Judgment Anant Singh, J. 1. This application is directed against an order dated the 17th June, 1985 passed by a Magistrate, First Class. Mr. M. Narain, Hajipur, in a proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. 2. The present petitioner was the first party and the opposite party were the second party in the proceeding in the Court below. The dispute relates to 8 Kathas 16 Ohurs of land of plot No. 29 appertaining to khata No. 61 of village Dohaji Ramchandar, within Mahua p olice station in the district of Muzaffarpur, at No. 29 containing some larger area was admittedly the bakasht land of the ex-landlord Shri Rai Bahadur Shyam Nandan Sahay. The first party took settlement of the land in dispute from the aforesaid ex-landlord and was granted rent receipts by him, as also by the State of Bihar after vesting of Zamindari. In the recent survey the name of the petitioner was recorded in the Pareha, though at the instance of the opposite party that was challenged and the decision of the settlement authority is still awaited. 3. "The case of the opposite party, on the other hand, was that Palakdhari, who was the lather of opposite party Nos. 2 to 4 and uncle of opposite party No. 1, had taken settlement of various lands by means of a patta executed by the ex-landlord Shri Rai Bahadur Shyam Nandan Sahay in the year 1945, and the disputed plot was one of the lands settled with Palakdhari. Ever since the said settlement, the opposite party claim to have been in possession from the time of Palakdhari. 4. Both the parties filed various documents and affidavits in proof or disproof of each others case. The first party also Sled an affidavit of one Sukhdeo Prasad Singh, who was the scribe of the patta, relied upon by the opposite party, and Sukhdeo Prasad Singh wore that the disputed land being 8 Kathas 16 Dhurs forming part of plot No. 29, as also one another plot No. 149, as mentioned in the patta in green ink, were not in fact written by aim when he had scribed the document. He said that the insertion of Plots 149 and 29 in the patta with other details were interpolations. 5. He said that the insertion of Plots 149 and 29 in the patta with other details were interpolations. 5. The learned Magistrate, while referring to the affidavit of Sukhdeo Prasad Singh, the scribe of the patta, regarding the alleged interpolation, has observed: ".... I am not inclined to accept the affidavit of Sukhdeo Prasad Singh unless the matter is examined by an expert This was surely a very serious matter The learned Magistrate, if he thought that there was interpolation in the patta by introducing the disputed land, along with another land, he should not have disposed of the affidavit of Sukhdeo Prasad Singh, the scribe, summarily, but should have got the matter examined by an expert, if it was at all considered necessary. I have also been shown the alleged interpolations in the patta. They are in green ink, different from the rest of the ink, and the writings of the patta. It is significant that the total area said to have been settled by the patta was also interpolated and wherever the area was mentioned, it has been overwritten at several places Prima facie there can be little doubt that there are interpolations in the patta and the disputed area comprised in plot No. 29 with the boundary as shown therein was subsequent interpolation. This was confirmed by the scribe of the document himself, namely, Sukhdeo Prasad Singh, and if there was any doubt about his evidence, the learned Magistrate should have got the matter examined by an expert, if he at all thought it necessary. 6. It follows that the alleged interpolations in the patta introducing the disputed area were not duly considered by the learned Magistrate. This was a very important question and that having not been properly considered, the case has to go back on remand for fresh decision according to law. The other evidence adduced by the parties may be considered afresh in the light of the genuineness or otherwise of the patta regarding the disputed land. 7. The application is, accordingly, allowed the impugned order of the learned Magistrate is set aside and the case is remanded for a fresh decision according to law. 8. Before I part with the case, I am constrained to observe that the disposal of the proceeding by the learned Magistrate was abnormally delayed for no obvious good reasons. 7. The application is, accordingly, allowed the impugned order of the learned Magistrate is set aside and the case is remanded for a fresh decision according to law. 8. Before I part with the case, I am constrained to observe that the disposal of the proceeding by the learned Magistrate was abnormally delayed for no obvious good reasons. It appears that at first on the 14th December., 1961, a proceeding under Sec.144 of the Code of Criminal Procedure was started and the same was converted into the present proceeding under Sec.145 of the Code on the 10th February, 1962. It was kept on hanging till April, 1964. The order dated the 29th April, 1964. as it stands now, reads as follows : "Parties file hazri. To 4-6-64 for judgment. The parties will be heard in the meanwhile". 