been said that no rule can be laid down lor determining whether the command is to be considered as a mere direction or instruction involving no invalidating consequences in its disregard, or as imperative, with an implied nullification for disobedience, beyond the fundamental one that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment. It has been said that no rule can be laid down lor determining whether the command is to be considered as a mere direction or instruction involving no invalidating consequences in its disregard, or as imperative, with an implied nullification for disobedience, beyond the fundamental one that it depends on the scope and object of the enactment. He adds that it may perhaps be found generally correct to say that nullification is the natural and usual consequence of disobedience, but the question is in the main governed by considerations of convenience and justice, and when that result would involve general inconvenience or injustice to innocent persons, or advantage to those guilty of the neglect, without promoting the real aim and object of the enactment, such an in-tention is not to be attributed to the Legislature. The whole scope and purpose of the statute under consideration must be regarded. The general rule is, that an absolute enactment must be obeyed or fulfilled exactly, but it is sufficient if a directory enactment be obeyed or fulfilled substantially. Maxwell then proceeds to draw a line of distinction where the prescriptions of the Act affect the performance of a duty and where they relate to a privilege or power. He states that where powers, rights or immunities are granted with a direction that certain regulations, formalities or conditions shall be complied with, it seems neither unjust nor inconvenient to exact a rigorous observance of them as essential to the acquisition of the right or authority conferred, and it is therefore, probable that such was the intention of the Legislature. But when a public duty is imposed and the statute requires that it shall be performed in a certain manner, or within a certain time, or under other specified conditions, such prescriptions may well be regarded as intended to be directory only in cases when injustice or inconvenience to others who have no control over those exercising the duty would result if such requirements were essential and imperative. As an illustration, Maxwell cites the case of the designers of prints who failed to engrave the day of publication with the name of the proprietor on each plate. As an illustration, Maxwell cites the case of the designers of prints who failed to engrave the day of publication with the name of the proprietor on each plate. It was held that the neglect to comply with the provisions of the Engraving Copyright Act, 1734, which gave to the designers of the prints the sole right of printing them for 14 years after the day of publication was fatal to the copyright. Similarly, the inn keeper whose common law liability for the goods on his guests was limited if he posted up a notice as required by the Inn-keepers Liability Act, 1863, did not obtain the exoneration if his notice was inaccurate in any material particular. It will be seen that these illustrations relate to the cases of individuals who suffered because they failed to fulfil the requirements of the law granting them the privileges or immunities claimed by them and thus they can be of no avail to the present applicants, in this case, in which the failure is on the part of the Government to carry out a specific provision of law with regard to the constitution of a tribunal, affecting the rights and privileges of thousands of subjects who had no control over the Officers entrusted with the duty. In fact, in the present case, the sanction of Maxwell may well be invoked for the opposite view that such prescription may be regarded as intended to be directory as it would lead to injustice or inconvenience to those who had ho control over those exercising the duty if. such requirements were held to be essential and imperative. Shri S.N. Parikh has also referred to Maxwell where he says that the enactments regulating the procedure in courts seem usually to be imperative and not merely directory. An illustration cited by Maxwell relates to the disposal of an appeal from a decision, the appeal being subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, such as giving the notice of appeal and entring into recognizance or transmitting documents in a certain time. It was held that the failure to comply with such conditions would be fatal. An illustration cited by Maxwell relates to the disposal of an appeal from a decision, the appeal being subject to the fulfilment of certain conditions, such as giving the notice of appeal and entring into recognizance or transmitting documents in a certain time. It was held that the failure to comply with such conditions would be fatal. Maxwell says that this imperative effect would seem in general to be intended even where the observance of the formalities is not a condition exacted from the party seeking the benefit by the statute, but a duty imposed on a Court or public officer in the exercise of the power conferred on him,, when no general inconvenience or injustice calls for a different construction. This last clause would in fact, seem to take the weight out of the arguments of the learned counsel for the applicants. It is well settled that the fundamental test is to examine the subject matter and to consider the importance of the provision which has been disregarded and the relation of that provision to the general object intended to be secured by the Act. As Bindra puts it, there are three tests which are often applied in the determination of the question whether a provision of law is imperative or directory. They are based on considerations of (i) the scope and object, some times called the scheme and the purpose of the enactment, (ii) justice and balance of convenience and (iii) the nature of the particular provision, namely, whether it affects the performance of a public duty or relates to a right, privilege or power. Finding his support from Maxwell, he states that a statutory provision which pertains to an official action is generally construed as directory rather than mandatory. He, further, proceeds to quote Crawford. On Statutory Construction, as follows— "As a general rule, a statute which regulates the manner in which public officials shall exercise the power vested in them, will be construed as directory rather than mandatory, especially where such regulation pertains to uniformity, order and convenience and neither public nor private rights will be injured or impaired thereby. If the statute is negative in form or if nothing is stated regarding the consequences or effect of non-compliance, the indication is all the stronger that it should not be considered mandatory. If the statute is negative in form or if nothing is stated regarding the consequences or effect of non-compliance, the indication is all the stronger that it should not be considered mandatory. But, if the public interest or private rights call for the exercise of the power vested in a public official, the language used, though permissive or directory in form, is in fact per-emptory or mandatory, as a general rule. "Crawford, then, cited the example of the statute which declared that Board of Supervisors, "may, if deemed advisable" levy a special tax to pay certain debts when their current revenue was insufficient to pay. It was held in this case, that the statute was mandatory, as the power vested in the officer was not for his benefit but for the benefit of the public and a duty was imposed upon the Officer rather than a privilege. Crawford, then, goes on to say that "Conversely, where the statute simply regulates the manner in which (he public officers shall exercise the power vested in them in order to promote uniformity, order and convenience, the statute is predominantly intended for the benefit of the Officers. Moreover, words mandatory in form should be construed to be permissive, even