This special appeal filed by Narain defendant appellant is directed against the order passed by a learned Member of the Board sitting singly exercising revisional jurisdiction and against his order dated 27.7.1964. Briefly the facts of the case are that Makhan and Laxminarain plaintiff respondents filed a suit for permanent injunction against Narain restraining him from interfering with the present possession of their suit land and obtained temporary injunction on 13.1.1962. Not satisfied with the grant of temporary injunction, the plaintiff respondents further made an application that as the suit land is likely to be interfered with by the defendant appellants, a receiver should be appointment was confirmed by the first appellate Court as well as by the Revisional Court in the Board of Revenue. It is against this order passed in revision by the learned Member sitting singly that this special appeal has been preferred. The counsel for the appellants only contention was that the learned single member in passing the impugned order ignored the important principle of law of granting temporary injunction, appointment of a receiver in suit by failing to examine the prima facie title of the plaintiff respondents. It is clear on record that Gyarsa and Raghunath are the recorded khatedar of the suit land. The plaintiffs have claimed their title to the land as mortgagee. This fact of mortgage has neither been touched by the subordinate Court nor by the Member sitting singly at the time of confirming the order of appointment of a receiver. This order was, therefore, clearly wrong and in violation of the cardinal principle taken into consideration before temporary injunction could be granted or a receiver could be appointed in a suit. The counsel for the respondents reply was that no doubt the suit filed by the plaintiff respondents was for permanent injunction was based on the title as mortgagee in possession of the suit land This was evidenced by the document dated 22.7.1966. The fact of possession has been proved by other evidence such as parcha abpashi etc. This was a sufficient title to enable them to obtain the temporary injunction which they did and also further to seek the relief of appointment of a receiver as the defendant appellants belonging to the majority community were trying to interfere with the lawful possession. The fact of possession has been proved by other evidence such as parcha abpashi etc. This was a sufficient title to enable them to obtain the temporary injunction which they did and also further to seek the relief of appointment of a receiver as the defendant appellants belonging to the majority community were trying to interfere with the lawful possession. He further replied by saying that no ground of special importance was made out by the counsel for the appellant in the special appeal which was against the order passed by the learned single member sitting singly exercising revisional jurisdiction. We have considered the arguments advanced from both sides and perused the record. O. 39 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides for grant of temporary injunction and other interlocutory order. Similarly O. 40 C.P.C. lays down the rules for appointment of a receiver. Thus there are separate rules for both these purposes in the Code of Civil Procedure which applies to the Rajasthan Tenancy Act. Sec. 212 of the Rajasthan Tenancy Act provides for the appointment of a receiver as well as for grant of temporary injunction. Sec. 212 is a combination of O. 39 and O. 40 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provisions in the Tenancy Act as well as in C.P.C. are thus invoked The Courts are vested with wide discretion to grant relief to the parties by way of temporary injunction as well as by appointment of receivers when it is just and convenient and if necessary these discretionary powers have to be exercised therefore in a judicial manner. Chitaley in his commentaries on the Code of Civil Procedure at p. 3992 in 1963 Ed. lays down, three broad principles which govern the exercise of discretion conferred by the rules. The first rule is that there must be a serious question to be tried in the suit and on the facts before the Court, there is a probability of being entitled to the relief asked for by him. This condition is generally termed as a prima facie case which means a prima facie existence of a right and its infringement is the first condition for the grant of a temporary injunction. This condition is generally termed as a prima facie case which means a prima facie existence of a right and its infringement is the first condition for the grant of a temporary injunction. It was therefore argued by the counsel for the appellant that the learned Member sitting singly as well as both the subordinate Courts failed to consider the question whether there was a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff respondents to be decided in the suit before any temporary injunction could be granted or a receiver could be appointed. The reply given by the counsel for the respondent was that this was a matter relating to the question of fact and not of law and could only be decided after considering the case on merits. Neither the subordinate Courts nor the learned Member sitting singly acted without jurisdiction or failed to exercise any jurisdiction in this matter and that order could not be challenged in the special appeal. In our opinion the scope of revision as well as a special appeal are different. The question that was agitated before the two subordinate Courts as well as before the Member sitting singly whether in the circumstances of the case before them temporary injunction should be granted or not or a receiver should be appointed. The law requires that before these discretionary reliefs could be given to the parties certain principles have to be applied these rules have been ignored. The rule relating to the prima facie case cannot be lightly ignored by any subordinate Court. If this rule is not rigidly followed and temporary injunctions are granted and receivers are appointed in utter disregard of this rule it will lead to multivious and prolonged litigation. Therefore all the Civil Courts are unanimous in the opinion that before granting these discretionary reliefs the Court must first determine whether there is a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff who seeks this relief. The plaintiff respondent no doubt filed this suit for permanent injunction on the basis of his title as mortgagee in possession. This mortgage it seems was created in his favour by a mortgage deed executed in 1946. It was in order to protect his possession as a mortgagee that the plaintiff respondent sought the appointment of a receiver before the permanent injunction could be given. This mortgage it seems was created in his favour by a mortgage deed executed in 1946. It was in order to protect his possession as a mortgagee that the plaintiff respondent sought the appointment of a receiver before the permanent injunction could be given. Therefore it was necessary for all the Courts to consider whether there was satisfactory prima facie evidence of mortgage in favour of the plaintiff respondents or not and whether they were litigating under that title. Was the document on which reliance was placed for proof of mortgage admissible in evidence ? Was there any other record from which the plaintiff respondents possession as a mortgagee which require to be protected could be proved ? This inquiry in our opinion has been completely ignored both by the subordinate Courts as well as by the learned Member sitting singly. This important principle on the prima facie case of title has not been considered by all these courts and the orders were passed in utter disregard of that principle. Thus the subordinate Courts including the learned Member sitting singly acted in the exercise of the jurisdiction illegally as well as with material irregularity. It was necessary for them to determine whether the prima facie case existed in favour of the plaintiff before these discretionary remedies of temporary injunction and appointment of a receiver could be granted. We therefore, for the reasons stated above, accept this special appeal, set aside the order of the learned single Member as well as the two subordinate Courts for appointment of a receiver as well as for temporary injunction and send this case back to the trial court that before it considers the question of granting temporary injunction or appointment of a receiver it must first see whether there is a prima facie case in favour of the plaintiff appellant which is required to be seriously agitated before that Court and then after hearing both the parties pass fresh orders.