Judgement G. D. SAHGAL, J. : These three causes raise a common question of law. One of these, namely, Sec. 115 Application No. 86 of 1961 came up before our brother Gyanendra Kumar, but as the point raised was of general importance, he referred that case to a larger Bench. That case accordingly came up before us and along with it two other cases have also been placed. A similar point is involved in them also. 2. The case giving rise to Section 115 Application No. 86 of 1961 was filed in the Court of Small Causes, Lucknow, as Original Suit No. 335 of 1951. It was decreed on 29th April, 1952 by that Court. The decree was put in execution by means of Execution Application No. 4016 of 1955 wherein execution was prayed for by arrest and detention of the judgement-debtor in civil prison. The second attempt for execution was made by moving an application for transfer of the decree under Section 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the 19th November, 1958. An order was passed for the transfer of the decree on 28th November, 1958, but the transfer certificate seems to have been signed on the 9th of December, 1958. The decree was accordingly transferred to the Court of the Munsif, Haveli, where an application was moved for execution on the 27th of February, 1960. Execution was sought by attachment and sale of immovable property. An objection was filed against the execution, under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the 5th of May 1960. The only ground to which objection was confined was that of limitation. The learned Munsif, however, did not deal with that plea but allowed the objection holding that the decree was not executable by sale of immovable property and ordered the record to be consigned. Against that order the decree-holder filed an appeal which came up before the Civil Judge, Lucknow. The Civil Judge, however, held that the decree could be executed by attachment and sale of immovable property and he allowed the appeal directing the learned Munsif to restore the execution application and the miscellaneous case to their original numbers and to deal with them according to law; so the point of limitation still remained to be considered. The Civil Judge, however, held that the decree could be executed by attachment and sale of immovable property and he allowed the appeal directing the learned Munsif to restore the execution application and the miscellaneous case to their original numbers and to deal with them according to law; so the point of limitation still remained to be considered. It is against that order of the learned Civil Judge that the application under Sec. 115 No. 66 of 1961 has been filed and which our brother Gyanendra Kumar has referred to a larger Bench. 3. In the second execution of Second Appeal No. 1 of 1961 also the decree was of the Judge of the Court of Small Causes, Gonda, passed on the 29th October, 1953. The decree was transferred to the Civil Judge and the decree-holder applied for the execution of the decree by attachment and sale of immovable property. The learned Civil Judge held that the execution was not maintainable and he struck off the execution. The decree-holder made an appeal to the District Judge who dismissed the appeal by his order dated the 17th October, 1960. It is against that order that this appeal has been directed. 4. In the second execution of Decree Appeal No. 5 of 1964, the decree of the Judge, Small Causes, was passed on the 27th August, 1953. It was transferred to the Munsiff and the one-fourth share of the judgement-debtor in a house was attached and sold. The decree-holder himself purchased the property and the sale was confirmed on 10th of October 1960. Possession was delivered to the decree-holder through Court on the 21st of September, 1961. On the 27th October, 1961 however, the judgement-debtor made an application for restoration of possession on the ground that the sale was a nullity inasmuch as immovable property could not be attached in execution of the decree of a Small Cause Court. The objection was upheld by the learned Munsif who set aside the sale directing the decree-holder to deliver back possession to the judgement-debtor. The decree-holder went up in appeal which was heard by the Civil Judge who dismissed it. It is against that order of the Civil Judge in appeal that this appeal has been filed. 5. The objection was upheld by the learned Munsif who set aside the sale directing the decree-holder to deliver back possession to the judgement-debtor. The decree-holder went up in appeal which was heard by the Civil Judge who dismissed it. It is against that order of the Civil Judge in appeal that this appeal has been filed. 5. The only question of law involved in these cases is as to whether under Section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by the U.P. Civil Laws (Reform and Amendment) Act, 1954, a decree passed by a Court of Small Causes could be executed by attachment and sale of immovable property by a regular Civil Court on its being transferred to such a Court. 6. Section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as it stood prior to the amendment aforesaid, read as follows :- " The Court executing a decree sent to it shall have the same powers in executing such decree as if it had been passed by itself. All person disobeying or obstructing the execution of the decree shall be punishable by such Court in the same manner as if it had passed the decree. And its order in executing such decree shall be subject to the same rules in respect of appeal as if the decree had been passed by itself." After the amendment the only change that has been brought about in Section 42 is that for the words "as if it had been passed by itself" the words "as the Court which passed it" have been substituted and the last sentence beginning with "and" has been joined with the earlier sentence by placing a comma in between instead of a fullstop. Thus, while in the old section the Court to which a decree was sent for execution exercised the same powers as if the decree had been passed by itself, after the amendment that Court in executing the decree has the same powers as the Court which passed it. Thus, while in the old section the Court to which a decree was sent for execution exercised the same powers as if the decree had been passed by itself, after the amendment that Court in executing the decree has the same powers as the Court which passed it. It cannot be disputed that the Court of the Munsif as well as the Court of the