where a statute regulating the exercise of powers by public officials is concerned, if the permissive construction will effect justice or save a proceeding from invalidity, provided, however, that such a construction does not destroy or impair the rights of the public or of any member thereof, in other words, whether a statutory requirement which relates to official action shall be considered mandatory or permissible depends upon the effect the suggested construction has upon public and private rights. If the requirement of the statute must be regarded as mandatory in order to promote justice, it should be so construed ; and if a mandatory construction operates mis- chievously, then the statute should be given a permissible construction." Bindra then proceeds to quote from Corpus Juris which also enunciates a similar proposition. If the requirement of the statute must be regarded as mandatory in order to promote justice, it should be so construed ; and if a mandatory construction operates mis- chievously, then the statute should be given a permissible construction." Bindra then proceeds to quote from Corpus Juris which also enunciates a similar proposition. It states, "Generally, statutes directing the mode of proceeding by public officers, designed to promote method, system, uniformity and despatch in such proceeding, will be regarded as directory if a disregard thereof will not injure the rights of the parties, and the statute does not declare what result shall follow in non-compliance therewith, nor contain negative words importing prohibition of any other mode of proceeding them that prescribed. Especially is this true when to hold void acts done in violation of the statute would work serious inconvenience, or would cause injustice to persons having no control over those entrusted with the duty enjoined, and at the same time would not promote the main object of the statute." If these principles are applied to the question in issue before us, it will clearly have to be held that this provision of law should be regarded as directory, for if it is held to be mandatory, it would cause serious inconvenience and injustice to persons who have appeared before the bar of the Board of Revenue during the last several years and who had no control over the officers of the Government whose duty it was to comply with this provision. Apart from causing inconvenience and injustice, it would not, in any way, promote the main object of the statute, which was to provide for a tribunal to adjudicate upon revenue disputes arising between subject and subject or between the subject and the State. The weight of the authorities cited above is heavily in favour of the proposition that where the prescription of an Act; relates to the performance of a duty by a public Officer, the breach of such prescription when it does not cause any real injustice, does not invalidate the act done under the Act and, therefore, such prescriptions are merely directory. Public policy often requires that minor omissions and failures of officials should not make void all their proceedings otherwise, Government in affected sectors might come to a standstill and thus chaos and confusion might ensue. It cannot be gain said! Public policy often requires that minor omissions and failures of officials should not make void all their proceedings otherwise, Government in affected sectors might come to a standstill and thus chaos and confusion might ensue. It cannot be gain said! that this would certainly be the result if the provisions of sub-sec. (4) are held to be mandatory and all the acts of the Board of Revenue performed, hithertofore are invalidated as being without jurisdiction. In further support of the view that this provision is directory and not mandatory, Shri P. D. Kudal has invited our attention to the parallel provisions of the Constitution of India, Jo wit, Articles 214, 216 and 217. Art. 214 provides for the Constitution of a High Court for each State even as sub-sec. (1) of Sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act provides for the constitution of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan. Art. 216 relates to the strength of the High Court, as does sub-sec. (2) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, with the difference that there is no minimum prescribed for the number of Judges constituting a High Court. Art. 217 prescribes the manner of appointment and conditions of the office of a Judge of a High Court. Sub-sec. (4) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act may be considered as running parallel to it. Sub-clauses (2) of this Article lays down that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as a Judge of a High Court unless he is a citizen of India and : (a) has for atleast 10 years held a judicial office in the territory of India; or (b) has for atleast 10 years been an Advocate of a High Court in any State specified in the First Schedule or of two or more such Courts in succession. A comparison of the provisions contained in the Constitution of India regarding the appointment of the Judges of a High Court or those of the Supreme Court with the similar provisions laid down for the appointment of the Members of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan clearly shows that in the case of the appointment of the Judges of the High Court it was the intention of the Constitution makers that minimum qualification should be prescribed for these appointments and those who did not fulfil these minimum qualifications should be debarred from presiding over these high offices, but evidently, this was not the intendment of the Legislature, when it laid down the provisions regarding the appointment of the Chairman and the Members of the Board of Revenue for Rajasthan. If such had been the intention, the Rajasthan Legislature could also have introduced some such conditions. It is pertinent to note here that the Madhya Pradesh Legislature has prescribed that a person shall not be qualified for appointment as Member of Board of Revenue unless, he (a) is eligible for appointment as a judge of the High Court: or (b) has been a revenue officer and has held for atleast five years an office, not lower in rank than that of a Collector. No such provision was made in the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act although judicial notice may be taken of the fact that the Government has been very circumspect in making appointments to the Board of Revenue, and perhaps, no case can be cited in which a person has been appointed as a Member of the Board of Revenue, who had not held, for atleast five years, an office not lower in rank than that of a Collector, prior to his becoming a Member of the Board of Revenue. There may be instances where a Member of the Board of Revenue may not have served as a Collector for five years, but even in such cases, the officer did hold an office equivalent to that of a Collector for at least five years before he became eligible for the super time scale, which was, in all cases, deemed to be the minimum condition precedent, for appointment as Member, Board of Revenue by the State Government. The fact that the Legislature did not use prohibitive or negative words would show that the command of the Legislature was not per-emptory. The fact that the Legislature did not use prohibitive or negative words would show that the command of the Legislature was not per-emptory. Moreover, the noncompliance by the State Government of this provision has, as stated above, in no manner, frustrated the purpose of the legislation. By this test also, the provision must be deemed to be directory. In coming to this conclusion, we are strengthened by the view taken in State of U. P. vs. Manbodhanlal Srivastava (A. I. R., 1957 S. C. 912). In this case, their Lordships had an occasion to examine the import of the provisions contained in Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution of India. Article 320(3)(c) is in these terms : 320(3) "The Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case may be, shall be