JUDGMENT Satish Chandra, J. - This special appeal is directed against the judgment of a learned single Judge of this Court dismissing a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Appellant filed the writ petition for a direction to the State of Uttar Pradesh, the Respondent, not to interfere with the Appellant's jagirdari rights in respect of the mentioned villages and to pay to the Petitioner the jagirdari dues at the rate of Rs. 10,000/- per annum from July 1952 to the date of the actual removal of interference. 2. The Appellant alleges that Raja Mahip Narayan Singh of Banaras conferred a Jagir of 41 villages situate in the district of Ballia on Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy, the ancestor of the Appellant. This jagir was recognised by the East India Company and on 10th January, 1785 Mr. Warren Hastings, the Governor General, by a fresh sanad assigned the same 41 villages as Altamga Jagir of Rs. 10,000/- on Dewan Krishna Kant Mandy. The Sanad mentioned that the grant was being made for purposes of defraying the expenses of worship etc., of the deities. By a dead dated 19th day of the month of Ramzan, A.H. 1207 corresponding to the year 1793 Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy created a trust of the income of this jagir in favour of the deity. In the settlement of 1841 Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy was entered as a jagirdar of these villages entitled to land revenue. The zamindars of these villages were charged with the duty of paying the annual land revenue of Rs. 10,000/- to the jagirdar, namely, Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy or to the Government in the event of the resumption of the jagir. 3. On the death in 1844 of Raja Krishna Nath, a descendant of Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy, certain disputes arose with the Government. Rani Swarnamayee, the widow of Raja Krishna Nath, filed a suit which was decreed in the year 1860 by the Sadar Dewaney Adalat of North West Provinces on the finding that the Sanad conferred a perpetual heritable grant. This decision is reported in 1860 S.D. of N.W.P. at page 705. The Appellant goes on to state that since 1785 Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy and his descendants have been realising the land revenue of the said villages. Various zamindars of these villages defaulted in payment of the revenue. This decision is reported in 1860 S.D. of N.W.P. at page 705. The Appellant goes on to state that since 1785 Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy and his descendants have been realising the land revenue of the said villages. Various zamindars of these villages defaulted in payment of the revenue. Suits for realisation of arrears of land revenue were filed against them and in execution of the decrees the Appellant's ancestors purchased the zamindari rights of the defaulting zamindars. Thus in 1952 when the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act came into force, the Appellant claims to have held two distinct rights; jagirdari rights in respect of all the villages covered by the Sanad in addition to the zamindari rights in respect of some of them by purchase in execution of the decrees. 4. Under the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act (hereinafter called the Act) the Appellant being a trust wholly for religious and charitable purposes, was paid compensation in the form of annuity in respect of Zamindari rights. The State of Uttar Pradesh claims that not only the zamindari but also the jagirdari rights of the Appellant have vested in the State of Uttar Pradesh under Sections 4 and 6 of the Act. According to the Appellant, this claim of the Government is not justified. The Appellant contends that his jagirdari rights are outside the purview of the Act and has not vested in the State. On these allegations the Appellant sought the reliefs set out above. 5. The State of Uttar Pradesh contested the petition. It pleaded that in respect of the villages for which the Appellant is recorded as a proprietor, compensation in the form of annuity to the tune of Rs. 13,400/15/- is being paid every year with effect from 1st July, 1952, the date of vesting; and that in respect of certain other villages the Appellant was not recorded in the records of rights maintained under Clauses (a) to (d) of Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act, 1901 for the year immediately preceding the date of vesting i.e. 1359 Fasli and as such no question of grant of any compensation arose. 6. The learned single fudge of this Court repelled the Appellant's submission that the grant of the land revenue of these villages was a pension. 6. The learned single fudge of this Court repelled the Appellant's submission that the grant of the land revenue of these villages was a pension. He held that the Appellant's jagirdari rights were nothing but zamindari rights with no liability to pay any land revenue to the Government and such a right was no longer in existence after 1st July, 1952. He dismissed the writ petition. 