9. After the 4th June, 1964, which was the date fixed for judgment, according to the order of the 29th April, 1964, seven dates were fixed until the 24th March, 1965, for orders. The orders of these dates are all to the same effect that the orders in the case could not be ready and hence the case was being posted to the various subsequent dates. 10. The order dated the 24th March, 1965, as it stands now, is to the following effect: "Orders not ready. Put up on 17-6-65 for orders. Heard the parties". 11. The subsequent order of the 17th June, 1965, was the final order, whereby the proceeding was disposed of declaring the possession of the second parry. 12. 1 should mention it here that the writings "heard the parties, as against the order of the 24th March, 1965, are in different ink from the rest of the writings preceding "heard the parties, and obviously these are inconsistent with the earlier portion of the order. The previous portion of the order of the 24th March, 1965, as also the other preceding orders, indicated that the order was not ready, showing clearly that the matter had already been heard, as mentioned in the order of the 29th April, 1964, when the case was adjourned to the 4th June, 1964, for judgment. There was hardly any occasion for hearing the parties on the 24th March, 1965, unless the parties were heard once again. The third sentence of the order dated the 29th April, 1964, has already been quoted. There was hardly any occasion for hearing the parties on the 24th March, 1965, unless the parties were heard once again. The third sentence of the order dated the 29th April, 1964, has already been quoted. This sentence is also in a different ink and style from the preceding two sentences of the order It is so clear on its very face that the aforesaid sentence in the order of 29-4-64 and the sen tence at the end "heard parties", in the order dated the 24th March, 196S, were both surely written sometime after, and could never have been written in due course when the preceding portions in the two orders were written. 13. It will appear that at the time the present application was admitted for hearing, report was called for from the learned Magistrate why the order was passed on the 17th June, 1965, when already the case had been heard in May, 1964, which should have been April, 1964. The learned Magistrate has since submitted his report, which has been kept on the record at Flag 58. He has denied in his report that the argument in the case had been heard on the 29th April, 1964. He says that the matter was not heard on the 29th April, 1964. On that date "... the case was fixed for orders on 4-6-64 with a note in the ordersheet that the argument will be heard in the meantime", ami, in fact, he heard the argument on the 24th March, 1965, because, during the intervening period he had been busy otherwise. The report further shows that after the argument was heard on the 24th March, 1965, the case was posted for the 17th June, 1965, when it was disposed of. 14. The report of the learned Magistrate is self-condemned. As I have already shown, the third sentence in the order of the 29th April, 1964, The parties will be heard in the meanwhile and the writings heard the parties in the order of the 24th March, 1965, are clearly subsequent insertions, obviously calculated to cover up his laches made in the disposal of the case. As I have already shown, the third sentence in the order of the 29th April, 1964, The parties will be heard in the meanwhile and the writings heard the parties in the order of the 24th March, 1965, are clearly subsequent insertions, obviously calculated to cover up his laches made in the disposal of the case. Unless the arguments had been heard on or before the 29th April, 1964, when 4th June, 1964, was fixed for orders, there was hardly any reason for the learned Magistrate to have fixed up so many dates for passing the orders saying in all the orders of different dates that the orders were not ready or could not be ready. 15. It was atrocious on the part of the learned Magistrate to have delayed the disposal of the proceeding for about three years and held up the passing of the final order for some thirteen months after the case had been closed on the 29th April, 1964. The legislature has clearly provided in Sec.145 of the Criminal Procedure Code that a proceeding under this section should be disposed of ordinarily within two months but the learned Magistrate took more than a year in" making his order after he had heard the arguments. This is one of the worst specimen of how such proceedings are delayed by some Magistrates against the express wish of the legislature. It was one thing for the learned Magistrate to have made abnormal delay in the disposal of the proceeding but he has taken recourse to unclean methods to cover up his laches by making certain interpolations in his order, as already referred to. I am constrained to observe that he does not appear to be a fit officer to be entrusted with the solemn duty of dispensing justice or any other responsible work. I wonder, if he has not subjected himself even to criminal liability for having made interpolations in the record of the case with a dishonest intention to shield his laches of delay in making tike orders. 16. A copy of this order may be sent to the Government for such action as may be considered necessary against the learned Magist rate and a copy may also be placed before the Standing Committee of this Court.