consulted., (a) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (b) ... ... ... ... ... ... ... ... (c) On all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving under the Government of India or the Govt. of a State in a civil capacity, including memorials or petitions relating to such matters." It was held in this case that the provision of Art. 320(3)(c) are not mandatory and non-compliance with these provisions, does not afford a cause of action to the civil servant in a court of law, notwithstanding the use of the word, "shall". It was observed that Art. 320(3)(c) of the Constitution does not confer any rights on a public servant so that the absence of consultation or any irregularity in consultation, should not afford him a cause of action in a court of law, or entitle him to relief under the special powers of a High Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution or of the Supreme Court under Art. 32. In this judgment, their Lordships have approvingly quoted the observations of their Lordships of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in the case of Montreal Street Railway Co. vs., Normandin, 1917 A. C. 170(B), while examining the question whether a certain provision in a statute imposing a duty on a public body or authority was mandatory or only directory. In that case, the question mooted was whether omission to revise the jury lists as directed by the statute, had the effect of nullifying the verdict given by a Jury. In that case, the question mooted was whether omission to revise the jury lists as directed by the statute, had the effect of nullifying the verdict given by a Jury. Their Lordships held that the irregularities in the due revision of the jury lists, would not ipso facto invalidate the verdict of a jury. It was observed that ".........The question whether provisions in a statute are directory or imperative has very frequently arisen in this country, but it has been said that no general rule can be laid down, and that in every case, the object of the statute must be looked at. The cases on the subject will be found collected in Maxwell on Statutes, 5th edn. p. 596 and following pages. When the provisions of a statute relate to the performance of a public duty and the case is such that to hold null and void acts done in neglect of this duty would work serious general inconvenience, or injustice to persons who have no control over those entrusted with the duty, and at. the same time, would not promote the main object of the Legislature, it has been the practice to hold such provisions to be directory only, the neglect of them, though punishable, not affecting the validity of the acts done." As noted by their Lordships of the Supreme Court, this principle was followed by the Federal Court in the case of Biswanath Kheraka vs. The King Emperor (1945 F. C. R. 99). In that case, the Federal Court had to consider the effect of noncompliance with the provisions of sec. 256 of the Govt. of India Act, 1935. requiring consultation between public authorities before the conferment of magisterial powers or of enhanced magisterial powers etc. The Court repelled the contention that the provisions of sec. 256, aforesaid, were mandatory. It was held that non-compliance with that Section would not render the appointment otherwise regularly and validly made, invalid or inoperative. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court ascribed particular importance to this decision as the words of the section then before their Lordships of the Federal Court were very emphatic and of a prohibitory character. 256, aforesaid, were mandatory. It was held that non-compliance with that Section would not render the appointment otherwise regularly and validly made, invalid or inoperative. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court ascribed particular importance to this decision as the words of the section then before their Lordships of the Federal Court were very emphatic and of a prohibitory character. It was held by them that though the provisions of Art. 311 of the Constitution conferred a right on a civil servant of the Union or State, which he can enforce in a court of law, Art. 320(3)(c) does not confer any such rights on a public servant, notwithstanding the fact that the word "shall" have been used in this article. It was observed that the use of the word "shall" though generally taken in a mandatory sense, does not necessarily mean that in every case it shall have that effect, that is to say, that unless the words of the statute are punctiliously followed, the proceeding or the outcome of the proceedings, would be invalid. This authority should be sufficient to demolish the case of the learned counsel for the applicants, and we have no hesitation in holding that the provisions of Sub-Sec. (4) in sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act are only directory and not mandatory. The Board of Revenue as constituted under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, has now been operating for 10 years and if these provisions are held to be mandatory, it would cause utter chaos and confusion, without in any manner, promoting the object of the Legislature for which the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act was promulgated. The Members of the Board of Revenue serving on 1.7.1956 might, of course, be saved by virtue of sec. 27 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act. But the Members subsequently appointed could not be so protected, if the provisions of Sub-Sec. (4), are held to be mandatory. This would invalidate all their decisions and acts and would thereby cause incalculable inconvenience, hardship, confusion and injustice to thousands of litigants who have appeared before the Board of Revenue during this decade, and who had no control over those entrusted with this duty, without, in any way, carrying forward the aim and object of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. This would invalidate all their decisions and acts and would thereby cause incalculable inconvenience, hardship, confusion and injustice to thousands of litigants who have appeared before the Board of Revenue during this decade, and who had no control over those entrusted with this duty, without, in any way, carrying forward the aim and object of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. As the Preamble to this Act reads, this Act was enacted to consolidate and amend the laws relating to land, the appointment, powers and duties of revenue courts, revenue officers, village officers and village servants, the preparation and maintenance of maps and land records, the settlement of revenue and rent, the partition of estates, the collection of revenue and other incidental matters. Under this Act, the Board of Revenue was constituted as the highest revenue court of appeal, revision and reference in Rajasthan. It was, further, laid down that in addition to the above duties, the Board shall exercise such other powers and perform such other duties as may from time to time be entrusted to it by the State Govt. or as are conferred or imposed upon the Board by any other law for the time being in force. Under this provision, many additional duties have been imposed on the Board, from time to time. In addition, the Board exercises general superintendence and control over all revenue courts and over all revenue officers in the State of Rajasthan. To invalidate the decisions and actions of the Board performed during the last 10 years on the ground of the failure of the State Govt. to prescribe the qualifications of the Chairman and the Members of the Board would, in our opinion, undoubtedly, cause immeasurable inconvenience, confusion and injustice which is not warranted by the weight of the authorities referred to above. Though no qualifications have been prescribed for the Chairman and the Members of the Board of Revenue, as stated above, we may take judicial notice of the fact that the officers who have been appointed to these posts in the past have been drawn from the cadre of the Super-time Scale Officers of the IAS. Though no