JUDGMENT 1. THIS is a rule obtained by the plaintiff on June 1, 1959, under section 115 of the Procedure Code calling upon the defendant, the State Electricity Board, the opposite party before me, to show cause why the appellate order of affirmance returning the plaint should not be set aside. 2. THE plaint is that of a simple suit for recovery of Rs. 250 for removal of 25 deodar trees from the plaintiff's land while installing overhead electric line over there in 1954, each tree having been valued at Rs. 10/ -. The Board files a written statement pleading inter alia that a matter as this is triable by the dist. judge and that the value of the trees cannot be more than Rs. 125 at the rate of Rs. 5 a tree - a sum the Board has all along been anxious to pay, 3. THE learned munsif returns the plaint on the ground that the dispute falls within the statutory arbitration provided for by section 19, sub-section 2 of the Indian Electricity Act, 9 of 1910 and that the only step to be taken is to move the State Government for appointment of an arbitrator under section 52 thereof. An appeal against that order comes to little, a learned subordinate judge who hears the appeal agreeing with the view taken. 4. NO second appeal lies against the appellate order by virtue of section 104, sub-section (2), of the Code. This is why the plaintiff has come up to this court in revision. The delay in bringing this revisional case to hearing is due to the loss of the original records and reconstruction thereof. Grant, the view taken by the learned munsif is right Still, why should the plaint be returned ? The very section the courts below go by, namely, section 52 of the 1910 Act provides that, save the nomination by the State Government of an arbitrator on the application by either party, in all other respects, the arbitration shall be subject to the provisions of the Arbitration Act, 10 of 1940. One such provision is clause (a) of section 2 defining an arbitration agreement to be a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not. One such provision is clause (a) of section 2 defining an arbitration agreement to be a written agreement to submit present or future differences to arbitration, whether an arbitrator is named therein or not. Another such provision is section 34 giving the power to a judicial authority to stay legal proceedings where there is an arbitration agreement and when any party to such legal proceedings any time before filing a written statement or taking any other steps in the proceedings applies for such a stay. Still another provision is section 46 placing a statutory arbitration (like the one section 19, sub-section (2), of the 1910 Act provides for) at a par with an arbitration agreement except for certain limited purposes which do not bulk large here, The combined effect of these provisions is that the opposite party could have applied for a stay under section 34. But that stage is no more, because the opposite party hag filed a written statement, and thereby forfeited its right to apply so. At all events, where is the scope of the return of the plaint on the basis of the statutory arbitration ? I do not see any ; nor have I been told of any. On this consideration alone, the order under revision cannot be sustained. And it is plain to be seen in view of all that goes before that the courts below exercised a jurisdiction not vested in them by law. What I record here is on the line of submissions made by Mr. Sinha, the learned advocate for the petitioner, supplemented by those of Mr. Roy Choudhury, the learned advocate for the opposite party, who has referred me to section 46 of the Arbitration Act 1940. 5. BUT the matter is such that it cannot be left here. The Board is a creature oil the Electricity (Supply) Act, 54 of 1948. Mr. Roy Choudhury, therefore, very pertinently refers me to section 42 thereof. The gist of this section in so far as it is material here is this : one, if there is a sanctioned scheme where provision is made for clothing the Board with all the powers of the telegraph authority for the placing of wires, poles etc. under Part III of the Telegraph Act 13 of 1885, section 19, amongst others, of the 1910 Act will not apply. I am concerned here with section 19. under Part III of the Telegraph Act 13 of 1885, section 19, amongst others, of the 1910 Act will not apply. I am concerned here with section 19. Two, where the sanctioned scheme does not provide so, section 19 will apply. Section 19 not applying, the district judge's is the only forum which will determine the compensation payable by the Board on an application by either party. Is this why the opposite party pleads in the written statement that the dispute is tribal by the district judge ? This has to be looked into. Mr. Roy Choudhury cannot enlighten me now if there is a sanctioned scheme in which provision has been made for conferring on the Board the power of the telegraph authority under Part III of the Telegraph Act. Hence, this does need looking into all the more. If as the result of looking into it. the munsif finds that there is a sanctioned scheme giving the Board the powers of the telegraph authority does possess, as stated above, he will have no option but to return the plaint for presentation to the district judge, 24-Parganas for treating it as an application under section 16, subsection (3), of the Telegraph Act, 1885. If, however, he finds that the sanctioned scheme does not provide so, he will proceed with the suit, the stage for stay being there no more. 6. HERE, also, I am glad to be able to record that both Mr. Sinha and Mr. Roy Choudhury are agreed that the matter cannot but be disposed of so, on the materials this court has had put before it up till now. In the result, the rule succeeds and be made absolute. The orders complained of be set aside. The case do go back to the learned munsif for proceeding with the matter in accordance with the directions that go before and also in accordance with law. 7. UPON all I see here, I make no order as to costs.