7. Pandit Gopinath Kunzru, appearing for the Appellant, has urged that the jagirdari right was a proprietary right independent of zamindari right which the Appellant acquired by purchase in respect of some of the villages. The two rights were acquired at different times and were entirely distinct in their nature and character. The zamindari rights alone vested in the State Govt. The jagirdari rights, on a true interpretation of the provisions, are not affected by the operation of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act and as such the State Government is not entitled to interfere with the Appellant's enjoyment thereof. We have considered this submission with care but have been unable to find any substance in it. 8. The scheme of the UP Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act is to provide for the acquisition of all estates situate in Uttar Pradesh. Section 4 of the Act provides that as from a date to be specified all estates shall vest in the State free from all encumbrances. Section 6 lays down the consequences of the vesting of estates in the State. Under Clause (a) all rights, title and interest of all intermediaries in every estate cease and vest in the State of Uttar Pradesh, free from all encumbrances. Clause (b) affects all grants and confirmation of title. It says: All grants and confirmations of title of or to land in any estate so acquired, or of or to any right or privilege in respect of such land or its land revenue shall, whether liable to resumption or not, determine. Under this provision all grants of any right or privilege in respect of land revenue in any estate, determine. The Appellant was the grantee of land revenue under the Sanad. Section 3(8) defines an "estate" to be an area included under one entry in any of the registers described in Clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Section 32, of the Land Revenue Act. The Appellant was the grantee of land revenue under the Sanad. Section 3(8) defines an "estate" to be an area included under one entry in any of the registers described in Clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d) of Section 32, of the Land Revenue Act. The land of the villages comprised in the Sanad was an estate within the meaning of Section 3(8) of the Act. The "estate" stood transferred to and vested in the State u/s 4; and the grant of the land revenue in favour of the Appellant stood terminated under Clause (b) of Section 6. This view is supported by a decision of the Supreme Court in Government of the State of Uttar Pradesh Vs. Kunwar Sri Trivikram Narain Singh, AIR 1963 SC 799 . In that case the State had granted a remission of one-fourth revenue of twelve monals fixed at Rs. 17,130/- in favour of Har Narain Singh. The Supreme Court held that the land of the Mohals was an "estate" within meaning of Section 3(8) of the Act. The right of remission of land revenue was a right in respect of the land revenue in the estate which stood vested in the State. The right in respect of the twelve mohals was transferee, to the State by virtue of the notification u/s 4 and the consequences set out in Clause (b) of Section 6 relating to those twelve mohals ensued. In the present ease, the right of the Appellant under the Sanad was similarly a right in respect of land revenue in the estate and it stood terminated u/s 6(b). Clause (j) of Section 6 provides that all engagements for the payment of land revenue by a proprietor etc. shall determine and cease to be in force. When the Petitioner's right in the estate ceased, it could not be converted into a positive right to receive the amount, notwithstanding tae extinction of the liability of payment of the land revenue. 9. Learned Counsel for the Appellant urged that the villages did not constitutue an "estate" qua the Appellant's jagirdari rights. When the Petitioner's right in the estate ceased, it could not be converted into a positive right to receive the amount, notwithstanding tae extinction of the liability of payment of the land revenue. 9. Learned Counsel for the Appellant urged that the villages did not constitutue an "estate" qua the Appellant's jagirdari rights. For this, reliance has been placed on the definition of "estate" in Section 3(8), the relevant part of which runs as follows: "Estate" means and shall be deemed to have always meant the area included under one entry in any of the registers described in Clauses (a), (b), (c) or (d)...of Section 32 of the UP Land Revenue Act as it stood immediately prior to the coming into force of this Act.... Under Section 32 of the Land Revenue Act the aforesaid registers are, inter alia, of the proprietors of mohals. It is, therefore, urged that an "estate" as defined is an area of land with reference to the persons who are recorded as proprietors in those registers, against each entry. The Appellant is not recorded in those registers as proprietor in respect of his jagirdari rights and as such the villages do not constitute an estate in respect of the jagirdari rights. This submission cannot be accepted for several reasons. In the affidavit, the Appellant has not stated how exactly is he entered in the register for the year immediately preceding the date of vesting, which alone is the relevant year under the definition. In paragraph 8 of the affidavit the Appellant states that in the settlement of 1841 Dewan Krishna Kant Nandy was described as jagirdar entitled to the revenue from the aforesaid villages. If this entry continued, it will mean that he was recorded as the owner or the proprietor of the revenue of the villages assigned to him under the Sanad. These villages will then be "estates" even according to the suggested connotation. Moreover, the word "estate" has been defined for the purpose of identification of specific areas of territory. The definition of an "estate" refers to the area included under one entry in the registers and not to the persons who may be recorded