qualifications have been prescribed for the Chairman and the Members of the Board of Revenue, as stated above, we may take judicial notice of the fact that the officers who have been appointed to these posts in the past have been drawn from the cadre of the Super-time Scale Officers of the IAS. An Officer in the I. A. S. is not entitled to be appointed to the Super time scale unless he has performed at least 15 years of satisfactory service in the I. A. S. During this span, he is expected to serve as an S. D. O., a Collector and a Secretary to the Government. When the post of Commissioner existed in the State of Rajasthan, normally, the first appointment of an I.A.S. Officer in the Super time scale was as a Commissioner, and after having served as a Commissioner, an officer was in course of time, promoted to the Board of Revenue. After the abolition of the post of the Commissioner, officers were directly appointed to the Board of Revenue and the duties of the Board of Revenue were duly expanded, in so far as some functions of the Commissioners devolved on the Members of the Board of Revenue, while others were entrusted to the Collectors and Revenue Appellate Authorities which were created to dispose of the judicial work being performed by the Commissioners, hithertofore. These officers had thus gained considerable experience of revenue and judicial work before they were appointed as Members of the Board of Revenue. The senior most officer amongst them was appointed as the Chairman. We have no doubts in our mind, that in appointing the senior-most officers of the I. A. S. to the Board of Revenue, the Government has, in substance, carried out the command of the Legislature, inspite of the fact that the Government has failed to carry out literally the express provision of the law contained in Sub-Sec. (4) of sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. In reply, the learned counsel for the applicants made a feeble attempt to counteract the stand of the opposite party by referring to the rule laid down in Rewachand vs. Anand Singh Kachhawaha (RLW 1964 P. 529). 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. In reply, the learned counsel for the applicants made a feeble attempt to counteract the stand of the opposite party by referring to the rule laid down in Rewachand vs. Anand Singh Kachhawaha (RLW 1964 P. 529). In this case, their Lordships dismissed the appeal on the ground that the memo of appeal did not comply with mandatory rules laid down regarding the submission of the requisite number of paper books. He also cited Mst. Tulsi Bai vs. Chunilal (RLW 1964 P. 253). In these cases, it is obvious, the failure was on the part of the litigant parties to observe statutory rules. As discussed above, the issue raised before us relates to the non-performance by the Government of the duty cast upon it by the Legislature, and does not relate to the non-compliance of a duty cast on the litigants. These cases are, therefore, not relevant to the present controversy. The learned counsel for the applicants has also referred to Bhanwarilal Agarwalla vs. State of Bihar and others (AIR 1961 Supreme Court 849). In this case, their Lordships had an occasion to examine the nature of the provisions in sec. 59(3) of the Mines Act, 1952 and came to the conclusion that the same were mandatory, as it was felt that arbitrary and haphazard regulations without full consideration on their practicability and ultimate effect on the efficient working of the mines, would, apart from, defeating the purpose of the Act, affect injuriously the general economy of the country. No such consequences are likely to flow in the present case, particularly, in view of the fact that the State Government while making the appointments of the Board of Revenue, has persistently followed a reasonable policy, consistent with the object and the scheme of the statute and the benefits intended to be conferred on the public, thereby. Our attention was also invited to Badridas Kanhaiya Lal vs. Appellate Tribunal of State Transport Authority, Rajasthan (AIR 1960 Rajasthan 105). In this case, the constitution of the State Transport Authority was struck down on the ground that the Chairman was not a person with judicial experience as required under the law. It was held that the orders passed by such an appellate authority which was illegally constituted suffered from patent want of jurisdiction. In this case, the constitution of the State Transport Authority was struck down on the ground that the Chairman was not a person with judicial experience as required under the law. It was held that the orders passed by such an appellate authority which was illegally constituted suffered from patent want of jurisdiction. In view of the foregoing discussion, this case, too, can be of no avail to the learned counsel for the applicants, as in the case of the State Transport Authority, the law, definitely, prescribed judicial qualifications for the Chairman. In the present case, no such qualifications have been laid down by the Legislature and thus no breach has occurred thereof. A reference was also invited to Madanlal Kapur vs. The State of Rajasthan (ILR 1952 Rajasthan 993). This case relates to the Rajasthan Dramatic Perfor-mances and Entertainments Ordinance, 1949. In this case, action permitted under secs. 3, 4, 6 and 8 thereof was held to be inconsistent with Art. 19 of the Constitution, as there was no provision for notice to and representation by the affected person. This case, also, is hardly relevant to the present issue. It should be enough to observe that a provision calling upon the Government to prescribe the qualifications of the members of a tribunal can hardly be placed on the same footing as a statute calculated to infringe the liberties of a citizen. As discussed above, the fundamental test of the question whether a direction is mandatory or merely directory is whether it partakes of the essence of the matter or is only a formal direction and what result shall fallow if it is not carried out. It may be admitted that if the State Government had not been so circumspect in the exercise of its discretion while making appointments to the Board of Revenue, by appointing only the officers in the super time scale of the I. A. S., it would have led to considerable embarrassment and the frustration of the object and the scheme of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, as the Board of Revenue constitutes the highest revenue court of appeal, revision, and reference in Rajasthan. Besides, the Members are called upon to perform other quasi-judicial and administrative functions from time to time, and this demands a high standard of probity, integrity, wide experience and comparable seniority. Besides, the Members are called upon to perform other quasi-judicial and administrative functions from time to time, and this demands a high standard of probity, integrity, wide experience and comparable seniority. It is not the case of the learned counsel for the applicants that those considerations were ignored by the State Govt. while making these appointments. Thus, taking into consideration, not only the actual words used by the Legislature, but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to the public, of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same, it must be held without any hesitation that the provisions contained in Sub-sec. (4) are directory and the non-observance thereof should not involve the consequence of invalidity as sought by the learned counsel for the applicants. In the result, therefore, we hold that this objection of the learned counsel for the applicants is also untenable. The third and the last objection is based on the ground that although the assent of the President to the Land Revenue Act was received on the 23rd May, 1956, it came into force on 1.7.1956 vide Notification No. F. 12(130) Rev. 11/54, dated 12.6.1956. It is argued that on 12.6.1956, the Act had not come into force and, therefore, the State Government did not have any power to issue a notification under sec. 1, sub-sec. (3) of