Civil Judge to whom the decrees were transferred could execute a decree by attachment and sale of immovable property and if the old Section 42 were in force then as their powers in executing the decree were the same as if the decree had been passed by them, the decrees could be executed by attachment and sale of immovable property. After the amendment, however, which came into force on the 30th November, 1954, the executing Court could not exercise powers beyond those of the Court which passed the decree, that is, the Court of Small Causes. Under Rule 1(a)(2) of Order 50 of the Code of Civil Procedure, decrees cannot be executed by a Court of Small Causes against immovable property and under Order 21, Rule 82. sale of immovable property in execution of decrees cannot be ordered by a Court of Small Causes. Thus, if the amended Section 42 is applied to the three cases, the decrees could not be executed by sale of immovable properly. This was the view taken by a learned Single Judge of this Court in the case of Karam Chand v. Gurdayal, 1960 All LJ 352 : (AIR I960 All 512), and has been confirmed by a Division Bench in Bhukan Lal v. Ishwar Dayal Singh, 1963 All LJ 220 : (AIR 1063 All 587). It was, however urged on behalf of the decree-holder that in view of the provisions of Section 3 of the U.P. Civil Laws (Reforms and Amendment) Act, 1954, as the decrees in all these cases were passed before the coming into force of the amending Act, the decree-holders had a vested right to get their decrees executed by attachment and sale in immovable property though it could be done only on the transfer of the decrees to a regular Court for the purposes of execution and that vested right could not be taken away by an amendment which could not act retrospectively against the interests of the decree-holders. Reliance was placed for this proposition on the case of Mt. Kamlabai v. Sheo Shankar Dayal. AIR 1958 SC 914 , where it has been held that a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and, unlike the law relating to vested rights, is not only prospective. Thus, if the change in law in this case is a change in law relating to a vested right, then the Act cannot be applied retrospectively. But if it is treated to be a change merely in the law of procedure, then the amended provision would in retrospectively. 7. Attention may in this connection be also drawn to the provisions of Sec. 3(1) of the amending Act which provides as follows :- "3. (1) Any amendment made by this Act shall not affect the validity invalidity, effect or consequence of anything already done or suffered, or any right, title, obligation of liability already acquired, accrued or incurred or any release or discharge of or from any debt, decree, liability, or any Jurisdiction already exercised, and any proceeding instituted or commenced in any Court prior to the commencement of this Act shall, notwithstanding any amendment herein made continues to be heard and decided by such Court." 8. Thus, the amendment is not to affect the validity, invalidity or consequences of any right already acquired. The question will, therefore, arise as to whether, in view of the fact that the Small Cause cases were instituted prior to the coming into force of the amending Act, the decree-holders had acquired any right to proceed in execution by attachment and sale of immovable property though this could he done only on transfer of the decree to a regular Court. In other words, whether the amendment, that the executing Court to which decree has been transferred shall have the same powers as the Court which passed it as against the original provision that the Court to which the decree has been transferred has the same power as if the decree had been passed by it, is an amendment relating to procedure or is it an amendment which affects substantive rights. The amendment only brings about a change in the powers of the Court to which the decree has been transferred for execution. 9. The amendment only brings about a change in the powers of the Court to which the decree has been transferred for execution. 9. The amendment may apparently relate to change in the powers of the executing Court but it does hit the substantive right of the decree-holder inasmuch as it places a bar against him to proceed against the immovable property of the judgement-debtor. How a decree may be executed may be a question purely of procedure but whether a decree-holder can realise his decree by the sale of immovable property cannot be said to be a mere matter of procedure. The right to realise the decree money from the immovable property of the judgement-debtor is a substantive right and cannot be taken away by an amendment which provides the execution cannot be proceeded with by sale of immovable property unless the statute specifically provides so and takes away that right. The amendment, therefore, in so far as it affects the right of the decree-holders who had filed suits prior to the coming into force of the amending Act or obtained decrees prior to that date cannot act adversely against the interests of such decree-holders by affecting their substantive rights. We may examine the matter further by seeing whether the right to proceed in execution by attachment and sale of immovable property is a vested right at All. Section 51 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows :- "Subject to such conditions and limitations as may be prescribed, the Court may, on the application of the decree-holder, order execution of the decree - (a) by delivery of any property specifically decreed; (b) by attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of any property; (c) by arrest and detention in prison; (d) by appointing a Receiver; or (e) in such other manner as the nature of the relief granted may require;" This provision also has been amended by introducing a Clause (bb) after Clause (b) as - " (bb) by transfer other than sale, by attachment or without attachment of any pro-party." But it is not material for the purposes of this case. 10. The heading under which Section 51 falls has been described as 'procedure in execution'. 10. The heading under which Section 51 falls has been described as 'procedure in execution'. It may, in the circumstances, be urged that Clause (b) of Section 51 under which a decree-holder has to proceed by attachment and sale or by sale without attachment of property including immovable property is only a matter of procedure and as that right has been taken away by an amendment, it is a procedural right that has been taken away and not a substantive right. 