against such entries. Such persons are dealt with in Section 6. The defined territory is itself acquired and vests in the State u/s 4. The definition of an "estate" refers to the area included under one entry in the registers and not to the persons who may be recorded against such entries. Such persons are dealt with in Section 6. The defined territory is itself acquired and vests in the State u/s 4. The consequences of this vesting, namely divesting of rights and titles, are given in Section 6. Under Clause (a) the rights, title and interest of all intermediaries in each estate cease and vest in the State. Clause (b) extinguishes all grants and confirmation of title in respect of land or its revenue situate in any estate. Thus, an estate is the area of land as a physical entity and not the intermediaries rights, title or interest in it. 10. Proprietors, under proprietors etc., mentioned in Section 32 Land Revenue Act are all included in the definition of intermediaries. Section 6(b) does not confine itself to intermediaries. The manifest intention is to determine all grants to land or land revenue irrespective of the status or recorded character of the grantee. The sweep of the provision is very wide and its amplitude will not have its natural operation, if the suggested meaning of an "estate" is accepted. 11. Learned Counsel for the Appellant submitted that the grant was in the eye of law pension and as such it did not determine under Clause (b). The grant was never described as 'pension' in any of the documents or records. The grant specifically was of land revenue which the Appellant was entitled to receive from the zamindars. The Appellant was not entitled to receive anything from the Government itself. The Appellant cannot draw any support from the decision of the Supreme Court in Kunwar Sri Trivikram Narain Singh (supra). There the Government had granted a fixed sum of money as an allowance equal to one-fourth of the net revenue of 166 mohals which previously belonged to Har Narain Singh as a Jagir and which had been resumed by the Government. It was held that this allowance was not in respect of the land or its revenue and it was granted as consideration for settlement of a claim relating to land and as such it did not determine u/s 6(b). In the present case the Petitioner had no right to receive any money from the Government. His right specifically was to land revenue. In the present case the Petitioner had no right to receive any money from the Government. His right specifically was to land revenue. Such a right is not a pension as commonly known, or as understood in the Pensions Act. 12. Learned Counsel for the Appellant next argued that if the Appellant's jagirdari rights were held to have vested in the State, then he was entitled to compensation and rehabilitation grant under the Act and the same not having been paid, suitable direction should be issued to the State to pay it. This is entirely a fresh point. There was no such ground nor any such relief' was claimed in the petition. The point was not argued before the learned single Judge. It has not even been taken in the grounds of appeal. Compensation is payable in accordance with the provisions of Chapter III of the Act. According to the affidavit, some compensation has been paid to the Appellant. Draft Assessment Compensation Roll in respect of intermediaries is prepared u/s 40. It is notified in the Gazette and a copy thereof is served on all intermediaries concerned u/s 46, calling upon them to file objections, if any, within a period of two months. The affidavit does not state whether the Appellant filed within the prescribed time, any objection to the Draft Assessment Compensation Roll. It does not state as to what happened to the objections, if any. There is a provision for appeal and second appeal right upto the High Court under Sections 50 and 51 of the Act. u/s 52 the Draft Assessment Compensation Roll is ultimately signed and sealed by the officers concerned and becomes final. Section 54 provides that the amount payable as compensation to an intermediary in respect of his interest in the Mohal shall be eight times of the net assets mentioned in the roll. The Appellant had ample opportunity to agitate the correctness of the roll in appropriate proceedings. Having failed to do so, he is not entitled to raise the question in a writ petition, specially when the affidavit does not contain any explanation for that omission. Similarly rehabilitation grant is payable under Chapter V of the Act. Under that chapter there is a similar provision for objections, appeal and revision. For the same reasons, the Appellant's claim in respect of rehabilitation grant has to be rejected. Similarly rehabilitation grant is payable under Chapter V of the Act. Under that chapter there is a similar provision for objections, appeal and revision. For the same reasons, the Appellant's claim in respect of rehabilitation grant has to be rejected. Under the Act, the Compensation Officer and the Rehabilitation Grant Officer have to assess the net assets for determining the compensation and the Rehabilitation grant. These statutory officers have not been made parties to the writ petition or this appeal. No effective direction as claimed by the Appellant, can hence be issued to the State of Uttar Pradesh, which is the only Respondent and is under the Act not liable to assess the compensation or the rehabilitation grant. 13. In the result, the appeal has no merits and is dismissed with costs.