the Act, in view of Sec. 5 of the Rajasthan General Glauses Act 1955. It is contended that the Land Revenue Act not having come into force in accordance with the law, it could not repeal the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance, 1949, under which the strength of the Board as then determined by the Government consisted of a Chairman and two Members. The fallacy of this argument is easily exposed by referring to sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955. This section reads as follows— "24. Making of rules, etc. and issuing of orders between passing and commencement of enactments. The fallacy of this argument is easily exposed by referring to sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955. This section reads as follows— "24. Making of rules, etc. and issuing of orders between passing and commencement of enactments. Where, by any Rajasthan law which is not to come into operation immediately on the passing thereof, a power is conferred to make rules, regulations bye-laws or to issue orders with respect to the application of such law or with respect to the establishment of any court or office or the appointment of any judge or officer thereunder or with respect to the person by whom or the time when or the place where or the manner in which or the fees for which anything is to be done under such law, then that power may be exercised at any time after the passing of such law, but rules, regulations, bye-laws or orders so made or issued shall not take, effect till the commencement of such law." It will be seen that under this section, the State Government has been expressly granted powers to issue orders with respect to the application of a law which is not to come into operation immediately on the passing thereof. In fact, power has also been conferred on the State Government to make rules, regulations or bye-laws or to issue orders with respect to the establishment of any court or office or the appoint merit of any Judge or officer thereunder for the purpose of carrying out the intention-of the Act at any time after the passing of such law, although it lays down that such rules, regulations or bye-laws, shall not take effect till the commencement of such law. This section takes care of the third objection raised by the learned counsel for the applicants. As a result, therefore, we come to the conclusion that the objections raised before the learned single Members of the Board in these cases are without any force and validity and the composition of the Board of Revenue as existing at present does not stand vitiated on account of the failure of the Government (a) to notify the strength of the members in the official gazette or (b) to prescribe the qualifications of the Members of the Board. Nor does it stand vitiated for the reason that the notification of the State Government appointing the date on which the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act was scheduled to come into force was issued prior to the coming into force of the aforesaid Act. The references will be answered accordingly and the undisposed of cases will be returned to the appropriate Benches for further action in accordance with the law. Per Shri R.N. Madhok—The Board of Revenue derives its authority from sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, which is reproduced below in full— "4. Establishment and composition of the Board.—(1) There shall be established for the State of Rajasthan a Board of Revenue hereinafter referred to as the Board. (2) The Board shall consist of a Chairman and such other members not less than three as the State Government may, from time to time, determine and appoint. (3) All appointments made under sub-sec. (2) shall be notified in the Official Gazette. (4) The State Government shall prescribe the qualifications of person who shall be eligible for appointment as Chairman and Members of the Board." The constitution of the Board of Revenue has been assailed on three grounds : (1) That the State Government while setting up the Board of Revenue under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, did not notify the composition, that is, the number of members of the Board ; (2) That the State Government did not prescribe any qualifications of persons who shall be eligible for appointment as Chairman and Members of the Board ; (3) That notification No. 12(130)Rev. 11/54, dated the 12th June, 1956 was issued by the State Government on a date when the State Government had no authority to act under the provisions of the aforesaid Act. To take the last argument first, the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, received the assent of the President on the 23rd day of May, 1956. Sec. 1(3) of the Act says that it shall come into force on such date as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint. Accordingly, notification No. F. 12(130) Rev. 11/54, dated 12.6.1956 was issued by the State Government in the Rajasthan Gazette on 16.6.1956, bringing the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act into force on 1.7.1956. Sec. 1(3) of the Act says that it shall come into force on such date as the State Government may by notification in the Official Gazette appoint. Accordingly, notification No. F. 12(130) Rev. 11/54, dated 12.6.1956 was issued by the State Government in the Rajasthan Gazette on 16.6.1956, bringing the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act into force on 1.7.1956. Shri S. N. Pareek contends that this notification could not have been issued on 16.6.1956 when the Act had not come into force. This argument is entirely untenable and runs counter to the plain language of sec. 1 (3) of the Act. In any case, sec. 24 of the Rajasthan General Clauses Act, 1955 authorises the Government to make rules and issue orders between the passing of an Act and its commencement, so that these rules and orders may take effect on the commence-ment of the Act. Perhaps Shri S. N. Pareek was not serious about his objection and has merely put it up to lend weight to other two objections of more substantial. The first objection is that the State Government failed to notify the strength of the Board in terms of the sec. 4(2) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, and that thereby the constitution of the Board stood vitiated. It may be noted that whereas sec. 4(3) of the Act requires all appointments to the Board to be notified in the Official Gazette, no such command of the Legislature is apparent from sec. 4(2) with regard to the strength and composition of the Board. In the Rajasthan Revenue Board Ordinance, 1949, there was a clear requirement that the strength of the Board should be notified, and since the legislature omitted this requirement of notification of the strength of the Board in sec. 4(2) the proper construction would be that the legislature did not require the State Government to notify the Strength of the Board. All that the legislature required was that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and such other members, not less than three, as the State Govt. may, from time to time determine and appoint. It is not argued that the strength of the Board has at any time fallen short of the minimum laid down in sec. 4(2). All that the legislature required was that the Board shall consist of a Chairman and such other members, not less than three, as the State Govt. may, from time to time determine and appoint. It is not argued that the strength of the Board has at any time fallen short of the minimum laid down in sec. 4(2). Moreover, the very act of appointment of a member of the Board assurance as a condition precedent to it the determination of the number of members of the Board. The argument that the constitution of the Board stands vitiated because the number of members of the Board was not notified by the State Government is devoid of force. The other substantial objection is that the Chairman and members of the Board were appointed from time to time by the State Government without prescribing any qualifications of the persons who would be eligible for