11. When a person files a money suit against another, he files the suit for the purpose of realising his money; if a decree is passed, it is the liability of the judgement-debtor to pay his creditor. The liability to recover the decree attaches both to his person and property. It is thus the substantive right of the decree-holder to realise his decree from the judgement-debtor from his property including immovable property. How has one to proceed against that immovable property is only a mode or procedure of proceeding against that property. One of the modes of proceeding against immovable property for the recovery of one's decree money is by attachment and sale of property. Another mode may be by sale without attachment of property and the third mode may yet be by transfer other than sale by attachment or without attachment of the property. Thus, while the right to recover one's dues on the basis of a decree from the property of the judgement-debtor may be a substantive right, the matter how one has to proceed in order to realise his dues from the property may be a procedural matter. It is in this light that the circumstance of Section 51 falling under the heading "Procedure in Execution" has to be construed. The fact that Section 51 falls under that heading does not lead to the conclusion that the recovery of one's decree money from the judgement-debtor from his immovable property is a matter of procedure only. 12. When the suits giving rise to these connected cases were filed, the plaintiffs know that the decrees they might be able to obtain would be realisable from the immovable properties of their judgement-debtors. 12. When the suits giving rise to these connected cases were filed, the plaintiffs know that the decrees they might be able to obtain would be realisable from the immovable properties of their judgement-debtors. They might not have cared to file those suits if they had known that they would not be able to realise the decrees from immovable properties but would have to confine themselves only to the person of their judgement-debtors and to their movable properties. It is not a mere matter of procedure as to how a decree could be recovered that has been amended by bringing in the change in Section 42, Civil P.C., referred to above, but the substantive right of the decree-holders has been taken away by restricting the powers of the transferee Court to the Court which passed the decree. It being not a mere change of procedure, the amendment could only be prospective and not retrospective. It cannot be made applicable to the decrees that had already been passed or to the decrees passed in cases that had already been instituted before the Amending Act came into force. 13. The right to recover the decree money from the immovable property being not a mere matter of procedure but a substantive right, it can be taken away by subsequent enactment only if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise, for this is a right similar to a right of appeal and what has been said of a right of appeal applied to such a right also. In case of a right of appeal it has been held that it is not a mere matter of procedure but a substantive right and this vested right of appeal can be taken away only by a subsequent enactment if it so provides expressly or by necessary intendment and not otherwise, vide Garikamati Veeraya v. Subbiah Choudhary, AIR 1957 SC 540 . 14. A reference to the case of 1960 All LJ 352 : ( AIR 1960 All 512 ) (supra), would show that the decree in that case was passed in Original Suit No. 557 of 1955, that is the decree related to a case instituted after the coming into force of the amending Act. The amended Section 42, therefore, did apply to that case. 15. The amended Section 42, therefore, did apply to that case. 15. As to the other case, 1903 All LJ 220 : ( AIR 1963 All 587 ), the report itself does not show as to whether the proceedings arose out of a case instituted prior to the amended Act or after it, nor does that point seem to have been raised before the Bench. I have, however, examined the record of the case and have found that the proceedings related to a case in which a decree was passed by the Court of Small Causes in the year 1950 and according to the view that I have taken above, the amended Section 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not applicable to that case. That point, however, was not urged before the learned Judges who heard that cast and, therefore, it cannot be said to have been decided therein that the amendment was retrospective. The only point considered therein was as to what the powers of the transferee Court are after the amendment of Sec. 42 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The Bench was not considering whether the amendment could not retrospectively operate even to cases which had been instituted earlier than the coming into force of the amending Act. I am, therefore, in respectful agreement with the interpretation of Section 42 as amended, in 1960 All LJ 352 : ( AIR 1960 All 512 ) (supra) and 1963 All LJ 220 : ( AIR 1963 All 587 ) (supra), but of opinion that amendment is only prospective in so far as it affects the rights of the decree-holders to proceed in execution by attachment and sale of immovable property. 16. The interpretation that has been put on Section 42 as amended in Karam Chand and Bhukan Lal's cases does not, to my mind appear to be any narrow interpretation as the trend of the judgement of my learned brother seems to suggest out it is a plain interpretation and to my mind no other interpretation is possible. I also do not with respect agree with the observations of my learned brother to the effect that the object of the amendment of Section 42 was not to narrow down or restrict the powers of the transferee Court but to enlarge its powers. I also do not with respect agree with the observations of my learned brother to the effect that the object of the amendment of Section 42 was not to narrow down or restrict the powers of the transferee Court but to enlarge its powers. To me the words used in the statute can be interpreted in one and only one way in which this Court has interpreted them in the two cases which have been referred to above. 17. Altogether, in view of what I have said above, I agree with the ultimate orders proposed to be passed by my learned brother and the three cases should be decided as he has stated. Order accordingly.