appointment as such. The argument is that this provision of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act is of a mandatory nature, and that since no qualifications of persons eligible for appointment as Chairman or member of the Board were prescribed by the State Govt. as conceded by the learned Advocate General, the Board is improperly constituted and its acts are invalid. The question to determine is whether sec. 4(4) is mandatory or merely directory in character. I am of the view that the expression "shall" occurring in sec.4(4) has the force of a mandate or a pre-emptory command by the Legislature. There is no other provision in the Act which could suggest that the expression "shall" occurring in sec. 4(4) does not have the attribute of a pre-emptory command of the legislature. In order to determine whether the expression "Shall" occurring in a statute should be interpreted as indicative of a mandate or of a direction., we have to examine the entire scheme of the statute. As has been observed in AIR 1961 S. C. 849, no general rule can be laid down for deciding whether any particular provision in a statute is mandatory, meaning thereby that not observance thereof involves the consequences of invalidity, or only directory, i. e., a direction the non-observance of which does not entail the consequence of invalidity, whatever other consequences may occur. But in each case the court has to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statute, the intended benefit to public by the contravention of the same. In A. I. R. 1957 S. C. 912 their Lordships had the occasion to interpret the expression "shall" occurring in Art 320(3) of the Constitution of India. This provision says that the Union Public Service Commission or the State Public Service Commission, as the case may be "shall" be consulted in matters of appointment, disciplinary action, etc. The contention raised in this case was that since disciplinary action had been taken against a civil servant without consultation with the Commission, the action was bad in Law. Their Lordships observed that the advice of the Commission was not binding on the Government, and that powers were vested in the Government to make rules so as to exclude the jurisdiction of the Commission in certain matters by making regulations to that effect. In these circumstances, their Lordships held that Art. 320(3) was not mandatory in effect but was only directory. In the present case, the legislature required the Government under sec. 4(4) to prescribe the qualifications of persons who would be eligible for appointment as Chairman and members of the Board. The learned Advocate General conceded that no qualifications had been prescribed by the State Government for the purpose. To my mind, the intention of the legislature was clear that before making appointments of Chairman and members of the Board the State Government should prescribe the qualifications of persons eligible to hold these offices. In other words, the laying down of the qualifications for these offices by the State Government was Condition precedent to the making of these appointments. The legislature intended that the State Government should not act arbitrarily in making the appointments, but should lay down and announce the qualifications for such appointments so as to inspire public confidence. The question is not whether suitable persons were appointed as Chairman or members of the Board by the State Government, but it is whether harm could result to the public by not prescribing qualifications for appointment to these offices. There is no doubt that in the absence of any prescribed qualifications there was the hypothetical possibility of appointments being made arbitrarily and capriciously or at least without any system or recognisable pattern. There is no doubt that in the absence of any prescribed qualifications there was the hypothetical possibility of appointments being made arbitrarily and capriciously or at least without any system or recognisable pattern. The Government failed to prescribe the qualifications of persons eligible for holding offices on the Board and, in my opinion this defeated the intention of the legislature and entailed invalidity of the constitution of the Board. The mandate of the legislature was clear that before any appointments were made the qualifications for persons eligible to hold these appointments should be laid down. A plain reading of all the sub sections of sec. 4 of the Act makes it clear that each component of this section is in the nature of a command or a mandate by the legislature. Besides, there is no other provision in the Act which could dilate or derogate from the mandatory force of the expression "shall" used in these sub-sections. Undoubtedly, a good deal of inconvenience would result if all the acts of the Board of Revenue are held to be invalid on the grounds that the Board was never properly constituted under the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956. But their lordships of the Supreme Court have reiterated in A.I.R. 1963 S. C. 1128 that inconvenience is not a decisive factor in interpreting a statute. There are other ways of removing the resulting inconvenience than what would appear to me to be a strained interpretation of sec. 4(4) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. In my view the laying down of the qualifications for appointments to the offices of the Chairman and the member of the Board was the very foundation on which the constitution of the Board could be built, and that foundation just does not exist. I would, therefore, hold that the Board of Revenue has not been validly set up under sec. 4 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, since the mandatory requirement of sub-sec. (4) of this Section has not been fulfilled. Per Shri Gajendra Singh—This reference to the Larger Bench has come up as a result of important provision of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956 assailed before a member constituting single Bench which related to establishment of and composition of the Board of Revenue. The section 4 of the Act laid down the provision for establishment and composition of the Board. The section 4 of the Act laid down the provision for establishment and composition of the Board. The provision was assiled on three grounds. Firstly that the notification enforcing the Act from 1st July, 1956, was issued by the Government when it had no power to do so; secondly, the State Government while setting up the Board did not notify its composition. Thirdly, the State Government did not prescribe the qualification of the persons who shall be eligible for appointment as chairman and members of. the Board. With regard to the first objection I agree with all the members, that under the General Clauses Act the State Government have wide powers to make Rules and appoint Officers for the enforcement of an Act before that Act actually comes into force subject to the proviso that the Act as passed by the legislature had become the Law of this land, on the assent of the Governor. In this case this law had received the required assent before it was notified to be enforced. Hence this objection is absolutely untenable and perhaps not pursued with any vigour by the counsel for the petitioners. The second contention was that the Boards composition should have been notified by the Government before any appointment was made of its members. In sec. 4(2) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act, 1956, it was laid down that the Board shall consist of a chairman and such other members not less than three as the State Government may from time to time determine and appoint. The plain and natural meaning of the section was that as far as legislature was concerned it had created the Board with a Chairman and three members. In case the Government wanted more members to man the Board the discretion was given to add members to the Board by determining its strength and then appoint them. This was a delegated legislative function to be performed by the Government by a process known as determination. It was conceded by the Advocate General at the Bar that the Government only performed this function simultaneously by appointing additional members, notifying their names in the Government. Separate determination of the strength of the Board was not done. This was a delegated legislative function to be performed by the Government by a process known as determination. It was conceded by the Advocate General at the Bar that the Government only performed this function simultaneously by appointing additional members, notifying their names in the Government. Separate determination of the strength of the Board was not done. It was rightly argued on behalf of the petitioners by their counsel that a delegated legislative authority should be exercised by a proper process and the persons affected should know that it has been exercised in that matters. If it is not exercised in the manner required then any other manner of its exercise of power is invalid. Crawford and many other reputed authorities on interpretation of statutes have been cited. The shelter taken by the Advocate General that non-determination of the composition of Board by a notification is not vitiated as the power was purely directory and not mandatory. My learned colleagues have taken a different view in the matter and they do not find any invalidity in the exercise of this legislative power of the Government. I however take the different view. When the legislature in plain, clear and unambiguous language directed the Government who was to exercise their power to determine the strength of the members of the Board, the Government was bound to act and determine the strength of the Boards membership separately by a proper notification duly Gazetted in exercise their power under sec. 4(2) and as it failed to do so and the strength of the membership has been increased beyond 3 members, which was the limit laid down by the Law, the appointment of members in excess of three was clearly illegal and invalid. It required to be revalidated by proper notification or by passing validating Ordinance or Act to revalidate the decisions and orders passed by the Board. On the question of prescribing qualifications of members of the Board, I entirely agree with view taken by the learned member Shri R. N. Madhok. The Advocate General admitted that the Government did not prescribe the qualification of members before appointment, but pleaded that this duty cast on the Government was purely directory and not mandatory and this was the view adopted by the other learned members. The Advocate General admitted that the Government did not prescribe the qualification of members before appointment, but pleaded that this duty cast on the Government was purely directory and not mandatory and this was the view adopted by the other learned members. They also observed that judicial notice could be taken of the fact that while appointing members the Government always appointed officials with requisite qualifications and of Revenue experience and of the standing of 5 years as collectors in the first instance, it was obligatory on the part of the Government to prescribe qualification of the members to be appointed to the Board under s. 4(4) of the Act. Under-sec. 361 (1) the Act required Rules to be made by the Government for appointment of members and prescribing their qualifications. It was frankly admitted on behalf of the Government that no such qualifications were prescribed nor any Rules were made. He only pleaded that the appointment in any case was not invalid as the command of the legislature was not mandatory. I disagree with this. The plain language used in the Act clearly required prescribing of qualification and of making Rules to that effect by the Government. This language required] no interpretation. This exercise of delegated authority by the Government for appointment of members was qualified, certain formalities had to be observed before members of requisite qualification could be appointed. Non-prescribing of qualification cannot be justified on grounds of in convenience to the bulk of private litigations. The quasi-judicial, judicial and administrative functions performed by the Board as a corporate body required that the Government should have laid down proper qualifications of persons who could be eligible to become members of the Board. They should be revenue administrator with a strong judicial back ground for proper discharge of their duties. The language of the Sections admits of no other interpretation, when the language is clear and as the Government have not laid down the qualification before appointment. They have clear acted in contravention of the express provision of low and thus rendered their action invalid. I therefore like to answer this reference accordingly. Per Shri Balwant Singh—I have the privilege of perusing the opinions expressed by the Chairman Shri R. K. Chaturvedi and my learned colleagues G.B.K. Hooja on the one hand and Shri Gajendra Singh and Shri R. N. Madhok on the other hand. I therefore like to answer this reference accordingly. Per Shri Balwant Singh—I have the privilege of perusing the opinions expressed by the Chairman Shri R. K. Chaturvedi and my learned colleagues G.B.K. Hooja on the one hand and Shri Gajendra Singh and Shri R. N. Madhok on the other hand. I have also heard the counsel for the parties and the Government Advocates and the Advocate General for the State. The main question which has arisen for determination and on which there had been a difference of opinion can be summarised as under: — 1. Whether the provision of section 4(4) of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act (hereinafter referred to as "Revenue Act") are mandatory or only directory? 2. Whether the Board of Revenue has been validly constituted if it be held that the above said provisions are held to be mandatory? At the outset, the learned Advocate General has cited K.S. Venkataraman and -Co. (P) Ltd., versus The State of Madras (STC 1966 page 413) wherein it was held that a court cannot decide the validity and vires of the provision of the enactment under which it has been constituted. The argument is devoid of any substance as the question before me is not for the validity or vires of any of the provision of the Revenue Act but it is about the interpretation of section 4(4) of the Revenue Act. This is neither part of reference nor is covered by difference of opinion on which I am called upon to decide. Further more the question whether this matter can be-heard by the Board or not has already been decided by he larger bench of this court on 24.3.66 before which the learned Advocate General also appeared and as such the same cannot be reopened before me. In interpreting a statute and to find out whether a particular provision is mandatory or directory, the absence of a provision providing a penalty for its non-observence alone is not the determining factor but the court has to bear in mind what was the legislative intent, object and scheme of the Act and the intended benefit thereof. This principle has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Monghyr versus Keshav Prasad (AIR 1962 Supreme Court page 1694 relevant page 1701). This principle has been laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Collector of Monghyr versus Keshav Prasad (AIR 1962 Supreme Court page 1694 relevant page 1701). The relevant observations are as under:— "The question whether any requirement is mandatory or directory has to be decided not merely on the basis of any specific provision which, for instance sets out the consequences of the omission to observe the requirement, but on the purpose for which the requirement has been enacted, particularly in the context of the other provisions of the Act and the general scheme thereof." In the above case the authority of State of U.P. versus Manmodhanlal (AIR 1957 S.C. 212) cited by the learned Advocate General before me has been examined and I see no reason to prefer and follow the view expressed in above said ruling of AIR 1957 S.C. 912 , more particularly because the proposition of law laid down in 1962 S.C. AIR page 1694 finds support from AIR 1961 S.C. page 849 (relevant page 851) Banwarilal versus State of Bihar wherein their Lordships of Supreme Court have laid down as follows:— "But in each case, the court has to decide the legislative intent. Did the legislature intend in making the statutory provision that non-observance of this would entail invalidity or did it not? To decide this we have to consider not only the actual words used but the scheme of the statutes, the intended benefit to the public of what is enjoined by the provisions and the material danger to the public by the contravention of the same." On the other hand, it is a well known concept that in interpreting a statute which confers an express power to do a thing in a particular form or manner, can be done only in that form and none other whatever may be consequences. The reliance for the above proposition can be laid down on the case of AIR 1961 Supreme Court page 1107 (relevant page 1113) which reads as under:— "The principles that when a statute confers an express power, a power inconsistent with that expressly given cannot be implied." This view has been again expressed in the case of Bhikraj versus Union of India (AIR 1962 Supreme Court page 113) relevant page 199, wherein their Lordships have observed, "where a statute requires that a thing shall be done in the prescribed manner or form but does not set out the consequences of non-compliance, the question whether the provision was mandatory or directory has to be adjudged in the light of the intention of the legislature as disclosed by the object, purpose and scope of the statute." The above further view finds support from the observations of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the case of State of U. P. versus Singhara Singh (AIR 1964 Supreme Court page 358 at page 361) which runs as under: — "If a statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid down the method in which the power has to be exercised, it necessarily prohibits the doing of things in any other manner, than that has been prescribed." The language of sec. 4 sub-sec. (4) of the Revenue Act is plain and unambiguous, and it is not the duty of this court to consider the hardship which might result by giving effect to the plain meaning of the section. But it has to be borne in mind that what were the objects for which it has been enacted. Therefore, while interpreting the statute, the Court should bear in mind that it has to look at the intention of the legislature, the desired effect and the evil which the legislature wanted to remedy by enacting a particular provision. The provisions of sub-sec. (4) of sec.4 or its equivalent could not exist in the Rajasthan Board of Revenue Ordinance. It is, therefore, clear that the legislature intended to provide certain qualifications of the persons who could be eligible for appointment as Members and Chairman of the Board of Revenue. The legislative intent was to inspire public confidence and it intended that the public should be aware that the personnel who will exercise the powers of the Board of Revenue are competent persons. The legislative intent was to inspire public confidence and it intended that the public should be aware that the personnel who will exercise the powers of the Board of Revenue are competent persons. The legislature intended to put a check on the arbitrary and capricious discretion of the State Government to pick and choose the personnel who should exercise the powers of this highest Revenue Tribunal. To hold otherwise would not be commensurate with the intention of the legislature and the object of the said provisions. From the perusal of the above authorities it is clear that the legislature intended the laying down of the qualifications before any appointment could be made. A primary duty was cast upon the State Government to prescribe statutory rules under sub-section (4) of sec. 4 of the Revenue Act before making the appointments. In the absence of any statutory rules to hold that the intention of the legislature has been fulfilled on the ground of the State Government laying down a policy on the administrative side in appointments it would be interpreting the said sub-section to hold that substantial compliance has been done in accordance with the legislative intent on the administrative side and no judicial notice can be taken of them. This defect has also been pointed out by the Rajasthan Revenue Laws Commission in its second Report in para 42 and that is why due to the lapses on the part of the State Government, it thought fit to lay down the qualifications in the bill itself. In 1961 Supreme Court page 751 their Lordships have observed that the statutory rules cannot be described as are equated with the administrative directions. My learned colleagues, the Honble Chairman and Mr. Hooja, it appears, have been swayed away by the idea that the general litigant public would be put to great hardship and inconvenience if the judgments delivered up to this time by the board of Revenue, are held to be invalid. Hardship cannot be the decisive factor in interpreting the statute. The Supreme Court has declined to take judicial notice of any existing practice which was illegal and also observed "that the argument from inconvenience and hardship of view is dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure. Hardship cannot be the decisive factor in interpreting the statute. The Supreme Court has declined to take judicial notice of any existing practice which was illegal and also observed "that the argument from inconvenience and hardship of view is dangerous one and is only admissible in construction where the meaning of the statute is obscure. If any hardship and inconvenience is felt, it is for the parliament to take appropriate steps to amend the aw and not for the Court to legislate under the guise of the interpretation." (Guranditta vs. Amar Dass AIR 1963 S.C. at p. 1966.) The same was held in 1963 Supreme Court page 1128 at page 1138 and in AIR 1950 Supreme Court page 265 at page 270. Recently the Supreme Court has held in the case of Martin Burn Limited versus Calcutta Corporation (AIR 1966 Supreme Court page 529) at page 535, that a result flowing from the statutory provision is never an evil and a court has no power to ignore the provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation. The same view has been of the Rajasthan High Court in the case of Vijai Cotton Mills vs. R. M. M. Sangh AIR 1965 page 213 and 1965 Kerla page 66, AIR 1966 Orissa page 1 and to put it more clearly in the words of Desai C.J. in the case of Jagan Nath versus Fatehuddin (AIR 1965 Allahabad page 345) relevant page 348, their lordships observed that we are not concerned with the question whether the legislature was wise or not in prescribing this condition precedent for an objection by a tenant; if it operates harshly, it is for the legislature to enforce it because it finds it to be harsh." I feel that I would be failing in my duty as a Member, Board of Revenue if I were not to point out that there has been very serious lapse on the part of the State Government in not prescribing the qualifications for the appointment of the Members of Board of Revenue which is likely to result in serious complications. In view of the above authorities and observations it is abundantly clear that sec. 4 is undoubtedly a mandatory provision laying down a command by the Legislature without fulfilling which the appointment cannot be made. In view of the above authorities and observations it is abundantly clear that sec. 4 is undoubtedly a mandatory provision laying down a command by the Legislature without fulfilling which the appointment cannot be made. I, therefore, agree with the views expressed by may learned colleagues Shri Gajendra Singh and Shri R. N. Madhok and hold that the provisions of sub-sec. 4 of sec.4 of the Revenue Act are mandatory and as the State Government has not prescribed any qualifications, the constitution and the composition of the Board as stands today is not valid.